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 Abstract 
 
Hungary’s political transformation of 1989 has been generally regarded as a peaceful 
revolution negotiated between the ruling Communists and the opposition. During the 
National Roundtable Negotiations, the fundamental framework of governance - including 
the amendment of the Constitution - was decided by members of Hungary’s political elite. 
Hungary’s mode of transition to democracy was an elite-led transformation and this was 
distinct from Czechoslovakia and Poland where the interests of society had been 
represented – to a large degree – by the likes of Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa. In view of 
this, some critics argued that compared to Poland and Czechoslovakia, Hungary had no 
equivalent high-profile figure who could break with the Communist past and claim the 
ideas of a new democracy.  
 
Hungary, however, had its own figure with democratic credentials. Árpád Göncz, who 
came to prominence during the inter-war period had been at one time or another, a student 
resistance leader during Nazi occupation in Hungary, a steelworker, an agriculturalist, a 
literary translator and, he subsequently became the first post-Communist President of 
Hungary. He experienced the major events of Hungarian history first hand, including the 
1956 Hungarian Revolution. During this pivotal time, Göncz undertook a significant role 
in the resistance that followed the suppresion of the Revolution; he was sentenced to life 
imprisonment as a result. His democratic activities were widely acknowledged by political 
elites and the general public alike. This, in turn, contributed to his election to the 
Presidency.  
 
Significantly however, much of the existing literature on Hungary’s post-Soviet political 
development has not attached a high degree of importance to Göncz’s role in Hungarian 
history or his political achievements. At present, there are no biographies of Göncz either 
in English or Hungarian. Thus this thesis, as the first English language scholarly biography, 
addresses a gap in the literature through the narration of the story of Göncz’s life; an 
expansive account of Göncz’s life is situated within a framework of the wider historical, 
political and social concerns of his generation. Specifically, the following questions are 
addressed: how were Göncz’s political beliefs developed and how did these beliefs later 
inform his term as the first post-Communist President of Hungary? Narrative analysis and 
elite interviewing are employed as the main research methods in order to explore the 
development of Göncz’s political beliefs and their significance for the understanding of 
Hungarian politics.  
 
It is argued that as a whole, Göncz made important contributions to the development of 
Hungarian democracy. Though not born into a political family and constrained by external 
forces beyond his control, Göncz attempted to address some of the key social and political 
problems of the age. It is also argued that the decade of Göncz’s Presidency was crucial for 
the shaping of the basic institutional tenets of governance in post-Soviet Hungary. Despite 
his lack of experience of governance, Göncz created a template for the role of President 
and significantly affected the demarcation of powers between president and government in 
the ever-evolving context of the process of political transformation. While his 
interpretation of the presidential powers and responsibility was not, and could not be 
regarded as positive in all respects, Göncz’s Presidency was imbued by his liberal and 
democratic values.  
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Introduction 
Reminiscing about the political transition of 1989, Péter Tölgyessy - the former President 
of the Alliance of Free Democrats – stated that: 
Unlike Poland and the Czech Republic, there were no heroes representing the 
idea of political transformation to democracy in Hungary (interview with 
Tölgyessy, 15 October 2007). 
 
Perhaps, this observation is true as Hungary’s political transformation of 1989 was 
generally regarded as a peaceful 'negotiated revolution or transition' between the ruling 
Communists and the opposition (Bozóki, 2002; Bruszt, 1990; Bruszt and Stark, 1991; Linz 
and Stepan, 1996; Sajó, 1996; Tőkés, 1996) and, there were no high-profile figures, such 
as Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa in Czechoslovakia and Poland, representing the interests 
of society. This is not to imply that the transformation in Hungary was any less dramatic 
and far-reaching than in the Czech Republic or Poland. Hungary’s role has far greater 
significance than is suggested by purely internal events. After all, it was the decision of 
Hungary’s government to open its border with Austria and let East German asylum seekers 
flee to West Germany (Kontler, 2002: 467; Lewis, 1994: 246; Romsics, 2007: 242-43) 
which, in turn, catalysed 'the fall of the Berlin Wall' (Swain, 1993: 66) and the collapse of 
'the dominoes in the socialist camp' (Okey, 2004: 85). Gyula Horn – the foreign Minister 
of Hungary at the time – recalled the consequence of the decision thus: 'It was quite 
obvious to me that this would be the first step in a landslide like series of events' (Isaacs 
and Downing, 1998: 382) across the whole of the Soviet Bloc.  
 
Moreover, these historical changes could not be achieved without those who dedicated 
their lives to the pursuit of democracy and upheld its values. One of those contemporaries, 
a 'non-hero' according to Tölgyessy, who experienced the major events of Hungarian 
history, including having been sentenced to life imprisonment due to his participation in 
the 1956 Revolution was Árpád Göncz; he subsequently became the first post-Communist 
President of the Republic of Hungary. Speaking at a ceremony welcoming Göncz to the 
United States, the former President of the United States, Bill Clinton, introduced him as a 
safeguard of democracy in Hungary: 
In the past year, I have had the privilege to welcome to the White House 
extraordinary leaders who risked their lives in the struggle for liberty, were 
imprisoned for their beliefs and activism, and now emerged in freedom’s 
sunlight as the Presidents of their nations: Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea, 
Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic, Nelson Mandela of South Africa. Today, 
with freedom at last shining brightly in Hungary, I have the great honour and 
pleasure to welcome President Árpád Göncz […].1   
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As a survivor of this period (he was born in 1922, lived through the inter-war period, three 
years of a brief democratic interlude, Communist era and finally transition and post-
transition periods), Göncz had a unique social background and experiences including 
participation in student resistance movements against the Nazis, as a junior politician in the 
Independent Smallholders’ Party, as an agronomist, steelworker, and political prisoner in 
Communist prison, a literary translator, and a dissident (Okolicsanyi, 1990: 21; Feitl and 
Kende, 2007: 204; Esti Hírlap, 20 June 1995; The New York Times, 3 May 1990). Though 
not born into a political family, Göncz, who witnessed the key events of the twentieth 
century, subsequently became involved in some of the key social and political movements 
of the age, proposing particular solutions to the political problems of those eras.   
 
In a speech on the role of politics and literature, Göncz recounted an important moment in 
his life and its impact on his political development: 
I started my political and literary career at the age of twenty three [1945]. What 
happened before that – a few poems, literary dreams, armed resistance to the 
Nazis – were rather emotional affairs and not the planned self-testing of a 
young man or the prudent acts of a politician. The war started when I finished 
my secondary education and I was at university when Hungary entered as a 
belligerent. In those years Hungary was drowning in a deluge of injustice, 
social inequality, racial and ethnic discrimination... The end of the war 
promised the ardently awaited return of national independence... [and] the 
coming of democracy... But it soon became clear that liberation meant Soviet 
occupation and the Cold War brought the formal Communist take-over in its 
wake... [Then] 1956 swept me back into politics with a much deeper 
understanding of social and political matters [...] [Tóth, 1999: 228-29, my 
emphasis]. 
 
Recalling these events and issues, Göncz recorded his experiences and views through his 
unpublished personal Oral History and in his essays, monologues and speeches. These 
documents contain a rich vein of detailed information with regard to Göncz’s 
understanding of Hungary’s social and political developments and offer a unique insight 
into the events and issues of the age. One of Göncz’s essays entitled "1956", for example, 
unveils a previously recondite story of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution which includes 
details of the Indian leadership’s mediation in the conflict between Hungarian democratic 
forces and the Soviet leadership (Göncz, 1991: 269-83). Despite such content, documents 
directly or indirectly related to Göncz have been largely untapped and have remained 
under-researched. At present, there are no autobiographies or biographies of Göncz either 
in English or Hungarian although an attempt to write a biography was made. The 
Hungarian political commentator, László Lengyel, noted that: 'Timothy Garton Ash once 
 3 
thought about writing a biography of Göncz but he did not do so in the end' (interview with 
Lengyel, 13 September 2007).   
 
Göncz’s Oral History, two sizeable volume of unpublished writing that forms a record of a 
series of interviews conducted between 1985 and 1986 and augmented in 1990, was and 
remains the first port of call for biographical research on Göncz. These books contain 
ground-breaking information regarding Göncz’s life and his personal testimony and views 
on the key events and issues of the age. Inspite of their potential importance, these 
documents have been under-researched partially due to their limited accessibility,2 but also 
because of sheer volume (around 430 pages in Hungarian) discouraging a wider readership 
at home and abroad. Recently, an abridged version of these books has been available 
through the official website of the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution.3 However, neither the original nor the newly edited and condensed version 
deals with the period of Göncz’s Presidency and his presidential role as a whole.  
 
"Conversation with the President" (A beszélgetések az elnökkel), a compilation of Göncz’s 
interviews aired on Kossuth Radio between 1991 and 1993, does constitute an important 
contribution to the biographical data available to the general public. It presents Göncz’s 
recollection of some historical events and his views and opinions regarding important 
issues and events that took place - primarily - during the early part of the 1990s. In 2007, 
this book was reissued with the inclusion of additional interviews with Göncz and his wife 
under the title of "Looking back" (Visszanézve). However, these publications are far from 
biographical in their contents and structure to enable researchers to trace Göncz’s 
intellectual and political development as they evolved through his life. As Pimlott notes, 
the most fascinating aspect of biography is that 'it links together human events in the way 
human beings actually experienced them' (Pimlott, 1999: 34) and draws insights into the 
lives and thoughts of the individuals in question. The existing documentation, however, is 
not structured in a way that enables researchers to see and reconstruct Göncz’s life within 
the context in which he lived and experienced contemporary events. Pimlott further 
explains the inherent nature of biographical research and what biographers should bear in 
mind when conducting research: 
Writing a biography is like entering a deep cavern. The cavern is a human life, 
the walls of the cavern are the evidence. From the lie of the land, you can tell 
that the cavern is likely to be an interesting one. But until you light your lamp 
and crawl around, you don’t know what you will find. You will never get the 
whole picture; there will always be crevices out of reach. But the project is 
finite and when your exploration is finished you will have not only a unique 
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appreciation of the particular cave, but a better feeling for geology in general 
(Pimlott, 1999: 34). 
 
In view of this, the research - as the first English language scholarly biography on Göncz - 
addresses a gap in the literature through the narration of the story of Göncz’s life; an 
expansive account of Göncz’s life, within the wider history, politics and social concerns of 
his generation is attempted. Biography, by definition, is 'person-centred' (Chamberlayne, 
Bornat and Wengraf, 2000: 22) and foregrounds individuals’ personal accounts and their 
views; this is indicative of the fact that the focus of analysis is upon particular individuals 
and, it is then told against a backdrop of broader social, economic and political 
developments. Yet this does not necessarily mean that biographers do not consider the 
social and political context in their research. On the contrary, Roger Gough – the 
prominent English biographer of János Kádár – notes, 'biography can illuminate not only 
an individual life but also the forces and events that shaped it' (Gough, 2006: 12). This 
biography does consider the social and political contexts in which individuals lived. 
Bearing this in mind, this research reconstructs the key events and issues taking place in 
twentieth century Hungarian history, refocusing them through Göncz’s experience.  
 
Designing research: the main framework of research, its questions and methods 
Within the framework of this type of biographical enquiry, the thesis seeks to answer the 
following research questions. Firstly, from where did Göncz’s political ideals originate and 
what form did they take? Secondly, in which ways did Göncz seek to translate his political 
ideals into practice? Lastly, with regard to Hungary’s transformation to democracy, what 
did Göncz seek to achieve and what did he actually accomplish as the first post-
Communist President of the Republic of Hungary? These questions have been identified 
during my field work in Budapest where I conducted archival research and undertook a 
series of interviews with Göncz and those who directly or indirectly became involved in 
the political decision making process. Despite the fact that, prior to the field work, I had a 
general picture of important phases of Göncz’s life and related questions, it was only 
during the field work that I was able to set the boundaries of research. For example, the 
documents I accessed before the field work indicate that Göncz’s visit to the United States 
in 1982 might have carried certain political importance.4 During the field work, however, 
it became evident that, other than some fragmentary information on Göncz’s observations 
and general impressions of the social atmosphere of the United States and his pursuit of a 
literary career, there was not sufficient information demonstrating the importance of his 
activism during this period (between the 1970s and the first half of 1980s). In my interview 
with Göncz, he explicitly stated that his visit to the US did not carry political significance:  
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Kim: As far as I know, you travelled to the US in 1982. What was the main 
aim of this visit? 
Göncz: This visit did not have a political meaning… At the invitation of my 
old friends, we [Göncz and his wife] travelled to America. This visit, however, 
did not have any political aims or significance. We had known many friends 
who were previously active in the Smallholders’ Party and they invited us. This 
visit was entirely a personal matter (Interview with Göncz, 18 June 2006). 
  
In a subsequent interview with me, Göncz’s wife, Zsuzsánna Göntér, reaffirmed the fact 
that Göncz’s visit to the United States was for the purpose of nothing more than seeking a 
reunion with his old friends: 
Göntér: A letter of invitation came from Göncz’s friends. Tibor Hám, István 
Csicsery-Rónay and those who emigrated to the US between 1947 and 1948 [in 
the wake of the dissolution] of the Smallholders’ Party invited us... Hám 
waited for us at Washington Airport and from that point, we had a wonderful 
time there for two months. Hám took us to [various events] organised by 
American-Hungarian associations... and this was the first big gathering we had 
had together since [after 1948] [...] (Joint interview with Göncz and Göntér, 10 
January 2008).   
  
In this way, by recording Göncz’s answers to each detailed question discovered during my 
field work and cross-checking the information with published sources as well as with those 
who had known him, I was able to frame the research themes for the thesis presented here. 
It transpired that the research could be broadly classified into two main analytical themes: 
the development of Göncz’s political beliefs during his early years and the ten years of his 
Presidency. Moreover, it became clear to me that Göncz’s Presidency is definitively the 
main focus of the research. This is not simply because his Presidency is the major gap in 
the literature to be addressed, but also it was through his Presidency that Göncz ultimately 
embodied his political beliefs. A set of important events and issues with which Göncz dealt 
during the term of his Presidency are thus selected, arranged and critically assessed against 
his desire to pursue his political beliefs. In so doing, this enables us to analyse Göncz’s 
actions in the presidential role in the context of the time at which they were undertaken and 
assess them within a coherent framework. Having set the central themes and main 
questions of the research, it is necessary to discuss the key framework and its methods.  
 
Underpinned by established, biographical research as earlier mentioned in relation to   
Chamberlayne et al 2000 and Gough 2006, this thesis examines Göncz’s life 
chronologically, as his political development cannot be understood fully in isolation from 
the time and the context in which he lived. Roberts notes that:   
Lives have to be understood… as lived within time and time is experienced 
according to narrative. Narratives – of past, present [and] future – are the 
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means by which biographical experience is given an understandable shape 
(Roberts, 2002: 123). 
 
Thus, a chronological framework leads us to reconstruct Göncz’s life as it related to social 
and historical processes through which he lived. The intention of the research, however, is 
not to narrate every detail as determined by slavish adherence to a time line. This is a 
political biography of Göncz with particular concentration on his presidential role and 
activity and its implications for the understanding of post-Communist politics in Hungary. 
Given the focus of the research, details of Göncz’s non-political activities and any other 
background information will only be presented where appropriate as additional to his 
intellectual and political developments. For this reason, his literary work, primarily based 
upon the translation of American and English literature, is not dealt with in detail in this 
thesis.5 
 
Text-based data 
During my preliminary research (July-August 2006) and the subsequent field work 
conducted in Budapest (2 May 2007-10 February 2008), a considerable amount of 
documentation relating to the research topic was gathered. Video and audio media, leaflets, 
manuscripts, magazines, archives and, above all, newspaper articles relating to Göncz and 
other useful background materials were systematically collected, analysed and utilised for 
the thesis. The four major Hungarian dailies – Magyar Hírlap, Magyar Nemzet, 
Népszabadság and Népszava – were the major sources of information, but other relevant 
Hungarian periodicals (as listed in the bibliography) were also scrutinised. Given the 
different political orientations of each newspaper, I endeavoured to collect newspaper 
articles while, at the same time, taking the political leanings of the papers into account. 
Over the course of my archival research, however, it soon became apparent that a 
comprehensive treatment of the newspapers would not be viable. This was partially 
because of the internal procedures which are routinely carried out when requesting 
newspapers in archives and libraries but, primarily, because of the sheer amount of 
material in circulation. 6  It transpired that there was an enormous number of articles 
published in periodicals pertaining to the subject of my research.7 In order to deal with 
these articles effectively, material which, fitted into the set of themes upon which this 
research was based, was selected and collected during the field work period. Overall, the 
press data provided me with valuable background information which formed the basis for 
identification of the main issues and events on the Hungarian political scene and therefore 
laid the basis for the formulation of research questions for the subsequent interviews.  
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In addition to the press data, archives that directly and indirectly related to Göncz were 
located in the major archival centres of Budapest: the Hungarian National Archive, the 
Open Society Archives and the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. 
The Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security were, however, inaccessible for 
my research,8  and some of documentation concerned with Göncz’s imprisonment and 
dissident activities of the 1980s could not be obtained. Similarly, the Library of the 
Presidential Office which holds an array of original documents composed by Göncz and 
his successors was not - and is still not - accessible to researchers for ethical and security 
reasons. 9 Consequently, Göncz’s personal documents which include letters, notes, 
memoranda, speeches and any other writings, could not be obtained. Despite these 
restrictions, the Oral History of Göncz held in the 1956 Institute provided essential 
information regarding Göncz’s life and his political development; this source was 
examined in-depth and employed as the primary source for my research. Additionally, 
speeches written by Göncz were compiled in the book entitled Göncz Árpád: Sodrásban 
and later published in an English edition under the title of Árpád Göncz in Mid-stream. In 
order to examine Göncz’s thoughts as they were expressed in the speeches that he 
delivered, these publications were used as additional important sources.  
 
Narrative analysis 
The main analytical tool for interpreting textual data utilised in this thesis was narrative 
analysis. This research approach is 'concerned with the search for and analysis of the 
stories' that subjects tell in order to try to understand their life and 'the world around them' 
(Bryman, 2004: 412), and, it has been employed for the reasons that follow. First, narrative 
analysis is advantageous for looking at an individual’s life experience as a whole unified 
and it allows the researcher to set their analysis within the context that their subject lived 
and experienced their life; it is for this reason that the method was considered appropriate 
for the purposes of interpreting Göncz’s views and experiences and reconstructing the 
inner world that he envisaged. Josselson and Lieblich note that: 
Narrative approaches to understanding bring [the] researcher more closely into 
the investigative process than do quantitative and statistical methods. Through 
narratives, we come in contact with our participants as people engaged in the 
process of interpreting themselves. We work then with what is said and what is 
not said, within the context in which life is lived and the context of the 
interview in which words are spoken to represent that life […] (Josselson and 
Lieblich, 1995: ix).    
 
Second, narrative analysis is beneficial for eliciting insights regarding a subject’s life 
experiences and the meaning that they give to these experiences. Mitchell captures the 
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fundamental utility of the narrative approach for the social and natural sciences concisely: 
'the study of narrative is no longer the province of literary specialists or folklorists 
borrowing their terms from psychology and linguistics but has now become a positive 
source of insight for all the branches of human and natural science' […] (Mitchell, 1981: 9-
10). As Caine notes, 'the most important contribution of biography to history is the insight 
that it offers into the lives and thought of significant individuals' (Caine, 2010: 1); thus, 
narrative analysis which highlights the importance of incisiveness is apposite to this type 
of biographical research.  
 
However, this is not to suggest that narrative analysis is not without disadvantages. As 
Roberts points out, narrative analysis has weaknesses in terms of 'quantification, 
generalisability, hypothesis-testing and validity and objectivity' (Roberts, 2002: 117). Thus 
if the focus of study is concerned to any great extent with the replicability of finding, 
narrative analysis may not be an appropriate research method. Despite these limitations, as 
Hatch and Wisniewski note, in addition to the positivist scientific research methods which 
stress the importance of standardisability and replicability of data, one of the alternative 
ways to find the truth is to 'go beyond the standardised notion of reliability, validity and 
generalisability' that is established in the tradition of quantitative research (Wisniewski and 
Hatch, 1995: 128). Therefore, the use of narrative analysis in this biographical study is 
justifiable.    
 
Elite interviewing 
In addition to narrative analysis for scrutiny of text-based data, in-depth interviews with 
the elite who were directly or indirectly involved in politics and knew Göncz personally 
were conducted. The semi-structured interview is employed in this research, because it is 
not only advantageous for interviewers to 'exercise some form of control' during the 
interview (Robert, 1998: 4), but also gives interviewees leeway to respond to questions and 
prioritise themes and raise issues important to them (Bryman, 2004: 321; Peabody et al, 
1990: 452). The selection of interviewees was made largely based upon three elite groups 
in society – politicians, academics and journalists – who had first hand experience and 
expertise in history, law, politics, economics and who were familiar with Göncz. This 
sampling was purposeful rather than representative, as it cannot be said that my select 
interviewees represented the majority opinion, perceptions, beliefs or the values and 
knowledge of the institutions to which they belonged. Despite this limitation, such 
interviewing has strengths and advantages which are central to this research. The elite 
interview is suitable for eliciting insights into events and issues that were little known to 
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the general public and for the enrichment of the quality of information that could be 
obtained in any other form of published resource (Lilleker, 2003: 208; Peabody, et al, 
1990: 454; Richards, 1996: 200; Robert, 1998: 5). As stated above, certain sections of 
archival resources on Göncz were subject to access restrictions, thus interviewing elites 
was considered and employed as an alternative method for gaining access to relevant 
information and opinions where necessary.  
 
It is necessary to mention a number of disadvantages and limitations that are associated 
with interviewing elites and possible ways to address the issues concerned. First, there is 
the question of power relations between the researcher and the interviewee. As Richards 
points out, 'by the very nature of elite interviews, it is the interviewee who has the power' 
and controls 'the information the interviewer is trying to eke out' (Richards, 1996: 201). 
Insufficiently well prepared researchers would find it difficult to engage in discussion and 
to establish a good rapport with interviewees. Second, there is the issue of reliability in 
elite interviewing. Interviews are subjective in nature and in terms of interviewees’ 
position, they are under no obligation 'to be objective and to tell [interviewers] the truth' at 
all time (Berry, 2002: 680). In fact, in the extreme instance, interviewing is counter-
productive to research as interviewees 'may deliberately set out to mislead or falsify an 
issue or event' in question (Richards, 1996: 201).   
 
With these caveats and guidelines in mind, I tried to address the issues of elite interviewing 
in following way. In an attempt to reduce the power differential between myself and the 
selected elites, prior to conducting an interview, I undertook thorough background research 
on my interviewee and their area of speciality. The main interview questions were 
formulated in accordance with the discoveries of this prior research and, these were put 
during the interview with particular attention paid to the way in which questions related to 
Göncz. For example, legal experts were asked more specific questions regarding the 
constitutional and legal issues that arose during Göncz’s Presidency. As Dexter notes, 
building up a decent level of background knowledge should precede elite interviews in 
order for it to be successful (Dexter, 1970: 20). Similarly, to address the question of 
reliability, information provided by my respondents was crossed-checked with published 
resources. In the circumstances that relevant information was not available in the form of 
documentation, the same questions were raised with other interviewees in an attempt to 
further verify the given data. In this way, to some extent, I was able to address some of the 
issues that arise in elite interviewing and, in total, 52 interviews were completed over the 
course of my field work. On average, the interviews lasted between thirty minutes and one 
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hour. All respondents who agreed to be interviewed were extremely helpful in providing 
me with valuable opinions, counter-opinions, judgements on and insights into the issues 
and events in Hungarian politics in which Göncz became involved. While they differed 
very considerably in their views and in their attitudes toward Göncz, there was also a 
certain convergence in their opinions. I found interviewing to be a useful and effective 
research method for data generation. 
 
Ethical considerations 
Ethics, the primary concern of which is to protect individual rights from any sort of 
transgressions caused by research (Bryman, 2004: 509), are a key issue to be addressed 
before, during and after the conduct of field work. Given that my research project involved 
interviewee participants, before conducing my field work, I applied for ethical approval 
from the Departmental Ethical Committee. Approval was granted with the guideline of 
ethical principles, which I read carefully.10 The most important aspect of these guidelines 
in relation to my project concerned the requirement to gain informed consent from my 
potential interviewees and, to provide them with essential information regarding my 
project and their entitlements and rights regarding their involvement in or, non-
participation in the research. With this in mind, I made contact with my interviewees on an 
individual basis (primarily through e-mail) and informed them of the basis for my research 
project and their rights therein. Some respondents refused to be interviewed (the majority 
of these were the current representatives of the Alliance of Young Democrats and Civic 
Party) and, in certain cases, the interviewees who initially agreed to be interviewed 
changed their minds before the interview. Overall, however, the vast majority of my 
respondents were willing to give interviews and, in fact, some of them undertook the role 
of gatekeeper and helped me to secure subsequent interviews (for example, Göncz himself). 
On the condition that interview materials would be used exclusively for my research 
project, no interviewee objected to their words being quoted and none requested anonymity.  
 
The overview of the thesis 
This thesis is composed of six chapters and broadly divided into two parts. The first part of 
the thesis is composed of three background chapters that examine the processes through 
which Göncz’s political beliefs were developed. His first hand experiences in the Second 
World War, the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the political transition of 1989 are 
selected as the focus of analysis, as they were the key events in which Göncz not only 
became involved, but they were also those which contributed to his intellectual and 
political development. Having examined these factors which contributed to shaping his 
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political beliefs, the second part of the thesis is devoted to exploring the main 
characteristics of Göncz’s Presidency by examining his role, actions and decisions that he 
undertook during the decade of his Presidency.  
 
Chapter 1 explores the early years of Göncz’s life and the development of his political 
outlook. Göncz’s family background, education, peer group and other social movements in 
which Göncz became involved and with which he interacted are examined as the basis for 
understanding his political origins. The focus of investigation is upon identifying the key 
factors for the early development of his political beliefs. The inter-war years’ democratic 
organisation known as the Pál Teleki Work Group, his first hand experience of struggle 
against the Nazis, his involvement in one of the key social movements of 1930s the so-
called, peasant populism and his first political activity in the Independent Smallholders’ 
Party are examined in depth, as they were the most important activities that Göncz 
undertook at this time.  
 
Chapter 2 examines Göncz’s first hand experience of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and 
his time in prison and thereafter. Where Chapter 1 examined the key factors shaping 
Göncz’s early political leanings, Chapter 2 goes on to trace his first hand experience of the 
Revolution and its impact on his political development. Göncz’s motivations for 
involvement in the resistance that followed the suppression of the Revolution and his view 
on and interpretation of the significance of this movement are particularly investigated in 
depth. This examination leads us to understand the proactive role and activities that Göncz 
undertook during the resistance and why he retrospectively defended the memory of the 
Revolution during his imprisonment.  
 
Chapter 3 continues the exploration of Göncz’s political development during which he 
participated in dissident movements in the late 1980s. The focus of investigation is upon 
Göncz’s thoughts on and interpretation of the changing social and political circumstances 
and the process through which his political beliefs are developed at this time. The chapter 
examines the significance of Göncz’s involvement in the dissident movements in terms of 
the development of his political views and his career at this time. 
 
Chapter 4 critically reviews the process through which the Presidency was established. 
This includes an examination of political bargaining, the actual negotiations among the 
political elites as they exerted their vested interests during the national Round Table Talks 
and negotiations that followed thereafter. Given that these political negotiations were de 
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facto a key to shaping the main attributes of the Presidency and their results were codified 
in the Constitution, the chapter analyses the presidential competences through scrutinising 
the Constitution itself. This examination leads us to understand the President’s position in 
Hungary’s political system and provides an essential background to the context in which 
Göncz interpreted and exercised his vested constitutional powers during the term of his 
Presidency. 
 
Having examined the main characteristics of the Presidency, Chapters 5 and 6 explore the 
way in which Göncz interpreted his constitutional powers and fulfilled the Presidency. The 
decisions and actions that Göncz undertook during the decade of his Presidency are 
critically assessed against a framework provided by a set of issues and events with which 
he became involved. Motivations for his involvement in dealing with important transitional 
issues and events are investigated, particularly in connection with his desire to pursue his 
liberal political values. This investigation leads us to understand why Göncz intervened in 
certain governmental matters and attempted to influence politics. Ultimately, the chapters 
question the consistency of his values and explore their significance for an understanding 
of Hungarian politics.  
 
In what follows I will address the first and second research questions through an 
exploration of the early years of Göncz’s life and his intellectual and political development. 
The final question then will be addressed through an examination of the way in which 
Göncz sought to realise his liberal political beliefs. 
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Part I: Development of Göncz’s Political Views 
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Chapter 1. Beginnings 
This chapter charts and examines the development of Göncz’s political views over the 
course of his adolescence and early adulthood. First, the influences of family, peer group, 
education and other social environments in which Göncz grew up, and with which he 
interacted, are examined. These are assessed in terms of their influence on the development 
of his social and political views. As noted by Károly Vígh, the Hungarian biographer of 
Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, 'the social environment in which one has grown up is one of the 
most important elements of influence and it determines one’s later life choices' (Vígh, 
1992: 8).  
 
Second, the chapter seeks to examine the impact that the democratic social organisation, 
known as the Pál Teleki Work Group, and one of the key social movements of 1930s – 
peasant populism – had on the shaping of Göncz’s political beliefs. Iván Vitányi, a veteran 
of anti-fascist movements and an old friend of Göncz’s, notes that:  
The awakening of Göncz’s political idea [occurred] not in his workplace, but in 
the circles, groups and movements in which he had conscientiously 
participated. The first, and perhaps the most important, was the Pál Teleki 
Work Group... Next, interconnected with this, there was the influence of 
populist writers [...] (Vitányi, 2002).  
 
Third, Göncz’s experience in the fight against the autocratic rule of the age and the 
influence of Hungarian intellectuals are considered in connection with his intellectual and 
political development. In an interview with Kossuth radio in 1993, Göncz specifically 
mentioned 'my experience of fighting against Nazi inhumanity' as one of the main factors 
explaining the liberal political views he later adopted (Wisinger and László, 1994: 71). 
Concerning the political impact on his thinking of the Hungarian intellectuals who laid the 
foundation for Hungary’s democracy, in his presidential inaugural address, Göncz 
revealed:  
I am thinking of such guardians... Béla Kovács, the one-time General Secretary 
of the Smallholders’ Party, kidnapped and held prisoner for years in the Gulag... 
István Bibó, the embodiment of the noblest democratic ideals, of Christian 
tolerance and patriotism and the independence of a true citizen (Tóth, 1999: 
19-20).  
 
Examining these multiple explanatory factors will enable us to see the process through 
which Göncz’s political beliefs developed and later informed his term as the first post-
Communist President of Hungary.  
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Thus, sections 1 and 2 of the chapter explore the effect that Göncz’s immediate family and 
peer groups had on the formation of his political ideas. The subsequent two sections then 
examine the impact of Göncz’s first hand experience in the armed student resistance 
movements and, that of social movements or idea elaborated by the so-called 'populist 
writers'. The remainder of the chapter examines Göncz’s first political activity, his role in 
the Independent Smallholders’ Party and Kovács’s influence on his political development. 
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1.1. The early years 
Árpád Göncz was born on 10 February 1922 in Budapest to Lajos Göncz and Ilona 
Heimann (Hegedűs, 1985). The Göncz family originally derived from Csáktornya in Zala 
county southern Hungary. Göncz’s great-great-grandfather worked as a pharmacist in 
Csáktornya, where he later participated in the 1848 Revolution, serving in the Zala 
Battalion (Wisinger and László, 2007: 14). Originally, he was an officer in the military of 
the Austrian-Emperor but, during the Revolution, he changed sides and began supporting 
the idea of Hungarian independence (Hegedűs, 1985). Injured in the battle of Vág, Göncz’s 
great-great grandfather was imprisoned for nine years after the defeat of the Revolution 
(Wisinger and László, 1994: 6-7). In one of his essays Göncz described his predecessor as 
an anonymous hero who facilitated the laying of the foundations of modern Hungarian 
democracy:   
In 1956, people rose up and the revolution broke out. It was inseparably linked 
to the spirit of anonymous Hungarians who fought in 1848. When my great-
great grandfather [fought] against the Austrian [monarchy], he fought for our 
country’s independence. He paved the way for the first democratic Republic of 
Hungary [...] (Göncz, 1991: 7).  
 
The above extract suggests that Göncz’s great-great grandfather’s story remained a source 
of pride in Göncz’s memory. Göncz foregrounds the continuity of the democratic ethos 
between two pivotal revolutions in Hungary’s modern history, taking pride in his great-
great grandfather’s participation in the 1848 Revolution. In fact, when discussing the 
matter in interview in 2006, Göncz confirmed the assertion that, despite the fact that he had 
little information on his great-great grandfather (other than knowing of his participation in 
the battle and his subsequent imprisonment), his influence on Göncz’s political outlook 
was important.  
Göncz: Originally, he was a pharmacist… later joined the Zalai Battalion. He 
was injured in the battle but I do not know where he was imprisoned. I do not 
have precise information on this. I cannot confirm it. 
 
Kim: Are you saying that your great-great grandfather’s story did not affect 
you? 
Göncz: Well, everyone [including him] who fought [in the battle] influenced 
me […] [Interview with Göncz, 18 July 2006, my emphasis]. 
 
Göncz’s mother, Ilona Heimann, was born in the small village of Tusty in the Southern 
part of Transylvania (currently this territory lies in Romania). Her father was Jewish and 
her mother came from Székely, an ethnic Hungarian region in Transylvania. The cause of 
her parents’ death is unknown, but Heimann lost them both at the same time. Initially, she 
was sent to an orphanage, but was soon placed in foster care with the Báthy family. 
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According to Göncz, the Báthy family had a good educational background and a social 
democratic disposition (Hegedűs, 1985). They made a living from the wood and textile 
trades until the end of the First World War. With the conclusion of the Treaty of Trianon,11 
the Báthy family fled to Pest where Heimann met with her future spouse, Lajos Göncz. 
Thereafter, Heimann settled in Pest permanently; she never took paid employment, but 
instead dedicated herself to caring for Lajos and their son, Árpád Göncz.  
 
Information on Lajos Göncz is scant. He was the youngest child and only son in a family 
of five children, as a result of which (according to Göncz), he was spoiled by his parents. 
Initially, Lajos was a postman but later became one of the best tennis players in Hungary 
and even wrote a tennis instruction manual (Papp, 2002). When Göncz turned six, Lajos 
divorced his wife. After the divorce, Heimann and her son lived in Lajos’ parents’ house. 
The time spent living with his father’s parents, however, was not the basis of pleasant 
memories for Göncz. Heimann had not been treated like a member of the family. 
In reality, my mother never became an independent person. We lived in my 
father’s parents’ house, and this was a very bitter situation. My mother was 
always considered to be a second-rate family member. This hurt her and she 
could not overcome this obstacle. This burden also [affected] me […] 
(Hegedűs, 1985). 
 
This suggests that the way in which Heimann was treated by her ex-husband and his 
parents laid the foundation for a lifelong remoteness between father and son. In fact, Göncz 
expressed strong feelings of dislike for his father noting that 'In general, one takes after 
one’s father. [But], I have a hatred of my father... For me, the role of father does not mean 
authority. My father was a source of pain to me...  There was no intimate, close and loving 
relationship between us [...]' (Hegedűs, 1985). Thus, it is hardly surprising that Göncz did 
not wish to resemble his father and, consequently, Lajos Göncz’s role in shaping his son’s 
political views was marginal. Heimann’s influence is, however, acknowledged. Göncz 
confirmed this position in his response to my questions about his mother’s influence on his 
future ideas and political beliefs.  
Kim: It is known that during one’s adolescence, parents, teachers and friends 
have important impacts on shaping one’s ideas. Could you tell me how your 
parents affected the development of your ideas? In particular, how influential 
were they on your political ideas? 
 
Göncz: In terms of political view, their impact on me was modest… My 
mother’s influence [remained] in all aspects, but my father was mainly abroad. 
I can say my father’s impact was insignificant. My nature was similar to my 
father’s but I consciously followed, and still follow my mother’s example 
[Interview with Göncz, 18 July 2006, my emphasis]. 
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Given the absence of intimacy between Göncz and his father, Göncz’s comments regarding 
his mother’s influence might derive from his affection for her. Thus Göncz’s apolitical 
mother’s sense of decency and kindness is what ultimately seems to have embedded itself 
in his politics.  
 
In 1932, after the completion of four years’ primary schooling, Göncz began his secondary 
education at the Werbőczy Gimnazium, and during his eight years’ of education that Göncz 
undertook at the Werbõczy, he joined in Boy Scouts activities. Hungary was at the 
forefront of the Boy Scout movements at this time. Since the translation of Lord Baden-
Powell’s "Scouting for Boys" had been published in 1909 (Ablonczy, 2006: 131), the idea 
of scouting had taken hold in Hungary. From 1909 onwards, the number of Scout troops 
rapidly increased and by 1930, the International Scout Bureau and other associated 
organisations had been founded.12 In 1933, Hungary hosted the 4th World Jamboree which 
took place at Gödöllő, a small city 11 miles away from the capital. While the scouting 
movement regards its role as one of forging good and well rounded citizens from 
adolescent men as dictated in the founding precepts of the Movement,13  for Göncz’s 
participation in scouting had a different significance. Scouting opened Göncz’s eyes to 
social reality, particularly with regard to the problems of the poor peasantry.  
The thing which determined the way of thinking for the entirety of Hungarian 
youth was the demand for land reform and peasant radicalism… We knew the 
necessity of land reform at the age of 14 or 15; we came to know the poverty of 
the peasantry. Through camping, we - the children who came from cities - 
encountered the [lives] of villages. This [scouting] was really a determining 
[factor] […].14   
 
The given account does not present us with the solid context in which the Hungarian 
peasants lived, let alone the meaning of 'peasant radicalism'. However, the urban peer 
group to which Göncz belonged and with which he interacted, shared experience in and 
knowledge of the situation in Hungary’s rural society. For Göncz, it is evident that his 
scouting experience functioned as an influence which awakened his political ideas and 
social sensibility. Göncz’s wife, Zsuzsánna Göntér, noted this significance thus:  
Ultimately, in the days of his youth, his social and political interest came from 
the Boy Scout Movement. This was the time before the Second World War, 
when the German threat was beginning to take shape… During the time when 
he was going to secondary school, the awakening of his political ideas took 
place in the Boy Scout Movement. After that, when he was a university student, 
this happened in the Pál Teleki Work Group […] (Joint interview with Göncz 
and Göntér, 10 January 2008). 
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Göntér’s observation underscores the fact that Göncz’s participation in the Boy Scouts was 
crucial in increasing his political and social awareness. Although this does not provide us 
with concrete information regarding the Pál Teleki Work Group (PTWG), during the early 
stage of Göncz’s adolescence, his scouting experience and later work in the PTWG were 
pivotal for the shaping of his political outlook. Moreover, it is likely that Göncz’s joining 
the PTWG was not coincidental. Having discovered some common ground or continuity 
between his scouting experience and the PTWG, Göncz may have decided to join the latter. 
Substantiation of this reasoning is in the subject of the next section of this chapter, in 
which I examine the main characteristics of the PTWG, and ask what it meant for the 
development of Göncz’s political ideas.  
 
1.2. The Pál Teleki Work Group (Teleki Pál Munkaközösség) 
The PTWG was formed in the autumn of 1936 by Piarists (Papp, 2002: 3), 15  who 
organised a series of social seminars for university students. The seminar was intended to 
foster a future leadership which would hold a certain world view and uphold a certain 
sense of morality. Count Pál Teleki was the programme’s chief supporter; he envisioned 
that the direction of and initiative for the lives of Hungarians would not come from 
politicians, but from society itself (Lukács, 1992: 57). Enlightening the Hungarian 
population became the PTWG’s main goal; national education was considered the key 
means through which a good social basis for future leadership could be nurtured. A good 
knowledge of Hungarian history, geography and a sense of responsibility towards family, 
friends, community and nation were seen as essential to the preservation of Hungarianness 
(Magyarság) (Mészáros, 1993: 57-64). The PTWG was intended to play the part of 
educational provider or forum where university students could gather to discuss various 
social issues that Hungary faced at the time. According to Göntér, the discussions centred 
on issues which affected the poor Hungarian peasantry and possible remedies. Göntér 
recalled: 'The PTWG was one of the programmes [which sought] a political solution to the 
problem of agricultural poverty and the poverty of rural peasants' […] (joint interview with 
Göncz and Göntér, 10 January 2008). The PTWG also had links to the National Alliance of 
People’s Colleges,16 which functioned as an educational provider for peasant children, and 
was intended to provide a platform for ingress into the intelligentsia. 
 
In 1941, the PTWG expanded its membership through the absorption of leading politicians 
and their associations into its organisational structure. One prominent historian, Gyula 
Szekfű, and key figures from the Independent Smallholders’ Party (hereafter ISP), József 
Bognár and Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky joined the PTWG at this time. In the following year, a 
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draft of the Self-Education Programme for the members of the PTWG was also composed. 
The Programme’s main objective was the realisation of the basic founding principle: to 
help young intellectuals identify various social problems that Hungary was experiencing 
and to find adequate solutions for them (Lukács, 1992: 58).  
 
After the German invasion of Budapest on 19 March 1944, the PTWG widened its purview. 
It was no longer just a discussion forum, but also joined other civic resistance movements 
to fight the Nazi occupation. The Vice-President of the PTWG, István Csicsery-Rónay, 
circulated an underground newspaper, while another member of the PTWG, Pál Játzkó, 
directed sabotage against Nazi-Germany. At this time, Göncz also participated in students’ 
armed resistance movements as a member of the PTWG (discussed in Section 1.3).  
 
With the end of the Second World War, the PTWG was reorganised as the Democratic 
Alliance of Hungarian Intellectuals (DAHI). The DAHI issued a manifesto and drew up a 
new action plan. According to the manifesto, the DAHI’s main objective was the 
mobilisation of Hungarian intellectuals in the expectation that they would play a key role 
in reconstructing democratic Hungarian society. The manifesto proclaimed:  
Hungarian Intellectuals! To build a new society, enormous work awaits you... 
It is you who must reconstruct, organise and lead destroyed Hungarian industry. 
It is you who must undertake the education of a new generation.  
Let your expertise flourish [bocsásd] for the reconstruction of new Hungary. 
Workers and peasants! Fight and arbitrate against the oppression of the fascists 
for an independent, sovereign Hungary; for democratic human rights; for the 
freedom of religion and consciousness; for land reform […].17  
 
To realise these aims, plans which set out the individual intellectual tasks which, together, 
would result in the successful fulfilment of DAHI’s manifesto pledges were formulated. 
For instance, multi-lateral talks held with people of various social backgrounds contributed 
to enriching the mutual understanding and knowledge of the DAHI’s membership. Those 
who had an expertise in foreign policy were assigned the task of formulating the DAHI’s 
syllabus on the topic; 18  as a result, a comprehensive course on foreign policy and, 
subsequently, a professional lecturing panel were set up.19 The Foreign Minister himself, 
János Gyöngyösi, gave the opening lecture on 25 May 1945 (Kis Újság, 26 May 1945; 
Kossuth Népe, 27 May 1945; Népszava, 27 May 1945; Szabad Szó, 27 May 1945).  
 
In addition to serving as a key organ of education and building the social basis for a 
democratic Hungary, the DAHI played a role on the conventional political stage. This was 
demonstrably realised when the central leaders of DAHI joined the ISP. The chairman of 
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the DAHI, Tibor Hám, became the General Secretary of the Political Committee of the 
ISP, 20  while the Vice-President of the DAHI, Csisery-Rónay, was in charge of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs within it (Saláta, 1989: 100). According to Lukács, one of 
the most important activities that the DAHI performed was the preparation for the 
municipal election in Budapest and the general election (Lukács, 1992: 62). At this time, 
Göncz also joined the ISP, where he served as secretary to the General Secretary of the 
party, Béla Kovács (discussed in Section 1.5).      
 
Despite successfully negotiating the transition to the national political stage, between 1947 
and 1948, the DAHI, along with other political forces, was forced to dissolve. It was at this 
time that Communists came to power in Hungary, employing so-called 'divide and rule 
tactics' (szalámi taktika) to eliminate their political opponents. Most members of the 
DAHI’s leadership were arrested, and either sent to prison or compelled to leave the 
country in connection with an alleged conspiracy against 'the Republic of Hungary' 
(discussed in Section 1.5). As Göncz eloquently asserted, the PTWG (later DAHI) which 
existed during and after the inter-war period, 'fought for an independent and democratic 
Hungary with pen and sword' (Lukács, 1992: 64), but neither instrument protected the 
organisation from oblivion.      
 
The PTWG thus laid an intellectual foundation and paved the way for Göncz’s subsequent 
political development. In his personal Oral History, Göncz recounted what the PTWG 
meant for him: 
I identified [myself] in spirit and practice with the PTWG. For one thing, this 
was the only group to have perfected its ideas of a democratic system of 
institutions, to have a tangible history of resistance and hold specific notions of 
democratic transformation and its methods, consequences, popular basis and 
system of law and education. We’d been working on this for years, thrashing it 
out. Reading the ideas of the 1945 PTWG today, they may seem naive and ill-
expressed, but there’s nothing in them I couldn’t espouse now (Tóth, 2009).  
 
This suggests that the PTWG laid the fundamental foundation for Hungary’s democratic 
transformation. Göncz is clearly of the view that the PTWG’s political ideals are not 
obsolete but have a contemporary relevance. In particular, the way in which the PTWG 
strove after their political ideals during the inter-war period remained - and remains - a 
significant legacy for him. While the extract above does not detail the way in which the 
PTWG had an influence on the shaping of Göncz’s political beliefs, Göncz certainly shared 
(and still shares) its founding ideas. In essence, Göncz asserted that he was able to expand 
his world view through his participation in the PTWG discussion forum:   
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The PTWG was the creature of the Boy Scout squad arising out of the liberal 
political movement and activity of the old Piarist students. The executive 
consisted of Tibor Hám, Pál Jaczkó, and Kálmán Saláta... [It] had an outlook 
very close to me in its efforts towards universality, its openness... It was 
organised quite democratically, with free debate and a constant flow of 
information from educated people... who were clearly expecting a German 
defeat when the war broke out... The whole thing, with its liberalism and 
openness came as a kind of refreshment to me [...] (Tóth, 2009). 
 
The extract above highlights the fact that the central atmosphere Göncz encountered in the 
PTWG was free, democratic and open. Göncz viewed that the PTWG served not only as a 
venue where intellectuals gathered to share available information, but also as a forum in 
which cultivated people vigorously debated the future of the country. Political and social 
problems of the age, including Hungary’s engagement in the Second World War, were 
dealt with in the PTWG discussions. According to Göncz’s account, the forum seemed to 
have been organised in such a way as to create a constructive ground in which independent 
thinking and progressive ideas could be fermented. Indeed, in an interview with György 
Litván, Göncz reaffirmed the reasoning that the PTWG was not only significant in his 
intellectual advancement but also in his subsequent political developments.  
Litván: In 1945, you worked at the ISP as a parliamentary secretary. Was this 
the beginning of your political career? 
Göncz: No. The beginning was when I was a university student, which means 
[at] the PTWG. The older [generation] of the PTWG constituted the so-called 
centre [force] of the ISP, which Béla Kovács and Béla Varga formed. I worked 
for Béla Kovács. 
Litván: So, the beginning of your political career was not bound to a party but 
to a place in which your intellectualism originated.   
Göncz: Yes. It was the PTWG that endeavoured to find a solution to the 
country’s problems and sought democracy. Even today I accept all the ideas 
that we adopted there. [When] I read old pieces on the PTWG’s works, they are 
still moving for me. They were composed by those people who had nothing to 
do with power anywhere on earth... In its spirituality, there were [elements] of 
experience in [our generation]: Christianity, the acceptance of democracy and 
the sense of social responsibility... It embraced the important elements of 
liberalism, the sense of Hungarianness, Europeanness and Christianity (4 x 4, 
1997).   
 
In view of this, it can be argued that the PTWG played a central role in the foundation of 
Göncz’s intellectual and political development. As was established in Section 1.1 of the 
chapter, during Göncz’s adolescence, if his scouting experience was momentous for 
arousing his political and social consciousness, it was the PTWG that contributed to the 
shaping of his democratic ideas thereafter. Evidence of such a connection was seen through 
the establishment of four values that Göncz embraced at this stage in his life, in which the 
PTWG had an enduring impact on his political beliefs. Having noted the PTWG’s 
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significance to Göncz’s democratic beliefs, especially with reference to his first political 
career in the ISP, the role and activities that Göncz undertook in this party will be 
discussed. Before embarking on this task, the following section of the chapter explores the 
democratic activities in which Göncz was engaged in the student resistance movements.  
 
1.3. Resistance: the Freedom Front of Hungarian Students 
 
 
The Freedom Front of Hungarian Students (FFHS) was officially formed on 7 November 
1944 under the joint leadership of László Kardos, Sándor Kiss, Tibor Zimányi, Ferenc 
Szűcs, Imre Farkas, György Szabó and Péter Pintér.21  They all signed the FFHS’s 
founding manifesto (Kiss and Vitányi, 1983: 100). Initially the FFHS was not a sub-unit of 
armed resistance but, under the command of the Hungarian Front, it was subsequently 
transformed into an underground armed resistance group. The Hungarian Front (HF) 
constituted leaders of the left-wing political parties which had been disbanded under the 
fascist Szalási regime (Kontler, 2002: 384).22 The Front was the prime association of those 
aiming to unify and direct the various underground resistance groups which existed at this 
time (Romsics, 1999: 213, 2005: 546). For example, the presidents of the Smallholders’ 
Party and the Social Democrats, Zoltán Tildy and Árpád Szakasits, were the leaders of the 
HF (Feitl and Kende, 2007: 199-200). In its manifesto, the HF called for national unity and 
for the creation of an independent, peaceful and democratic Hungary: 
In the most crucial time of our history, we speak [before] the nation. The 
German conqueror smashed our country. Our lives, freedom, nation and the 
fate of future Hungarian generations are at risk… We feel great responsibility 
for the fate of our country and for the perpetuation of our nation…. We create 
the unit for the fight for Hungarian freedom - the Hungarian Front. The [aims] 
of the HF [are as follows]: the expulsion of the German conquerors and their 
The Freedom Front of Hungarian Youth 
The Freedom Front of Young 
Hungarian Workers 
The Freedom Front of 
Young Hungarian Peasants 
Mihály Táncsis Brigade The Student Movement of 
Free Life 
Árpád Göncz 
The Freedom Front of 
Hungarian Students 
The Hungarian Front 
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accomplices, peace with the allies, [to] lay the foundations for the basis of free 
and democratic Hungary […] (Romsics, 2000: 62-64).    
 
The main task assigned to the Freedom Front of Hungarian Youth (FFHY), a sub-unit of 
the HF, was to coordinate the unorganised and sporadic student resistance movements. 
However, the FFHY’s coordinating role did not function as intended. Different sub-groups 
conceived different strategies of extrication from the war and this was particularly true in 
respect to the differing approaches proposed for fighting against the German occupiers. 
Furthermore, members of the sub-groups had varied political orientations meaning that 
each association wished to develop political affiliations with different parties. For instance, 
both the Győrffy College students (Győrffy Kollégium)23 and the Movement of Student 
Unity (A Diák Egység Mozgalom) positioned themselves on the left of the political 
spectrum. Yet, the former had links to the Communists and Social Democrats, whereas the 
latter preferred to build their affiliations with the Smallholders (Kiss and Vitányi, 1983: 
104-09). Thus, although the different groups were tentatively unified and coordinated 
through their allegiance to organisations higher up in the organisational hierarchy of 
resistance movements, once anti-Nazi sentiment was removed from the equation they were 
politically incompatible. In Deák’s terms, the anti-German resistance movement was 'a 
small movement consisting of a few hundred individuals from the most varied political 
backgrounds, [and, moreover] their fundamental differences could barely be bridged by 
their common determination to oppose the Germans' (Deák, 1995: 210).  
 
The Mihály Táncsis Brigade (MTB) one of the sub-groups in the resistance movement to 
which Göncz belonged was founded in December 1944 (Kiss and Vitányi, 1983: 122-23). 
At this time, Horthy’s Regency was still in control of the conservative Hungarian 
government, and during this period (March 1920-November 1944), a paramilitary unit, 
known as the Levente, operated in Hungary. Young male students between the ages of 12 
and 21 were required to participate in regular military exercises or physical training.24 The 
intended goal of the programme was to equip them with basic military skills in an attempt 
to complement and augment the country’s self-defence system (Kontler, 2002: 357-58). As 
the Treaty of Trianon banned Hungary from forming a national army, the Hungarian 
government introduced this Levente system in an attempt to overcome the limits which had 
been placed it in this regard. The Levente was later transformed into a paramilitary unit 
which was renamed the National Guard (Nemzetőr) (Kiss and Vitányi, 1983: 123). The 
National Guard was composed of different units constituted from university students. 
József Várhelyi, a medical student at the Budapest Sciences University was appointed as 
one of the captains during the Lakatos government (between 29 August 1944 and 16 
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October 1944).25 Similarly, Kálmán Szenpétery was chosen a captain of the Economics 
Faculty of the Budapest Engineering University. Under orders from the leadership of the 
HF to form a unified structure, on 1 December 1944, these two captains decided to 
amalgamate the two groups into one unit, creating the MTB (Kiss and Vitányi, 1983: 124).  
 
The founding of the MTB was important to Göncz as at this time since he deserted his 
military posting, and joined this student resistance group instead. Göncz had been 
conscripted into the Hungarian army after the German occupation began (Göncz’s 
interview with Bartok Radio, 12 July 2002), but had been exempted from enlistment while 
he attended university. Upon the completion of his studies, he was drafted into and later 
deployed by the 25th Reserve Mountain Infantry Battalion (Hegedűs, 1985). At the time of 
Göncz’s deployment, the Red Army had already crossed the border of Eastern Front and 
Göncz’s regiment was given an order to retreat to Germany but, realising that neither his 
conscience nor his military pledge would allow him to leave the country, Göncz soon 
decamped from his barracks (Papp, 2002). Göncz stated: 
I took an oath to myself, because as I see it, one should not leave one’s country 
when the country is in trouble. It is only acceptable to leave your country when 
your country is doing well… With a rifle and a hand grenade, I set off in the 
opposite direction [to Budapest] […] (Wisinger and László, 1994: 13).  
 
Upon his return to Budapest, Göncz joined the MTB with the help of his friend, Miklós 
Szűr, a former member of the PTWP.   
 
According to MTB records, Göncz belonged to the first platoon led by Tamás Székely. The 
majority of the First Platoon’s members were from the Arts and Law Faculties of Budapest 
University and particularly, they were students of Eötvös College, and the Horthy 
Dormitory. The First Platoon (members of which called themselves ‘Leprosy’) was always 
in the vanguard of any action; its members assumed risky and difficult tasks, such as 
stealing weapons from the Nazis, and helping to acquire identity cards for refugees (Kiss 
and Vitányi, 1983: 127). Göncz himself participated in an operation to disarm the local 
military unit of the Arrow Cross in Rákos Hill (Göncz’s interview with Bartok Radio, 12 
July 2002).26 Göncz reminisced about the time: 
We returned to the Rákos Hill and there, in collaboration with the illegal [cell] 
of the Communist Party, we liberated one village. Along with two 17-year-old 
boys, I stole weapons [szereltem le] from the house of the Arrow Cross… I was 
injured and one comrade was killed […].27 
 
Göncz’s involvement in this movement was important for him, since through it he came to 
realise how basic democratic values - freedom, national independence and humanity – 
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were critical to those people who had been deprived of them. Göncz stated explicitly in an 
interview that a cooperative network of resistance movements was established by people of 
different political affiliations so as to help extricate the country from the vortex of war:  
We were bound together and interconnected [by our] hatred of inhumanity, 
[and we felt] a sense of responsibility to save the country. We hardly asked 
who our fellow resistance fighters were. Especially, it was not appropriate to 
ask whether one was Communist, because it [represented] a life-threatening 
danger… The common spiritual denominator that bound us together was a 
commitment to freedom, a sense of social responsibility and humanism… The 
essence of the fight that we carried on was against inhumanity which meant 
that Hungary should escape from the War as soon as possible… Our common 
goal was to save as many people as we could […] [Wisinger and László, 2007: 
24-25, my emphasis].  
 
This suggests that the civil resistance movement which Göncz joined was a genuine 
manifestation of the will of those Hungarians who were willing to devote themselves to the 
realisation of a free, socially responsible and humane society. According to Göncz, these 
three fundamental values underpinned the idea of modern democracy which was 
threatened by the War. Thus, those individuals felt the necessity to end the War gathered 
together and formed resistance groups. As Iván Vitányi pointed out, during the time of the 
resistance movements’ activities the only question they asked the people who wished to 
join was whether they would accept Hitler. Vitányi said: 'We did not ask whether one was 
a communist or a social democrat. We asked people about Hitler… Do you accept Hitler? 
If not, come to us' (interview with Vitányi, 23 November 2007). Moreover, as Göncz 
commented in an interview with a Hungarian political weekly, 168 Óra, it was because of 
his awareness of the country’s predicament that he felt he had to join the resistance 
movement. Göncz stated:  
[The] inhumanity surrounding [us] led me [to join] the armed resistance 
[movement]. If you had lived at that time, perhaps you would have done the 
same thing. In these circumstances [azt ami, akkor történt] it was not possible 
for the people to stand there [without] doing something (168Óra, 8 May 1990).    
 
In this light, it can be said that Göncz’s participation in the resistance movement can be 
seen as a singular move neither driven by ardent patriotic sentiment nor inspired by the 
pursuit of a future political career. There is little doubt that through his participation in the 
anti-fascist movement, Göncz distinguished himself from individuals who either - 
reluctantly or willingly - compromised themselves by engaging with Nazi Germany. As we 
will see in Chapter 4, Göncz’s anti-fascist credentials were fundamental to the subsequent 
public perception of him as a politician of moral authority. Much later, this would be an 
important factor in Göncz’s nomination to the post of Hungary’s first post-Communist 
President. Despite this fact, it is fair to suggest that the plurality of the movement - though 
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a product of dire necessity to struggle against the Nazi inhumanity - was Göncz’s principal 
motivation for participation in the resistance and subsequently, in politics. Bearing this in 
mind, the way in which Göncz struggled for democracy and that impact on his political 
development will be further examined. Before then, the following section examines 
another important factor contributing to the shaping of Göncz’s political beliefs: so-called 
radical peasant populism.   
 
1.4. Peasant populism 
In the mid-1930s in Hungary there emerged group of intellectuals known as the 'populist 
writers' (népi írok) who attempted to represent the traditional values of the Hungarian 
peasantry (Némedi, 1995: 69; Kiss, 2002: 749). While these writers had differing political 
leanings or orientations,28 the one common element intellectuals shared was a desire to see 
radical change in the under-developed, backward agricultural regions of rural Hungary. For 
these intellectuals the peasants were 'the source of morality' (Mudde, 2001: 35) and the 
root of Hungarianness and these ideas formed the philosophical foundation of their mission. 
The populist writers considered drawing the attention of the ruling elites towards the 
reality of the poor peasantry to be their top priority. To this end, these writers, along with a 
number of sociologists who felt a moral imperative to discover the reality of the situation 
and the social milieu in which the Hungarians peasantry lived, conducted so-called 'village 
explorations’ (Held, 1980: 335-36; Kontler, 2002: 359; Romsics, 1999: 172, 2005: 523). 
They travelled from county to county to uncover the real circumstances under which the 
peasants lived, and tried to formulate a solution to the destitution of the Hungarian 
peasantry. Between 1936 and 1938 a series of essays was published, vividly describing the 
pauperised peasantry and the oppressive attitude of the ruling elite towards 'the fate of 
three million beggars', and arousing public awareness of peasants’ poor social conditions 
(Némedi, 1995: 70).29 As Molnár points out, this number is rather exaggerated but 
considering that the vast majority of the rural population did not possess cultivable lands,30 
it is highly indicative of the fact that the question of the Hungarian peasantry was viewed 
as the critical social issue of the time (Molnár, 2001: 271-72). In Rainer’s terms, the one 
thing that bound the populist writers together was 'moral outrage or indignation' over the 
indifference of ruling elites towards the landless peasants (Rainer, 1993: 34). It is not 
surprising therefore that 'at the heart of the populist movement there lay a demand for 
radical land reform' (Held, 1980: 336) and, with this aim, the populists considered that it 
was necessary to undertake political actions in order to further their aims and agenda. In 
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March 1937 they formed a popular front, the so-called March Front, followed later by the 
founding of the National Peasant Party (NPP).  
 
The March Front had a 'twelve-point manifesto' demanding radical political and socio-
economic reforms (Tőkés, 1970: 87). The guarantee of universal suffrage, individual and 
political freedoms, land reform, the elimination of latifundia, the abolition of industrial 
cartels, a guarantee of workers’ rights, educational reform, the realisation of self-
determination for the people of the Danube valley among others were outlined in the 
Front’s manifesto (Litván and Varga, 1995: 166-67; Romsics, 2000: 282-83), which called 
upon the Hungarian government to take radical action. However, these radical and 
progressive ideas were neither supported by the conservative goverment, nor successful in 
prompting the mobilisation of urban intellectuals and the peasantry. Consequently, the first 
fundamental transformation of the established structure of land-ownership (Kónya, 2000: 
262) and political enfranchisement only took place in Hungary after the end of the Second 
World War, only to be undermined almost immediately by the imposition of Soviet style of 
communism (Held, 1996: 16). 
 
However, even though the era of peasant populism was relatively short-lived, the populist 
movement was a significant social phenomenon, as the intellectuals of those days strove to 
address the question of impoverished peasantry. As Tőkés notes, populist movements in 
Hungary were the genuine manifestation of provincial intellectuals efforts to 'search for 
realistic, non-revolutionary [methods of] socio-political modernisation and democratisation 
at home' (Tőkés, 1970: 87) or 'a third road to incorporate the best and and rejected the 
worst features of fascism and communism' (Tőkés, 1996: 6).  
         
At the height of the Hungarian populist movement (which culminated in the formation of 
the March Front), Göncz was still a young man (15 years old) and one who had yet to 
formulate his ideas definitively. However, Göncz’s own reflection on this period of his life 
suggests that the populist movement had an important impact on his intellectual 
development:  
Look, the impact of the populist writers was so significant in our generation. 
[They] deeply influenced us... I knew the populist writers very well because 
[one of the] exam questions in my secondary school graduation [paper] was 
also about them... I read the populist writers’ work and these were the most 
important things to read. The populist writers represented the view of the 
peasantry... In practice, I knew none of them in person... but their influence on 
my intellectual development was very important [...] [Interview with Göncz, 18 
July 2006, my emphasis]. 
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This suggests that Göncz’s access to the populist writers’ publication opened his eyes to 
the world and reality of the peasantry, and it is clear that the influence of populist writers’ 
ideas was entrenched in Göncz’s memory. Of course, the idea of peasant populism was not 
only transmitted to Göncz through his reading activity, but also through his direct and first-
hand experience, as discussed earlier, in his scouting activity. The particular social issues 
that drew Göncz’s intellectual curiosity concerned the question of peasantry and land 
reform.  
 
There is wealth of other evidence to support the contention that Göncz’s outlook was 
deeply influenced by the populist movement and the writers at its helm. In an interview he 
gave on Kossuth Radio, for example, Göncz emphasised the role of peasant populism in 
the genesis of his political outlook. Furthermore, Göncz claimed that his political views 
were already well developed by the time he reached his early twenties:  
Radio Interviewer: What idea of society influenced your political belief at the 
time?  
Göncz: In the PTWG, we constantly followed the most important social 
phenomena. By the age of twenty, I already had a political notion which was 
organically linked. [My outlook was concerned with] the nature of democracy, 
the way of democracy, the question of the peasantry and the question of land 
[reform]. We believed the key to the future of Hungary lay in land reform. This 
was the thinking among the young intellectuals at the time - my thinking as 
well. The ideas of the populist radicals influenced [me] most deeply [...] 
[Wisinger and László, 2007: 17, my emphasis]. 
 
Göncz’s emphatic statement suggests that his political beliefs were significantly affected 
by the idea of peasant populism. The precise concept of democracy Göncz envisaged was 
not detailed in the interview (will be discussed in Chapter 3), but he believed that the core 
of peasant populism lay in land reform and this would pave the way for the future of 
Hungary’s democracy. According to Göncz’s exposition, it is clear that peasant populism 
was a crucial social movement, and he was also under its influence.  
 
Another important component which demonstrates Göncz’s populist leanings is related to 
his preferred literature and his later academic pursuits in agriculture. Göncz noted: 'I was 
influenced by the populist writers, perhaps László Németh most of all… My favourite poet 
was Mihály Babits, [who] almost excluded the influence of László Németh, but embraced 
the political [idea lying] at the root of land reform, that is, radical peasant politics' […] 
(Tóth, 2009). Göncz’s interest in agriculture led him to acquire expertise in this related area. 
This was realised in 1952 when he entered the Gödöllő Agricultural University.31  
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Finally, given Göncz’s interest in peasant populism it is not surprising that the leading 
Hungarian intellectuals who had the most impact upon shaping his later political ideas 
were also involved in populist movements. For example, István Bibó, whom Göncz met 
personally, espoused the idea of peasant populism. Bibó was at the forefront of populist 
movements. He not only became involved in the drafting of the March Front (Litván and 
Varga, 1995: 166-67; Szilágyi, 1991: 532), but was also one of the key founding members 
of the National Peasant Party (Berki, 1992: 514). Göncz’s own comment regarding Bibó’s 
intellectual legacy is indicative of Bibó’s influence on him:   
Göncz: My political view is identical with that of Bibó.  
Kim: You mean, [in terms of] the liberal, social aspect? 
Göncz: Yes, and populist [ideas], Bibó attached himself to the Peasant Party, 
whereas I attached myself to the Smallholders’ Party […] (Joint interview with 
Göncz and Göntér, 10 January 2008).  
 
Göncz’s comments on Bibó’s intellectual legacy are too brief to estimate the significance 
of Bibó’s role in shaping Göncz’s populist ideology. However, when Göncz later became 
the first post-Communist President, in an opening speech delivered at the foundation of 
New Peoples’ College, he reiterated the fact that Bibó played a key role in shaping his 
political beliefs, including populist ideas. As Göncz explicitly stated, 'Bibó was my role 
model': 
I cut my teeth in the late 1930s under the spell of populist culture, at the time of 
the radical peasant movement, when a pressing need was felt for land reform. 
István Bibó contributed much to my understanding, putting into focus for me 
the component elements which have determined my political beliefs to this day. 
He was my role model with his gentle radicalism, genuine Hungarianness, 
European liberalism […] (Tóth, 1999: 10). 
 
Thus, it can be reasonably argued that Bibó’s intellectual influence and peasant populist 
ideology had become entrenched in Göncz’s political beliefs. Having recognised this 
significance, the next chapter further explores and traces Bibó’s intellectual influence on 
Göncz characterised throughout the latter stage of Göncz’s life. The views of the head of 
the 1956 Institute, János Rainer are apposite with regard to concluding this exploration of 
Göncz’s early political and intellectual development: 
The populist movement was Göncz’s political school. Indeed, it had a big 
impact on him... One should not forget that in the beginning, the populist 
movement was a radical left-wing movement. The cause of this [radicalism] 
was moral indignation over the peasantry who live in misery, because they did 
not have land, [access to] credit, or job opportunities [...]. They lived in unjust 
circumstances. The village was backward... and the populist movement fought 
against this. It was a left-wing movement of social critique... It separated 
[itself] from the legacy of Horthy’s Hungary (Interview with Rainer, 22 August 
2007). 
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With the end of the War, Göncz found his role within the ISP, which embraced the idea of 
peasant populism and represented the interests of a small land-owning peasantry. Göncz 
believed that the ISP would serve as the main platform through which he could pursue his 
ideals in politics. The substantiation of this reasoning is the subject of the following section 
of this chapter, in which I examine the main characteristics of the ISP and its political 
context in post-War Hungary. This is followed by a brief biographical sketch of Béla 
Kovács – the General Secretary of the party - with whom Göncz established his first 
political career as a personal secretary.   
 
1.5. Independent Smallholders’ Party (ISP) 
On 4 November 1945, the first free, unfettered general election was held in Hungary. 
Among the six parties entered into Parliament, the ISP secured an absolute majority of 
votes cast and won a landslide victory.  
Table 1: The electoral result of the 1945 parliamentary election 
Parties Votes (ratio) Number of seats 
The Independent Smallholders’ Party (ISP) 57,03 245 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) 17,41 70 
Communist Party (CP) 16,95 69 
National Peasant Party (NPP) 6,87 23 
Civic Democratic Party (CDP) 1,62 2 
Hungarian Radical Party (HRP) 0,12 - 
Adapted from (Bihari, 2005: 74) 
 
The significant portion of seats that the ISP secured in Parliament enabled the party to form 
its own government. However, partially due to a pre-election intra-party agreement, 
regardless of the electoral result, they were to form a coalition government (Crampton, 
1997: 222) and, more importantly, through the pressure of the Marshall of the Allied 
Control of Commission (ACC), Kliment Voroshilov, the ISP was compelled to establish a 
coalition with three left-wing parties: the CP, the SDP and the NPP (Argentieri, 2008: 217; 
Cartledge, 2006: 440). This power-sharing structure is interesting and, in fact, clearly 
representative of the disadvantageous political circumstances that the first post-war 
electoral victor - the ISP democratic government - had to face at the time. Founded in 1930, 
the ISP was initially a left-wing orientated opposition party to the conservative government 
which existed during the inter-war period (Körösényi, Tóth and Török, 2003: 192). Its 
constituency lay in rural areas and represented the interests of a small land-owning 
peasantry, today considered as ‘small farmers’ (Tőkés, 1997: 116). The end of the war did 
not alter this original platform on which the ISP stood, but there was a shift in its political 
orientation. It became something of a catch-all party, an amalgam of anti-Communist 
conservative forces (Körösényi, Tóth and Török, 2003: 192). 'The party united several 
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different political lines stretching from the clerical right to the national left' (Bozóki and 
Karácsony, 2002: 73), indicating that the ISP had a broader appeal to the electorate than the 
party’s name might have suggested. The ISP, however, could not translate legitimate power 
into its actual legislative programme without the Soviet leadership’s consent. Despite the 
fact that the Soviet leadership’s approach towards Hungary was relatively tolerant and 
permissive; as such, free elections were permitted. However, there was a limit to the Soviet 
leadership’s tolerance of Hungary’s democratic experience; this was demonstrated by the 
ACC’s direct and indirect intervention in domestic affairs. For example, the post of Interior 
Minister - the key to the control of the police and security apparatus – should have been 
allocated to the ISP. The portfolio, however, was assigned to the Communists owing to 
pressure from Voroshilov (Kontler, 2002: 396), and was 'thereafter never to be 
relinquished' (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000: 99). The consequence of this was the 
Communists’ misuse of security force to threaten and coerce oppositional forces under the 
guise of law enforcement. As I shall discuss below, Kovács and Göncz also became victims 
of this abuse, albeit on different charges.  
 
In brief, the overall political situation in which the ISP democratic government found itself 
was in character that of a 'constrained sovereignty' (Bihari, 2005: 60-62) or 'tentative 
democracy' (Gyarmati, 2005: 551); in reality, it was unable to wield and exercise power. As 
Göncz, a young member of the ISP, neatly observed; real power lay with the Communists 
backed by the Soviet army. The weakness of this power relation was exemplified by the 
ISP’s leniency towards and concession to the demands of the Soviet leadership. Göncz 
asserted that the reason for conceding was the ISP’s naive expectation that the Paris Peace 
Treaty would bring about a political turn-around with the withdrawal of Soviet troops: 
The ISP could not enjoy 100 percent power, because the source of power lay in 
the presence of the Soviet army. I remember inter-party agreements were 
concluded between [the coalition parties]. [But], the next day, Voroshilov 
announced that if this and that did not happen in eight days, Hungary must pay 
off the arrears of reparation. To prevent civil war and famine, the ISP gave way 
again and again… The ISP leaders believed the country’s occupation would 
cease… [They believed] once the Peace Treaty was concluded, the occupying 
force would withdraw and if there were democratic parties about when this 
happened, they could take over power […] (Hegedűs, 1985).  
 
However, the Peace Treaty was not concluded as the ISP leadership expected. On the 
contrary, the Treaty allowed the Russian army onto Hungarian territory; 32  under its 
protection, the Communists could lay the foundation for the consolidation of their power. 
This process developed gradually until 1949, when Hungary became Sovietised with the 
proclamation of the Hungarian Peoples’ Republic.33  
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It is not known precisely when Göncz joined the ISP, but his decision to become a member 
of the party was influenced by his friends. Having realised those PTWG members who 
struggled together during the anti-Nazis resistance movements had found a role in the ISP, 
Göncz also decided to join the party. Initially, the PTWG leaders requested that Göncz run 
for the general election and become a parliamentarian, but he refused reasoning that he was 
not ready for that position. Instead Göncz took on a secretarial job for Béla Kovács 
(Hegedűs, 1985). 
 
Béla Kovács was born on 20 April 1908 to a small peasant family (Palasik, 2002: 9). 
During his adolescence, Kovács was under the influence of peasant populism. He took the 
question of the peasantry seriously, and felt the improvement of their social environment 
was essential. On 12 October 1930 at Békés, where the ISP was founded, Kovács was 
influenced by a visionary speech delivered by the party leader, Ferenc Nagy (Palasik, 
2002: 10). This was the most crucial moment for him, as Kovács not only decided to join 
the party but later came to a leading position through Ferenc Nagy’s sponsorship. In 1932, 
he briefly assumed a post of associate-judge in Mecsekalj and, after four years, was 
appointed to the General Secretary of ISP’s Barany constituency.34 In Kovács’s political 
conviction, the peasantry was considered a national tribe (nemzet törzse) whose virtue had 
to be preserved, and he strongly advocated the interests of the peasantry (Vida, 2002-3).  
 
During the German occupation of Hungary, Kovács took an anti-Nazi stance and supported 
resistance movements, establishing contact with the leaders of the HF as well as the PTWG. 
With the end of the war, he briefly assumed the post of Minister of Agriculture, but on 23 
February 1946, he resigned from this post to 'dedicate himself to being the General 
Secretary of the ISP.35 Kovács was a straightforward, resolute and intransigent personality 
(Palasik, 2002: 12) who considered the Communist’s monopoly on power to be 
inadmissible (Vida, 2002-03). His anti-Communist line caused a conflict with the 
Communists; according to Göncz, Kovács was audacious enough to stand against the 
future Hungarian Stalinist leader Mátyás Rákosi. Göncz recounted that: 'In a meeting, 
Kovács once said to Rákosi, "Hey Mátyás, haven’t you got a neck. [If not], how can we 
hang you?" People thought [saying] this sealed his fate' (Hegedűs, 1985). On 25 February 
1947, Kovács was arrested for his implication in an alleged conspiracy against the 
Republic, and taken to a Soviet labour camp. From 1948 onwards, he was transferred to 
several camps in the Soviet Union and, on 7 September 1955, by the decision of the 
Supreme Presidium Council, Kovács was handed over to the Hungarian authorities. He 
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was subsequently imprisoned in Jászberény and in April 1956, through the mediating roles 
of ISP politicians, he was released.36  
 
Göncz fulfilled the secretarial position until Kovács’s arrest by the Hungarian authorities. 
According to Göncz’s account, however, this period of work was an unpleasant time in his 
life. Göncz recalled it thus: 
When I undertook the job of secretary, I had no idea what it would entail. A 
secretary, after all, is a personal assistant, there to clean and feed the boss and 
so on. This kind of work is not my cup of tea. Nor did I like calling my boss 
'my master'. The time I spent alongside Kovács was [one of the most] 
unpleasant period[s] in my life […] (Hegedűs, 1985).      
 
Perhaps, Göncz’s independent personality and the assignments he undertook were 
incompatible. However, Göncz’s sense of dissatisfaction with his professional work does 
not necessarily mean that it did not have an important impact on the shaping of Göncz’s 
political outlook. For example, in an interview with Demszky, Göncz remembered Kovács 
as a statesman who was endowed with all qualities that he respected and still respects: 
I think, among the peasant MPs within the ISP, Kovács was the most 
influential figure. In my opinion, he was a man who had the gifts to be a great 
statesman: energy, readiness to learn, his vision of the [future], decisiveness 
and others... I was a witness on the day when he was taken away to the [Soviet 
Union]. It was at the time that the entire coalition government was in crisis, and  
when Communists used salami tactics to [eliminate their opponents]. Kovács 
struggled almost alone to protect the party - even [confronting] Zoltán Tildy 
[the party chairman] - from those threats which came from outside the party... 
In my opinion, he lived an unfulfilled political life. [His abduction meant] the 
significant loss of his [vision] on peasants and its accompanying democratic 
[ideals] [...].37   
 
Göncz noted that Kovács was an important politician who lived through during the inter-
war period. Göncz was clearly of the view that because of the firmness of Kovács’ own 
political principles and beliefs, his integrity and above all, his courage, which had been 
displayed to him, to party members and to political opponents, Kovács remained a moral 
authority. The practical meaning of Kovács’s vision of the peasantry and his ideals remains 
open to question, but Kovács’s influence on Göncz’s political development is firmly 
established. In an interview with me, Göncz reaffirmed the argument, noting that:  
Béla Kovács was the General Secretary of the ISP. He was an extremely 
important politician who came from a peasant [background]. He was 
imprisoned for nine years in the Soviet Union. I learnt politics from him and 
saw politics from his eyes. He had a significant impact on me, because Kovács 
was the first serious politician whom I had ever met… I learnt a lot from 
Kovács not only from the perspective of politics, but also from his 
personality… Kovács constantly read books and had a strong sense of 
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responsibility as the Minister of Agriculture… In a word, my encounter with 
Kovács was a critical juncture in my life [Interview with Göncz, 18 June 2006, 
my emphasis]. 
 
This still does not tells us in what way Kovács had an impact on Göncz’s subsequent 
political developments. However, according to Göncz’s account, it is clear that he saw 
Kovács as a teacher or reference figure for a good statesman role model. As Göncz 
mentioned, he may have disliked his work as assistant secretary work but his position 
certainly as part of his apprenticeship in building up his political career next to the person 
to whom he deferred and paid respect at the time, and still does so.  
 
Aside from his role as secretary, another important activity performed by Göncz in this 
period was undertaking the editorship of the weekly party magazine, the Generation 
(Nemzedék). According to Göncz, the Generation was not successful at the time, partly 
because the ISP did not have sufficient funds to support it, but primarily because the 
readership of magazine was not clearly established. Göncz observed: 'I think, we could not 
really decide who this magazine was for. Was it for the youngsters or the senior citizens or 
the peasants or the students?' (Wisinger and László, 2007: 27). Among those articles 
published, the first issue contained one, "The Crisis of Democracy", written by István Bibó. 
The central theme of the article dealt with the abstract concept of 'reactionaries' 
(reakciósok). The article is too brief to elicit an underlying message; however, Bibó and 
Göncz diverged in their opinions over the question of how they defined and saw 
reactionaries.  
 
Göncz interpreted Bibó’s view as being that reactionaries were those individuals who 
openly and consciously stood against democracy and human needs (Göncz, 1946). Göncz, 
however, contended that the reactionaries were not all identical and in his opinion, they fell 
into two distinct categories: the 'objective' and 'subjective' reactionaries. The first category 
referred to those individuals appointed to privileged positions in terms of economic 
resources and political power, so-called 'aristocrats'. The second type were not originally 
aristocrats, but behaved as if they were. Among the subjective reactionaries, there was a 
significant economic gap between the wealthy peasants and the poor ones. The wealthy 
peasants behaved like the gentry, whereas the poor peasants, who lacked economic assets, 
tried to overcome their disadvantaged position through education. The critical issue was, 
however, that the vast majority of the Hungarian population belonged to the latter 
category; a reasonable solution had to be found to narrow this disparity. One of the ways to 
bridge the material gap conceived by Göncz was to hold social discourse or dialogue, in 
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the expectation that it would provide some idea or solution to tackle the problem. One 
could infer that the idea of holding social dialogue could be related to the influence that the 
PTWG had on Göncz. As discussed in Section 1.2, the PTWG held social seminars where 
university students and intellectuals gathered to discuss social issues and exchange ideas 
regarding the question of the peasantry. In this article, however, Göncz did not detail the 
way in which social discourse could be organised, not to mention that no probable 
connection between the PTWG and his idea was mooted; this therefore remains open to 
question. Nevertheless, Göncz’s editorship of the party magazine was an important activity 
undertaken at this time. It not only demonstrated Göncz’s capacity for critical thinking on 
the issue of the peasantry, but also highlighted the fact that his own approach to politics 
was already well formed by this time.   
 
Göncz’s editorial activity did not last long, as the ISP was gradually dissolved. The State 
Security Authority led by the Communists arrested the key leadership of the ISP in 
connection with an alleged conspiracy against the Republic. The pretext for this was the 
ISP’s complicity in an illegal, secret organisation of Hungarian nationalists, which had 
existed since before the War, the so-called the Hungarian Brotherly Community (HBC). 
The HBC was founded in the 1920s by a group of Calvinist gentry who mainly came from 
Transylvania (Palasik, 2000). At the core of their thought, Hungary was perceived as a 
distinguished nation but the development of this nation was hampered by foreign influence. 
In particular, German expansionism was considered as a major threat; the HBC took an 
anti-German and later an anti-Nazi stance. Bálint Arany, a nationalist ISP politician, was 
the HBC’s spiritual leader but, according to Göncz, the centrists within the party - Kálmán 
Saláta, István Csicsery-Rónay and even the Prime Minister, Ferenc Nagy - were secret 
members (Hegedűs, 1985). The main goal the HBC aspired to achieve was preparation for 
a time when they could form a democratic government, but 'without the participation of 
Communists' (Kenez, 2006: 220). The HBC was also known to have a secret military cell 
whose strength was insignificant when measured against that of the Red Army (Kenez, 
2006: 221). However, uncovering the existence of this secret society gave a sufficient 
pretext for the Communists, who claimed that the HBC conspired to overthrow a 
democratically elected coalition government to act. A wave of arrests in the HBC 
leadership ensued, and with fabricated evidence and extorted confessions, it was soon 
claimed that the ISP was behind the plot.  
 
In particular, the Communists targeted Béla Kovács who was seen as an obstinate, 
intransigent and anti-Communist figure (Cartledge, 2006: 443). Despite his legal immunity, 
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on 25 February 1947, Kovács was arrested by the Soviet authorities on the grounds that he 
had masterminded the formation of a secret anti-Soviet armed terrorist group (Palasik, 
2002: 66) and 'espionage against the Soviet army' (György, 1947: 309). Briefly tried in the 
Soviet military court, Kovács was imprisoned in a Soviet labour camp (Romsics, 1999: 
234). Other leaders of the ISP suffered a similar fate: they were forced to resign or sent 
into exile. As Göncz noted, Kovács had nothing to do with the HBC; on the contrary, he 
stood against it: 'Kovács loathed the HBC... [He] turned red when he heard the name HBC 
and died in the belief that he had been its victim' (Tóth, 2009). However, as stated above, 
some members of the ISP also belonging to the HBC provided a good pretext for the 
Communists to eliminate its largest opposition party, which ultimately resulted in 'the first 
in a series of show trials' (Kenez, 2006: 218), as well as the beginning of the end for the 
ISP (Schöpflin, 1977: 100).   
 
Göncz escaped this purge as he was never a member of the HBC and his position within 
the ISP was a low-ranking one. The excessive nationalism that the HBC advocated was 
against Göncz’s political beliefs, which in turn distanced him from it. Göncz said: 'From 
the beginning, my opinion was against the Hungarian [chauvinism] that the HBC 
represented... They never asked me to join... Perhaps, they sensed my resistance, because 
every time, I stood against the HBC' (Hegedűs, 1985). Despite his non-membership 
however, Göncz was also taken to a military court soon after Kovács’s abduction (Papp, 
2002). The charge on which Göncz was arrested was not related to the HBC affair but 
rather an illegal visit to Romania he made around at the end of 1946. The available 
documentation does not allow us to uncover why the ISP entrusted Göncz to visit local 
Hungarian politicians residing in Romania or the nature of the specific goal to be 
attained.38 However, inferring from Göncz’s own account, the main objective of his 
business in Romania seemed to have been of little importance. Göncz argued that, given 
his low-profile position in the party, he was far from taking on an important role during his 
visit to Romania. His visit was, instead, aimed at observing the country’s situation in 
transition and presenting a report to the ISP afterward:  
Kim: As far as I know, while you worked at the ISP, at the behest of the party, 
you went to Romania. For what purpose did you visit that country? 
Göncz: I just looked around to see what the situation was. In Romania, this 
was the transitional period [after the war] and it was not possible to tell how 
the situation would evolve. I talked to some Hungarian politicians residing in 
Romania and later I gave my report to Béla Kovács. 
Kim: Was your visit not concerned with matters of peace between Hungary 
and Romania?  
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Göncz: Look, I was not an important person. My position was far from that 
which would have allowed me to do anything such as concluding a peace treaty. 
I just looked around Romania, and no more than that. I was not assigned a 
seriously important political task... Do not assume that I was an important 
politician at this time [Interview with Göncz, 18 July 2006, my emphasis]. 
 
As Göncz suggested, from a political perspective, his visit to Romania may not have 
carried great significance. However, the Communist authorities who accessed information 
regarding Göncz’s meeting with the Hungarian politicians in Romania, interpreted this as a 
serious matter, taking him into custody for interrogation as a result. Göncz was detained 
for three weeks and during this confinement, he underwent harsh interrogation. In his 
memory, this was a distressing experience:  
It was a cruel place. They made me stand up 36 hours in a row… [When I] 
collapsed, they made me stand up using a rifle butt… it was hard to stand up 
for 36 hours. Next day [after interrogation began], I was already seeing rabbits 
on the wall. In the morning, [I] was given a black coffee in a mess-tin, but they 
did not let me go to the toilet. When I was released, they said 'Congratulations, 
Comrade to be freed from here'. It was an inhumane, strange, and terrible 
experience (Wisinger and László, 2007: 28).      
 
Despite this interrogation, not one useful piece of information that could have been used to 
charge Göncz regarding his involvement in ISP affairs, particularly in connection with 
Béla Kovács, was obtained and Göncz was released. By this time, the ISP had lost its key 
leadership due to their alleged machinations against the Republic, and the Communists 
were ready to take power. Indeed, this was evidenced by the rise of Communist power led 
by a quartet of Hungarian Muscovites: Mátyás Rákosi, Ernő Gerő, Mihály Farkas, and 
József Révai. Hungary was destined to enter one of the murkier periods of her modern 
history - Communist rule. Unemployed as a consequence of the ISP’s dissolution, Göncz 
took on several part-time skilled manual jobs, including soldering and pipefitting (The 
Baltimore Sun, 24 September 1990). At the same time, he took a distance learning course 
at Gödöllő Agricultural University, where he specialised in soil erosion and protection 
(interview with Szunyog, 19 August 2007). Göncz then utilised his knowledge working as 
an agronomist at the Soil Improvement Firm until the outbreak of the 1956 Revolution. 
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This chapter has examined the development of Göncz’s political views as they took shape 
during his adolescence and early adulthood. As a whole, the analysis presented here has led 
to the conclusion that during the early years of Göncz’s life, two elements – liberal and 
democratic political beliefs and radical peasant populism – were crystallised and 
entrenched in his ideological trajectory. The genesis of Göncz’s liberal and democratic 
political beliefs lay in the PTWG, where he participated in a series of social seminars of 
intellectual forum and that later led him to find his role in the student armed resistance 
movements. The fundamental ideas and values that Göncz espoused and struggled for 
during the resistance rested in their commitment to the realisation of a free, democratic and 
socially responsible society. His first hand experience in the resistance movement served 
as a catalyst which, in turn, contributed to the development of Göncz’s liberal and 
democratic political beliefs. 
 
Similarly, but more importantly, the idea of peasant populism was embedded in the fabric 
of Göncz’s political beliefs. Göncz’s understanding of peasant populism originated from 
his scouting activity, which served as a basis of raising his social awareness regarding the 
situation of poor peasantry. Göncz sensed that there was a moral imperative for the radical 
social and political change, and firmly believed that land reform and the provision of 
national education to the peasantry would serve as the key means to resolve the social issue 
of the age. Göncz’s first political activity was in the ISP, which embraced the idea of 
peasant populism and endeavoured to formulate it into actual policy. This leads to the 
conclusion that at this period in his life peasant populism was the most consistent and 
pronounced element entrenched in Göncz’s political beliefs. Having noted this significance, 
the following chapter further examines and traces the continuity of the influence of peasant 
populism on Göncz’s political ideas and their coexistence in his thinking with liberal 
democratic ideas, when he experienced one of the most crucial social and political changes 
of the age, the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. 
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Chapter 2. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution 
Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the development of Göncz’s political views during the 
early years of his life. It was argued that two elements – the idea of peasant populism and 
Göncz’s first-hand experience in anti-Nazi student resistance movements - were the most 
important factors contributing to Göncz’s democratic political beliefs prior to 1956. With 
this in mind, the present chapter examines Göncz’s subsequent political and intellectual 
development by exploring his first-hand experience of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. On 
15 June 1995, in a speech delivered at the commemoration of Imre Nagy’s execution, 
Göncz clearly stated what the Revolution meant to him:  
'56 was a turning point in my life too. It has determined my personal life to this 
very day. Without '56 I would not be standing here in front of you […] (Tóth, 
1999: 55). 
 
A detailed discussion regarding the events and developments of the 1956 Revolution, 
however, is not provided in this chapter. As Cox notes, research exploring 'the events, 
meanings and memories of 1956' are on-going in academia (Cox, 2006: 3) and, as a 
biographer and a historian looking into the political life and achievement of Árpád Göncz, 
my research necessarily focuses upon him. Relevant background information will be 
presented where it is necessary. The chapter is laid out as follows.  
 
The first section examines Göncz’s activity in the Petőfi Circle. As will be discussed here, 
Göncz gave a speech to the Circle which was in fact his only notable political activity 
before the outbreak of the Revolution. Although this was an isolated action and the 
implications of this activity are open to question, it is worth examining his speech as it 
exhibited Göncz’s own view regarding Soviet farming models in Hungarian agriculture.  
 
Subsequently, a brief chronology of the key events of the Revolution, and Göncz’s role and 
actions in the resistance of 1956 which followed the suppression of the Revolution are 
discussed. In particular, Göncz’s liaison role in negotiations between István Bibó and India 
(which took a proactive role in the Hungarian issue) are examined in depth. The chapter 
will examine what Göncz sought to achieve through these activities.  
 
The remainder of the chapter examines Göncz’s life in prison and, ultimately the chapter 
will probe in what way Göncz’s experience of this pivotal event impacted the shaping of 
his political beliefs.  
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In general, Göncz had a fragmented memory regarding the 1956 Revolution. As Göncz 
acknowledged, he was incapable of reconstructing the development of the Revolution until 
he gained access to the relevant history book: 'I could hardly recount the moments 
regarding the Revolution... Until I obtained Bill Lomax’s book, I could not even arrange 
my memories chronologically. The entire thing was so blurry' (Hegedűs, 1985).39 Despite 
this vagueness, drawing upon the collated information and documentation discovered in 
Göncz’s own essays, his personal Oral History, speeches, interviews and newspaper 
articles, one can be certain that Göncz did not participate in the armed resistance of the 
Revolution. Until 10 November 1956, when the Soviet forces finally quelled the armed 
insurgency of the Hungarian freedom fighters, Göncz’s main activity comprised observing 
and witnessing some memorable events. For example, on 23 October 1956 when thousands 
of demonstrators gathered in front of Parliament demanding Imre Nagy’s presence, Göncz 
and his daughter were there and experienced the powerful atmosphere. Göncz recounted: 
'In front of Parliament when people demanded Imre Nagy, I was there with my little 
daughter [Kinga] who was on my shoulders. [People] lit crumpled newspapers like torches' 
(Göncz’s interview with Kossuth Radio, 22 October 1990). This activity carried a certain 
importance as Göncz witnessed and took part in the development of the Revolution. 
Similarly, Göncz’s participation in a meeting where Imre Nagy and young insurgents were 
present at Nagy’s house was a notable political activity. Göncz reminisced about it thus: 
We had a discussion at Imre Nagy’s house. Nagy received us saying that 'here 
it is, the entire resistance movement'. The discussion was interrupted when 
Nagy’s secretary came with a memo. Nagy [who saw the memo] said, 
'Gentlemen! From now on, we need to discuss another thing because there is a 
dangerous possibility of a Third World War' [breaking out]. This was about the 
Alexandria intervention (Göncz’s interview with Kossuth Radio, 22 October 
1990). 
 
The memo concerned the Suez Crisis, which took place on 29 October 1956 when Great 
Britain and France attacked Egypt over access to the Suez Canal. Göncz’s account 
provides an interesting perspective regarding Nagy’s perception of the Suez Crisis and his 
sense of reality. In terms of Göncz’s position, however, it is far from clear as a sufficient 
explanation of his relationship with Nagy and other insurgents who participated in the 
meeting. How could it be possible for Göncz to attend the meeting? Given Göncz’s 
position and career at this time – that of an agriculturalist – it is unreasonable to suggest 
that Göncz suddenly took on a position of leadership and was able to discuss affairs of 
state.40 In this way, there were a number of similarly interesting moments, pictures and 
impressions that remained in Göncz’s memory, but all of these are fragments of 
overarching revolutionary developments. As a whole, the lack of relevant material in 
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available documentation prevents us from reconstructing Göncz’s political role and actions 
over this time period. Thus, research must necessarily be focused on those events in which 
Göncz not only became involved, but which also offered a valid starting point for a 
discussion of his proactive political activities. This exercise can justifiably be begun with 
the speech that Göncz delivered to the Petőfi Circle. 
 
2.1. The Petőfi Circle (Petőfi Kör) 
On 6 November 2001, in a public lecture delivered at Corvinus University of Budapest, 
Göncz stated that:  
In the preparation for the Revolution, within the framework of social debate, 
the Petőfi Circle discussed numerous important questions of the age, which 
also gave rise to the sea-change in theoretical and moral authority [elméleti és 
morális tekintélyek pályfordulását].41   
 
The so-called Petőfi Circle (which was named after the heroic poet of the 1848 Revolution, 
Sándor Petőfi) was a forum where intellectuals and the general public alike participated in 
social debates. Göncz utilised this forum to offer his critique of the Soviet farming model 
and its relevance to Hungarian agriculture. Despite the fact that Göncz did not take a 
leading role in the Circle, it is important to consider the significance of Göncz’s 
involvement in it. As Litván noted, the Circle 'created the opening wedge of future 
intellectual revolt' (Litván, 1996: 39), leading to the development of the Revolution.  
 
Founded in March 1955, under the auspices of the Union of Working Youth (Cartledge, 
2006: 461; Kovrig, 1984: 93), the Petőfi Circle was initially no more than a loose 
association of former activists constituted from the League of Hungarian University 
Students and the National Association of Peoples’ College (Litván, 1996: 39).42 With the 
dissemination of Khrushchev’s 'Secret Speech'43 to members of the party elites and 
intellectuals, the Circle was gradually transformed into a forum and platform where 
reform-minded intellectuals and professionals (Romsics, 1999: 299) and, more importantly, 
intra-party opposition gathered and debated topical issues. Twelve important agendas, 
including the need for reform in agriculture, education and the economy, and above all, 
political renewal were set as the central themes for the debates.44 The Circle meetings took 
place throughout the spring and summer of 1956, and attracted an ever growing audience 
(Hegedűs, 1997: 115-24); in effect the Circle mobilised the hitherto obedient, passive and 
acquiescent society in the discussion of how to address pressing issues that weighed upon 
the Hungarian population at the time. In Gyarmati’s terms, the Circle functioned as the 
'parliament of society', where participants exchanged their opinions and ideas 'with such 
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frankness and willingness that it was as if [meetings] were not taking place in the shadow 
of monolithic party domination' (Gyarmati, 2005: 586).   
 
As an agronomist Göncz had an opportunity to voice his opinion regarding the adequacy of 
the Soviet farming model in the Circle. The available documentation does not enable us to 
clarify precisely when and how he became a part of the Circle.45 According to records and 
minutes compiled by the former Secretary of the Circle András B. Hegedűs, however, on 
17 October 1956 at the Kárl Marx Economic University of Budapest, Göncz attended one 
of the agricultural debates entitled "Garden Hungary" (Kert Magyarország). In this 
meeting, Göncz contended that the Soviet farming model – 'extensive farming' – which 
required vast areas of land for large-scale production of wheat and barley - was essentially 
not favourable to Hungary’s agricultural environment.46 Instead, as a way of enhancing 
the efficiency of Hungary’s agricultural system, Göncz suggested that 'intensive farming', 
which is advantageous for increasing the yield of crops in smaller land areas, be introduced. 
Above all, Göncz considered that the extension of agricultural education to the peasants 
and farmers was required to help equip them with adequate knowledge of agriculture. 
Göncz stated: 'Education is very important, because two-thirds of the peasants and their 
children do not have an opportunity to learn how to become a cultivated peasantry' 
(Hegedűs, 1994: 150). Additionally, Göncz detailed the way, in which intensive farming 
could be implemented and what short-term effects and consequences could be expected, 
after its implementation:   
An important precondition of intensive farming is the reduction of the sowing 
area of bread-grains... If the sowing area of wheat is reduced across the country, 
it is expected that, in a smaller area, for the first year, the average production 
would not increase significantly. However, a few years after, [owing to the 
increase of] forage, stock and farm yard manure, favourable green crops would 
increase to the extent to which the average production could reach the current 
level of yield. To be sure, it would be an illusion to believe that all of the 
economies belonging to the socialist sectors could function [well] and be 
managed via a large scale mode [Hegedűs, 1994: 151, my emphasis].     
 
This speech clearly highlights Göncz’s dissenting opinion and shows how his critical 
thinking that was distinct from the official party-line on agricultural policy. As Romsics 
noted, if the Communist authorities’ strict control over education - including political 
indoctrination and re-indoctrination courses – meant that pluralistic values were neglected 
and dissenting opinions and critical voices among people were neutralised (Romsics, 1999: 
281-92), the Circle undoubtedly resisted this by demanding reform and revision of state 
policy. Not surprisingly, the Communist leadership watched the Circle’s activities 
anxiously and finally decided to ban it. However, this decision was reversed with the 
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removal of Hungarian Stalinist Mátyás Rákosi from the party leadership; it had become 
apparent that it was too late to turn back the tide of the reform movement. Indeed, as the 
Soviet leadership foresaw, it became a harbinger of the development of the 1956 
Revolution: 'the discussion of the Petőfi Circle [is] an ideological Poznan without the 
gunshots' (Kramer, 1998: 179). Given this historical significance, it is fair to suggest that 
Göncz’s participation in the Circle and his speech regarding the necessity of agricultural 
reform carried a certain significance, albeit a manifestly symbolic one.  
 
2.2. Chronology of the key events of the 1956 Revolution 
On 22 October 1956, the students who believed that more should be done to persuade the 
Communists to accept their demands gathered at the Budapest Technical University. They 
formulated a sixteen point agenda outlining the need for fundamental radical reform in 
education, the economy and politics; among these, the withdrawal of Soviet troops was set 
as the top priority.47 The following day, university students took to the streets where they 
were joined by the general public, and they also insisted that the sixteen point agenda be 
broadcast on Budapest Radio Station. However, the guards who were defending the Radio 
Station building shot at protestors and consequently, a peaceful demonstration turned into 
an armed insurgency. This was the beginning of the 1956 Revolution which lasted for two 
weeks thereafter.48  
 
Between 23 October 1956 and 27 October 1956, freedom fighters and Soviet forces were 
engaged in armed clashes. The Soviet military intervention which had commenced on 24 
October at the request of the General Secretary of the Hungarian Workers’ and Peoples’ 
Party Ernő Gerő, met with scattered but strong armed resistance from the Hungarian 
people. Engagement continued until 28 October when Imre Nagy, who had by then been 
reinstated as the Prime Minister, announced his government’s willingness to begin 
negotiations with the freedom fighters, acknowledging that 'the uprising is a national 
democratic revolution' (Litván, 1996: 184). 
 
Over the following three days, from 28 October 1956 to 30 October 1956, the domestic 
situation of Hungary was stabilised and democratic political reforms followed. A truce 
between the freedom fighters and the Soviet forces was called and Nagy announced the 
dismantling of the one-party system and the establishment of a coalition government. In 
response, the Soviet leadership displayed leniency towards Nagy’s reform plan and backed 
his government. The Soviet leadership seemed to be willing to negotiate on the withdrawal 
of troops from Hungary and the 'declaration of mutual respect for the independence of 
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socialist states' was announced (Litván, 1996: 185). In the meantime, on 30 October, 
Anglo-French forces attacked Egypt over Suez, and Göncz along with his friends were at 
Nagy’s house when they heard the news. 
 
During the next phase, 31 October 1956 to 4 November 1956, the prospect of armed 
clashes between the freedom fighters and Soviet forces once again loomed. On 31 October, 
the Soviet leadership changed their lenient position towards the Nagy government and 
decided upon the re-introduction of a military presence in Hungary (Békés, Byrne and 
Rainer, 2002: 41). In response, on the following day, Nagy declared Hungary’s neutrality 
and asked for protection from the United Nations. However, no positive response and 
practical help from the West was forthcoming and, on 4 November, Soviet forces began to 
crush the armed insurgency. Nagy sought, and was granted, asylum in the Yugoslav 
Embassy49 and, on that day, István Bibó (a Minister of State in the Nagy government) 
composed an official letter of protest - the Proclamation entitled "Hungarians" (Magyarok) 
(Berki, 1992: 514) – against the forced removal of the legitimate Nagy government.50 
Bibó was mistaken for an ordinary clerk and so survived the military crackdown, escaping 
from Parliament with the proclamation (Falk, 2003: 136; Granville, 2001: 2). This 
declaration was later widely circulated 'either in part or in whole' in both the Hungarian 
press and 'the world’s major newspapers' (Rainer, 1993: 32) which, in turn, contributed to 
making the Hungarian situation and Bibó’s name known to the public at large. Over the 
period 5 to 11 November 1956, the armed uprising was put down and the two week long 
revolution was at an end.    
 
2.3. Rearguard struggle: liaison between István Bibó, India and the West 
By 11 November 1956 the last of the armed uprising had been quelled by the Soviet army. 
However, the resistance of democratic forces to the newly established Soviet-sponsored 
Kádár regime continued for some months thereafter. Workers launched a series of general 
strikes demanding the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the return of the Nagy government 
(Cartledge, 2006: 486), and the Revolutionary Council of Hungarian Intellectuals – 
primarily writers, journalists and student bodies - issued statements of protest against the 
Soviet invasion and appealed for help and mediation from any quarter in the West (Litván, 
1996: 100-22; Romsics, 1999: 316-20). István Bibó, a symbol of democratic intellectual 
resistance, drafted statements, exposés, and proclamations and offered his own solution to 
the challenges which arose during and after the suppression of the Revolution. Among 
Bibó’s writings were the Draft Proposal for a Compromise Solution to the Hungarian 
Questions (hereafter the Draft Proposal) is particularly worthy of in-depth discussion, as it 
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is this proposal that provided the fundamental basis for the democratic forces to negotiate 
with the Kádár regime (Granville, 2001: 2; Szilágyi, 1991: 541). Göncz participated in 
debates on the Draft Proposal and helped Bibó to establish a rapport with Indian 
government officials who mediated in the conflict between the democratic forces and the 
Soviet leadership (Litván, 2008: 378). Moreover, Göncz endeavoured to smuggle a 
manuscript authored by Imre Nagy – "On Communism in Defense of New Course" - to the 
West and campaigned for clandestine financial support for the families of imprisoned '56 
revolutionaries.  
 
One of the key aspects requring examination is the question of how Göncz became 
acquainted with Bibó and, how he established a collaborative relationship with India 
concerning the Hungarian situation. The discussion of this issue begins by considering 
India’s attitude towards the 1956 Revolution. Initially, India was 'slow, cautious and 
hesitant' about becoming involved in the Hungarian Revolution (Kidwai, 1984: 64). The 
Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis were concurrent and India promptly reacted to 
the latter by condemning the Anglo-French intervention. The Indian Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru stated that: 'In all my experience in foreign affairs I have come across no 
greater case of naked aggression than what France and England are trying to do' (Stein, 
1969: 86). In relation to the former issue, the Indian leadership took an ambivalent stance, 
expressing sympathy for those anonymous Hungarians who fought for freedom, but the 
Indians were hesitant about becoming directly involved. On 2 November 1956, in a 
telegram forwarded to his ambassador, Kumara Pladmanabha Sivasankava Menon 
(hereafter K. P. S. Menon),51 Nehru stated that: 'It is difficult for us to intervene in any 
way but I should like you to let the Soviet authorities know informally that this situation in 
Hungary is causing people in India much concern and naturally sympathy goes to those 
who represent the national desire for freedom' […] (Hasan, Prasad and Damodaran, 2005: 
453). More strikingly, when the UN voted for the adoption of a resolution condemning 
Soviet military aggression, the Indian delegates led by Nehru’s confidant, Krishna Menon, 
abstained from voting (Gopal, 1989: 307). This differentiated approach provoked 
controversy among the members of the international community and, India was essentially 
criticised for adopting a double standard in its treatment of two apparently separate, but 
intertwined events (Guha, 2007: 165). As a biographer of Nehru, Judith Brown, has noted, 
'the juxtaposition of Suez and the Hungarian uprising placed Nehru in an unenviable 
position' in terms of defending his non-alignment policy (Brown, 2003: 263).52   
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By the middle of November 1956, signs of the shift in India’s position towards Hungary 
were emerging. In a speech, Nehru called for the swift withdrawal of the Soviet troops 
from Hungary and expressed solidarity with the Hungarian people who fought for freedom, 
stating that 'the people of Hungary should be allowed to determine their future according to 
their wishes' (Nehru, 1961: 555). What led the Indian leadership to reconsider its initial 
position towards the Hungarian question? International pressure from the members of the 
UN, advisors within the government and ambassadors’ reports, and Nehru’s sister’s 
contact, Vijaya Lakshmi Nehru Pandit, (who by then was acting as a High Commissioner 
in London), all contributed to changing Nehru’s stance towards the Hungarian crisis 
(Brown, 2003: 264-65). According to Göncz, however, an Indian diplomat named 
Mohamed Attaur Rahman was crucial to the change of India’s position. Rahman was the 
Chargé de Affairs in the Indian Embassy in Budapest (Farkas, 1991). He was assistant to 
the ambassador K.P.S. Menon. Menon, however, was also accredited to Moscow and had 
another important diplomatic commitment there; Rahman was de facto the only legal 
representative leading the Embassy. In his personal Oral History, Göncz explained how 
Rahman might have contributed to altering the Indian leadership’s position in dealing with 
the Hungarian question:  
In Budapest, there was the Chargé de Affairs of the Indian Embassy named 
Rahman. He changed the attitude of the Indian government towards the 
Hungarian Revolution. Rahman clearly [saw] the possibility that India’s [role 
in the Hungarian question] could be [one] of participating in the settlement of 
an international conflict as a moral authority. In the Indian parliament, Nehru 
said that 'based on the report given by our official resident in Pest, we should 
[consider] correcting our previous stance' (Hegedűs, 1985).   
 
Göncz may have overstated Rahman’s role but, as Stein has observed, while 'no senior 
diplomat was present in Budapest, one member of the Indian Embassy [Rahman] managed 
to get several well-written and detailed reports out of Hungary via Austria' (Stein, 1969: 
90) a fact which demonstrates Rahman’s significance for the Hungarian question. Indeed, 
several telegrams exchanged between Nehru and Rahman indicate that Nehru’s changed 
stance towards Hungary had been informed by Rahman. In the telegram dated 18 
November 1956, in response to Rahman’s reports, Nehru made his position on events in 
Hungary and their possible solution very clear:  
We have received your telegrams... We welcome this detailed information 
which enables us to form a clearer picture of events. Our policy is to encourage 
the speedy withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary but that this should be 
peacefully done. Any violence will not only bring fresh misery but delay such a 
withdrawal [...] (Hasan, Prasad and Damodaran, 2005: 467).  
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Four days after this correspondence, Nehru began to proactively engage with the 
Hungarian question. He took the initiative in the formation of a Delegation of UN 
Observers to be dispatched to Hungary. This action was aimed at providing relief, 
clarifying the situation that had developed as a result of the Kádár regime’s deportation of 
some Hungarian young people who had participated in the Revolution. On 22 November 
1956, Nehru simultaneously sent letters to Marshall Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin, 
János Kádár and Josip Broz Tito, requesting their cooperation in his arbitration on the 
Hungarian question. The letter forwarded to Tito is worthy of examination, as it conveys 
Nehru’s ideas most explicitly: 
In Hungary there appears to be widespread belief that deportations have taken 
place and some evidence is also produced to that effect. As you know, [the] 
resolution sponsored by India, Indonesia and Ceylon was passed by the UN 
General Assembly last night... It would be exceedingly unfortunate if [the] 
Hungarian Government or [the] Soviet Government refused to allow [the] 
Secretary General of [the] UN or UN Observers to go to Budapest now... I 
have sent a personal message today to Premier Bulganin as well as Premier 
Kádár of Hungary pointing out to them that our resolution passed by the UN 
Assembly notes Hungarian denials [of the deportations] and fully recognises 
[the] sovereignty of Hungary... In view of serious allegations and doubts that 
have arisen in people’s minds, it is highly desirable for [the] UN Secretary 
General and UN Observers to be allowed to go to Budapest for talks with the 
Hungarian Government. I am afraid that if this permission is not given, [the] 
consequences will be disastrous. I would request [that] you also exercise your 
great influence to get the Hungarian Government to agree to the Secretary 
General or UN Observers going to Budapest [...] (Hasan, Prasad and 
Damodaran , 2005: 478-79). 
 
As Gopal noted, Nehru’s diplomatic endeavour 'marked an emphatic change in his 
attitude' on the Hungarian event (Gopal, 1989: 309).53  
 
The news regarding the change of India’s position towards Hungary was circulated among 
a narrow circle in Hungarian society and, in mid-November 1956, Göncz came across a 
journalist who provided him with this crucial information: ... 'Around 10 November 1956, I 
[Göncz] ran into a news writer, Pál Magyar. He told me that the Indian officials would 
undertake arbitration [between the Hungarian democratic forces and the Soviets] if they 
received a request signed by the Hungarian democratic forces' (Hegedűs, 1985). Having 
been informed of the news, Göncz visited Bibó who was composing the Draft Proposal at 
this time. According to Göncz (in an interview with Hungarian daily Magyar Hírlap), he 
first:  
got to know Bibó when [Bibó] worked at a university library... Bibó drafted a 
treatise with [Ferenc] Erdei and [Jenő] Matyasovszky. At this time, I worked in 
a soil improvement firm and Matyasovskzy was my colleague. But my really 
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close relationship with Bibó was [formed] around 10 November 1956 [...] 
[Lengyel, 1992, my emphasis]. 
 
Thus, according to Göncz’s statement, it would appear that the 1956 Revolution provided 
the momentum required to bring him and Bibó together and, a good working relationship 
between them was developed thereafter. Indeed, Bibó confirmed Göncz’s view that the 
meeting of November 1956 represented the starting point of their working relationship: 
Sometime between 9 and 11 November, Göncz dropped into my flat. I had 
known him previously but we were not close friends then. However, from that 
point onwards, we were in constant touch... In the middle of November, Göncz 
showed me something he had written requesting the Indian government’s 
mediation [in the Hungarian question], which I favoured. Later, having 
collected signatories from other [social] organisations, Göncz handed over [the 
request] to the Indian Embassy, which he visited constantly during December 
and informed me of [the situation] [...] (Litván and Varga, 1995: 495).  
 
Throughout December, Göncz visited the Embassy frequently and one of the notable acts 
he undertook was that of conveying Bibó’s Draft Proposal there. Bibó composed the 
Proposal after the second Soviet intervention had quelled popular Hungarian armed 
resistance. In this Draft, as a way of resolving the situation that had developed after the 
suppression of the Revolution, Bibó proposed the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the 
convention of a national assembly (Kenedi, 1996: 60-62). Firstly, Bibó saw that from the 
beginning, Hungary had no intention of breaking away from the socialist order, but the 
intervention of Soviet forces in the popular uprising was counter-productive to the 
consolidation of the domestic political situation achieved by the Nagy government. For this 
reason, Bibó urged the withdrawal of the Soviet army and proposed that foreign policy 
between Hungary and the Soviet Union be revised in a way that put them on an equal 
footing (with the eventual conclusion of a bilateral treaty). Secondly and more importantly, 
the manner in which the social democratic order could be re-arranged and re-aligned upon 
the departure of Soviet troops was detailed. Bibó’s concept was that an interim national 
assembly - constituted from the delegates of Workers’ Councils and Revolutionary 
Committees - could play a major role in the political arrangement in terms of the 
fundamental structure of the state, the constitutional order and the formulation of basic 
laws. Among the most important issues to be decided in the national assembly were the 
following:    
According to Article I of the draft law of 1946, the form of the Hungarian state 
is that of a Republic; 
According to Article III of 1848, the form of the Hungarian government is that 
of a parliamentary democracy built upon an independent government 
accountable to the general public; 
The form of Hungarian society is that of one free of exploitation (socialism), 
which means the maintenance of the 1945 land reform, and [that] of 
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nationalised mines, banks and heavy industry; the provision of opportunity for 
the free undertaking of individual and cooperative business with a guarantee of 
the prohibition of exploitation [...] (Kenedi, 1996: 61-62).   
 
This proposal was discussed and signed by the leaders of parties, workers’ councils and 
revolutionary committees that had emerged or been reconstructed during the short-lived 
Nagy government (Litván, 1996: 116; Wisinger and László, 2007: 37). Bibó and Ferenc 
Farkas signed on behalf of the Peasants’ Party, and on behalf of the Smallholders, Jr. 
József Antall and Zoltán Tildy appended their signatures. Göncz himself, as a member of 
the Peasant Alliance, signed the Proposal (Litván and Varga, 1995: 496), and delivered a 
copy to Rahman. Bibó confirmed this act, noting that: 'On 14 December, at the draft 
editors’ behest [Ferenc Farkas and I] Göncz took copies of the Proposals – one in English 
and two in Russian - to the Indian Embassy' […] (Litván and Varga, 1995: 497). Within a 
week, feedback regarding the Draft Proposal came from the Indian side. Rahman informed 
Göncz of the Ambassdor K.P.S. Menon’s visit to Pest for the business of discussing the 
Proposal. On several occasions, between 16 December and 8 January 1957, meetings 
between Bibó, Göncz and Menon took place at the Indian Embassy and the Margit Hotel 
(Tóth, 2009). Menon confirmed his willingness to undertake shuttle diplomacy between 
Hungary and the Soviet Union, and agreed to convey the Proposal to the Soviet leadership. 
It was ultimately handed over to Bulganin (Lendvai, 2008: 156), but no positive response 
was forthcoming from the Soviet side (Falk, 2003: 136; Göncz, 1991: 282). In his personal 
Oral History, Göncz clearly remembered the result of India’s mission:  
István Bibó and Ferenc Farkas composed the proposal... We [Bibó and I] 
handed it over to Menon... Menon said that it was delivered to [Bulganin]54 
but he did not receive feedback. He said [Bulganin] didn’t refuse to accept it 
but made no comments on it either (Hegedűs, 1985).   
 
Another important activity undertaken by Göncz was smuggling Nagy’s manuscript on 
Communism in Defence of the New Course to the West (Cservenka, 2000; Kőrösi and 
Molnár, 2003: 159; Kozák, 1991: 115; Petri, 2002). The manuscript was originally written 
by Imre Nagy after he was ousted from the premiership. In this manuscript, Nagy defended 
the New Course,55 the main aim of which was easing the problems caused by 'forced 
collectivisation and industrialisation' and 'mitigating the repressive and arbitrary features of 
the totalitarian system' (Kovrig, 1984: 92). One copy of the script was kept by László 
Kardos, who was not a member of the Nagy Group but who sympathised with the New 
Course.56 Göncz had become acquainted with Kardos when he joined student armed 
resistance movements during the German occupation of Budapest. Kardos was active as 
one of the leaders of the Freedom Front of Hungarian Students at this time.57 Around 
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March 1957, Kardos and Göncz collaborated with one another in the smuggling of Nagy’s 
manuscript to the West (Cservenka, 2000; Litván, 2008: 336). This operation was made 
possible through the assistance of Nagy Regéczy-László, a former military officer, and a 
chauffeur to the First Secretary of the British Legation, Christopher Lee Cope (Kőrösi, 
1991: 217). Regéczy-László, a distant relative of Göncz, acted as an intermediary between 
Cope and Göncz and arranged a series of secret meetings. In his Oral History, Göncz 
explained why it was necessary to take the manuscript out of the country: 'Kardos said 
there was some material written by Imre Nagy that had to be sent abroad. If Nagy was tried, 
it would be possible to prove he was a Communist after all. I looked for my old friend 
Regéczy-Nagy... and at his flat I met Cope' (Tóth, 2009). Göncz and Kardos expected that 
if the manuscript were successfully smuggled to the West, it might have helped to rescue 
Nagy from execution after his forthcoming trial. It would provide important counter-
evidence to the official propaganda and disinformation disseminated by the Kádár regime 
to the effect that Nagy had sought 'a counter-revolution in a socialist system' (Gough, 
2006: 110) and attempted to restore a capitalist order.58 
 
Cope agreed to become involved in this mission and established the precise manner in 
which the manuscript could be smuggled out of the country. An exact time and venue were 
arranged in advance and in the early spring of 1957 Göncz met Cope. The moment when 
the manuscript was handed over is vividly described by Göncz:  
On 14 March [1957] I was at the Miniatür coffee-shop to receive the file from 
Kardos... He brought a briefcase [with Nagy’s script inside], and put it on the 
ground, then left the scene with my bag... I stayed there to hand over the 
briefcase to a passing car... [Cope’s] car appeared and the manuscript was 
taken. It went to the [British] Legation [...] (Hegedűs, 1985). 
 
The joint operation was successful and the manuscript was ultimately delivered by the 
British Legation to the Émigré Revolutionary Committee based in Strasbourg (Rainer, 
2002b: 307). In an enclosed letter forwarded to one of the leaders of the Strasbourg 
Revolutionary Committee, Sándor Kiss, Göncz urged the publication of Nagy’s manuscript 
and detailed the situation of Nagy, who was awaiting trial at this time. Göncz wrote:   
It appears that Imre Nagy’s trial is imminent. Before this trial, I saw the 
publication of the enclosed piece of work was necessary, even if you [may] not 
agree with all aspects of Nagy’s political views. I guarantee the authenticity of 
it... The condition of publication is that only the Hungarian Revolutionary 
Committee must act as publisher - other publishers cannot take this role. The 
entire text must be published... The publication of the work is urgent. I trust 
your judgement [regarding whether the work needs to be] distributed via radio 
or the press... I consider the translation of the work into English, French, Italian, 
German and any other languages spoken in Democratic People’s Republics is 
necessary [....] (Kis, Kőszeg and Solt, 1992: 889). 
 52 
Indeed, Nagy’s work was translated and published in several countries, including France, 
Germany, Italy and the UK (Rainer, 2002b: 291), and news regarding the publication of 
Nagy’s essay was broadcast by the BBC in London and Radio Free Europe (Kis, Kőszeg 
and Solt, 1992: 889). As former British Ambassador to Hungary, Peter Unwin noted, the 
essay 'created a stir' among its Western readership and offered a unique insight and 
valuable revelations regarding 'the closed world of the Communist leadership' (Unwin, 
1991: 112). However, as Bibó’s Draft Proposal could not change the direction of the Soviet 
leadership’s foreign policy towards Hungary, the essay - other than drawing Western 
interest and sympathy for Nagy and his reform policy – failed to give support and practical 
assistance to Nagy at his trial; Nagy and his associates were destined for execution.  
 
The last activity carried out by Göncz before he was arrested was campaigning for the 
Hungarian Aid (HA – Magyar Segély) movement. Originally, the HA was a world-wide 
solidarity movement led by Western governments and civil organisations. Sympathising 
with the Hungarian population, it had drawn on individuals and organisations across 
Europe to provide moral and material support to the freedom fighters during the 
Revolution (Kőrösi and Molnár, 2003: 73).59 Göncz, one of the '56 revolutionaries who 
committed himself to rearguard actions, knew, directly and indirectly the families who 
were in desperate need of moral and material support, and thus, decided to act for them. In 
particular Göncz endeavoured to win émigré support for families and friends in need. In a 
letter forwarded to Sándor Kiss, Göncz appealed for material assistance for the dependent 
families of the revolutionaries who had already been arrested: 
At home, another wave of new arrests has hit and as a consequence, László 
Kardos and others among my acquaintances have been arrested. More and 
more, the families who were arrested are finding themselves in a difficult 
situation... Please offer financial support to those people listed in the enclosed 
letter...60 Probably, in one or two weeks, Bibó and I will be taken into custody. 
In this case, please take care of our families [...] (Kis, Kőszeg and Solt, 1992: 
889). 
 
Shortly after this correspondence, Göncz’s clandestine activity was uncovered by the 
Communist authorities and on 28 May 1957 Bibó and Göncz were both arrested and their 
rearguard actions ceased. Despite their arrest, the solidarity of Hungarian society 
demonstrated during the Revolution continued, though fewer people were willing to take 
part in resistance as Kádár’s power was gradually consolidated. As Göncz’s wife 
Zsuzsánna Göntér neatly asserted, this sense of social solidarity shared by anonymous 
Hungarians served as an impetus for the families in need, enabling them to cope with the 
difficult circumstances:  
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Everyone who shared a sense of solidarity with the '56 revolutionaries took 
risks… I received money from Göncz’s Boy Scout’ friends and his 
paediatrician friends who collected money for us in the hospital. Although I 
was unable to make a decent living with my pay, our family had no problem 
with finance. I really don’t know where and how many times we received 
support. They just left money next to the window or left an envelope at the 
door without a name on it. Our circle of friends was fantastic (Interview with 
Göncz and Göntér, 10 January 2008).  
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2.4. Trial, imprisonment, hunger strike and the translation bureau  
At midnight on 28 May 1957, two weeks before Nagy’s trial and his subsequent execution, 
Göncz was arrested by secret police at his flat on suspicion of complicity in overthrowing 
the state order of the People’s Republic of Hungary (Beszélő, 1990; Mátraházi, 1989; Pál, 
1991; Petri, 2002). Göncz was taken to the head office of the police and justice department 
where the Investigation Division of the Budapest Police Department, Capital Military 
Court, Capital Military Attorney's Office and Psychiatric Examination Institute were 
located.61According to Litván, this place was hidden from the world, and in it secret trials 
were prepared, which then proceeded under a shroud of secrecy. Imre Nagy’s trial on 15 
June 1957 was at this venue. Litván noted:  
The police and justice system operated in secrecy so that they [the Communist 
authorities] could conceal the truth that the Imre Nagy group was not in 
Romania but at home [Gyorskocsi Street] in preparation for the trial. The trial 
proceeded [as planned] but the news became known to the public only after 
Nagy’s execution (Interview with Litván, 22 July 2006).    
 
By the end of Nagy’s trial, Göncz, together with Bibó and Regéczy-Nagy had been 
detained for 14 months and during this time they were primarily interrogated in connection 
with their actions pertaining to India and the West. Each of the accused was questioned 
individually thus preventing any meetings between Bibó, Göncz and Regéczy-Nagy during 
the interrogation. Nevertheless, before the trial, they once had an opportunity to see each 
other. In that meeting, Bibó and Göncz behaved altruistically to save Regéczy-Nagy by 
taking all the responsibility for their collaborative actions. Regéczy-Nagy reminisced about 
the manner in which questioning proceeded and how Bibó and Göncz acted at the time:  
They [the investigators] wrote down our personal records. Bibó was 
interrogated alone then Göncz followed... When it was [my turn], both of them 
sat down... Bibó wanted to save us, and Göncz wanted to save me... The 
interrogators said if they could hang anyone twice, they would hang Bibó and 
Göncz twice. They were angry on account of Bibó and Göncz’s [attitudes] [...] 
(Interview with Regéczy-Nagy, 5 October 2007). 
 
The extract above implies that the spirit of solidarity that Göncz, Bibó and Regéczy-Nagy 
had shared and demonstrated in the course of resistance activities was kept alive during 
their internment. The quote does not furnish us with a sufficient explanation regarding the 
circumstances under which interrogations were held. However, given the precedent of 
Nagy’s trial, of which 'preparation, inquiry and [interrogation] were carried out in absolute 
secrecy' at this place (Lendvai, 2008: 221), it is almost certain that Bibó, Göncz and 
Regéczy-Nagy were also placed at a similar disadvantage in terms of defending themselves 
in their forthcoming trial. Indeed, in his Oral History, Göncz confirmed that during the 
questioning, defence lawyers appointed to him and Regéczy-Nagy de facto were unwilling 
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to represent them in trial, and instead provided impractical counselling. Göncz noted: 'I 
realised my lawyer could not defend me in practice... The only defence [suggested] to me 
was to say that "Bibó was accountable for [everything] and forced me to join in''... 
Regéczy-Nagy’s lawyer did the same thing, saying that ''Göncz was responsible for 
[everything]'" (Hegedűs, 1985).  
 
While Göncz and his associates did not receive any useful legal advice and counselling 
from their lawyers, there were people who offered moral support and help to them. In 
Göncz’s case, these people included his wife and interestingly, his prosecutor, János 
Kovács. During the interrogation period, Göncz was banned from receiving any visitors, 
but occasional exchanges of letters were permitted under strict conditions, and this 
correspondence encouraged Göncz to endure hardship and adversity during his internment; 
it became the source of the maintenance of 'a strong spiritual link' between him and his 
family. Göncz recounted how letters from his wife served to sustain his mental strength:  
I was allowed to receive letters from my wife at times, but no names and 
numbers could appear. Once they [the censors] rejected her letter because there 
were too many names in it. It was useless to explain to them I had four 
children… I am very proud of my wife who did a good job [in delivering 
messages to me]. Once when she sent in a package of [clothing], she wrote a 
letter in dark blue ink on a dark blue scarf. The guard didn’t recognise it… We 
had a very close spiritual link (Hegedűs, 1985). 
 
In addition to his wife’s support, the prosecutor Kovács played an important role in 
defending Göncz at trial. Given that some questioning conducted before the trial was 
arranged in preparation for imposing a severe sentence on Göncz, he anticipated the verdict 
that would be handed down. Göncz recounted: 'I realised it was a hanging matter when the 
psychiatric examination was done... When I returned to the jail from [the examination], the 
guard told me that it wouldn’t be painful to be hanged. It wouldn’t be worse than having 
teeth out' (Tóth, 2009). Yet, in this unfavourable situation, Kovács helped Göncz by 
informing him before the trial of the legal rights he retained for example, the right to 
remain silent and more importantly, by his action during the trial in declining to ask for 
capital punishment (Papp, 2002; Petri, 2002). It is not known why Kovács tried to defend 
Göncz during the proceedings, but the unusual character of this situation was demonstrated 
by the reaction of the embarrassed judge who had expected the prosecutor to ask for capital 
punishment. Göncz vividly remembered the dramatic moment of the day of trial, thus:  
When the prosecutor did not ask for the death penalty, the judge leapt up in 
anger. 'Now, please give us the sentence you demand' [Na de kérem]. The 
prosecutor said 'I request the second heaviest sentence'. In response, the judge 
once again said 'give us the sentence you demand'. The prosecutor said, as I 
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already mentioned, 'I request the second heaviest sentence' [...] (Hegedűs, 
1985). 
 
Whether or not the prosecutor’s request was considered in the verdict for Göncz’s trial is 
unknown, though the judges did decide not to hang Göncz (Göncz’s interview with Bartok 
Radio, 12 July 2002). It is not clear what circumstantial factors could have affected the 
change of verdict at the last moment, but according to Göncz, the India government was 
behind the commutation of the death sentence. In numerous interviews, Göncz underscored 
the significance of the Indian government’s role. For example in an interview with a 
Hungarian political and cultural monthly, Göncz commented that, 'According to legend – I 
cannot confirm the truth – Nehru saved us [Bibó and Göncz] from hanging' (Beszélő, 1990: 
6-7). Similarly, Göncz once again highlighted the role of Nehru stating that 'Miraculously, 
they did not hang us [Bibó and Göncz]. Probably, there was an intervention from Nehru, 
but I cannot confirm this'.62 
 
Since this remained an unconfirmed story as far as Göncz was concerned, I endeavoured to 
locate evidence to shed light on Nehru’s role in the proceedings of Bibó’s trial. Nehru’s 
autobiographies, biographies of his life and K. P. S. Menon’s diaries and other available 
documentation were scrutinised. 63 Although no compelling evidence demonstrating 
Nehru’s direct intervention in Bibó’s trial was discovered, there is an indication that Nehru 
was consistently exerting pressure on the Soviet leadership and the Kádár regime to stop 
the reprisals against those who fought for freedom and were later imprisoned for their 
involvements in the Revolution. For example, according to one of Nehru’s notes dated 6 
September 1957 recalls: 
I met the Soviet Charge d’ Affaires this afternoon and spoke to him about 
Hungary…. I was worried… about reports of present happenings in Hungary. 
We were informed that large numbers of arrests and convictions were still 
taking place and that the secret police which has ceased to function in the 
Soviet Union and Poland and other countries was still very much in evidence in 
Hungary. Our own Ambassador [K.P.S. Menon], who had recently visited 
Budapest, also reported to us that while there had been some improvement in 
some [aspects of] the situation, it was regrettable that so many political arrests 
were being made… I mentioned to [the Soviet Charge d’ Affairs] also that I 
had received a telegram from some International Association of Jurists saying 
that trials in Hungary did not allow adequate facilities for defence… I added 
that I hoped that the Soviet Government would exercise their influence in this 
matter in creating normal conditions in Hungary. The Soviet Charge d’ Affairs 
said that he would communicate what I said to his government (Hasan, Prasad 
and Damodaran 2007: 663-64).         
 
Nehru’s conscience was clearly disturbed by the developments that followed the 
suppression of the '56 Revolution. He was clearly of the view that a series of reprisals and 
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political trials taking place in Hungary were counter-productive to the restoration of social 
order and normality. Thus, he urged the Soviet leadership to influence the Kádár regime to 
change or at least ease their retributive actions against the Hungarian people. Moreover, 
according to a journal article containing the testimony of Mohamed Attaur Rahman, the 
Indian Charge d’Affaires, the Indian leadership’s diplomatic effort did effect a change in 
the sentence imposed on Bibó and Göncz. Rahman recounted:  
… The interesting point for us is that the coroner is likely to have had enough 
evidence against the two freedom fighters [Bibó and Göncz] to have sentenced 
both to death by hanging. [But this did not happen] I must therefore assume 
that our intervention has saved them from that [...] (Bonn, 1991: 46-47).  
 
Similarly and more explicitly, in an interview with the Hungarian socialist daily 
Népszabadság, Rahman once again highlighted the fact that diplomatic efforts made by 
Indian officials were crucial to the alteration of a decision made at Bibó’s and his 
associates’ trials. This was realised through an Indian military attaché who established 
warm and amicable relations with a high-ranking official of the Soviet military leadership 
– the former Chief of the State Security Agency, Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov. Rahman 
reminisced about how diplomatic action might have acted in saving Göncz’s life:   
When their [Bibó’s and Göncz’s] trial was under way, an [Indian] military 
attaché who was accredited to Hungary and had a good relationship with the 
Soviet military leadership came over from Moscow to Budapest. I asked him to 
try to intervene in the trial, because the charge [against Göncz] – collaboration 
with a foreign force - seriously threatened to [result in] a death sentence. On 1 
April [1958], among guests, as his old friend, the attaché thanked Serov for [his 
presence] in the military parade… and he later discussed [the matter] with him 
for a long time. This [may have] had an impact on [the trial] or it may have 
been Nehru’s personal intervention… Today it is difficult to clarify [which 
affected the trial]. In any case, among the convicts of the Bibó trial, our friend... 
had a narrow escape... Today, [his identity] no longer needs to be concealed. 
His name was Árpád Göncz [Farkas, 1990, my emphasis].  
 
This still does not tell us whether it was the Indian attaché’s influence or Nehru’s personal 
mediation that was responsible for the change of the verdict given to Göncz. However, it is 
certain that the influence exerted by the Indian leadership ultimately prevented Göncz from 
being hanged. This relief effort fell short of stopping Kádár’s extensive reprisals taken 
against those anonymous Hungarians who were incarcerated for their actions during the 
Revolution.64 Nevertheless, in doing this, India demonstrated a good example of solidarity 
in action and of the values they upheld. In an interview with a Hungarian political weekly 
168Óra, Rahman made clear that the values embraced by the Indian leadership was their 
understanding of and appreciation for the will of Hungarians’ yearning for freedom and 
truth, which came from peoples’ hearts and minds:    
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Newspaper interviewer: What was your motivation in deciding to stand on 
the side of revolutionaries in the Hungarian Revolution?  
Rahman: I had to stand by the truth. From the very beginning of the 
Revolution, even a blind man could have seen that the entire [city] of Budapest 
was in a fever of freedom. Above all, we heard [this] – 'finally we are free'. 
'We are not afraid of fighting for freedom'. In these circumstances, I would 
have been very cynical if I had not resolved to [do something] (168Óra, 23 
April 1991).     
 
With the end of trial in August 1957, Bibó and Göncz began their imprisonment at the 
Gyűjtő jail (Gyűjtő fogház), which had also been the venue65 for the execution of Imre 
Nagy and his associates. 66 Within the Gyűjtő, they were confined to the specially 
designated cell, the so-called Kis fogház, where a group of political prisoners who received 
heavy penalties for their involvement in the Revolution served their sentences. According 
to Litván and Varga, between March 1958 and December 1961, around 411 political 
prisoners were in custody.67 Among them were high profile figures – whose registration 
numbers began with the prefix 476 - László Kardos, Gábor Tánczos (Secretary of the 
Petőfi Circle), Tibor Déry (an eminent writer), Zoltán Tildy (Secretary of State during the 
Nagy government), Miklós Vásárhelyi (Chief Press Secretary of the Nagy government), 
György Litván (an historian), and Bibó and Göncz. The authorities could have mixed '476-
ers' together with common criminals as a deliberate attempt to further humiliate and 
brutalise them. According to Bibó, however, the 476-ers were separated from common 
criminals. Bibó noted: ... 'The 476-ers exclusively occupied here [Kis Fogház]. This meant 
the prisoners with registration numbers beginning 476 were there. This [the 476-ers] was a 
kind of society, [...] a leadership whose names were known well [to the people]' [...] 
(Litván and Varga, 1995: 470).  
 
Isolation from the outside world and separation from friends made it difficult for the 476-
ers to serve their long sentences and endure the extremely restricted conditions and 
circumstances surrounding them. According to a former convict and '56 veteran, Imre 
Mécs, the restricted conditions included regulation of visits, letters and parcels. At the Kis 
fogház, visitors were permitted for ten minutes every six months, and correspondence was 
allowed every three months (Wisinger and László, 2007: 85). All of this meant that the 
prisoners were very disconnected from the outside world. The greatest anguish the 476-ers 
had to bear was that of witnessing the final moments of the prisoners who were to be 
executed. Göncz recalled the crushing effect that witnessing the final day prior to 
execution of his friends had on him and his fellow convicts: 
At the Kis fogház, every other second or third day, two or three prisoners, 
shouting - 'Dear fellows! Don’t forget us' - were taken out for execution. I 
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didn’t know anyone who had to be brought under the gallows… There were 
two girls who were to be executed – Mari Wittner and Kati Sticker. Perhaps 
they were taken out to be hanged because we – who were on the first floor – 
heard their screaming. 'Murderers!' and then the voices of [the guards retorting]. 
'You are the murders!'… Next day, we were taken out for exercise and heard 
one girl crying… The girl cowering was Mari and when she recognised me, she 
told me: 'Boys, forgive me! I was not executed, only Kati' […].68    
 
Prisoners who had to spend time at the Kis fogház would have shared similar experiences, 
and these remained painful events in their lives. However, prison life was not always so 
testing; there were moments of relief and solace which helped the jailed revolutionaries to 
endure. Some such moments were provided by the translation bureau located at the Vác 
prison where intellectuals met and could discuss the issues of the day.   
 
The Vác prison, nicknamed the 'House of Lords' held some good memories for the 476-
ers.69 Unlike the Kis fogház, prisoners were not executed there (Wisinger and László, 
2007: 83) and, more importantly, the prisoners were able to work and see one another at 
the translation bureau. It is not known precisely when the translation bureau was set up 
within the Vác jail. According to Litván, however, it was established in order to meet the 
demand from high ranking functionaries within the Communist party for information and 
intelligence deriving from Western literature. These bureaucrats lacked a good command 
of foreign languages, the 476-ers were put to the task of translation. Litván explained what 
type of literature the intellectuals were able to access and, in what way translation work 
brought benefits to them:  
We translated the memoirs of Churchill and De Gaulle, literature relating to 
military [history] and so on. These had to be translated, because the 
Communists did not know foreign languages… Later, some of these [works] 
were published [in numbered editions] by the party publisher. Copies were 
numbered, because they were not legally allowed to be read outside [the upper 
echelons of the Communist hierarchy]… Bibó, Göncz and other intellectuals 
worked there for several months. We were able to meet regularly… This was 
the best workplace in the prison (Interview with Litván, 22 July 2006). 
 
In order to better understand the reasons why reading this particular type of literature was 
prohibited outside the prison, it is worth briefly looking into a cultural policy adopted by 
the Kádár regime. In essence, the main framework of the Kádár regime’s cultural policy 
consisted of the so-called three Ts: 'Support (Támogatás), Toleration (Tűrés) and Ban 
(Tiltás)' (Cartledge, 2006: 506; Kontler, 2002: 445; Romsics, 1999: 389). Literary works 
that fell within the first category were non-political and pro-government in character, 
whereas any works containing an element of criticism or voicing defiance of the regime 
were denied distribution to a wider readership. Of these three criteria, toleration was the 
most tactful and crafty self-censorship measure. As long as the message that authors tried 
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to convey to their readers did not overtly challenge the regime, publication was permitted, 
and thus a little freedom was granted. The goal that Kádár sought to achieve through using 
the three Ts system was clear: the neutralisation of the criticism from the intelligentsia and 
silencing the voice of dissent. In this light, it is hardly surprising that the Western literature 
the '56 intellectuals gained accessed to at the Vác prison was forbidden material for 
Hungarian society. Göncz neatly captured how this cultural policy actually affected writers 
and their readers, and more importantly what consequences it had for the 476-ers 
themselves: 
Writers were classified into three groups: the sponsored, the tolerated and the 
blacklisted. Those in the first group had prostituted themselves for everyone to 
see. The third group was equally cut off from living literature. The tolerated 
writer was in the hardest, but professionally healthiest, situation. He became 
tough like a hunted fox, his work was sometimes published… by writing coded 
messages between the lines he took a risk… But his honour remained intact, he 
had not prostituted himself and he was still a writer […] (Tóth 1999: 224-25).   
 
The translation work that the '56 intellectuals were compelled to do at the Vác seemed 
bearable, even enjoyable.  
 
Firstly, translation work laid the foundation for Göncz’s later literary career. As Litván 
explained, Göncz, along with other '56 revolutionaries, was able to access various works of 
Western literature primarily concerned with the Cold War and military history. In addition, 
Göncz gained access to some classical western literature and belles-lettres; for instance, 
Galsworthy’s Forsyte Saga, which he managed to read through, translating it into 
Hungarian (Barabás, 1989). This work was ultimately smuggled out of the prison by his 
associate, György Litván, and the translation work later served a basis in Göncz’s pursuit 
of a career as a literary translator and writer. In an interview, Göncz explained what 
translation work meant to him personally:  
In the prison, for three years, I worked as a translator at the translation bureau 
which meant I was given [a chance] to prepare for my later career. For the first 
attempt, I managed to complete translating the Forsyte Saga and Litván 
smuggled it out to my wife for our wedding anniversary. When I was released 
from prison, this brought me a job, as I found employment in [literary 
translation].70    
 
Secondly and more importantly, translation work contributed to the development of 
Göncz’s intellectual life. Reading and translating various pieces of work not only helped 
Göncz to widen his scope of knowledge in the related field, but the translation bureau itself 
also provided the main impetus for Göncz to engage in discussions and debates with other 
imprisoned intellectuals. When Göncz was interned at Kis fogház, he was separated from 
his associates and placed in solitary confinement. This effectively disconnected Göncz 
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from communication and connection with his friends. The translation bureau, however, 
provided an opportunity for the re-establishment of contact and engagement between them. 
For example, of the well-known '56 revolutionaries, Göncz was reunited with Imre Mécs, 
György Litván and István Bibó at this translation bureau (Hegedűs, 1985). The lack of 
relevant material in available documentation prevents us from reconstructing the content of 
the discussions that went on. Nevertheless, inferring from Mécs’s account, during their 
discussions, a wide range of topical issues including politics were covered. Mécs 
recounted:   
Physically we [may] have been confined in the prison but, in spirit, we freed 
ourselves. We were able to debate and discuss politics and social issues. We 
did not [feel] we were losers… We were on an island, the island of '56, where 
dissidents could preserve the picture of Hungary breaking out [from the prison] 
[…] (Wisinger and László, 2007: 90). 
 
Mécs’s statement demonstrates that the intellectual engagement the '56-ers shared at the 
prison provided an important impetus to sustain their mental strength. The prison might 
have restricted and deprived the '56-ers from their individual liberty but they were able to 
maintain an intellectual capability through discussions. Mécs’s account implies that 
intellectual engagement served as a vital means of resisting the sense of being vanquished 
that some of the '56 revolutionaries might have felt in the prison. Furthermore, it was the 
main channel through which the '56 intellectuals were able to overcome the physical 
limitations and constraints imposed upon them. It should be noted that while they were 
working at the translation bureau, the prison guards were not present; this in turn 
encouraged an atmosphere in which the '56 intellectuals freely discussed and exchanged 
their ideas. Göncz noted: 'We were very pleased to have translation work. The guards were 
not allowed to enter the cells when the prisoners were doing translation work. This was an 
interesting [phenomenon] of the Communist system' (interview with Göncz, 18 July 2006). 
In this respect, it is also fair to suggest that emotional attachments or bonds of friendship 
among the '56 revolutionaries deepened to the extent to which they became their raison 
d’être during imprisonment. Göncz reminisced about the Revolution and assessed the 
effect that it had on him in terms of the development of human relationships: 
I considered my time in prison to be useful... Two weeks’ revolution remained 
superficial [in my memory], but before my arrest, I made durable friendship 
[with the '56-ers]. Later, this friendship was deepened to the extent [that] it 
signified a reason for being to me... If people spent more than a year in prison, 
[feelings of] hatred could develop but fortunately, I did not come to have such 
feelings [...] (Hegedűs, 1985).  
 
Göncz, together with other '56 intellectuals, undertook translation work until Easter 1960 
when they began a hunger strike.  
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In April 1960, a hunger strike of convicts began at the Vác prison (Kőrösi and Molnár, 
2003: 159). The direct cause of the strike was indignation over the 'double standards' 
applied by the Kádár regime (Lendvai, 2008: 219). Initially, the prisoners were informed 
that they would be granted an amnesty and released by autumn of the same year (Révész, 
2000: 175); this was confirmed by Kádár’s speech delivered at the General Assembly of 
the UN. In this speech, Kádár announced that the vast majority of political prisoners who 
had been sentenced for their involvement in the 1956 Revolution had been or would be 
released from prison. Kádár claimed:  
… More than three-quarters of the people called to account for their acts in 
connection with the 1956 counter-revolution have already been released by 
general amnesty and returned to their daily lives. Today in our country, fewer 
people are in prison than at any time in the existence of Hungary as an 
established state […] (Romsics, 2000: 241).   
 
In reality, only partial pardons were decreed to a certain group of high-ranking party 
functionaries; 'the generals, the leaders of the Communist Party, writers and politicians 
were released, whereas students, ordinary soldiers and members of the small local 
committees were excluded from the amnesty and stayed in jail' (Litván and Varga, 1995: 
475); among the well-known figures freed by this amnesty were a former Minister of 
Defence Mihály Farkas, and the head of the State Security Authority Gábor Péter (Kurcz, 
2010; Lendvai, 2008: 219).  
 
Discontented with and infuriated by official propaganda and lies, the prisoners launched a 
hunger strike. It is not known who made the first move, but Göncz and Bibó joined the 
strike. Unsurprisingly, the action was received with hostility by the prison guards, who 
considered the strike as a serious challenge to order. The wardens attempted to use the 
incident to make prison sentences more stringent under the pretext of prison riot or 
disobedience. This, however, came to nought and instead, the authorities decided to 
separate the group of prisoners by transferring them to different branches of the prison 
service. Consequently, Göncz and Bibó were transferred to Márianosztra - an infamous 
prison where the so-called 'Class Enemies' (idegen osztály) served their sentences,71 
whereas other figures from the '56 revolutionaries such as György Litván and Sándor 
Fekete were relocated to Gyűjtő.72 Litván remembered how the action of the hunger strike 
could have changed the sentence of prisoners: 
They [guards] recorded how many times the prisoners refused to eat meals. I 
think Göncz refused to eat lunch once, but he was also categorised as a 
striker… The prisoners were transferred to other jails according to the record. 
The vast majority of prisoners were transferred to Sátoraljaúhely… while the 
prisoners who committed serious crimes were taken to Márianosztra. At the 
time, Göncz and Bibó were taken to Márianosztra… The guards wanted to 
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initiate new trials against them [Göncz and those who joined strike] as they [in 
the guards’ view] had committed another crime. The charge against Göncz and 
Bibó could have meant their sentences being changed from life sentences to the 
maximum penalty. However, this did not happen […] (Interview with Litván, 
22 July 2006).  
 
As Göncz eloquently asserted, the hunger strike which took place at the Vác was 'a 
manifestation of solidarity in action among the prisoners' (interview with Göncz, 18 June 
2006) who were outraged by the official propaganda and the double standard applied by 
the Kádár regime.  
 
In March 1963, a general amnesty was granted to all political prisoners who had been 
prosecuted for their involvement in the Revolution and who had been excluded from the 
partial amnesty issued previously (Ekiert, 1996: 98; Swain and Swain, 2003: 162). This 
action was due to Kádár’s agreement with the United States (later consented to by the UN) 
that a compromise would be made, and once the '56 prisoners were freed, the question of 
Hungary would be removed from the UN agenda (Romsics, 1999: 332).73 Kádár, who had 
already gained 'approval for an amnesty from Khrushchev' (Gough, 2006: 143) used it as a 
bargaining chip to reinstate Hungary’s legal status within the UN,74 and ultimately win 
international recognition for the legitimacy of his regime (Kontler, 2002: 437). A former 
co-convict from Bibó’s trial, Regéczy-Nagy, explained the core of the issue:  
After the 1956 Revolution, with an absolute majority, the General Assembly of 
the UN [agreed] that the Soviets must leave Hungary, free elections were to be 
held, and amnesty granted. [But] with the passage of time, it became clear that 
the Soviet forces would not withdraw [from Hungary]… U Thant [the 
Secretary General of the UN] said 'the question of Hungary is protracted'. 'At 
least the issue of an amnesty' for political prisoners [needs resolution], then, 
Hungary could retrieve the right of attending the General Assembly of the UN. 
This was the [essence] of the matter (Interview with Regéczy-Nagy, 5 October 
2007). 
 
As a result of the amnesty, four thousand people were released from prison, including Bibó 
(Gough, 2006: 143), but his co-convicts - Göncz and Regéczy-Nagy – did not benefit from 
the amnesty (Cservenka, 2000). The precise reason for their further stay in prison remains 
unclear to this day, but according to an official account given by the authorities at the time, 
Göncz and Regéczy-Nagy were excluded from release because they did not fall within the 
limits of the cut-off date set for the amnesty. In the event that political prisoners committed 
a crime after 1 May 1957, they would be excluded from the amnesty (Hegedűs, 1985). 
However, the given explanation is contradictory as Bibó – who had acted with Göncz - was 
freed at this time, whereas Göncz and Regéczy-Nagy remained in jail. Bibó’s high-profile 
– he was the Minister of State of the Nagy government and several of his works had 
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become known to the West – may have drawn international attention and pressure from the 
international community resulting in his release. As Göncz noted, 'Bibó had to be released 
as the eyes of the world’s press were on him... Probably Regéczy and I stayed in jail 
because little attention was paid to us and we were less important and not internationally 
recognised figures... [But this] remains an enigma' (Hegedűs, 1985).  
 
Three months after Bibó’s release, in July 1963,75 Göncz and Regéczy-Nagy were granted 
individual pardons and released (Kőrösi and Molnár, 2003: 159, 173; Petri, 2002; Szálé, 
2006). Following his release from prison, Göncz attempted to resume his agricultural study 
which had been interrupted by the outbreak of the Revolution. However, he was unable to 
complete his study due to his involvement in the Revolution. Göncz recalled: 
The head of department told me that I was not allowed to change the world and 
at the same time finish university… He banned me from completing my 
agricultural studies at any of the universities in Hungary (Gönz, 1991: 296).  
 
Having been thwarted in this regard, Göncz took up writing professionally. Firstly he 
worked as a part time translator for the Veszprém Chemical Heavy Industry Research 
Institute. Thereafter, he continued utilising his English language skills to build up a 
professional career as an English-American literary translator and writer (Esti Hírlap, 20 
June 1995). This literary life was interrupted in the second half of the 1980s when the time 
came for demanding reform and political change once again. Göncz, alongside his friends 
who had shared his fate during prior attempts at anti-Soviet resistance, was ready to act and 
take the leadership of the revived dissident movement. This intention was realised when 
the taboo topic of the rehabilitation of Imre Nagy and his associates was raised and the 
Committee for Historical Justice was founded. This will be discussed in detail in the next 
chapter. Before embarking on this task, the chapter concludes by exploring the reasons for 
Göncz’s participation in the resistance of 1956 and what his aims were. Finally, I will 
examine in what ways, if any, his first hand experience in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution 
contributed to the shaping of his liberal and democratic political beliefs.  
 
One possible explanation for Göncz’s determination to participate in the resistance of 1956 
may have been his sympathy with Nagy’s political vision. As has been discussed in 
Section 2.3 of the chapter, Göncz demonstrated his political stance in favour of Nagy’s 
position. The following two comments are of particular relevance here. Firstly, in 1953 
when Nagy delivered a radio speech regarding the introduction of the New Course, Göncz 
was surprised but showed his appreciation of it. Göncz noted:  
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We listened to the [speech], Zsuzsa and I looked at each other, agreeing that 
some kind of new world was upon us because he spoke in Hungarian and told 
the truth for the first time in several years. It was impossible not to see the 
importance of the thing (Tóth, 2009).  
 
Similarly but more strikingly, in an interview with Hegedűs, Göncz asserted that during the 
development of the Revolution, he not only saw that the future of Hungary lay in the 
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP) led by Nagy, but he could also have joined it:  
Göncz: I could have joined the HSWP led by Nagy. I believed that a way out 
from the given socialist [order] was necessary. This was not only my opinion 
but was also shared by others, because [people’s] loss of belief in the 
programme and its morality became apparent. 
Hegedűs: Whose loss of beliefs in what are you talking about? 
Göncz: [What I mean is] the loss of belief in socialism itself or in that of the 
Communist Party. A Communist party led by Nagy could have started from 
scratch (Hegedűs, 1985). 
 
It appears from this statement that Göncz wished to suggest that a new world breaking with 
the past could have been opened up to the Hungarian population and that Nagy was a 
central figure bringing this fundamental change. On the one hand, Göncz saw that the root 
of the problem weighing upon Hungarian society lay in people’s distrust of the ruling 
Communist party. Lies, propaganda and promises pledged but unfulfilled by the 
Communist party had distanced the Hungarian population from the party, and this in turn 
led to the moral crisis of the existing socialist order.76 On the other hand, Nagy’s radio 
speech provided a realistic assessment regarding the country’s situation and gave hope and 
vision to the Hungarian people. Göncz, along with the Hungarian population shared this 
view and considered Nagy’s programme as a blueprint for a remedy to help extricate the 
country from its predicament. For this reason, Göncz thought that, if necessary, he would 
have joined the party led by Nagy, playing his own part within it.  
 
However, it should not be concluded from the above discussion that Göncz’s support for 
Nagy’s political vision means Göncz was a Communist who attached himself to the 
Maxist-Leninist idea and dedicated his life to its realisation. On the contrary, Göncz had 
pursued his political path in the ISP, an anti-Communist party that existed between 1945 
and 1948 (Section 1.5 of Chapter 1). This therefore suggests to us that there would be other 
reasons as to why Göncz saw the future of Hungary in Imre Nagy. According to Péter 
Kende – Göncz’s life-long friend, who lived through the Communist era – for Göncz, the 
name of Nagy and in fact to the Hungarian population in general, signified the feasibility 
of democratic change within the existing socialist order. This idea of so-called 'democratic 
socialism' was a prevalent phenomenon of the age and, Göncz believed that Nagy was 
 66 
foremost in embodying and representing the Hungarian variant of this idea. In response to 
my question,77 Kende succinctly stated: 
Like Bibó, Göncz thought that social justice could be achieved through 
economic improvement and that the equal distribution of [income] was a 
means to this end. In this respect, Göncz, along with Bibó, was a socialist but 
not in the sense that the Maxist-Leninists [conceived]. In 1953 or 1956 Göncz 
sympathised with Nagy because he saw that he could link socialism with 
democracy through Nagy. The [foundations] and potential of this democratic 
socialism were formed in the middle of the 20th century but by the end of the 
century, when the world economy became globalised, [this] idea became 
[obsolete] as people no longer considered it [to be realistic]. But in 1956, many 
people considered it as a possible form of socialism. Today, it remains a 
principle or a concept (Interview with Kende, 5 October 2007).   
 
Regéczy-Nagy reaffirmed Kende’s view, stating that the idea of Nagy’s socialism was 
sufficiently visionary so that he was also under its influence; not least because it was seen 
by him as the only alternative form of socialism. Regéczy-Nagy noted: 'I accepted the idea 
of socialism, because there was no other alternative. In the presence of Soviet troops, the 
maximum extent of reform Nagy could have [implemented] was the easing of political 
pressure and terror... But the Soviets never understood this and were not interested either' 
(interview with Regéczy-Nagy, 5 October 2007). In view of these statements, it is safe to 
suggest that Göncz’s comments regarding his willingness to join the Nagy-led HSWP were 
an expression of his sympathy and respect for Nagy’s political vision, and not a sign that 
Göncz could indeed have pursued his political career as a Communist.  
 
A second and more plausible account lies in Göncz’s support for the popular will and 
values proclaimed by the Hungarian population during the Revolution. Initially, Göncz 
was hesitant and unsure about whether the event was simply a protest to serve the interests 
of a particular group or an uprising that arose from the aspirations of the Hungarian 
population. Having realised that it was a genuine manifestation of popular will (the will of 
those anonymous Hungarians who wished to construct a society different from the 
previous regime), Göncz decided to join the event. In an interview with 168Óra, Göncz 
clearly stated: 
When the revolution broke out, I had to ask myself whether the event was 
simply [led by] the reform Communists (by the Imre Nagy group) or whether 
this was also my revolution. When one or two days passed, while people were 
making up their minds, [I was able to make my decision] that this was a 
popular revolution so it also belonged to me [168Óra, 27 October 1992, my 
emphasis]. 
 
This lends weight to the claim that Göncz’s sympathy with and, appreciation of, the will of 
the Hungarian population led him to join the Revolution. Although this does not provide us 
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with a solid context regarding the demands and goals the Hungarian people sought to 
achieve, Göncz implied that the spirit of unity or solidarity was embodied in the 1956 
Revolution. In his memory, the event remained a symbolic flame of the popular uprising 
that belonged to everyone; it could not be appropriated by a person, an interest group or a 
political party. In fact, when one examines Göncz’s own assessment regarding the 
significance of the 1956 Revolution, it becomes evident that unity of the nation was the 
most essential value for Göncz. In a parliamentary speech delivered for the 34th 
anniversary of the 1956 Revolution, Göncz defined the practical meaning of unity and 
what it meant to him personally:  
We went on defending the memory of unity, the shared emotion: 'we are one'. 
It meant more than just the undisputed common goal we had proclaimed 
together during the Revolution: national independence, neutrality, justice, the 
creation of a communal society thought to be socialist, non-exploitative and 
cleansed from every stain [...] (Tóth, 1999: 64).  
 
The above extract suggests that - for Göncz - the significance of unity was more than an 
emotional attachment to the people he interacted with during and after the Revolution. 
Göncz implied that under this slogan - "we are one" – people took an oath of their 
commitment to the common goals they sought to achieve. Above all, the restoration of an 
independent nationhood, the right to self-determination and the creation of a socially equal 
society, all of which would lead to the democratic transformation of the country, were set 
as the main objectives to be attained. This was also engraved in Göncz’s’ mind and 
consciousness, which in turn led him to participate in the Revolution. In an interview with 
the 168Óra, Göncz once again highlighted the assertion that the unity of the nation 
culminated symbolically in the events of 1956 and that this was a moment of the truth 
demonstrating the will of Hungarian nation:  
In modern Hungarian history, 1956 was the moment of grace and truth that 
unequivocally [manifested] the [will] of national unity... The revolution so 
united [people] as it began from a tabula rasa [tiszta lappal]... [In 1956] there 
was nothing other than tackling the dismantling [kitakarítás] of the Stalinist 
dictatorship and the restoration of the country’s independence. The goal set for 
the revolution was so clear [...] (168Óra, 22 October 1991).    
 
Judging by the above excerpt, it is clear that, in Göncz’s historical consciousness, 1956 
remained a juncture epitomising the unity of the nation in Hungarian history. Göncz 
implied that people’s long-cherished desire to break with the practices of the previous 
regime - or its social order - led the Hungarian population to take to the streets. The 
abandonment of Stalinist dogmatism and its ritual practices and the reinstatement of 
national sovereignty were demanded and set as the key issues to be addressed. Göncz 
supported this idea and believed that the realisation of these goals would contribute to 
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opening up a new beginning of the country’s history. As Rainer noted, if 'the ideas and 
experiences of the revolution influenced the life and thinking of all of Hungarian society' 
(Rainer, 2002a: 7), Göncz was also influenced by the Revolution and imbued with this idea. 
It can thus be assuredly stated that Göncz’s willingness to take a role in the resistance of 
1956 signified his support and respect for the ideas that the Hungarian population aspired 
to achieve.  
 
In terms of the development of Göncz’s political views, what impact did his first-hand 
experience of the 1956 Revolution have on him? As noted in Chapter 1, it was established 
that during Göncz’s adolescence, the idea of radical peasant populism and his experience 
in student armed resistance movements were the most important contributory factors in the 
shaping of his political views. In the former idea, land reform and the provision of 
education to the poor peasantry were considered as the main issues to be tackled. In the 
latter, Hungary’s extrication from the Second World War and, the restoration of the 
country’s independence, democracy and social justice were set as principal goals by the 
student resistance. While Göncz interacted with and was influenced by both ideas, peasant 
populism was the more pronounced factor in shaping Göncz’s political beliefs at this time 
of his life. If one traces the continuity and discontinuity of peasant populism and its impact 
on Göncz’s political ideas, it becomes evident that the significance of this factor was 
receding into the background during and after the Revolution. Instead, there was a shift in 
his political orientations towards liberal and democratic values. Despite the fact that 
Göncz’s pursuit of the idea of peasant populism was evidenced in the speech delivered at 
the Petőfi Circle and, in his attempt to complete his agricultural studies, all of which were 
prevented (or interrupted) by the development of the Revolution. Göncz was still under the 
influence of peasant populism, but the will of Hungarian population epitomised under the 
banner of the creation of a free, self-determined and socially responsible society more 
convincingly imbued him with liberal and democratic beliefs. Such a sign was evidenced 
through Göncz’s commitment to resistance which he firmly believed would contribute to 
informing the outside world of the truth and ethos of the Revolution. Even during his 
imprisonment, Göncz along with his friends ruminated on the significance of the 
Revolution that they witnessed and experienced.  
 
Thus, the events of 1956 had a reinforcing effect on the development of Göncz’s liberal 
and democratic ideas which had been shaped through his proactive role in the student 
resistance movements. The common denominators that bound Göncz with the 1956 
Revolution and the student resistance movements lay in his aspiration for and commitment 
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to the realisation of a free, democratic and socially responsible society. Having noted this 
importance entrenched in the fabric of Göncz’s political beliefs, the following chapter 
further examines and traces the significance of democratic and liberal values when he 
witnessed and underwent another dramatic change of the Hungarian society in the late 
1980s. The chapter will probe the process by which Göncz’s political views were 
developing and crystallised into a cogent, more or less definite liberal and democratic 
ideological trajectory. It is appropriate to conclude this exploration of Göncz’s political 
and intellectual development with his own thoughts and views regarding his experience in 
the student resistance movements and the 1956 Revolution:  
I am not a saint. When I was conscripted into the [Hungarian] army, I deserted 
with arms, I fought against the Nazis... If once one gave one’s life for 
democracy, there is little doubt that one would give one’s life again. The 
Revolution ended my [agricultural] studies. On this occasion, I was lucky again 
because I witnessed a great deal of inhumanity. After the defeat of the 
Revolution, with my friends, I did not want to [choose] something like a 
political way out or a compromise, a modus vivendi with [an order established 
by] the Soviet Union. [We] did not [want to] repeat the eight terrible years of 
the past. [But] our attempt was not successful... In a closed and secret trial, 
with summary proceedings, without any possibility of appeal, I was convicted 
to life in prison on a charge of conspiracy and treason... In the prison, I taught 
myself English and today I feel that it was worth being imprisoned for this 
reason alone [...] (Göncz, 1991: 8-9).     
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Chapter 3. Dissidence in the 1980s 
Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the development of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and its 
impact on the shaping of Göncz’s political beliefs. As has been argued, Göncz’s first hand 
experience of the Revolution had a significant impact on his political development. Despite 
the fact that the activities which Göncz undertook following the suppression of the 
Revolution, failed to influence the Soviet leadership’s intentions for Hungary, Göncz 
succeded in making a clear demonstration of his own political stance. The basic but 
fundamental elements of democracy – the realisation of a free, self-determined and socially 
responsible society – were Göncz’s ultimate goal and it was to the achievement of this aim 
that he committed himself wholeheartedly.  
 
It was also noted that Göncz’s subsequent imprisonment contributed to his intellectual and 
political development. For Göncz, incarceration did not mean the cessation of his 
intellectual and political activities. On the contrary, the existence of a translation bureau 
within the prison meant that Göncz was able to access valuable Western literature which 
was largely beyond the reach of the general public. The intellectuals alongside whom 
Göncz served his sentence proved able and vigorous debating partners. They along with 
Göncz envisaged the future of Hungary and waited for the appropriate circumstances in 
which they might realise their ideals. Such an opportunity first appeared for Göncz early in 
1988 when he began to engage in political activities, founding the so-called Committee for 
Historical Justice (CHJ). In his personal Oral History, Göncz reminisced about this 
moment: 
Early in 1988, there were three great things in the making... I remember at least 
[among '56-ers there were] three preliminary agreements on the need for the 
Commitee for Historical Justice. We felt a moral obligation to [form the 
organisation] and we felt the time [for action] was ripe [...] (Tóth, 2009). 
 
This chapter continues the exploration of Göncz’s political development in the late 1980s. 
The first section of the chapter briefly examines the main features of the social and 
political change in Hungary during the second half of the 1980s. The main focus of the 
remainder of the chapter is then devoted to examining the role and the activities that Göncz 
was engaged in while associated with these opposition movements. Finally, the chapter 
explores what Göncz sought to achieve by undertaking these actions and explains their 
significance in terms of the development of his liberal and democratic beliefs as well as his 
political career at this time.   
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3.1. Political and social changes in the second half of the 1980s 
In the literature on Hungary it is generally accepted that the late 1980s was an epoch 
marked by the regime’s deepening crisis. Although the then leaders had held power for the 
three decades since Revolution, their grip was no longer as assured as it had once been 
(Barany, 1999; 113-25; Bayer, 2005; 130-35; Körösényi, 1992: 1-10; Kontler, 2002: 458-
68; O’Neil, 1998; 579-603; Pittaway, 2003: 57-61; Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000: 239-
43; Romsics, 1999: 412-23, 2007: 13-139; Schöpflin, 1991: 60-63; Swain, 1993: 66-70). 
The domestic situation was described as 'Gulash Communism', a system based on an 
'unsigned informal tacit social contract' between the Kádár regime and Hungarian society 
(Hankiss, 1990: 35), the essential conditions of which were the provision of relative 
material affluence by East European standards, in return for the relinquishment of the right 
to public participation in politics. However, by the late 1980s this arrangement was losing 
what little attraction it had held. In the Kremlin, Mikhail Gorbachev – an advocate of the 
fundamental, far-reaching reform of state socialism under the banner of Perestroika 
(restructuring) and Glasnost (openness) - came to power. Gorbachev’s significance is 
nicely captured by Whitehead: 'The most crucial shift in the international context [was] 
Moscow’s decision to lift its military veto over the unfolding of indigenous political 
processes... The linchpin that upheld the entire regional system was removed' (Whitehead, 
1994: 41, 47). In turn, the consequence of this internal and external change strengthened 
dissident voices and increased the level of social dissatisfaction with regard to the decline 
of living standards78 and the gerontocracy, led by Kádár, who was too slow to react to the 
rapidly changing circumstances.79  
 
Although the core of the party-state institutions remained intact, Kádár’s grip on power 
was at stake and the pendulum of public opinion swung decisively towards the politics of 
change.80 As a result, in June 1987, a new Social Contract (Társadalmi Szerződés) was 
formulated by the democratic opposition made up of the urban intelligentsia who had 
appeared in the late 1970s as a response to the formation of Czech Charter 77.81 They 
concluded that 'Kádár must go' (Kiss and Vida, 2005: 47-48). Similarly, in September 1987, 
another major strand of the opposition – the populist intellectuals who primarily came from 
writers’ backgrounds and had a politically nationalist outlook - gathered at Lakitelek and 
established the Hungarian Democratic Forum. In its founding statement, the populists 
declared what they sought to achieve: 'The Hungarian people have been swept into one of 
the gravest crises of [their] history... This forum would be suitable for discussing our 
serious problems, analysing certain topics, and preparing proposals of alternative solutions' 
[...] (Romsics, 2007: 372-73). Inspired by the formation of a populist front, the democratic 
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opposition, who were by then mainly concerned with the formulation of reform 
programmes and the circulation of underground publication, chiefly Samidzat also decided 
to found their own forum, creating the Network of Free Initiatives, which later became the 
Alliance of Free Democrats. This followed the establishment of an alternative non-
Communist youth league, the Alliance of Young Democrats (AYD).82 All of this was 
indicative of an emerging political plurality, as Bayer notes, this political pluralism was 
one of the distinctive characteristics of the Hungarian process of political transformation in 
the 1980s (Bayer, 2005: 133).  
 
At this historically dynamic juncture, Göncz, as a member of the older generation who had 
experienced the Second World War and the 1956 Revolution, engaged in the emerging 
social movements and played a part in the development of political change. Imre Mécs 
noted: 'It was in the Committee for Historical Justice and the Network of Free Initiatives 
that Göncz’s political activities began in the 1980s' (Papp, 2002). Göncz’s dissident 
activities contributed to increasing his moral authority which, in turn, led him to be 
nominated for the post-Communist Presidency. The following sections of the chapter 
explore Göncz’s participation in these pivotal social and political movements.  
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3.2. The Network of Free Initiatives and the Alliance of Free Democrats 
The Network of Free Initiatives (NFI), a loose alliance of various independent civic groups, 
clubs and organisations, was founded on 1 May 1988 (Bozóki and Karácsony, 2002: 87; 
Jenkins, 1995: 185). In its founding statement the NFI urged Hungarian society to break its 
silence and, to confront the need for the creation of a societal forum where intellectuals and 
the general public could hold a dialogue to confront the deepening political and socio-
economic crisis:  
The economic and political crisis of our country is rapidly deepening. Society 
no longer believes that the regime is capable of preventing the decay [of the 
system]... Social groups must be organised and [articulate] their demands... But 
this movement must reach a higher level to break the fatalism [prevalent] in 
public opinion so that society itself becomes political force. We consider it to 
be important for the newly organising groups to preserve their independence 
and diversity [and that this] develop[s] into pluralism... Ultimately, we believe 
that such a body which is capable of assessing the situation and stating its 
position regarding important national issues, must be established. 
The current initiators83 – members of different groups and those outside the 
groups who agree with us – suggest that the Network of Free Initiatives be 
created [...] (Miszlivetz, 1995: 229-31).  
 
As individuals and representatives of autonomous groups that were critical of the regime’s 
policies joined the NFI,84  it attempted to operate as a single umbrella organisation 
integrating existing democratic forces (Kontler, 2002: 464; Romsics, 1999: 420, 2007: 
101). In fact, according to a Hungarian political scientist, Ervin Csizmadia, the founding of 
the NFI was partially attributed to cross-national influence emanating from Poland. The 
parallel lesson that campaigners drew from the Polish Solidarity movement was that 
Hungary needed to create a similar pressure group which would represent a unified societal 
stance, as this would create the conditions in which a political space for public 
participation could evolve. Csizmadia noted 'Society is also accountable for its own 
situation. The [current] crisis would last long[er], the longer the different groups of society 
[took to press their] demands' (Csizmadia, 1995: 435). The NFI was expected to fill this 
gap, and it aspired to function as a viable alternative political force. With its basis in grass-
root initiatives and, having underscored the significance of pluralism, the NFI did not 
represent a single political line or platform and the structure of the association was 
naturally horizontal. The Provisional Coordination Committee of the NFI did not give 
specific direction but rather acted as a channel through which members of various groups 
were able to communicate and update information regarding its recent activities.85 With 
the exchange of information, opinions, and the sharing of experience among its supporters, 
the NFI was intent on drawing a social consensus and stating its position with regard to 
critical issues of the age. For example, on 1 May 1988 when the NFI adopted the draft of 
 74 
its operating principle, it also unveiled a visionary concept regarding political reform. The 
document - entitled "There Is A Way Out" – contained a fundamental political framework 
including demands for the formulation of a new constitution, the establishment of a new 
parliament and the guarantee of civic rights.86 
 
By the end of summer of 1988, it had become evident that the NFI’s strength – the 
representation of pluralism and civic initiatives – had turned into its weakness. In the 
absence of coherent leadership, the NFI attempted to encompass different ideas and varied 
values but, 'this participative way of functioning based on wide-ranging negotiations 
among the member organisations was too slow and time-consuming' (Bozóki and 
Karácsony, 2002: 88), and resulted in operative weakness. Furthermore, the ruling 
Communist leadership announced that they were only willing to discuss state affairs with 
those opposition groups that 'had [their own] programme and formal membership that 
could be considered as a party' (Miszlivetz, 1995: 122); the NFI faced a dilemma – the 
Network had to decide whether it should continue to function as a front for the existing 
democratic forces or, to transform itself into a party with individual membership. One of 
the advocates of the second option, Bálint Magyar, reasoned that without organising the 
NFI into a properly coherent framework, its political role would become marginalised in 
the process of political transition (Bozóki and Karácsony, 2002: 90).87 In contrast, Ferenc 
Miszlivetz preferred the first choice as he was of the opinion that the maintenance of the 
NFI might become the platform for the creation of a robust civil society in Hungary. 
Miszlivetz argued: 
They [those who supported changing the Network into a party] told me: let’s 
close off the regular meetings. 'We neither need many people nor have time to 
listen to the opinion of all taxi drivers... We are the vanguard and elites'. I did 
not like this... I think it was a mistake to close off the Network at such an early 
[stage]. We should have sought compromise and cooperation [among various 
groups]. We should have created a strong civil society. At least, it should have 
[functioned] for another six months in order to become a political force 
(Interview with Miszlivetz, 16 July 2007). 
 
This incongruence in opinions was brought to an end on 13 November 1988 at the Jurta 
Threatre, where the future of the NFI was ultimately decided through a vote. The vast 
majority of participants supported the second option and agreed to establish a proto-party88 
named as the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD) (Magyar Hírlap, 14 November 1988; 
Magyar Nemzet, 14 November 1988; Népszabadság, 14 November 1988). 
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From the outset, Göncz undertook a proactive role in the founding of the NFI and also 
participated in the composition of the founding statement.89 It is not clear who first took 
the step towards establishing the NFI but, according to Göncz, 'I have to say that this 
thought was already in the air. It just had to be initiated by someone. I was also one of the 
initiators' (Wisinger and László, 2007: 59). As an observer, Göncz along with other '56 
veterans took part in discussion and debate at the NFI meetings; Göncz saw the sharing of 
his experience and knowledge with people as one of his most important tasks. According 
to Miszlivetz, it was at an NFI meeting that Göncz first encountered the future leader of the 
country, Viktor Orbán, who took the leading role in the founding of the AYD at the time. 
Miszlivetz noted: 
I am not saying that Göncz was too active in the NFI. He did not speak out 
much but he was there and at times expressed his opinion. He was rather an 
observer. Göncz wished to share his experience with the younger generation 
and, precisely with Orbán’s circle. He said that 'he would be happy to talk with 
the students'. But the Orbán circle never came to Göncz [...] (Interview with 
Miszlivetz, 16 July 2007). 
 
It is not known why Orbán and his associates distanced themselves from Göncz, but in 
Göncz’s explanation Orbán’s decisive and independent personality appears to be one of the 
factors. In his Oral History, Göncz remembered Orbán as an attentive participant but one 
who was cautious about committing himself to anything specific: 
I got to know Orbán and László Kövér at the NFI meetings... Normally, they 
listened to [other people] and, if necessary, expressed their opinion. They 
remained [both] within and simultaneously outside the NFI. They had not 
decided yet where they [should] belong to... I once spoke to Orbán saying 
'come to see me'... Orbán said, 'I will tell them [members of the AYD] about 
your offer'. But, up to today, they have never done so...  
Hegedűs: I think they might have been afraid of your influence. 
Göncz: Yes. perhaps. Unfortunately, this [fear] was decisive in their attitude...  
I was sad to see this situation [...] (Hegedűs, 1990). 
 
This still does not sufficiently account for the question of why, and for what ends, Göncz 
was willing to meet with Orbán and his camp. Given the role of the NFI as a social forum 
for all, Göncz may have thought that this would be a good opportunity to share his 
experience with an energetic but still inexperienced younger generation. Moreover, NFI 
members may have been keen to foster the pluralism they were advocating for wider 
Hungarian society within the alliance itself.  
 
Inferring from an interview Göncz gave to Hegedűs, it is possible to establish that ideas of 
political pluralism were of utmost importance for Göncz. In the interview, Göncz presented 
his own definition and the concept of democracy:  
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I think we must support initiatives which came from grass-roots [alulról], 
because they expand the [scope] of democracy. My views on democracy have 
never changed. Perhaps, the only difference was that in 1956, I didn’t feel 
pluralism [as] a timely [demand]... Democracy is not a matter of goodwill, an 
idyll, but the question of an institutional system. And, of a precisely 
circumscribed sphere of influence where stronger interest groups come to the 
fore in free contest. But we must also listen to the opinion of the minority 
because it could become a majority view tomorrow. So the basic requirement 
of democracy is pluralism, a democratic institututional system which [allows 
for] free enterprise to release human energies and an increase in the number of 
independent personal and economic units. Since I was [active] in the Pál Teleki 
Work Group, I felt this way and my views [on democracy] basically have not 
been changed [...] (Hegedűs, 1985).   
 
Evidently, the significance of pluralism was underscored by Göncz.90 On the one hand, he 
acknowledged the importance of free competition and, viewed that those interest groups 
which exerted stronger influence with articulate demands would be the major player of 
democratic politics. On the other hand, Göncz took the minority view into consideration, 
implying that the ideal democracy he envisioned was an established political system which 
could reconcile differing interests and varied values and, if possible, strike a balance. As 
discussed in Section 1.2 of Chapter 1, this political vision had already taken some shape 
when he was active as a member of the Pál Teleki Work Group (PTWG) and had been 
maintained over the course of his life.  
 
In terms of the development of Göncz’s democratic ideas with particular reference to his 
view on pluralism, there was a continuity between the PTWG and the NFI, and this had 
consistently remained in his political consciousness. By the time that Göncz gave an 
interview to Hegedűs, his views on democracy and pluralism had crystalised and been 
firmly established in the fabric of his political beliefs. The quotation above does not tell us 
specifically whether Göncz’s attachment to the significance of pluralism was a factor 
which led him to become a part of the NFI. However, given the paramount significance of 
pluralism in his political beliefs which was the common denominator between the PTWG 
and the NFI, it can be argued that Göncz’s involvement in the NFI was related to his liberal 
and democratic political ideas.   
 
There is another reason why Göncz’s liberal and democratic idea was primarily responsible 
for his decision to become a part of the AFD. While Göncz was active in the NFI and later 
the AFD, he also demonstrated an interest in the re-organised party ISP. With József Antall 
whom he had collaborated during the 1956 Revolution, Göncz attended a preliminary 
meeting of the ISP that took place on 18 November 1988 at the Pilvax Coffee House 
 77 
(Révész, 1995: 30). According to Göncz’s account, however, it is clear that the ISP was no 
longer attractive to him. In response to my question on the subject,91 Zsuzsánna Göntér 
stated: 
The prominent Smallholders known to Göncz were not in [Hungary]. Béla 
Kovács was taken to the Soviet Union and other Smallholders fled the country 
in 1949 [when the Communist came to power]. In reality, the real 
Smallholders’ who [led the party] after World War II did not exist at home. 
Instead, a position hunting, [i.e. ambitious] József Torgyán – with whom 
Göncz had nothing to do - was there [in the party]. In a word, for Göncz, the 
Smallholders’ was defunct in [1949] [Interview with Göncz and Göntér, 10 
January 2008, my emphasis]. 
 
Thus, for Göncz, the ISP was the party which existed during the short-lived democratic 
period in Hungary (1945-1948). As a one time ISP party member, Göncz might have 
entertained the idea of reinvigorating peasant populism along with his friends. However, 
having recognised the infeasibility of re-establishing the ideal of the post-war ISP, Göncz 
decided not to become a part of it. It should be noted that those close friends with whom 
Göncz had worked in the ISP had sought asylum in the US,92 when the Communists 
purged the ISP leadership for their involvement in an alleged conspiracy against the 
Republic (see Chapter 1.5 of Chapter 1). In terms of Göncz’s position, then, even if the re-
organised ISP was operating under the same name, it was not the same party that Göncz 
had known. Instead, Göncz came to realise that those '56 veterans who shared a common 
fate during the resistance that followed the defeat of the '56 Revolution had found places in 
the AFD and Göncz also decided to attach himself to it. In this way, the practical reason 
for Göncz’s membership of the AFD was informed by his friends’ choice of joining the 
same party. In response to my question,93 Hungarian political scientist, András Körösényi 
reaffirmed the reasoning: 
Perhaps one reason may be found in his personal relationship with people, 
amongst the AFD, the '56 veterans, such as Miklós Vásárhelyi... Göncz 
maintained contact with them in the 1980s and these people rather went in the 
AFD direction. I think, Göncz’s personal relationships were decisive in 
leading him to join the AFD [...] [Interview with Körösényi, 11 July 2007, my 
emphasis].   
 
János Rainer also upheld the view: 
One of the reasons lies in Göncz’s personal relationship with the '56 veterans. 
For example, György Litván joined the AFD and this influenced him. At the 
initial stage of [systemic change], personal ties were very influential for one’s 
political orientation. This must not be forgotten [Interview with Rainer, 22 
August 2007, my emphasis]. 
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From the discussion above, however, one should not assume that Göncz always followed 
his friends’ political path or, that he did not have his own views and principles. Even if his 
friends’ influence was an important contributing factor leading him to find his role within 
the AFD, Göncz would not have joined had he not also embraced the values represented by 
the AFD. Indeed, in an essay that he authored, Göncz indicated that there were other 
reasons for his determination to become a member of the AFD. These were grounded in his 
own belief that the idea of peasant populism was no longer applicable to Hungary’s 
changed agricultural society. Göncz stated: 
The 'populist opposition' came from the populist writers, those who had been 
influential for me during my adolescence. I was also attached to the idea of the 
significance of rural Hungary. [But] I thought that, in wider societal terms 
[társadalmilag már], the legacy of radical peasantism had lost its significance 
[talaját vesztette], although I still felt it was important. With [the 
implementation] of land reform and the termination of large estate land-
ownership, the village had been transformed, albeit forcibly [...] (Wisinger and 
László, 2007: 59). 
 
This highlights the fact that Göncz had the intellectual capacity to judge the existing 
circumstances independently of the influence of his '56 veterans friends. According to 
Göncz, it is clear that with the transformation of Hungary’s society, the significance of 
peasant populism was receding; emotionally, Göncz still attached himself to the idea of 
peasant populism, but certainly it lost its contemporary relevance in his political beliefs. 
Instead, liberal and democratic ideology - the significance of which had come to the fore 
for Göncz through his first hand experience in fighting against the oppression of Nazis and 
the dictatorial rule of Communist regime - had a stronger influence on his political 
direction. It is important to remember that during his adult life, the importance of peasant 
populism diminished whereas Göncz’s political orientation shifted towards liberal and 
democratic values (see the conclusion of Chapter 2). By the time the ISP was re-organised, 
Göncz had realised that his political ideal was rather close to those incorporated into the 
programme of the AFD. Göncz stated:  
Göncz: Look, this is not about against the Smallholders’ Party. I have never 
denied my relationship with the Smallholders’, especially my relation with 
Béla Kovács. But the liberal thinking of the AFD was much more closely in 
line with my own [...].  
Kim: Are you saying that you were attracted by the liberal and democratic 
ideology of the AFD? 
Göncz: Yes... It was self-evident that [my own] way of thinking was being 
changed [...] (Interview with Göncz, 18 July 2006). 
 
In view of this statement, it can be argued that Göncz’s activities in the ISP and the AFD in 
the late 1980s were an attempt to find a role and to pursue his political ideals and, whereby 
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his pursuit of peasant populism ultimately moved into his firmly established liberal and 
democratic ideological trajectory.   
 
3.3. The Committee for Historical Justice  
The Committee for Historical Justice (CHJ) was officially founded on 5 June 1988 eleven 
days before the 30th anniversary of the execution of Imre Nagy and his associates (Élet és 
Irodalom, 13 June 2008; Komor, 1989). Göncz with thirty six protagonists - primarily 
composed of the families of the executed, the '56 veterans and writers94 - signed the 
Committee’s founding statement.95 Revealing the truth which had been concealed by the 
Kádár regime for three decades, the CHJ drew Hungarian society’s attention to the iniquity 
of the system and appealed for public support and mobilisation: 
Proclamation to the Hungarian people 
 
Thirty years [have passed] since 16 June 1958, the day when the Prime 
Minister of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Imre Nagy and his two associates, 
the Minister of Defence Pál Maléter and journalist Miklós Gimes were 
executed. Another prisoner in their trial, József Szilárgyi had already been 
hanged in March [1958]… the Minister of State Géza Losonczy was [killed] in 
prison in December 1957 before the last act of this legal farce. [For] three 
decades, many hundreds of people fell victim to the neo-Stalinist vengeance 
that followed 4 November 1956. [Their bodies] had been hidden in the bushes 
in the remote Lot 301 of the Rákoskeresztúr Cemetery… It is the [request] of 
their families and friends that we, the comrades of the martyrs, wanted to give 
voice to. We turn to the public of the country, to Hungarian society: Help us! 
[We want] our dead comrades and martyrs to be honoured. For the sake of 
justice! (Irodalmi Újság, 1988).  
 
The CHJ’s main goals were to right past wrongs by uncovering the remains of the executed, 
their decent burial and legal rehabilitation of the victims of post-Revolutionary repression, 
both dead and alive. Additionally, the CHJ demanded the opening of legal cases and secret 
files containing information on the show trials and miscarriages of justice that had 
occurred since 1945 and, the implementation of a full-scale investigation into the 
circumstances surrounding these events. The official discourse concerning the events of 
1956 (which considered that the Revolution had been a counter-revolutionary attempt to 
restore a capitalist order),96 did not allow for dissenting views or judgements which 
deviated from the party’s; the CHJ demanded the opening of political trials and 
independent investigations. It is important to remember that research and publications on 
the subject of Nagy and the Revolution had been banned over the course of the Kádár 
regime (see Chapter 2). In fact, according to Gyula Kozák - the former Director of the Oral 
History Archive at the 1956 Institute - a series of illegal roundtable talks that took place 
between December 1981 and summer 1982 at András B. Hegedűs’s house,97  were 
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instigated as an attempt to overcome the restriction imposed on independent research at the 
time. These secret meetings were led by nine '56 veterans including Göncz.98  The 
recounting of memories from 1956 and the creation of an alternative reliable source of 
non-regime sanctioned information were the main goals of this assembly. Kozák recalled:  
1981 was the 25th anniversary of the Revolution. Commemoration of the event 
of '56 was shown on television, radio and in the press, which portrayed the 
Revolution as a terrible counter-revolution... All real, reliable materials which 
were held in the archives were inaccessible to [researchers]... [In this situation], 
the prominent '56 veterans who represented different groups gathered and sat at 
table. Miklós Vásárhelyi and Ferenc Donáth represented the Nagy Group and 
Imre Mécs represented the [view] of university students [...].   
Kim: What was the main aim of the meeting? 
Kozák: [It was aimed at] refreshing the memories of '56. Every participant 
recounted their own '56... This led to the formation of a mosaic and a new 
picture of the Revolution (Interview with Kozák, 19 September 2007). 
 
In short, as Rainer notes, critical reflection and impartial assessment regarding the event of 
1956 was not practicable 'as long as [the] conditions prevailing at the time of the formation 
of the Kádár regime continued to exist' (Rainer, 2002b: 292); the CHJ demanded the 
cessation of the political manipulation of the country’s history and pushed for a change.  
 
Another issue that the CHJ wished to address was the end of direct and indirect 
harrassment by the authorities and the discrimination that was suffered by the families of 
those who had been executed and of the '56 veterans. By 1962, the Kádár regime had 
consolidated of its grip on political power (Ekiert, 1996: 107). To realise this level of 
supremacy, coercion and repression 'with a harsh reimposition of agricultural 
collectivisation' (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000: 204) had been employed in an attempt to 
crush the resistance to the regime within Hungarian society. The execution of Imre Nagy 
was a good example of how the regime approached the achievement of its aim. From 1962 
onwards, however, the regime’s political tactics had gradually altered. The level of 
coercion was eased as evidenced by the reduction of political terror and the issuing of an 
amnesty to political prisoners (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000: 204). Instead, softer tactics 
of manipulation were employed in order to control the dissenting voices of those political 
prisoners who had been released from jail. One of the methods used by the regime was that 
of discrimination against, and stigmatisation of, the prisoners and their families. Childern 
whose fathers were imprisoned due to their activities in the Revolution were taught by 
teachers that their parents received due punishment as they had acted to harm society. In 
contrast, at home, mothers told their childern that their fathers were innocent men who had 
acted heroically and in defence of the nation. This contradiction between the interpretation 
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established by the regime and that of the families meant that the childern concerned had to 
confront the question of who was right? If the children upheld the view of the regime, the 
past of their fathers remained a stigma and a disgrace to the family. If, however, the 
childern concluded that their fathers had acted correctly, they were nonetheless faced with 
an irreconcilable question: why were their right-thinking fathers being punished? In 
Kőrösi’s and Molnár’s terms, this 'irreconcilable contradiction between the values 
represented by society and those represented by the family' led to 'a double system of 
values' when assessing the Revolution (Kőrösi and Molnár, 2003: 91).  
 
Similarly, various discriminatory acts were undertaken against the families of the political 
prisoners. For example, Judit Gyenes – the widow of the former Defence Minister of the 
Nagy government Pál Maléter – was unjustly treated in employment and housing as a 
consequence of Maléter’s involvement in the Revolution. In my interview, Gyenes said 
that she was evicted from her house and forcibly relocated to a commune where she had to 
live with another family. Moreover, she was deprived of an opportunity to be employed as 
a full time worker instead, she had to make her living by taking on several part time 
manual jobs. Gyenes recounted: 
In May 1957, I received an order from the local military authorities telling me 
that I had to leave my house within 24 hours. I protested against it, asking on 
what grounds I had to leave... But it was not possible to negotiate with them... I 
was put into a commune where a family of six members already lived. One 
room for this family and another was for me, but there was no bathroom. I 
washed myself in the kitchen... An instruction came from the Ministry [of 
Labour] [instructing my employer] to dismiss me from my work place... [From 
that point on] I took on baby-sitting, gardening work, cleaning and I [even] dug 
graves in the cemetry. I did not rely on anyone and I am proud of myself [for 
having survived through during this difficult time] (Interview with Gyenes, 23 
August 2007). 
 
Thus the CHJ considered the issue of discrimination and stigmatisation as one of the major 
areas of social inequity which had to be properly addressed. Not surprisingly, the ruling 
Communist leadership regarded the demands of the CHJ as too radical but displayed signs 
of leniency with regard to the remembrance of the event of 1956. On 14 June 1988, the 
Political Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP) brought a 
resolution that they would tolerate the holding of a memorial service commemorating 
Nagy’s death and those of his associates. This tolerance was extended on the understanding 
that the service was not used as a platform for displays of discontent against the regime 
(Ripp, 2006: 171). Members of the CHJ, dissident intellectuals and the '56 veterans visited 
Lot 301 of the Rákoskeresztúr Cemetery where victims of the post-Revolutionary 
crackdown had been buried in unmarked graves. In a solemn and quiet atmosphere, a 
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memorial service took place; a poem was recited and a eulogy delivered (Ripp, 2006: 172; 
Molnár, 2009: 49-53). In central Budapest by contrast, peaceful rallies organised by the 
members of the democratic opposition were brutally dispersed by the riot police (Hegedűs, 
1998; Papp, 2002; Népszava, 16 June 2009), however, the authorities presented a false 
report to media. In an interview with members of the foreign press, Károly Grósz - János 
Kádár’s successor as the General Secretary of the HSWP - claimed that police intervention 
at the event did not constitute excessive use of force, not least because the demonstration 
that had taken place did so in breach of public order bylaws and had instigated violence.99 
Grósz claimed: 'We do not like it when our police are beaten up but we have evidence that 
this happened… The protest that occurred on 16 June was stirred up by fascist propaganda, 
chauvinism and irredentism' (Népszabadság, 12 July 1988).    
 
Having disagreed with and been infuriated by Grósz’s false statement, Göncz, as a vice-
president of the CHJ, wrote a letter of protest to him. In this letter, Göncz expressed his 
deep regret at the way in which the authorities handled the events at the demonstration: 
Dear Prime Minister 
 
I am a witness, an observer, and a partial participant and victim of the incident 
of 16 June... and this compelled me to write a letter to you [...].  
You are one of the party leaders who supported the memoriali[sation] of the 
dead.... For this reason, I feel extremely sad to [see] that on 16 June, the batons 
of [the riot police] and all those endlessly bitter acts [perpetrated in the 
regime’s name] such as the removal of banners from the wreath and the 
confiscation of the memorial pole, [but these acts] have not silenced the voices 
of the dead [Imre Nagy and his associates] but [instead] made them louder 
[...].100   
 
Göncz protested against the regime’s use of violence as he viewed that coercion applied by 
the Grósz regime as contradictory to the General Secretary’s promise to allow people to 
pay tribute to the fallen. Although Göncz did not mention the name of Grósz’s predecessor 
or the policies Kádár was known to employ, he implied that there was no difference 
between the manner in which the Grósz regime dealt with the past and its remembrance 
and the attitude of previous party leaders. For this reason, Göncz considered that the 
question of coming to terms with the past could no longer be discounted, and proposed his 
own solution to deal with the past appropriately, he appealed to Grósz:   
If you wish to complete your historical task and renew the party [image], you 
must clearly dissociate yourself [from the party-line] not only through your 
[words], but also through your deeds... I know this may be against the interests 
of some and might seem detrimental to you as well. But it would serve the 
interests of society, the credibility of your words and your domestic and 
foreign policy. In this respect, dealing with the past cannot be avoided... I 
believe the vast majority of Hungarian people would be pleased, if you 
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committed yourself to reckoning the past before [them]... I firmly believe that 
[the holding of] a dialogue is the basic moral condition and, the key to the 
future of this country... Without this, neither the shattered belief of the Party’s 
politics nor [wider] social supports can be restored [...].101   
 
This once again highlights Göncz’s earlier point. In Göncz’s view, there was a discordance 
between Grósz’s word and and his actions. This still does not present us with the full 
context regarding Grósz’s pledge to Hungarian society, but Göncz clearly implies that the 
Grósz regime had failed to renew the image of the party and to restore public confidence. 
Above all, settling accounts with the past was seen as a long-pending issue which 
contributed to disharmony between the regime and the Hungarian society. For this reason, 
Göncz urged the regime to face the past honestly, as in his view, this was a pre-requisite to 
societal reconciliation. It should be noted that Grósz could have acted coercively in an 
attempt to silence Göncz and, Göncz’s letter of protest carried a certain importance, albeit 
a manifestfully symbolic one.   
 
In response to Göncz’s letter, Grósz sent a reply a week later. In his letter, Grósz 
essentially refused to accept Göncz’s proposition, and adhered to his previous stance. With 
regard to the actions of the police, Grósz defended his earlier position, reasoning that the 
conduct of police was correct as it served the maintenance of public order. Grósz claimed: 
'On 12 June, I had already made clear to the protest organisers that [people must] refrain 
from violating public order... There is no political system [in the world which would] 
tolerate [a situation where] their police are kicked [by people]; this is never going to 
happen'.102 Secondly, Grósz stated that the question of dealing with the past in the manner 
that Göncz had suggested would not be possible, because this would serve to undercut the 
fundamental political pillars which supported the regime. Grósz stated: 'You suggested 
securing my moral authority with relentless reckoning of the past. Unfortunately, I cannot 
accept this. Before the world, I pledged that I am not willing to reckon a past which lasted 
42 years, but only its crimi[nal elements], distortions and errors [committed by] the 
rightists and leftists'.103  Thus, Grósz firmly believed that political reform, including 
dealing with the past would not be necessary for securing the interests of the established 
order and of Hungarian society; by the end of 1988, no positive sign regarding re-
evaluation of the past had emerged. 
 
At the end of January 1989, the momentum which broke the stalemate originated from 
within the ruling party leadership. In a radio interview, a leading reform Communist, Imre 
Pozsgay, made the startling announcement that the events of 1956 were not a 'counter-
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revolution', but a 'popular uprising' (Bayer, 2005: 134; Cartledge, 2006: 518; O’Neil, 1998: 
100). Opinions regarding Pozsgay’s statement may be differently perceived and assessed 
by the Hungarian population, but a general consensus established in the academic literature 
suggested that its effect was unequivocal and far-reaching: the re-evaluation of 1956 
undercut the regime’s legitimate political principles 'to their very foundation' (Ekiert, 1996: 
119; Lewis, 1994: 244; Linz and Stepan, 1996: 305; Tőkés, 1996: 299; Rainer, 2002b: 298). 
While Pozsay did not mention that the reassessment of 1956 included Nagy’s rehabilitation, 
the redefinition of 1956 opened up just this possibility, a fact that was indeed demonstrably 
evidenced by the change in the regime’s attitude towards its historical consciousness. On 
14 February 1989, the regime assented to the CHJ’s demand that Nagy and his associates 
be reburied, albeit in a private family ceremony (Ripp, 2006: 348; Unwin, 1991: 221).104 
With the CHJ and the families of the deceased having agreed with the government’s 
proposition, Nagy’s exhumation and those of his associates followed (28 March-1 April 
1989). The concession that the regime made to society thus far was, that Nagy’s reburial 
could be dealt with as a family matter, excluding any possibility of public involvement in it.  
 
The change of status quo was, however, once again initiated by the regime. On 19 April 
1989, newly appointed Prime Minister, Miklós Németh, announced that Nagy’s reburial 
'could be no longer considered as a private matter', reasoning that 'it required the 
government’s cooperation' (Ripp, 2006: 349). Moreover, Németh stated that Nagy’s trial 
was unlawful, indicating that the legal redress – in due course – Nagy’s exoneration would 
be inevitable. Evidently, Németh’s actions suggest that there was a rift within the regime, 
and that such a cleavage became increasingly apparent after Pozsgay’s public statement. 
Indeed, Bruszt and Stark note that in an evening news programme, Németh made such a 
gesture by 'publicly repudiating one of [Grósz’]s speeches and distanc[ing] himself from 
the party hierarchy' (Bruszt and Stark, 1991: 225-26); which is highly indicative of the fact 
that the separation of government and party was already occurring within the regime.   
 
Once the Németh government acknowledged that Nagy’s re-interment would be treated as 
a public funeral, the main issue for the CHJ to address were those of venue and time. This 
was negotiated between Göncz and his associates and the Németh government. The result 
of negotiations showed that on 16 June 1989 the following government representatives – 
the premier, Miklós Németh, the Deputy Prime Minister, Péter Medgyessy, the Secretary 
of the State, Imre Pozsgay and the Speaker of Parliament, Mátyás Szűrös – were allowed 
to pay tribute to the deceased at Heroes’ Square.105 At Göncz’s suggestion, both parties 
also agreed that, along with five coffins for Nagy and his co-defendants, an empty casket 
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would be included as a representation of the Unknown Insurgents who shed their blood 
during the Revolution (Bozóki, 2003: 90). On 1 June 1989, the result of agreements was 
announced by communiqué of the Central Committee of the HSWP, stating that June 16 
would be a day of national mourning to the deceased and one which would also symbolise 
'national reconciliation' (Népszabadság, 1 June 1989). The regime expected that with 
allowing Nagy’s reburial and the presence of some government members at the funeral 
might be helpful for the cause of redeeming the past.  
 
However, Nagy’s reburial turned out to be a symbolic day, epitomising the beginning of 
the end of Communism and catalysed Hungary’s democratic transformation. It was not 
simply the day of Nagy’s ceremonial re-interment but that of the entombing the old system 
itself. In the presence of a quarter of a million of the Hungarian population, it became a 
public political demonstration, one which de-legitimised the Kádár era.106 Those people 
who had made a pledge to the Kádár regime were now put in a position of historical 
paradox. 'Kádár was Macbeth' whereas 'Banquo’s ghost [Nagy] was lying in state on 
Heroes’ Square' (Ash, 1990: 48-53). Just as Nagy had claimed during his final statement at 
his trial: 'If my life is needed to prove that not all Communists are enemies of the people, I 
gladly make the sacrifice. I know one day there will be another Nagy trial that will 
rehabilitate me. I also know I will have a reburial. I only fear the funeral oration will be 
delivered by those who betrayed me' (The New York Times, 16 June 1989); his prophecy 
had finally been realised. Therefore, for those anonymous Hungarians who fought for 
freedom alongside Nagy, this was 'the day of resurrection of the fallen and their crushed 
ideal[s] and [their] revolution' (Litván, 2008: 288).  
 
Göncz did not give a memorial speech on this historical day but, from the beginning he, 
alongside a small group of '56 veterans, had prepared for this moment. It was Göncz, who 
opened the funeral proceedings (Magyar Hírlap, 17 June 1989) stating 'Fellow Hungarians 
let us pay our kegyelet [tribute], let us remember' (Benziger, 2008: 22). Göncz vividly 
remembered the event and noted its significance both for him and for Hungarian history:  
I had no idea of the power of the spoken word [until then]. I saw several 
hundred thousand faceless people in front of me. When the list of those 
executed was read out, every name was like a hammer stroke on one’s heart 
and on history. It was stupefying. I had never felt such psychological pressure 
or such a responsibility. I felt as if everything had slipped out of my hands and 
everything was in God’s hands, myself included. I felt something enormously 
importance was taking place, as if this really was the final cathartic moment in 
Hungarian political development. This was the breakthrough in its [society’s] 
silent force and amazing discipline (Tóth, 2009). 
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Indeed, after the end of the funeral, root to branch political change ensued. On 24 June 
1989, Grósz’s sole leadership was replaced by the presidium of four: Rezső Nyers, Miklós 
Németh, Imre Pozsgay and Grósz himself (Izsák, 2001: 391), thus Grósz was marginalised 
within the party (Ash, 1990: 56). Two weeks later, on 6 July, the very day when the 
Supreme Court overturned the case against Imre Nagy and his fallen associates, János 
Kádár, who had reigned over the country for three decades died (Gough, 2006: 256; Rainer, 
2002b: 303). Over the summer of 1989, the democratic opposition entered negotiations 
with the new leadership of the HSWP over the matter of arranging free elections and 
changing the Constitution. On 11 September 1989, Hungary opened its border with Austria 
to allow the East German asylum seekers to flee to West Germany, this act denoted the 
symbolic collapse of Communism (Lendvai, 2008: 239).107  
 
At this juncture, Göncz was active as a member of the AFD and simultaneously assumed 
the brief chairmanship of the Hungarian Writers’ Association (HWA) until May 1990. On 
26 November 1989, at the annual meeting of the HWA, Göncz had been elected to the post. 
Initially, Göncz had received the same number of votes as a leading representative of 
populist writers Sándor Csoóri (Tóth, 1990: 66), but with Csoóri’s voluntary 
relinquishment of his candidacy Göncz became the chairman of the HWA without runoff 
election. According to Göncz, winning the presidential post of the HWA was somehow 
related to his early political activities in the peasant populist movements.  
Newspaper interviewer: It was said that you were elected to the President of 
the HWA, because you had the least number of enemies within it...  
Göncz: Perhaps, it was something like that. [Those belonging to] the populist 
camp thought I am the 'solution' [to their problems]. My political school is 
back in the March Front. The way of thinking of the populist writers deeply 
influenced me, because they [dealt with] the crucial question of our lives: what 
the [future] of the peasantry and land reform would be. To this end, we stood 
against the Horthy system. Even today, I feel the original tradition of the 
Hungarian Democratic Forum is back to the [era] of the peasant populis[m] and 
came close to me [...].108   
 
Göncz was able to attract support from both populist and liberal wings of the HWA 
(although these camps were traditionally loathed to co-operate). Thus Göncz’s integrative 
personality contributed to his selection for the position of the first post-Communist 
President which, in turn, meant that he had reached the zenith of his political career. The 
details of Göncz’s tenure in the post will be thoroughly examined in the next chapter in 
which I analyse the actual process and political negotiation required in order to 
institutionalise the Presidency in the post-Communist era and Göncz’s selection to the post. 
This chapter concludes by exploring the significance of Göncz’s activism in the CHJ for 
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his political development.     
 
First, Göncz’s role in the CHJ contributed to strengthening his liberal and democratic 
values. As has been discussed in Section 3.2 of this chapter, Göncz’s determination to join 
the NFI rested with his appreciation of the significance of pluralism inherent in the NFI. 
Having noted this, his actions in the CHJ also showed that seeking societal reconciliation 
was of equal importance to the democratic values that Göncz upheld. Above all, Göncz 
along with the CHJ members, considered that three issues – the rehabilitation of Imre Nagy 
and his associates, the opening of secret files to independent research and the cessation of 
police harrassment – ought to be addressed as a matter of urgency. They believed that 
meeting these demands would not only serve to clarify a past that had been overshadowed 
by the oligarchic rule of the Communist regime, but would also lead towards societal 
conciliation. Göncz, as the Vice-President of the CHJ, urged the regime to change its 
conventional tactics with regard to dealing with the past and its remembrance; prior 
concealment of the truth and the use of coercion underscored the importance of an open 
approach. In particular, Göncz stressed the holding of a social dialogue as a key means of 
breaking down the wall between the regime and society. Despite the fact that the regime 
ultimately refused to accept Göncz’s proposition, this act clearly illustrated the democratic 
values that Göncz had committed himself to.  
 
Secondly, Göncz’s activity in the CHJ contributed to the strengthening of his moral 
authority. As has been examined in Chapters 1 and 2, the origin of this is seen in a number 
of his proactive, political acts: beginning with his participation in student armed resistance 
movements against Nazi Germany, continuing through his important actions that followed 
after the defeat of the 1956 Revolution and his subsequent imprisonment to the founding of 
the CHJ, all of which laid the foundation of his moral authority. While Göncz was not able 
to achieve all of the objectives that he set himself, he nonetheless clearly demonstrated the 
values which he embraced. The common denominator that bound Göncz with those who 
fought together in these democratic movements was their commitment to the realisation of 
a free, democratic and socially responsible society. As Holmes notes, Göncz’s democratic 
activities for which he spent a considerable time in jail 'under the old regime symbolises 
the courage and decency of anti-Communist dissidents' (Holmes, 1993), and displayed 
untainted moral authority to the public at large. It is appropriate to conclude this 
exploration of Göncz’s political development with Göncz’s thoughts and views regarding 
his democratic activities and their implications: 
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It was not all that surprising that I was nominated to be President of the 
Republic by the [Alliance] of Free Democrats, which, as a liberal movement 
and later political party, was the direct successor of the democratic opposition. 
The grand old men of Hungarian politics – who had languished in limbo for 
years, who led every democratic initiative since 1941, resistance to the Nazis 
and before that the March Front, the peasant-radical writers’ movement for 
national unity, 1956, the movements for a peaceful transformation in the late 
'80s – did not live to see the changes that they should have represented and 
symbolised. All this left just me, a writer with three politically colour[ful] 
chapters in my life [...] (Tóth, 1999: 232). 
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Chapter 4. Development of the post-Communist Presidency in Hungary 
Introduction 
This chapter examines Göncz’s political career after his election to Hungary’s first post-
Communist President (On 3 August 1990). An exploration of the factors which contributed 
to his accession to the presidential post is the main focus of the chapter, but in order to 
examine Göncz’s political development in a wider context of Hungary’s political history, 
the chapter is laid out as follows.  
 
The first section of this chapter briefly examines the National Roundtable Negotiations and 
its significance, as it was in this forum that the fundamental framework of governance for 
the country was decided by participants, and the form and structure of the Presidency was 
included. The next section critically reviews and re-examines the actual process of 
institutionalising the Presidency. This includes the analysis of accounts offered by those of 
my interviewees who actually participated in the Roundtable Talks and subsequent 
political negotiations.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is devoted to analysing the constitutional powers granted to 
the Hungarian President. The chapter asks what the main characteristics of the Hungarian 
Presidency are, and identifies their significance and their implications for Göncz’s exercise 
of powers during the term of his Presidency.  
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4.1. The National Roundtable Negotiations, the beginning a new 'political game in 
town' 
On 23 October 1989, the People’s Republic of Hungary which had lasted for more than 
four decades, was proclaimed the Republic of Hungary. The date is significant as it was the 
anniversary of the day that the Hungarian people rose against Communist rule and 
proclaimed their will to struggle for freedom and national independence in 1956.109 The 
new rules for the governance of the country had been established in the national Round 
Table Negotiations (RTN) between the ruling Communist party and the Opposition 
Roundtable (OR).110 The OR – a tentative alliance of the eight democratic forces111 – was 
founded on 22 March 1989 with the aim of coordinating oppositionist actions more 
effectively and, above all, of forming a united front against the ruling Communist party 
(Hungarian Socialist and Workers’ Party, hereafter HSWP). The RTN lasted from 13 June 
1989 until 18 September of that year,112 during this period both parties held a series of 
intensive negotiations to discuss the six items on the agenda: the Draft Bill on the Electoral 
Law; the Draft Bill on the Amendment of the Criminal Code and Proceedings; the Draft 
Bill on the Media and Publicity; the Draft Bill on the Amendment of the Constitution, 
including the Bill on the Establishment of the Constitutional Court and the Presidency; the 
Draft Bill on Political Parties and Party Finance; and Guarantees of a Peaceful Transition 
(which concerned the dismantling of the Communist para-military unit: the workers’ 
militia) (Bozóki, 2003: 95).   
 
The result was mixed (Népszabadság, 19 September 1989a and 1989b). Both the HSWP 
and the OR managed to agree on the first four issues, at least in principle,113 whereas they 
failed to reach a consensus over the last two questions. In particular, divergent opinions 
among the political elite centred on the establishment of the Office of the President and in 
particular on the method of presidential election (by popular vote or indirectly elected by 
Parliament), the timing of the election (before or after the founding parliamentary election) 
and the range of the President’s constitutional powers (Elster, 1993: 96; 1996: 14). The 
HSWP leadership demanded that the timing and method of the presidential election be 
decided before the parliamentary election and, by a popular vote. In contrast, the OR 
insisted that the creation of the Presidency be dealt with only after the first parliamentary 
election. Ultimately, the only element agreed upon during the RTN was the establishment 
of the Presidency itself. As Péter Tölgyessy – a key delegate of the OR and former leader 
of the Alliance of Free Democrats – noted, it was the Presidency that invoked the most 
contentious debate among the Hungarian political elite during the RTN (Tölgyessy, 1999a). 
The following section of the chapter probes what was behind this political intransigence.   
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4.2. Designing an institutional system: the Presidency 
4.2.1. Bargaining over the Presidency  
As stated above, an agreement over the establishment of the Presidency was reached 
between the HSWP and the OR during the RTN. The actualisation of this agreement, 
however, was far from easy and did not proceed without incident; above all, the legal 
procedure had to be settled upon advance. In practical terms, this meant that the previous 
Communist Constitution promulgated by Act XX of 1949,114 had to be revised so that new 
political institutions could be introduced. Interestingly, the proposal for the amendment of 
the Constitution was first offered by the HSWP and, this occurred even before the first 
rounds of RTN talks (Stanger, 2004: 7). According to constitutional expert, István 
Somogyvári, in March 1989 the legal experts, Géza Kilényi, Kálmán Kulcsár, Somogyvári 
himself and others, were assigned the task of composing a constitutional draft for the 
amendment of the Constitution. Somogyvári observed: 'We received an instruction to 
immediately draft a set of rules required for the creation of the presidential office... Since 
the presidential office could only be created after the amendment of the Constitution, I 
composed a draft of the constitutional revision' (interview with Somogyvári, 22 May 2007). 
In addition to the Presidency, relevant provisions for the establishment of the 
Constitutional Court and the Office of Audit were also subsequently prepared; in April 
1989, a draft Constitution formulated by these legal experts was approved by the politburo 
of the HSWP (Schiemann, 2005: 86).        
 
The essence of the draft changes to the Constitution was that the post-Communist 
Presidency should be built upon the model provided by the French Fifth Republic 
(Tölgyessy, 1999a, 1999b), which is, a 'semi-presidential' or 'premier-presidential 
system'. 115  According to this draft, the Hungarian President was to exercise wide 
'legislative' and 'executive' powers, taking on an important role in the separation of powers 
(Kukorelli, 1995: 195). For example, the President was to be able to dissolve Parliament 
and declare war, although the exercise of the latter power could only occur under 
circumstances where Parliament could not be convened (Schiemann, 2005: 86). 
Furthermore, the President was to be directly elected by the population, and the 
presidential election was due to be held before the first parliamentary election. The OR 
were strongly against the HSWP proposal, arguing that the institutionalisation of the 
Presidency ought be dealt with by the first democratically elected Parliament. The OR 
reasoned that since neither the Parliament elected in 1985 nor the HSWP had legitimacy to 
introduce a new political institution, little reason remained for further discussion (Bozóki, 
1992: 65). Instead, the OR focused on ensuring that the basic institutional conditions be 
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met (for example, the enactment of a new electoral law), in preparation for the first free 
parliamentary election. At the initial stages, therefore, the OR took a resolute and 
intransigent stance against the HSWP proposal; a clear, bi-polar cleavage between the 
HSWP and the OR was established.    
 
By the end of the summer of 1989, however, a conciliatory political stance was slowly 
taking shape on the OR side. According to Tölgyessy, a number of world leaders who 
visited Hungary in the summer of that year advised OR members not to 'take on a radical 
solution' (interview with Tölgyessy, 15 October 2007). The practical meaning of this 
message was that the political transformation of Hungary should be made democratically, 
but at the same time peacefully. The leaders who advanced this idea did not directly 
mention that a compromise should be sought to ensure a peaceful transition to democracy. 
Nevertheless, as Tölgyessy pointed out, 'in reality the West allowed the Communists to 
retain some prerogatives' (interview with Tölgyessy, 15 October 2007), indicating that 
compromise should be key to the process of Hungary’s transition to democracy. The 
West’s view along with the prevailing domestic political situation assessed by political 
elites (for which the withdrawal of the Soviet army from Hungary was a top priority) 
meant that the intransigence of the OR began to shift. On 6 July 1989, the conservative 
members of the OR, the Christian Democratic Peoples’ Party and the Hungarian Peoples’ 
Party gradually moved toward the HSWP’s position, showing a willingness to accept the 
HSWP proposal (O’Neil, 1997: 204; Schiemann, 2005: 89).116 In contrast, the other 
members of the OR, particularly the Alliance of Young Democrats (AYD) and the AFD 
which took a radical anti-Communist stance at this time, persistently refused to accept the 
HSWP proposal.  
 
Thus, by the summer of 1989, the political cleavage that existed between the HSWP and 
the OR further developed a more complicated form. Tensions now existed among the 
members of the OR and between the OR and the HSWP. Consequently, negotiations 
concerning the establishment of the Office of President ended in a stalemate. According to 
the historian, Zoltán Ripp, throughout the summer bargaining over the Presidency was at a 
standstill until a representative of the HDF, József Antall, proposed a solution. With the 
approval of the HDF Presidium, on 17 August, Antall proposed a package deal, arguably 
an ambiguous, compromise-seeking solution which was neither entirely representative of 
HSWP nor OR preferences. The important point of the proposition was as follows:  
The presidential election can be held after the parliamentary election or 
simultaneously [együtt]. Until then, the Speaker of the House will be the 
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interim President. For the first occasion, the President of the Republic shall be 
directly elected for five years [...] (Ripp, 2006: 443).  
 
The only clear element of Antall’s proposition was that a one-off direct presidential 
election could be held, if the Communist and OR members agreed on his proposal. The 
timing of the holding of a presidential election, however, remained unclear. On 29 August 
1989, Antall made another proposal. This time, he suggested that, with the restoration of 
Act I of the 1946 Constitution, legal disputes over the institutionalisation of the Presidency 
can be settled. Reasoning that, according to Act I of the 1946 Constitution, the President is 
elected by Parliament, Antall suggested that the Presidency be built on this historic model 
(Ripp, 2006: 447). However, he insisted that a one-off direct presidential election be 
further considered. Thus, although Antall made two different proposals, they had one 
element in common: the holding of a one-off direct presidential election. In practical terms, 
this meant that the initial intransigence displayed by the HDF was now developing into 
leniency towards the HSWP, if the Communists would accept the condition: the 
Presidency should be based upon Act I of the 1946 Constitution but, on one occasion, 
direct presidential elections could be held.117 As Swain notes, the populist camp led by the 
HDF 'changed their opinion over the issue of the Presidency and came to support the "your 
President and our Prime Minister" solution, with Pozsgay the favoured candidate for a 
directly elected Presidency' (Swain, 2006: 150).  
 
Indeed, according to O’Neil, apart from the AYD, the AFD and the Democratic League of 
Independent Trade Unions, in September 1989, all other members of the OR accepted 
Antall’s proposal, signing a 'preliminary agreement' between the HSWP and the OR 
(O’Neil, 1993: 187; 1997: 205). According to this agreement, on only one occasion, the  
direct presidential election would be held on 28 November 1989. Frustrated with this 
agreement, the AYD and the AFD refused to sign the final RTN agreement as an 
expression of protest, although they did not challenge the act of signing the agreement 
(Ripp, 2006: 456). Instead, these two rebellious groups decided to collect signatories in 
order to push for a referendum. In November 1989, their efforts came to fruition when the 
so-called 'Four Yes-es' referendum was held. Göncz recounted how this historical political 
process took place during the initial transitional period of Hungary’s democracy.  
Newspaper interviewer: You were not at the centre of this talk [RTN] but you 
firstly [proposed] a solution that if an agreement was reached that the AFD 
found unacceptable, they should neither sign nor veto it. Is that correct? 
Göncz: Yes, as far as I know, I was the first to say this. At least, according to 
my memory, it was me although it is possible that there were others too... 
Antall saw – and for a while myself [I was in agreement] – that the future of 
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the [country] could be only imagined as a cooperation between the main forces 
of the HSWP (or its successor) and the opposition. But in September 1989, the 
AFD thought that for the transition to [democracy] the HSWP’s participation 
was not [required]. The [root] of this [thinking] lay in whether the presidential 
election should be held before or after the parliamentary election, and Imre 
Pozsgay was not necessarily [the preferred presidential candidate] for the AFD. 
[Refusing to] sign [the agreement] overturned Antall’s carefully thought 
through strategy, as he saw the alliance with Pozsgay as indispensable. The 
HDF or Pozsgay would never forgive me or the AFD for this.118     
 
4.2.2. 'Four Yes-es' (Négy Igen-es) referendum 
With the adoption of the agreement between the HSWP and the OR, disputes over the 
establishment of the Presidency seemed to have ended. According to this agreement, the 
presidential election was due to be held before the end of the year. However, this was not 
realised as a result of subsequent joint political action taken by the AYD and the AFD (the 
liberals). Having disagreed over the outcome of the RTN, particularly concerning the 
timing and method of the presidential election, the liberals collected signatories to launch a 
referendum. The ultimate goal of this campaign was to retract the decision to hold a one-
off direct presidential election. In addition to this, members of the dissenting groups sought 
to settle other issues which had not been resolved during the RTN. These included whether 
the Communists should retain their long-held privileges, and on 26 November 1989, the 
Hungarian population were asked the following questions:   
1) Should the HSWP’[s party activity] in work places be banned?  
2) Should the workers’ militia be dissolved? 
3) Should the HSWP’s party property be liquidated? 
4) Should the presidential election be held after the parliamentary election? 
(Bozóki, 2003: 104).  
 
In this referendum, the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP)119 campaigned for three yes-es 
and one no (on the last issue), whereas the liberals appealed to the population to vote for 
four yes-es. The HDF, however, initially boycotted the referendum (O’Neil, 1997: 206; 
Pittaway, 2003: 62), yet interestingly they later went on to nominate their own presidential 
candidate, Lajos Für (Népszava, 23 October 1989). Given that the HDF de facto supported 
the HSP’s presidential candidate, Imre Pozsgay during the RTN – one of the most popular 
reform Communists (see Section 3.3 in Chapter 3) - there was a question mark over Für’s 
nomination for Presidency.120 According to Ripp, Für’s nomination was an ad hoc tactical 
solution taken by the HDF leadership to neutralise criticism raised by the AFD. Ripp 
asserted that before the referendum, the HDF was heavily criticised by the AFD and 
labelled as 'Communists’ friends' or 'collaborators' (Ripp, 2006: 496). Having faced fierce 
criticism, the HDF leadership sought to find a way to neutralise these allegations, but 
without damaging the relationship with the HSP. The solution was the nomination of an 
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independent presidential candidate from within the HDF, in the expectation that this would 
help the AFD to vindicate themselves in light of the allegations that had been made. In 
hindsight, however, Für’s nomination for the Presidency was merely window dressing. 
Given that the HDF’s real stance towards the HSP was questionable, the HDF had to 
exhibit an image to the public through which it could dissociate itself from the HSP. A 
former factional leader of the HDF, Ferenc Kulin, noted:  
The AFD launched a campaign against the HDF... They said the HDF wanted 
to collaborate with the Communists... [In response] we had to demonstrate that 
we had our own independent candidate... For this reason, we put Lajos Für 
forward as the presidential candidate (Interview with Kulin, 14 November 
2007).  
 
In terms of the HDF’s position, Für’s nomination did not militate against Pozsgay, but 
rather, aided his position (Ripp, 2006: 496).   
 
The referendum was held, and its result supported the liberal’s position over the HSP, by a 
margin of only 0.2 percent (Dezső and Bragyova, 2007: 91-92). According to the result, 
the timing of the presidential election was now rescheduled so as to take place after the 
parliamentary election. With hindsight, this referendum was not about the scheduling of 
the presidential election, but was a question of accepting Pozsgay as the first post-
Communist President (Elster, Offe and Preuss, 1998: 66). Given that no other candidates 
from the liberals group 'could run for the Presidency [against Imre Pozsgay and have] any 
realistic chance of winning' (Pokol, 2003) by deliberately deferring the presidential 
election, the liberals prevented the HSP from reconsolidating their powers within the 
Office of President. In his memoir, Pozsgay expressed his devastation at the impact of the 
referendum on the defeat of his political ambition thus:   
After the blows [rained upon] me, I concluded that I had been defeated in a 
venture of high stakes but, [that I] had not failed... It was as if I had been 
kicked in the stomach. I would be a Pharisee and a hypocrite if I denied [this] 
(Izsák, 2001: 401). 
 
The disputes over the issue of a direct presidential election appeared to have ended. 
However, in 1990, the HSP found another way to recast their powers in the presidential 
office. This time by launching another plebiscite along with the independent 
parliamentarian, Zoltán Király,121 the HSP asked the population about the form of the 
presidential election itself. However, this attempt to reignite the discussion on the 
presidential election was not realised as a result of an extremely low turnout of only 14 
percent (Népszabadság, 30 July 1990). Given this political history, it is thus clear that the 
HSP persistently attempted to reconsolidate their power through the Presidency, but its 
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plan was largely thwarted by the joint action of the uncompromising and intransigent 
members of the OR – the AFD and the AYD. In terms of the position of the AFD and the 
AYD, the success of the referendum would have contributed to an increase in their 
recognition factor with the general public and, this would have been beneficial for gaining 
more seats than might have been expected in the forthcoming parliamentary elections. 
However, as will be discussed in the following section, the actual result of the general 
election did not come about in this manner, and required a new configuration of power-
sharing between the electoral victor and the largest opposition. 
 
4.2.3. The Pact 
The first free and competitive general election in Hungary was held in the spring of 1990. 
The HDF, whose founding ideology was rooted in populist-nationalism (népi és nemzeti), 
won the first general election (Körösényi, 1999: 35-36). Securing 42.75 percent (164/386 
seats) of the vote, the HDF defeated their counterparts, but their number of seats in 
Parliament fell short of an outright government parliamentary majority.  
    Table 2: The outcome of the 1990 parliamentary election 
Parties 1990 
HDF 164 (42.75%) 
AFD 92 (23.83%) 
ISP 44 (11.14%) 
HSP 33 (8.55%) 
AYD 21 (5.44%) 
CDPP 21 (5.44%) 
Adapted from Népszabadság (10 April 1990) 
To overcome this, the HDF sought a coalition agreement with two ideologically close 
conservative parties, the Independent Smallholders’ Party (ISP) and the CDPP (Christian 
Democratic People’s Party), which together secured a sufficiently large number of seats 
(229/386) to form a majority. Subsequently, on 23 May 1990, the President of the HDF, 
József Antall, was sworn in as Premier.    
 
Having secured a qualified majority of parliamentary seats, Antall’s decision to make a 
pact with the leading opposition party – the AFD - is questionable. There are various 
accounts explaining his decision, but a general consensus offered by academics suggests 
that the decision was informed by new legislation, which required a majority vote of two-
thirds among the Members of Parliament (MPs) (Bihari, 2005: 395-96; Debreczeni, 2003: 
298; Lomax, 1993: 87; Romsics, 1999: 440; Sajó, 1996: 89).122 Despite the fact that Antall 
formed a conservative coalition government, the coalition’s total of parliamentary seats 
was insufficiently high to ensure the passage of legislation, which required a minimum of 
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256 votes from MPs. The Antall government, for instance, could not even pass the law on 
the state budget without the receipt of votes from the opposition. A former factional leader 
of the HDF, Imre Kónya, noted:   
When the HDF won the general election, it became clear that with selected 
coalition partners, we comprised more than 50 % of [parliamentary seats]. In a 
normal country where a normal parliamentary system is functioning, it would 
have been possible to govern the country thus. But, according to the 
Constitution at the time, for the passage of almost all bills, such as the bill of 
the state budget, a two-thirds majority vote was required. With the AFD we 
met this [quorum] (Interview with Kónya, 11 December 2007). 
 
The AFD, which had ninety two seats (23.8%) in Parliament at the time, was selected as a 
potential ally for the conclusion of a stability pact. Subsequently, between 27 and 29 April 
1990, after two days of intensive talks, Antall concluded a pact with the AFD (Kis, 1990). 
The essence of this political bargaining was that the HDF secured the support of the AFD 
in the passing of the laws which required a two-thirds majority vote, conceding the 
Presidency to them in return (Debreczeni, 2003: 298; Kis, 1990; Szegő, 2010). 
 
The puzzle of the AFD 
Antall was able to secure a stable basis for the governance of the country through the 
conclusion of the pact with the AFD. In terms of the AFD’s position, however, there is a 
question mark as they simply accepted Antall’s proposition. If these issues had been 
differently resolved, the HDF-AFD coalition government could have met the requirement 
of a two-thirds majority quorum with ease. Alternatively, by forming a grand coalition 
with the AFD and the AYD, the Antall government could have benefited from a wider 
legitimacy within Hungary’s new democracy. In fact, before the conclusion of the pact, 
Antall made a gesture of cooperation with the AYD (Tölgyessy, 1993) and the AFD had 
already signalled to the HDF that they were willing to enter a coalition government 
(Debreczeni, 2003: 81).123 The president of the AYD, Viktor Orbán noted: 'Everyone 
knew that the situation needed something like an agreement among political forces. We 
would have been pleased if the HDF had invited several parties to make a [coalition] 
agreement' (Papp, 2002). It is thus interesting to ask why the formation of a coalition 
government was discarded as an option at a very early stage.  
 
There is no clear explanation in the available documentation as to why the coalition 
government failed to come to fruition. As Tökés notes, this question remains 'one of the 
great still-unresolved puzzles of the Hungarian transition' (Tőkés, 1996: 397). However, 
according to my email exchange with János Kis – the former chairman of the AFD and one 
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of the key participants in the pact-making process – one possible explanation lies in the 
objection of the HDF founders to form a coalition with the AFD. Kis suggested that 
although Antall might have considered the formation of a coalition with the AFD, 'the 
Lakitelek founding members of the HDF vehemently opposed it' (emails with Kis, 4, 10 
August 2010). Given their contrasting political orientations and differing political 
backgrounds rooted in rural and urban politics respectively – the AFD was largely a left-
liberal party whereas the HDF was at the right-conservative end of the political spectrum – 
this oppositional political position made it difficult for the HDF founders to accept the idea 
of sharing power. For example, if as a part of the fulfilment of a coalition agreement, key 
ministerial posts were distributed to the AFD and a conflict was to arise between the AFD 
affiliated Ministers and the HDF Premier, an impasse could result. It is important to 
remember that the political split between the HDF and the AFD had begun in 1987 when 
the populists founded the HDF at Lakitelek, and their united position ultimately broke 
down in the aftermath of the Four Yes-es referendum.  
 
Moreover, in terms of Antall’s position, making a pact with the AFD would be more 
advantageous for the consolidation of his position within the HDF. At this time Antall was 
not yet strong enough to lead the HDF outright. He was not a founding member of the 
party and he came to a leading position only after an authority in the populist camp, Sándor 
Csoóri, helped him find a role within the party. Political commentator, László Lengyel 
stated:  
Csoóri was a spiritual leader for the HDF. He suggested to the HDF that they 
accept Antall as party president. Aside from Csoóri, Antall did not know 
anyone within the HDF. Neither had he known István Csurka nor Zoltán Bíró. 
Csoóri was the only figure Antall had known (interview with Lengyel, 13 
September 2007).  
 
Thus, given Antall’s reliance on the support of the HDF founders, he could not challenge 
their opinion which in turn, meant that he needed to find an alternative solution to the 
question of power sharing. In effect, Antall decided to make a secret pact with the AFD 
without the approval of the HDF’s founders. Zoltán Bíró – a key founding member and the 
first president of the HDF – recounted the process of Antall’s rise and the process of pact-
making: 
I was the first president of the HDF. When the first general election began I 
resigned my post, because the AFD at the time criticised us claiming that we 
are anti-Semite and, had made a pact with the HSP. I thought Lajos Für would 
be an eligible figure for the post [of president]… but at the request of Csoóri, 
we accepted Antall… He made the pact with the AFD but he did not even ask 
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the opinion of the Presidium. He made the pact with the HDF’s opponent in 
secret […] (Interview with Bíró, 10 December 2007).  
 
Indeed, Csoóri convened the meeting of the HDF founders at Selyemgombolyító to discuss 
the developing situation and, accordingly, to find a solution (Révész, 1995: 85). However, 
it was too late to thwart Antall’s move, whereby the HDF founders had been marginalised 
within the party and moved to the periphery of politics as a whole (Tőkés, 1996: 398). 
Similarly, Antall’s success in concluding the pact with the AFD meant that the largest of 
the opposition’s forces and the one which could potentially have obstructed the passage of 
new legislation had been neutralised. In effect, Antall seemed to have 'killed two birds with 
one stone', but in terms of the AFD’s position, it is still not clear why they were willing to 
accept Antall’s proposal.        
 
The Pact: a power-sharing scheme or the origin of confrontation?  
With the agreement of the AFD, Antall was able to secure a necessary quorum required in 
order to adopt new legislation and to govern the country. To this end, Antall offered the 
presidential post to the AFD which, in turn, strengthened the AFD’s position in the 
decision-making process – this would also ensure that the AFD had more influence than 
would have been the case if the party had merely remained a member of the opposition. 
Apparently this political bargaining was advantageous to both parties. However, if one 
looks into the details of the pact, it suggests an alternative perspective in which the pact 
was not merely a power sharing scheme but that the potential for confrontation was built 
into its fabric. This section examines the significance of this bargaining process through 
analysis of the content of the pact as it was negotiated.  
 
On 29 April 1990, the HDF and the AFD agreed on the following points of the pact. The 
salient parts of the agreement for the argument presented here were as follows: 
The Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats agree 
that both the parties of the government and the parties of the opposition have a 
special responsibility before the nation for the consolidation of the new 
democratic institutions and for the 'governability' of the country… For this 
reason, the following is agreed: 
▪ The original status of the President of the Republic should be restored 
according to Act I of 1946 Constitution; 
▪ … The President of the Republic appoints ministers according to the 
suggestion of the Prime Minister;   
▪ In the interests of the governability of the country, the presidential right to 
dissolve Parliament can be conditionally expanded, if necessary;124  
▪ The election of the Prime Minister requires an absolute majority; and a 
motion of no confidence against the Prime Minister also requires an absolute 
majority;    
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▪ … The institution of the motion of no confidence shall not apply against 
individual ministers, but only against the Prime Minister. The motion of no 
confidence will take the form of a constructive vote of no confidence;  
<Supplement number III> 
The parties also agree that … in the presidential election, the HDF supports 
Árpád Göncz, and upon this, the Speaker of the House will be György Szabad; 
<Supplement number IV> 
The national television [and] radio [stations] and the Hungarian News Agency 
should be free from party political interference [csatározások martaléka]. For 
this reason, [both parties agree] that according to the suggestion of the Prime 
Minister, the President… appoints the President and two Vice-Presidents of the 
national television and radio [stations] […] (Izsák and Nagy, 2004: 555-60).  
 
Both parties concluded that, in order to lay a stable basis for the governance of the country 
in the future, the amendment of the Constitution that had been concluded during the RTN 
was essential (Ripp, 2006: 543; Körösényi, Tóth and Török, 2007: 35). To this end, both 
sides agreed that the introduction of several institutional guarantees was required; among 
these, agreement would have to be reached regarding the institutionalisation of the 
Presidency. The HDF and the AFD concluded that the post-Communist Presidency be built 
upon the reinstatement of Act I of the 1946 Constitution.125 According to this Act, the 
President was to be elected by Parliament for a term of four years,126 and the exercise of 
power was significantly circumscribed by a counter-signatory system. For example, 
concerning the issue of personnel management, the President was required to have the 
Prime Minister to act as a co-signatory. Similarly, the President was capable of dissolving 
Parliament only if such a proposition was put forward by the Premier or by at least two-
fifths of MPs.  
 
In terms of the President’s position, thus, Act I of the 1946 Constitution essentially 
established weak presidential powers which, in turn, established the Prime Minister as the 
locus of Executive power in Hungary’s political system. This was, indeed, evidenced in the 
strengthening of the position of Premier. With the introduction of a constructive vote of no 
confidence, akin to the German Chancellery system (Baylis, 1996: 300; Szoboszlai, 1996: 
126), the removal of the Prime Minister from power could be practicable only if an 
equivalent candidate was simultaneously nominated by Parliament. Likewise, placing the 
cabinet under the control of the Premier contributed to the expansion of the jurisdiction of 
the Executive over the Legislature. Together, it appears that the competences of the Antall 
government were enhanced regarding the extent to which they could govern the country 
with their own programmes.  
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However, the pact also contained provisions which could potentially turn into sources of 
conflict. This was particularly the case when Antall agreed that the HDF would support 
Göncz’s election to the Presidency. Considering Göncz’s political affiliation, if the 
presidential post were to be used by the AFD as such an attempt to expand their influence 
in the decision-making process, this agreement would be counter-productive for the Antall 
government. For instance, Supplement IV of the pact specified that the appointment of the 
Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the broadcasting media would be made possible through 
a two-step process: according to the suggestion of the Prime Minister, the President would 
appoint them. In the event that the President disagreed with the Premier’s proposal, a tug-
of-war between them and their camps seemed to be inevitable. Indeed, one of the most 
controversial issues in which Göncz became involved during the first term of his 
Presidency (1990-1995) concerned the issue of control over the broadcast media and, this 
conflict occurred during the Antall government (will be discussed in detail in the next 
chapter). In Viktor Orbán’s terms, the pact may have been a clumsy political attempt to 
'create a friendship between a cat and a dog' (Papp, 2002).    
 
Göncz’s selection for the Presidency  
If the presidential post was a bargaining chip in the process of creating a stable power base 
for Antall, why did he single out Göncz for the Presidency? In principle, Antall could have 
opted for other figures from within the AFD. According to my interviews and, articles 
found in the Hungarian literature, there are three primary explanations for his appointment.  
 
Firstly, it has been suggested that Antall’s decision to nominate Göncz stemmed from pre-
existing personal ties (Lengyel, 2000) or a mutual trust between them (Buják, 2000; Somos, 
1997). In order to understand better how their relationship was built, it is worth revisiting 
the relevant points of the previous chapters. In Section 2.3 of Chapter 2, it was noted that it 
was the ISP that brought Göncz and Antall together. During the time when Göncz worked 
for the General Secretary of the ISP, Béla Kovács, he also became acquainted with József 
Antall Sr., the Minister of Reconstruction of the ISP. Through his father, Göncz became 
known to József Antall Jr., a secondary school student at the time. Thereafter, in 1956, 
particularly in the struggle that followed the suppression of the Revolution, Göncz and 
József Antall Jr. appended their signatures to the Draft Proposal composed by István Bibó. 
Considering the political activity in which Göncz participated in the ISP and their 
collaboration in the resistance of 1956, Antall may have had reason to find common 
ground between them. It should be noted that on 18 November 1988 Antall and Göncz 
once again participated in the meeting to reconstruct the ISP, which is highly indicative of 
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the fact that in terms of their joint past activities, they had a good reason to trust one 
another (see Section 3.2 of Chapter 3). In practice, this meant that after the change of 
regime and, even though they represented different parties, in the eyes of Antall, Göncz 
may not have appeared entirely as a member of the AFD. As László Lengyel notes, 
Göncz’s political orientation was relatively unknown when compared to those of other 
potential presidential candidates, and this also contributed to his selection for the 
Presidency: 
People didn’t know which political camp Göncz belonged in. For example, 
people knew the political camp into which Miklós Vásárhelyi fell, and the 
populists in [the HDF] did not want to accept him. It could have been a big 
struggle for Antall if he had tried to have Vásárhelyi accepted. György 
Konrád127 might have been possible but he also had enemies. He was a well 
known writer. [Compared to them], Göncz was much less well-known to 
people... When [the decision was made] that Göncz would be President, 
politicians asked each other, 'who is Göncz'?... I am saying this because 
obscurity [ismeretlenség] also helped Göncz in his selection for the Presidency 
(Interview with Lengyel, 13 September 2007). 
 
The second explanation lies in Göncz’s distinguished moral authority (interviews with 
Horkay-Hörcher and Kende). Central to this argument is whether Göncz was able to 
represent the idea of democracy when its legitimacy was essentially underpinned by the 
process of breaking with the Communist past. As we have seen in Lengyel’s account, there 
were several potential presidential candidates with dissident backgrounds and democratic 
credentials within the AFD. Among those, Miklós Vásárhelyi, Press Secretary of the Imre 
Nagy government and a spiritual leader of the democratic opposition, was once considered 
as one of the presidential candidates within the party. However, this possibility was not 
realised, as Vásárhelyi’s political disposition was unacceptable to Antall and his political 
camp. Tölgyessy explained how this actually worked for Göncz, but against Vásárhelyi: 'A 
significant part of the '56-ers was constituted from Communists who had once been 
enthusiastic about [the idea] of Communism but later came to realise it was a bad system... 
Vásárhelyi was once a real Communist... Antall could have considered Vásárhelyi as a 
partner but had never accepted him as a suitable candidate... Göncz’s secret was while he 
was also a '56-er, he was not a Communist at all and this was acceptable for Antall' 
(interview with Tölgyessy, 15 October 2007). As the Hungarian political scientist, Ferenc 
Horkay-Hörcher pointed out, the proactive role Göncz undertook in 1956 imbued him with 
moral authority, leading Antall to choose him for the Presidency: 
During the '56 Revolution, Göncz played an important role and because of that 
he was imprisoned. His legitimacy originated from this... On the one hand, 
moral [authority] and on the other hand, very strong political legitimacy was 
given to him, as he stood against the totalitarian Kádár system and stood with 
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freedom... This explains why Göncz was acceptable to Antall (Interview with 
Horkay-Hörcher, 16 November 2007). 
 
The final explanation lies in Antall’s political calculation. It was possible that Antall 
considered the presidential post to be another locus of power which the HDF members 
could potentially misuse to challenge his authority (O’ Neil, 1997: 214). The formal or de 
jure powers of the President were codified in the Constitution. Yet 'the separation of 
powers between the head of state and the head of government remained unclear' (O’Neil, 
1997: 210); the Presidency could be tested as a power-base. Indeed, according to Kis, 
Antall’s concern about this was demonstrated when he tactfully dealt with a potential 
presidential candidate within the HDF, Sándor Csoóri.128 Kis noted: 
If the HDF [had] appointed their own presidential [candidate], Sándor Csoóri 
[could have been chosen] for the Presidency. But Antall did not want Csoóri to 
become the President... Antall thought that he should satisfy Csoóri, so he 
offered him the [post] of the Chairman of the World Hungarian Association... 
This office did not have any real power and influence [sóhivatal] (Interview 
with Kis, 27 September 2007).     
 
It is therefore possible to argue that Antall may have expected Göncz to fill the presidential 
post, satisfying the requirements of parliamentarian democracy while leaving the 'real' 
state of affairs to the Antall government. However, as numerous instances during the first 
term of his Presidency demonstrated (details of which will be examined in–depth in 
Chapter 5), Göncz did not interpret the role of the President in the manner that Antall had 
expected. As an MP of the AFD, Imre Mécs, neatly summarised:  
Antall’s idea appeared to be genius, because a kind, warm-hearted, gentle- 
looking [man] like [Göncz] was acceptable even to the conservative side. A '56 
veteran, a writer rather than a politician, would not intervene in [state] affairs 
and would sign everything. In a word, [Antall thought] he gave his friend to us 
to ensure governability with constitutional amendment... But it soon turned out 
Göncz had a very resolute and clear idea when it came to [dealing with] the 
most important questions [...] (Wisinger and László, 2007: 96). 
 
 
Hitherto, this chapter has examined the actual process of institutionalising the post-
Communist Presidency and multiple explanatory factors involved in Göncz’s selection for 
the post. Having noted that bargaining over the Presidency in which the political elite 
engaged was, de facto, a key to shaping the institution; ultimately, this resulted in a major 
amendment of the Communist Constitution, the following section of the chapter is devoted 
to analysing the presidential competences (formal powers) through investigation of the 
revised Constitution itself. The scope of this examination encompasses the constitutional 
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amendments with respect to any change of presidential powers that have been made from 
1989 up to the present day. The comprehensive investigation of these aspects lays an 
essential foundation for, and background to, an understanding of the President’s position in 
Real politik, the context in which Göncz interpreted and exercised his vested constitutional 
powers during his Presidency.  
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4.3. The constitutional powers of the Hungarian President 
Hungary’s Head of State is the President of the Republic who represents the 
unity of the nation, and monitors the democratic operation of the State; 
The President of the Republic is the Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian 
Armed Forces.129 
 
These are the principal roles of the President of the Republic of Hungary as defined in the 
current Constitution. As these clauses indicate, the main tasks of the head of state can be 
largely divided into three functions: assuming representative, ceremonial or symbolic 
roles; overseeing the democratic functioning of state institutions involved; acting as the 
Commander-in-Chief. While the practical meanings of performing these functions are open 
to debates, according to the legal status of the President, the head of state appears to have 
some executive authority. For example, leading the Hungarian army implies that the 
President may be able to decide over the mobilisation and de-mobilisation of armed forces. 
However, if one examines the other constitutional powers vested in the President, 
particularly in relation to the President’s power over the government, it becomes evident 
that the head of state exercises only nominal or minimal powers. The main constitutional 
powers granted to the President are as follows:  
▪ Accredit and receive ambassadors and envoys; 
▪ Grant individual pardons; 
▪ Conclude international treaties in the name of the Republic of Hungary; if the 
subject of the treaty falls within its legislative competence, prior ratification by 
the Parliament is necessary for the conclusion of the treaty; 
▪ Confer titles, orders, awards and decorations specified by law; 
▪Appoint and dismiss State Secretaries in accordance with regulations specified 
in a separate law; 
▪ Appoint and dismiss the President and Vice-presidents of the National Bank 
of Hungary... and university rectors... upon the recommendation of persons or 
organisations specified in a separate law; 
▪ By the suggestion of the Prime Minister (after listening to the open hearing of 
the Parliament’s Cultural and Press Affairs Committee), the President of the 
Republic appoints and dismisses the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of 
Hungarian radio and television, as well as the director of the Hungarian News 
Agency;  
▪ In order to exercise the [above] right, the President is required to have a 
counter-signature from the Prime Minister. 
Adapted from: Ács (2000: 57); Sükösd (1996: 361); ('The Law No. LVII of 1990 on 
the Appointment Procedure of the Heads of the Public Media').130 
 
The first two rights noted above apparently suggest that they are realms of the President’s 
independent authority, whereas the remainder refers to circumscribed presidential powers. 
Evidence demonstrating the limitation of presidential powers is found in stipulations where 
the President is required to consider separate or specific laws for the exercise of each legal 
power. For example, the right to nominate to state apparatus and the conclusion of 
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international agreements indicate that the President is obliged to have prior approval from 
the branch of powers responsible for that area of governance. In contrast, there are no 
additional conditions restricting the President’s rights to receive ambassadors and issue 
individual pardons. However, it should be noted that all of the legal powers stated above 
must be approved by the counter-signatures of the Prime Minister or responsible ministers. 
As McGregor notes, the system of co-signature of the Prime Minister or ministers is one of 
'the sources of presidential weakness' (McGregor, 1994: 30). The only exceptional case 
which may not need co-signatories from other political organs is in an extraordinary 
situation where the President is required to activate his or her 'reserve' (tartalék) function 
(this refers to additional powers afforded to the President in a state of emergency). 131 
However, given that the President’s extraordinary powers are even shared by others – the 
Prime Minister, the Speaker of the House and the President of the Constitutional Court – 
the extent to which the President is able to make an independent decision without seeking a 
consensus is unclear (Körösényi, Tóth and Török, 2003: 560), which is highly indicative of 
the fact that the presidential powers over government are minimal. In practice, this means 
that the President does have some de jure powers, but he or she cannot take independent 
action without the endorsement of the government (Halmai, 1991).  
 
Concerning subsequent constitutional amendments, particularly with respect to the 
presidential powers listed above, until the present day there have been changes on two 
occasions. According to Law XXXI of 1989, the President was initially able to appoint and 
dismiss State Secretaries upon the suggestion of the Prime Minister, but Act XL of 1990 
brought about a change in the stipulation, as stated above.132 In terms of the range of 
presidential powers, however, this change of wording does not make any difference, as the 
President is still unable to decide without reference to the Premier or Parliament. 
Thereafter, Act LIV of 2006, once again altered the relevant stipulation, yet this 
amendment did not lead to any change of presidential powers either, because it remains 
undecided as a gap in the current Constitution.133 Therefore, despite several attempts to 
alter the scope of constitutional powers, the weakness of the Presidency has remained, as 
the President is still obliged to have a co-signature to validate his or her actions.  
 
This raises important questions. Why does the Constitution grant such limited power to the 
President? It is also questionable whether the Constitution does grant discretionary power 
to the President in any capacity. According to Hungarian legal experts, the President’s lack 
of political responsibility is primarily responsible for the weakness of the Presidency (Ács, 
2000: 61; Báldy, 2003: 391; Sükösd, 1996: 354-55). According to Article 31/A which 
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specified the President’s legal status in terms of potential prosecution, the head of state is 
not held accountable for his political actions, not least because his jurisdictional 
independence is guaranteed (Petrétei, 2001: 90; Magyar Hírlap, 25 May 1992). The only 
exception is applicable to a case where the President has consciously violated the 
Constitution or other laws (Ács, 2000: 61; Báldy, 2003: 391; Petrétei, 2001: 100). In reality, 
however, calling the President to account is very challenging, due to legal requirements 
which demand the overriding of the rule of party discipline. According to Article 31/A, in 
order to launch impeachment proceedings, a two-thirds majority vote by MPs is required. 
If the vast majority of MPs (including those who come from the same party as the 
President) voted against the President, the case would be forwarded to the Constitutional 
Court to decide whether the President has violated the Constitution. Yet, in the event that 
MPs from the President’s party vote according to their party line, the chance of meeting the 
necessary quorum is slim indeed. As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, Göncz 
served out his term largely due to this complex procedure, even though he took very 
controversial political decisions and may have overstepped the limits of his constitutional 
role. 
 
Concerning the discretionary powers of the President, despite the fact that the President’s 
room for manoeuvre is significantly circumscribed by the cross-signatory system, the 
Constitution does grant some flexibility nonetheless:  
▪ The right to participate and speak in the plenary session of Parliament; 
▪ The right to announce parliamentary and municipal elections and mayoral 
elections as well as the dates of the European Parliamentary elections and 
national referenda;134  
▪ The right to propose bills to Parliament; 
▪ The right to veto legislation proposed by Parliament; 
▪ The right to make a political statement; 
Adapted from: Ács (2000: 54-56); Sükösd (1996: 356-60); Körösényi, Tóth  
and Török (2003: 561). 
 
In general, the President’s power over Parliament is relatively more wide-ranging and 
flexible than his or her power over the government. In order to exercise the above rights, 
the President is not required to have a counter-signature from any other political organ. For 
example, the right to propose a bill suggests that not only the Legislature, but the President 
him- or herself is entitled to act as an initiator of legislation. Furthermore, the right of veto 
underscores the fact that the Constitution does vest the President with some discretionary 
powers. The activation of these powers is possible through the 'constitutional or political 
veto',135 even though both types of veto cannot be exercised by the President at one and the 
same time. The former is exercised by the President when he or she has a reservation 
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regarding the constitutionality of a given piece of legislation (Article 26. §4). If the 
President’s concerns about legislation are legally grounded, he or she refers it to the 
Constitutional Court for judicial review. In the event that the Court finds the legislation is 
unconstitutional, the President returns it to Parliament. In the opposite case - if the Court 
upholds the legality of legislation - the President must sign the contested legislation into 
law and promulgate it within five days (Körösényi and Tóth and Török, 2003: 561). In the 
strictest sense, however, the constitutional veto cannot be understood as a powerful 
political tool for the exercise of presidential influence, as the final decision falls under the 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. As Petréti notes, use of the constitutional veto 
means that the President acts as an initiator to facilitate the creation of laws, which 
conform to the principle of constitutionality (Petréti, 2005: 134).   
 
The political veto is exercised by the President when he or she disagrees on adopted 
legislation or any part of it, prior to its promulgation to the public (Article 26. §2). In this 
case, as an expression of disagreement, with or without comments, the President returns 
the law to Parliament for reconsideration. Since the President’s reservation with regard to 
signing the law is not legally grounded (but instead based on any other reasons), this may 
be interpreted as an influential political tool at the President’s disposal. However, the use 
of a political veto only has a restricted impact in terms of changing the adopted legislation. 
Parliament does not need to follow the President’s instruction, this is due no small part to 
the simple procedure by which the political veto can be overriden; in reality, the 
President’s influence on politics through the political veto channel is marginal. As a former 
judge of the Constitutional Court, Géza Kilényi argues, a simple majority vote is sufficient 
to void the political veto:  
Ferenc Mádl [Göncz’s successor] returned an adopted bill to [Parliament] for 
reconsideration. On the same day, the same number of MPs once again voted 
for the bill. But Mádl was not called into Parliament. Some MPs did not even 
know that the extraordinary parliamentary session was held at 9 pm in the 
evening... They were in Brussels at the time... The rank of the President’s veto 
should be raised to the extent that MPs are not allowed to override it with a 
simple majority (Interview with Kilényi, 9 May 2007).  
 
Ultimately, this means that if Parliament once again votes to the challenged legislation with 
the majority votes that MPs have cast, the President must sign the law that has been 
returned (Rose-Ackerman, 2005: 63). The only impact that the President could have on 
politics through the political veto over Parliament is the deferment of the promulgation of 
the law for the period of time that it takes for Parliament to decide to amend or re-adopt the 
challenged legislation (because of this effect, the political veto is also called as the 
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'suspensory veto'). In this regard, if one strictly judges the scope of the President’s 
discretionary powers, the political veto cannot be interpreted as a genuinely powerful tool 
of presidential authority. Thus, the President’s power under Hungary’s parliamentarianism 
is minimal; weakness persists as the defining feature of the institution of the Presidency.   
 
This, however, does not suggest that the President always follows the will of Parliament or 
moves within narrowly defined constitutional boundaries. 'Institutions do matter' as 'they 
create incentives and disincentives for political actors... establish the context in which 
policy-making occurs, and help or hinder in the construction of democratic regimes' 
(Ishiyama and Velten, 1998: 217). However, as Ishiyama and Velten neatly point out, 
political actors do not all respond and act in the same way according to the given 
'institutional incentives' (Ishiyama and Velten, 1998: 231); it cannot simply be said that 
institutions themselves determine the strength of presidencies. For example, other than 
constitutionally defined formal powers, there are numerous informal sources or channels 
which the President is capable of translating into an expansion of actual influence. Holmes 
aptly maintains that:  
It is perfectly normal, too, that informal resources help determine the real 
powers of a sitting President: a well-organised staff, a strategic use of 
appointment powers to build up a dense network of collaborators, sheer 
popularity and access to the media, agility at playing off some parties against 
the others, personal involvement in negotiating cabinet coalitions, and the 
ability to bully Parliament by threatening convincingly to "appeal to the 
street"... Where legislatures are fragmented, coalition cabinets are unstable, and 
courts are inexperienced, even a modestly powerful President can wield 
decisive influence (Holmes, 1993: 36).  
 
In inexperienced democracies, therefore, there is considerable leeway for even 
constitutionally weak Presidents to convert these informal resources into their real powers. 
The characteristics of the Presidency would be, then, shaped by and reflected through the 
presidential actions, such as how they interpret the scope of presidential powers and 
interact with other political players. Some ambitious Presidents may capitalise on vaguely 
defined constitutional powers and also use informal resources to maximise political 
influences for the purpose of achieving the goals that they set themselves. The question of 
this will be addressed in the next chapter, in which the main characteristics of Göncz’s 
Presidency are examined in-depth. The most important instances and examples of Göncz’s 
proactive engagement in politics will be placed under scrutiny. In particular, the chapter 
will ask how Göncz’s own liberal and democratic political values were reflected through 
and embodied in his engagement with important transitional political and socio-economic 
issues. Ultimately, I will ask what Göncz sought to achieve in pursuing his liberal and 
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democratic ideas during the term of his Presidency.  
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Chapter 5. The first Presidency (1990-1995) 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the main characteristics of the first term of Göncz’s Presidency 
(1990-1995) and assesses his presidential role and decisions. In Chapters 1, 2 and 3, it was 
established that liberal and democratic ideas were the most consistently pronounced 
elements which Göncz developed throughout life and, which became entrenched in his 
political beliefs. With this in mind, the present chapter examines how Göncz’s liberal 
values were embodied in his Presidency. This examination includes an in-depth discussion 
of Göncz’s interpretation of his constitutional powers in dealing with important transitional 
issues emerging over the course of Hungary’s post-Communist history.  
 
It is generally established in the Hungarian literature that the presidential role Göncz 
undertook during the first term of his Presidency was proactive, controversial (Buják, 
2000; Szomszéd, 2005) and was marked by conflict between the President and the first 
democratically elected Antall government (Bakony, 2005; Somos, 1997; Varró, 2000). The 
literature highlighted particular aspects of Göncz’s relationship with the Antall 
government; the President, it was proposed, had sought a counter-balancing role to the 
Antall government (Babus, 2000; Körösényi, 1999: 280; Kontler, 2002: 476-77) and this 
political activism had been counter-productive to the development of democracy, for he 
failed to act for the unity of the nation as a non-partisan figurehead (Debreczeni, 2003: 
298-311; Varga, 1995). Göncz’s political origins in the AFD (a liberal left-wing party) 
were proof - critics claimed - that Göncz was acting in the vested interests of his party 
(Fricz, 2010; Lovas, 2002) and, against the Antall government (whose political orientation 
conservative and right-wing).  
 
However, as will be discussed in the next chapter, Göncz’s partisanship does not explain 
his acquiescence during the last two years of the second term of his Presidency (1998-
2000), at which time another conservative, right-wing government - the Orbán government 
– was in power. Given that the AFD was once again on the opposition side at this time, had 
Göncz determined to act in favour of the party, he would have taken a balancing role 
against the Orbán government. As the Hungarian political scientist András Lánczi noted: 
'This [the Orbán government] was again in the situation where the head of government was 
strong and the head of state was weak. Politically it may have been possible for Göncz to 
be more active than [he showed himself to be], this is not how it turned out' (interview with 
Lánczi, 12 July 2007).  
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Therefore, in addition to political affiliation, there would have been other factors 
responsible for Göncz’s role as counter-weight to the Antall government. In particular, the 
chapter addresses this gap in the literature by exploring other factors. The first gap 
concerns, how, after the collapse of Communism, in a context where there was no 
preceding example to follow and little experience of democratic governance had been 
gained, political actors interpreted their formally granted constitutional powers and 
interacted with one another. This includes Göncz’s perception of the role of President and 
how it affected the shaping of this newly established political institution. The second gap 
which must be addressed concerns that of a plausible explanation for Göncz’s controversial 
role - opposing the Antall government – which may be that his actions were guided by his 
democratic and liberal beliefs rather than any partisanism on behalf of the AFD. Thus, the 
chapter seeks to examine Göncz’s actions in the presidential role in the context of the time 
at which they were undertaken and, to critically assess them with respect to his 
partisanship and his liberal and democratic values.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section of the chapter briefly discusses the 
main features of the Antall government’s policies and political orientations. This is done in 
order to provide the contextual background which is essential for gaining an understanding 
of the Antall government’s politics. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to examining - 
on a case-by-case basis – instances in which Göncz was proactively engaged during the 
first term of his Presidency.  
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5.1. The Antall government 
On 25 January 2001, in an interview with Wisinger, Göncz stated that: 
The [level] of blood pressure and diabetes of the President depends on the 
Prime Minister. Likewise, the level of blood pressure and diabetes of the Prime 
Minister depends on the President or the President’s personality (Wisinger and 
László, 2007: 329). 
 
On 22 May 1990, a week after the formation of the new cabinet, the Prime Minister, József 
Antall, gave his first high-profile speech on the government programme. Various issues 
and goals that his government sought to achieve were outlined, but the fundamental 
principle that they were to adopt would be that of a 'government of freedom'. The practical 
significance of this can be interpreted in various ways; Antall’s suggestion was that the 
government of freedom embraced basic democratic values such as freedom of the press, 
freedom of expression, and equality before the law (Népszabadság, 23 May 1990). In 
established democracies these freedoms are perhaps taken as essential elements of the 
political system. However, at this juncture of Hungary’s political history - the Antall 
government marked the new beginning of post-Communist politics – the Premier’s 
reference to freedom was significant, even if only symbolically so. The significance of 
freedom was also emphasised by Antall in the realm of economic transformation. The 
reasoning was that if, in the past, free entrepreneurialism had largely been oppressed then, 
this government would reshape the economic order to follow the 'principles of market, 
competition and risk' (Romsics, 2007: 296). Indeed, having aspired to attain these goals, 
over the summer of 1990, the Antall government had worked intensively to build a 
fundamental framework for governance through the passage of new bills (Romsics, 2007: 
302). As Rothschild and Wingfield argue, Antall 'employed his formidable political skills' 
to realise government programmes in the interest of laying 'the foundations for 
parliamentary democracy and market economy' (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000: 278).  
 
However, considering the policies that Antall actually pursued – demonstrating a 
preference for strong state intervention and state control – it appears that there was a 
discrepancy between the Premier’s legitimising principles and the reality of the 
government actions undertaken during Antall’s tenure in office. Privatisation, for example, 
was to be governed by the principle of the market economy and free competition, albeit at  
a gradual pace.136 However, the mode of economic transformation employed by the Antall 
government brought the whole process of privatisation 'under strict state control, attracting 
accusations of effecting a renationalisation of property' (Cox and Furlong, 1994: 4). 
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Despite the fact that, by 1993, a substantial portion (55%) of Gross Domestic Product 
stemmed from the private economic sector (Ágh, 2000: 157), the transfer of the State 
Property Agency from parliamentary control to that of the government demonstrated the 
manner in which the government approached the problem.137 As Stark has neatly asserted, 
this government-controlled privatisation method led to a blurred or quasi privatisation, in 
which the transformation of property ownership could not be categorically divided into 
public and private spheres (Stark, 1996: 998-1001). Thus, the conservatism of the Antall 
government was 'interventionist and in the economic sphere it has favoured state control 
rather than direction' (Swain, 1993: 78). The Law of Arable Land (discussed in Section 
5.2.4) is a good example of how the concept of control was interpreted and applied by the 
Antall government in the form of economic protection. Similarly and more strikingly, the 
significance of state control appears to have negated the stated desire for media freedom 
(as will be discussed in depth in Section 5.2.5). The placement of the media under state 
control was one of the most controversial moves that the Antall government undertook.    
 
Thus, it is important to explore the relationship formed when the conservative Antall 
government, (which embraced strong state control) encountered a President for who liberal 
democratic values were of crucial importance. In such a situation one can justifiably ask 
whether the President ought to seek to become involved in those events and issues with 
which the government was concerned. On the basis of their differing political outlooks, 
one might expect conflict to arise between them. Conversely, if the President were to take 
a passive and neutral stance on state affairs, the appearance of liberalism given by the 
President could be regarded as a mask, hiding basic agreement between nominally opposed 
government and presidential camps from public view. The following section of this chapter 
addresses these questions exploring those important issues and events in which Antall and 
Göncz became engaged, and interacted with other political players.  
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5.2. Göncz’s first presidential term: liberal and democratic values vs. partisanship 
 
5.2.1. The Taxi-drivers’ strike  
In autumn 1990, less than four months after the Antall government took office, the 
Hungarian socialist daily, Népszabadság, ran the news of the development of a 
spontaneous public protest, the so-called 'Taxi Blockade' or taxi-drivers strike, under the 
following headline: 
 The President of the Republic is against the [application of public force] 
 (Népszabadság, 27 October 1990b). 
 
The sudden announcement of a sharp increase in the price of oil – 'With effect from 
midnight, oil prices will increase by 65 percent' (Népszabadság, 26 October 1990) - 
prompted taxi and lorry drivers to take to the streets in protest. The government explained 
that the rise in the price of petrol was unavoidable due to the sharp increase in the price of 
crude oil on the international market (Romsics, 2007: 328).138 However, this account was 
far from satisfactory to the lorry and taxi drivers, who saw the action as a direct threat to 
their livelihoods (O’Neil, 1993: 192). They blockaded major bridges, demanding that the 
increase in the price of petrol be suspended. The obstruction of critical points on main 
roads meant that their protests soon paralysed the transportation networks of Central 
Budapest. Consequently, their demonstrations brought about immediate reactions from 
both the government and opposition, and also from Göncz. The Minister of the Interior, 
Balázs Horváth,139 announced that there would be no concession or compromise, stating 
that 'the government would not rescind the decision and would restore order employing all 
available' legal measures (Népszabadság, 27 October 1990b). In response, the chairman of 
the AFD, János Kis, expressed the AFD’s solidarity with the protestors, stating that with 
the statement of such a threatening message, the government had committed a crime 
(Népszabadság, 27 October 1990a).  
 
No specific details concerning what measures the government was proposing to take were 
forthcoming. Thus, in the uncertainty of the situation, a rumour was circulated that the 
government might use the forces of public order to deal with the crisis (Gyarmati, 2005: 
623). However, this never came to pass due to Göncz’s intervention. In a letter sent to the 
Minister of Interior, Göncz made his position clear, stating that, as the Commander-in-
Chief, he would not allow the forces of public order to be employed in order to tackle the 
crisis (Debreczeni, 2003: 160-61). Additionally, on the same day, in a televised public 
statement, he called on the government to enter into negotiations with the protestors 
(Magyar Hírlap, 27 October 1990).  
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Facing mounting pressure and criticism over the development of the crisis and their 
attitudes towards it, the government changed its original decision. At the National Interest 
Reconciliation Council, in which the delegates of government and those of the employers 
and the employees participated,140 a compromise was reached by lowering the petrol price 
increase by 20 % (Népszabadság, 29 October 1990), putting an end to the four-day strike.  
 
The first sizeable public protest of the post-Communist era ended peacefully at the 
negotiating table. During the development of the crisis, Göncz acted as a mediator between 
the government and the protestors. However, his intervention prompted considerable 
controversy among the political elite and the issues of whether his intervention was ever in 
fact necessary and, what led him to make such a statement, were particular points of 
contention.  
 
Göncz explained that intervention was prompted by the information available to him at the 
time. Heavy military vehicles had been dispatched to the capital to clear the blockade 
(Magyar Hírlap, 24 October 2000; Népszabadság, 24 October 2000; Mester, 2000; Veress, 
2010) which, Göncz interpreted as meaning that the government might act coercively. In 
contrast, the government strongly denied that such an order had ever been issued. In 
addition, they emphasised that Göncz had overreacted to, or misjudged, the given situation. 
For example, even a decade after the occurrence of the strike, when a public debate was 
broadcast on an RTL television programme, the former Minister without portfolio in Secret 
Services, Péter Boross, responded to Göncz’s comments: 
Newspaper interviewer: Recently, Göncz stated that as the Commander-in-
Chief, he stopped a military intervention and by so doing, prevented 
bloodshed... Were you aware of this operation?  
Boross: I am concerned about Göncz’s statements and afraid to say that the 
previous period begins again [meaning a confrontational relationship between 
the President and the government]. On several occasions, the President 
confronted the government [...].  
Newspaper interviewer: Are you saying that the government didn’t plan 
armed intervention or didn’t want to dispatch military vehicle to the taxi 
drivers? 
Boross: I was present at government meetings, but this kind of [plan] was out 
of the question [...].  
Newspaper interviewer: At the time, the Minister of the Interior, Balázs 
Horváth, made a statement saying that he would restore order, whatever it may 
take. 
Boross: He did not say that [he would restore order] even by resorting to illegal 
[actions]. The Hungarian army did not have a public order remit, so this kind of 
question cannot even be raised [...] (Stefka, 2000).   
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Since the official documents that would enable us to substantiate this order remain 
inaccessible for the purpose of research (Népszabadság, 24 October 2000), there is no hard 
evidence proving the order had ever been given.141 Nevertheless, inferring from accounts 
offered by an eye-witness and government members, it is very probable that military 
vehicles had indeed been dispatched to the scene. Géza Kilényi stated: 'Around half past 
eight in the morning, four huge trucks showed up on the Árpád Bridge. Soliders were [on 
board these trucks]. They were not armed, but they wore military uniforms. I felt terrible, 
because [apparently] the government was using military [force] against unarmed people... 
[The government] claimed the [use] of the army was out of the question, but I witnessed it 
with my own eyes' (interview with Kilényi, 9 May 2007). Similar views were held by 
government members, although the emphasis of their statements differed from that of 
Kilényi’s. The first President of the HDF, Zoltán Bíró, claimed that: 
The Minister of Interior, Balázs Horváth and the Minister of Defence, Lajos 
Für, agreed that a temporary military bridge should be built. They did not want 
to [act coercively], but [help people] to cross bridges blocked by strikers 
(Interview with Bíró, 10 December 2007). 
 
Similarly, a former factional leader of the HDF, Imre Kónya, maintained that:  
No! It is out of question! This was about asking the Hungarian army to borrow 
towers, or cranes to [help remove] taxis from bridges. The Hungarian army had 
this [equipment]. So, [the government] did not want to introduce the Hungarian 
army [itself] (Interview with Kónya, 11 December 2007). 
 
In light of these statements, Göncz appears to have misjudged the existing situation, and 
this, unsurprisingly, prompted sharp criticism from members of the government. In essence, 
the government claimed that Göncz’s actions were an attempt to expand his authority 
beyond his constitutional remit (Magyar Nemzet, 29 October 1990). In response to my 
question, 'How do you evaluate Göncz’s actions in the event of the taxi-drivers’ strike?'  
the former factional leader of the HDF, László Salamon, claimed: 'During the blockade, 
Göncz made a statement that he would not allow the introduction of the army into the 
situation. This was pointless, because nobody wanted to introduce the army. He also made 
a mistake because he did not even have such power' (interview with Salamon, 24 October 
2007). It is not a coincidence that six months after the blockade, when a jurisdictional 
dispute arose between the Defence Minister Lajos Für and President Göncz over the right 
to be the Commander-in-Chief (Népszabadság, 3 April 1991), Für turned to the 
Constitutional Court. In its ruling, the Court concluded that 'the President of Hungary is 
outside of the [power] of the Commander-in-Chief' (Sólyom and Holló, 1992: 190), 
suggesting that this right is only a title. Thus, in terms of the government’s position, the 
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pursuit of power or seeking personal gain was the principal reason behind Göncz’s 
intervention in the situation.  
 
However, Göncz’s televised public statement suggests that there was in fact an important 
reason for his intervention. On 26 October 1990, Göncz, who had anxiously followed the 
development of events at the presidential office,142 made the following statement: 
1. I propose that the government suspend the increase of oil prices; 
2. I request that the government, the assigned [officials] and the taxi drivers 
[hold] negotiations in line with the taxi drivers’ [proposal and] in a way that 
makes it possible to [reach] mutual agreement; 
3. On the announcement of the suspension of [petrol prices], provisionally, I 
ask the lorry drivers to go home and [clear] the road blocks; 
4. I propose that on Monday, the Parliament convene an extraordinary session 
to discuss the situation; 
 
I ask the country’s population, during the negotiations, to refrain from such 
acts which make it difficult to [seek] a solution;  
Above all, I ask the country’s population to maintain normality, allowing the 
delivery of daily goods and medical [services] to continue.   
(Magyar Hírlap, 27 October 1990) 
 
Thus, Göncz was very involved in mediation between the government and the protestors. 
In order to reconcile conflicting interests, he was of the opinion that the government ought 
to concede its position or step down. Göncz was certain that this concession could be 
realised through negotiations, over the course of which the goverment should reconsider its 
decision. Thus, Göncz clearly recognised the legitimacy of the demonstration and acted in 
favour of the protestors. Given Göncz’s stance, it is hardly surprising that his act 
displeased those in government who may have thought that Göncz had interfered in the 
government’s business without having a right to do so. They may have thought that, on the 
pretext of seeking a consensual solution, Göncz capitalised on the public media to 
propagate his opinion. A former MP of the HDF, József Debreczeni, recalled thus: 
During the blockade, the role undertaken by Göncz was the first sign of 
anxie[ty]... The most obvious mistake was [with] his presidential statement: he 
[acted] in such a way as to facilitate the reaching of an agreement, but in 
practice he ordered the government to accept the demands of the [protestors] 
(Kovács, 1993: 46). 
 
Given the position and political allegiance of the commentator, however, this criticism is 
not unexpected. For example, when one looks at other aspects of the above statement, a 
different perspective is revealed: the restoration of public order and securing peace was 
behind Göncz’s determination to intervene in the event. That is, even if Göncz 
sympathised with the protestors and this act was considered a sign of his interference in a 
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governmental matter, the principles on display in Göncz’s statement emphasised a peaceful 
and non-coercive solution. It is important to remember that doubt over whether the 
government might have used force to disperse the protestors was eliminated only after 
Göncz made this public statement. As Kis aptly observed, where democracy, by all 
accounts, was in jeopardy, Göncz stepped into the situation. Kis noted: '[If] the 
government [had] prove[d] capable of breaking the mass movements or they [the 
protestors] had prove[d their ability] topple the government, democracy [would have been] 
in danger' (Kis, 1991: 6). Thus, considering the critical situation in which Hungary’s 
nascent democracy faced its first crisis, it is possible to argue that this predicament could 
'only [be] retrieved by the statesmanlike action of President Göncz who adopted a 
relatively even-handed approach towards the protestors and the government' (Lewis, 1994: 
284). As the Hungarian political scientist, Gabriella Ilonszki, neatly asserted, Göncz’s 
intervention in the impasse amply demonstrated where his political values lay: 
The question is not one of whether there was a plan to disperse the 
demonstrators [with the use] of military or police force, but that there was a 
head of state who said that under no circumstances would he accept such a 
[coercive] solution in a democratic state... Ultimately, in the creation of 
democracy and democratic order, Göncz played his role (Interview with 
Ilonszki, 16 October 2007).   
 
In this light, it is fair to suggest that coping with the first public protest (a context in which 
a crisis-management mechanism was not well-established in Hungary’s inexperienced 
democracy), Göncz pursued his own democratic and liberal ideas and this contributed to 
resolving the crisis peacefully.    
 
In terms of the subsequent impacts that Göncz had on Hungarian politics, however, the 
event of the taxi-drivers’ strike was only a catalyst contributing to the beginning of a 
political separation between the HDF and the AFD, including Göncz and Antall. András 
Lánczi neatly captured the implication of the strike for Hungarian politics thus: 
The taxi-drivers’ blockade was the critical juncture when it became clear that 
the AFD was the party which had turned against the HDF... Before the taxi-
drivers’ blockade, the Four Yes-es referendum was an important event for [the 
split between these two]... But the blockade was the point of [complete] 
political separation (Interview with Lánczi, 12 July 2007).  
 
5.2.2. The Visegrád Summit 
If the blockade catalysed the disintegration of cooperation between the Antall government 
and the opposition, as Lánczi contended, the Visegrád Summit demonstrated how 
significant cooperation between the Head of State and the Head of Government can be. 
Despite the fact that neither public mobilisation nor confrontation between the governing 
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party and opposition emerged as a result of the Summit, this event clearly illustrates how 
the relationship between Göncz and Antall moved into conflict. The Summit took place in 
early spring 1991, when the Presidents of Czechoslovakia and Poland - Vaclav Havel and 
Lech Walesa - and their delegates gathered in the historic Hungarian city.   
 
The central aim of this regional group meeting was to lay a cooperative framework for 
joining Western European institutions (Farkas, 1991; Weydenthal, 1991: 28). Economic 
and political issues, along with future relations with the Soviet Union, were discussed; in 
signing a 'General Declaration', this regional meeting concluded successfully. Before 
holding the Summit, however, Göncz and Antall clashed over the right of international 
representation in foreign countries. Having been informed that the delegations of 
Hungary’s counterparts were to be led by their Presidents, Göncz insisted on participating 
in the Summit. However, Antall opposed this, arguing he himself directed foreign policy. 
Ultimately, after a debate, both parties agreed that they would jointly attend the Summit on 
the condition that Hungarian delegates would be led by the Prime Minister (Vajda, 1991). 
   
Central to the dispute at the Visegrád Summit was the question of what the presidential 
foreign policy rights meant in reality. More specifically, the President’s constitutional tasks 
and role in foreign policy should have been succinctly defined in relation to, and contrast 
with, those of the Prime Minister. Surprisingly, however, considering the relevant 
stipulations embodied in the Hungarian Constitution, vagueness appears to have provoked 
a jurisdictional debate between Göncz and Antall. Relevant clauses in use at the time were 
as follows: 
Article 30/A 
The President of Hungary represents the State of Hungary; 
The President of Hungary concludes international agreements in the name of 
the Republic of Hungary, if the subject of the treaty falls within its legislative 
competences, prior ratification by the parliament is necessary for the 
conclusion of the treaty. 
     
Article 35 
The Council of Ministers (Government) cooperates in the decision making 
process concerning foreign policy issues; 
The Government concludes international agreements in the name of the 
Government of the Republic of Hungary143 [My emphases]. 
 
Since the Constitution vested the Head of State and the Head of Government with almost 
the same authority (italicised above), it was unclear who actually had the final say in the 
conclusion of international agreements. The only difference was found in the conditional 
stipulation on the President’s side, stating that the President was required to have a prior 
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approval from Parliament, if his or her signing international agreements fell within the 
jurisdiction of the legislature. However, the clause in question does not tell us whether 
Göncz was obliged to have Parliament’s approval for attending the Summit. If one 
compares these stipulations with the revised version, it becomes evident that the ambiguity 
of the Constitution was not clarified even after its subsequent amendments.  
[The current Constitution in use after amendment in 2002]  
Article 30/A 
The President of Hungary represents the State of Hungary; concludes 
international treaties in the name of the Republic of Hungary; if the subject of 
the treaty falls within its legislative competences, prior ratification by the 
parliament is necessary for the conclusion of the treaty.   
 
Article 35 
The Government participates in the development of foreign policy; conclude 
international treaties in the name of the Government of the Republic of 
Hungary. 
Article 35/1 
The Government represents the Republic of Hungary in the institutions of the 
European Union that require government participation.144 
 
The difference between the 1989 version and its subsequent amendment is found only on 
the part of the government, which made subtle changes to parts of Article 35 and 35/1. The 
wording of the stipulation has been slightly altered in Article 35, and it is now clear that it 
was within the jurisdiction of the government to represent Hungary in the European Union. 
Nonetheless, this still does not provide an answer to the original question – should the 
President or the Premier have represented Hungary at the Visegrád Summit? The answer 
could have clarified whether the Summit required the President to have Parliament’s 
appproval for his participation. The main problem was, however, that the President’s 
constitutional competencies regarding international representation were not clarified during 
the Summit. Under these circumstances, Göncz, who may have interpreted his presidential 
scope broadly, argued that he was entitled to participate in the meeting. Göncz may have 
thought that he was authorised to exercise similar powers, to the extent to which his 
counterparts Havel and Walesa could.145 In contrast, the Premier, Antall, interpreted the 
scope of the President’s authority more narrowly than Göncz had expected.  
 
Hence, the Visegrád Summit demonstrated how ambiguity within the Constitution 
contributed to jurisdictional dispute over the President’s role in foreign policy. In fact, 
issues of constitutional obscurity resurfaced when Göncz and Antall clashed over control 
of the broadcast media. Although the causes of their conflict and Göncz’s determination 
for involvement, differed from issues surrounding foreign policy, this also demonstrated 
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how ambiguity in the Constitution was leading to different interpretations of the document. 
Before examining this issue, the following section of the chapter explores how Göncz 
coped with one of the most crucial transitional issues that the new Hungarian democracy 
had to face: the question of coming to terms with the Communist past. 
  
5.2.3. Dealing with the Communist past 
With Communism’s collapse, perhaps the most common transitional task that the first 
post-Communist governments in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) had to address was a 
question of settling accounts in some way or other. Across the region, while each 
government had different ideas and conceptions of its past, it was generally recognised that 
without settling this issue appropriately, social consensus could not be created. As Elster 
noted, 'the return to democracy [was] accompanied by a desire to see transitional justice 
done in an orderly manner' (Elster, 2006: 3). Different approaches were conceived and 
adopted so that a variety of models to deal with the Communist past were created by the 
governments concerned. Despite these variations, a striking similarity in pattern can also 
be noted. For example, according to Offe, different models adopted by Eastern European 
governments can be broadly classified into five typologies: monetary compensation, legal 
rehabilitation, the revelation of perpetrators’ name, the launch of trials and the formation of 
truth-telling committees (Offe, 1992, in Calhoun, 2004: 7-9). The first two indicate an 
approach to dealing with the victims of previous regimes, whereas the remainder refer to a 
way of dealing with those wrongdoers unpunished during the previous regimes’ tenure. 
Across the CEE, these approaches took various forms and were given different names but, 
under the banner of 'de-Communisation', they were largely formulated into anti-
Communist legislation or its related programmes. Hungary was no exception to this 
process and, indeed, the Antall government adopted the Laws of Compensation and Justice 
at an early stage.  
 
Despite the fact that the main impact these laws had on Hungarian society differed, the 
overall outcome of the Hungarian approach to the de-Communisation process suggested 
that it was conducted at a largely symbolic level (Enriquez, 1998: 277; Welsh, 1996: 415). 
In practical terms, this meant Hungary avoided taking the path of intense restitution and 
retribution, adopting the view that 'the best way to deal with the past is to do better now' 
and emphasising the attitude that "living well is the best revenge" (Halmai and Scheppele, 
1997: 156). As will be discussed later, Göncz also made a significant contribution to this 
process, particularly by bringing the issue into conformity with the principle of the rule of 
law. In effect, his intervention led the government to reconsider the way to deal with the 
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past. The following section of this chapter examines the main developments of the post-
transitional justice issue and Göncz’s role in it, after which comes an examination of 
factors that may have led Göncz to become involved in this question.  
 
5.2.3.1. The Law of Compensation 
On 24 April 1991, the Hungarian Parliament passed the Law on Compensation 
(Okolicsanyi, 1991a: 10). Aiming to right past wrongs by providing a symbolic level of 
financial aid to victims of Communist rule (Okolicsanyi, 1991b: 22, 1993: 49), the Antall 
government adopted 'Law No. XXV of 1991 on Partial Compensation for Damages 
Unlawfully Caused by the State to Properties Owned by Citizens in the Interest of Settling 
Ownership Relations' (hereafter the Law on Compensation).146 According to this law, in 
principle, victims and heirs whose property had been illegally confiscated by the previous 
regime were given an historic opportunity to retrieve their losses. In reality, however, the 
Law on Compensation was far from meeting expectations. The value of vouchers or bonds 
distributed to victims of Communst rule fell far short of restoring their lost property, 
because the extent of compensation was calculated against the original value of 
expropriated property with no allowance for inflation being made. For example, according 
to criteria set by the government, the level of material damage up to £1000 was fully 
compensated by this scheme, whereas the rest of the case was partially compensated 
according to a significantly declining scale (Fleming, 1995: 72-74).147 Additionally and 
more importantly, the Compensation Law had a serious legal drawback. According to Act 
XXV of 1991, for example, not everyone was granted an opportunity to claim 
compensation, and arguably this meant that citizens eliglible for compensation were also 
discriminated against. In particular, only those who lost property after 8 June 1949148 were 
entitled under the government scheme (Okolicsanyi, 1993: 49). Furthermore, politically 
persecuted victims who lost lives and freedom under the previous regime were essentially 
excluded (Mihály, 1997: 9, 2004: 10).149 Consequently, as Okolicsanyi has noted, Act 
XXV of 1991 neither covered property and personal losses incurred before June 8 1949, 
nor paid for claims lodged by Jews and other foreigners who had lost their property 
primarily before and during the Second World War (Okolicsanyi, 1991a: 8).  
 
Consequently, legal disputes over the Law on Compensation did not only arise among 
parliamentary parties, but also among the public at large. As a whole, a division of opinion 
emerged between the Antall-led coalition government and the opposition, as well as within 
the coalition itself, with the point of contention centering on differing conceptions of the 
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law. For instance, within the coalition the HDF and the CDPP both supported the partial 
compensation scheme, whereas the ISP demanded the implementation of 'reprivatisation' 
which meant the return of assets to original ownership (Comisso, 1995: 210-11; Fahidi, 
1994: 55; 218-19; Paczolay, 1992: 811). As for the opposition, the AYD and the HSP 
refused even to adopt the Compensation Law (Romsics, 2001: 420), while the AFD 
claimed that an equal amount of monetary compensation should be allocated to all 
Hungarian citizens. 150  Public opinion was also divided, showing an almost equal 
percentage (48% to 46%) of respondents for and against any type of compensation (Lázár, 
1992: 575-76).   
 
On 14 May 1991, Göncz, who had shown reservations about signing the Compensation 
Law, turned to the Constitutional Court (Bodnár, 1991). Raising four questions (of which 
details are discussed below), he asked for a judicial review on the issue of whether the law 
could be upheld in its constitutionality (Magyar Dokumentáció, May 1991). In response to 
Göncz’s questions, the Court ruled that the Law on Compensation was unconstitutional in 
several respects (Sólyom and Holló, 1992: 80-81). Above all, the cut-off date of 8 June 
1948 was found to be unconstitutional, because it was arbitrarily set (Magyar Nemzet, 30 
May 1991). The Court also decided that discrimination made between land and other types 
of property was against basic law (Magyar Dokumentáció, May 1991), as it contravened 
the principle of equality. However, the Court found that the state had a 'moral obligation to 
compensate the former owners' (Paczolay, 1992: 824), underlining the idea that the Law on 
Compensation could enter into force if discriminatory elements within the law were 
removed. Accordingly, in spring 1992, the law was revised several times so that 
contentious legal debates appeared to have been brought to an end.151 However, on 16 
April 1993, Göncz once again referred the amended version - Law No. I of 1993 
Compensation - to the Constitutional Court (Sólyom and Holló, 1994: 221),152  and 
controversies over this law continued throughout the Antall government.  
  
Given that the implementation of the Compensation Law was conditional upon the 
amendment of the law, it is possible to question Göncz’s intentions for forwarding it to the 
Constitutional Court. Göncz himself was a political victim of Communist rule, a person 
who was unjustly imprisoned and, the introduction of the Compensation Law may have 
benefitted him financially. This might explain Göncz’s reluctance to sign the law. An 
interview Göncz gave to Kossuth Radio implies that one of the primary reasons for his 
reluctance lay in his anxiety about the lack of social consensus prevalent in Hungarian 
society at the time:  
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Countless requests were [sent] to me. These came from both sides. On the one 
hand, it was suggested that the implementation of the law be accelerated… On 
the other hand, there were appeals about how the law violated [various] 
interests. Public opinion was also divided by age and social [background]. In 
these circumstances, naturally, I [had] doubts about the law. I felt that it was 
my duty to [address this doubt] by raising questions and receiving answers 
(Wisinger and László, 1994: 161-62). 
 
Having faced this dilemma, which made it difficult for Göncz to reconcile conflicting 
interests, he may have thought that the law should be more carefully drafted prior to its 
introduction. According to Göncz’s account, it would appear that he did not object to the 
idea of compensation per se. However, any doubt over legal deficiencies inherent in the 
law was required to be resolved, because this was seen by Göncz as the main cause of 
controversy among people, something which in turn contributed to social division. For 
example, according to an historian of the State Security Archive, László Varga, the 
Compensation Law had numerous inherent problems which violated the right of ownership 
and people’s interests. Varga noted that: 
The biggest problem of monetary compensation is the question of ownership. 
Let’s say in 1938, land belonged to a Jew. [During the Second World War] the 
Arrow Cross expropriated this land and in 1945, the [new government] took it 
away from the Arrow Cross and somone bought it. But if this land was again 
taken away from the third owner as a consequence of collectivisation, in 
principle, the government would have to compensate for land owners three 
times. In practice, of course, this rarely happened [...] (Interview with Varga, 
27 August 2007).   
 
In these circumstances, Göncz naturally had reason to doubt the legality of law. Indeed, an 
attempt to remove the doubt was evidenced by the letter he sent to the Constitutional Court 
in which he raised these questions: 
1) Does it correspond to the spirit of the Constitution that compensation is not 
complete [in scope], but only partial [indicating moral obligation]? 
2) Does it correspond to the spirit of the Constitution that much of the 
legislation concerning compensation is defered until a later date? This applies 
to the [nationalisation] which took place before 8 June 1949, and also applies 
to the Church and other bodies. 
3) Does it correspond to the spirit of the Constitution that discrimination 
between citizens is based on the nature of nationalised property? 
4) Does it correspond to the spirit of the Constitution that compensation will be 
made at the expense of local authorities and cooperatives?153 
(Magyar Hírlap, 14 May 1991)  
 
In essence, Göncz questioned whether the Law on Compensation violated the principle of 
equality by discriminating against the dispossessed based on the expropriation date and the 
type of once-nationalised property. In particular, the cut-off date for one specific criterion 
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set by the Antall government was questioned by Göncz, as this decided whether people 
were eligible for demanding any compensation for material damages. Similarly, Göncz 
wondered why certain types of lost property could be retrieved, while others could not. 
According to the Compensation Law, partial compensation would be provided only to 
those who had forcibly lost their lands and some buildings, but excluded any possibility of 
being recompensated for material losses of their goods and chattels. Thus, the law had 
intrinsic legal defects as it treated land restituants preferentially, a fact which is indicative 
of the contravention of the principle of equality.  
 
Considering the specific questions formulated by Göncz and their implications, it is fair to 
suggest that Göncz dealt with one of the most controversial transitional laws in light of his 
own liberal and democratic values. The significance of the principle of equality was 
demonstrably highlighted in this instance. Göncz clearly sensed that the main cause of 
social division over the Compensation Law lay in possible discriminatory measures within 
it, which he interpreted to mean that the issue should be addressed through the 
constitutional review process. Moreover, given his intellectual and dissident background in 
the struggle for the realisation of justice, it is likely that Göncz would have had his own 
ideas or suggestions when dealing with the compensation issue. Indeed, the inference to be 
drawn from an interview Göncz gave to Kossuth Radio supports the reasoning that Göncz 
had his own opinion regarding the Compensation Law. In essence, Göncz argued that the 
Law on Compensation should have been more thoroughly examined in the context of the 
holistic view of Hungary’s entire socio-economic transformation process. Göncz stated: 
I would be very pleased, if they [MPs] evaluated the social consequences and 
side-effects of the law in the course of parliamentary debates… For example, 
how those people who bear financial burdens would react to the 
[compensation] law; what long-term impacts the law may have… how the law 
affects next year’s budget… Not only from [the point of view of] inflation, the 
financial market, and economic processes, but also from the viewpoint of the 
[overall] general conditions of the social transformation process, [the law 
should have been more comprehensively investigated] (Wisinger and László, 
2007: 185). 
 
With this in mind, it can be fair to say that along with the deficiency of the principle of 
equality within the Compensation Law, the shortsighted economic policy that the Antall 
government proposed cannot be ruled out as a factor which influenced Göncz’s 
determination to intervene in the issue.   
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5.2.3.2. The Law on Justice 
On 4 November 1991, less than six months after the Compensation Law was challenged by 
the Constitutional Court, the Hungarian Parliament passed the 'Law of Zétényi-Takács', 
named after its initiators, Zsolt Zétényi and Péter Takács: 
§(1) On 2 May 1990, the statue of limitations on certain crimes committed 
between 21 December 1944 and 2 May 1990 begins. According to the 1978 
[Criminal Law] which was in effect at the time, perpetrators committed the 
following crimes: treason as defined in 144.§ (2) paragraph, premediated 
murder as described in 166. § (1) and (2), and manslaughter as dictated in 
170.§ (5). The start point of the statue of limitations is [reset] if the perpetrators 
of a crime [originally escaped] punishment for political reasons [...] (Hack, 
2007: 544).    
 
Designed to reset statutory limitations for certain crimes - 'premeditated murder, treason 
and aggravated assault' – committed between 21 December 1944 and 2 May 1990 (Pataki, 
1992a: 21; Welsh, 1996: 416),154 the primary goal of the Zétényi-Takács Law lay in calling 
Communists to account (Huyse, 1995: 69). According to this law, the renewal of the statute 
of limitations meant that those perpetrators who had not been punished for political reasons 
during the previous regime could now be brought to justice. Not surprisingly, in the course 
of legislation, controversy arose, with legal disputes centring on the issues of whether 
retroactive law could be implemented in the name of justice. The governing coalition 
(comprising the HDF, ISP and CDPP) supported the law (Hámor and Bártfai, 1991), 
reasoning that the state had a moral responsibility to undo past injustices. A CDPP MP 
Miklós Hasznos argued that: 'The question of justice is not a simple legal question but a 
much more complex [issue], because it [requires] the realisation of moral justice... People 
demanded and always demand that time does not give a free pass to those offenders who 
acted against their own people' [...] (Kurtán, Sándor and Vass, 1992a: 549). In contrast, the 
opposition - the AFD and AYD - were against the law, raising concerns about its possible 
social consequences (Magyar Dokumentáció, October 1991). For example, an MP of the 
AFD, Imre Mécs, said that he would oppose the law, as he believed that its enactment 
might stir up a sense of fear and hatred among the population and, could also be misused to 
launch political trials or witch-hunts (Népszabadság, 18 November 1991).  
 
Having become aware of the lack of social consensus on this issue, Göncz referred the law 
to the Constitutional Court on 18 November 1991 (Fekete, 1991; Népszava, 19 November 
1991). With an emphasis on the fact that the calling of perpetrators to account ought to be 
done strictly within the framework of a state built upon the rule of law (Magyar 
Dokumentáció, November 1991), Göncz asked the Court whether the adopted law 
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contravened democratic principles. Sensing the significance of the issue, he also visited the 
Court personally (Sereg, 1991). Göncz acted in this way having seen that social division 
over the Justice Law had raised concern about potential consequences (details are 
discussed below).  
 
Upon Göncz’s request, the Constitutional Court issued its ruling on 3 March 1992. Eight 
points of constitutional violation were raised by the Court (Sólyom and Holló, 1993: 77-
78), the essence of the verdict was the Zétényi-Takács Law was against the Constitution, 
because it violated the principle of legal security, whereby 'the citizen can count on the law 
to protect him and the law cannot be [distorted] by the state' (Oltay, 1993a: 6). In practice, 
this meant that once the statute of limitations had expired, those criminals who had not 
been punished in the past were also entitled to benefit from legal immunity. Various 
reactions soon followed the Court’s ruling, but division between the government and 
opposition once again manifested itself. The AFD and the AYD welcomed the Court’s 
ruling, but the HDF governing party found the decision surprising (Magyar Nemzet, 4 
March 1992). Göncz stated that 'no one can appeal or reverse the ruling' (Magyar 
Dokumentáció, March 1992), adding that he himself would respect the Court’s decision.  
 
However, Göncz stressed that people had a right to know about their own history and past 
(Kovács, 1992); the pursuit of the truth had to go on. To this end, Göncz offered his own 
proposal to Parliament, suggesting that a Special Commission for Historical Investigation, 
a body whose main task was to elicit confessions from those criminals who were 
responsible for past misconducts, be set up in Parliament (Göncz, 1993: 1-5). The results 
of these investigations, such as the names of those accountable for crimes, were also to be 
made available to the public (details are discussed below).  
 
Meanwhile, in February 1993, almost a year after the Zétényi-Takács Law was overturned 
by the Court’s ruling, the Hungarian Parliament passed two new laws dealing with 
Communist crimes (Oltay, 1993a: 7). One was concerned with the procedure relating to 
crimes committed during the 1956 Revolution. Another was a version of the Zétényi-
Takács Law but this time amended 'the Criminal Procedure Act of 1973 to make it 
obligatory for public prosecutors to level accusations in certain cases' (Halmai and 
Scheppele, 1997: 165). In practice, there was no fundamental difference between the 
Zétényi-Takács Law and its revised version. However, in the case of the law dealing with 
crimes committed during the '56 Revolution, the government introduced two new elements 
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– war crimes and crimes against humanity – to bring the Communists to account. The 
government explained that during the '56 Revolution, Hungary was in a state of war, and 
the crimes committed during this war did not fall under the jurisdiction of statutory 
limitations (Oltay, 1993a: 7). They claimed that perpetrators belonging to this category 
should be tried as war criminals.  
 
While the constitutionality of these two laws was in question, on 8 March 1993, Göncz 
again called on the Constitutional Court to review them. Three months later, the Court 
ruled that the amended Zéteny-Takács Law was unconstitutional.155 Referring to the same 
rationale which had previously been made in the case of the first draft of the Zétényi-
Takács Law, the Court concluded that the revised law still contravened the principle of 
legal security. On 12 October 1993, the Court also ruled that the law which dealt with 
crimes committed immediately after the '56 Revolution was unconstitutional. According to 
the original Bill, crimes committed after the '56 Revolution should be considered as war 
crimes. However, the Court ruled that crimes committed during the '56 Revolution did not 
fall within the category of war crimes by the definition of international agreements 
(Halmai, 2004: 57). The Court nonetheless found that, according to the Geneva 
Convention of 1949 and the New York Convention of 1968 (which Hungary had also 
signed),156 crimes committed after the '56 Revolution belonged in the category of crimes 
against humanity, highlighting that the criminals could now be brought to justice without 
reference to the statute of limitations. Subsequently, on 22 October 1993, in consideration 
of the Court’s ruling, the Hungarian Parliament adopted Law No. XC of 1993 on the 
Procedure related to Crimes committed during the 1956 Revolution and Struggle for 
Freedom.157 The constitutionality of the law having been upheld by the Court’s ruling, 
Göncz finally signed it (Népszabadság, 25 October 1993).  
 
This issue clearly demonstrates the dilemma of transitional justice that the post-Communist 
Hungarian government had to tackle. On the one hand, it was recognised that 'no deed 
deserving punishment' should remain unpunished (Kis, 2003: 274), as this was deemed to 
be morally reprehensible. On the other hand, it was agreed that, in a constitutional state, 
justice is workable only if it is sought within the framework of the principle of the rule of 
law. The main problem was that taking legal action against the wrongdoers was not 
possible, as the time limit for prosecution had already expired. Thus, a clash between the 
concept of moral justice and the new government’s commitment to the principle of the rule 
of law emerged. This was recognised by the political elite, legal experts and the general 
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public alike but they could not reach an agreement over the best way to deal with the past. 
More precisely, they were not certain that on moral grounds, justice could be enacted 
retrospectively. In this uncertain situation, Göncz, who had once strongly urged the redress 
of past injustices through the establishment of the Committee for Historical Justice (see 
Section 3.3 Chapter 3), now firmly stood with the rigorous application of the principle of 
the rule of law. Thus, it is necessary to question what it was that led him to deal with this 
delicate issue in this manner.  
 
According to my interviews and articles found in the academic literature, three factors are 
primarily responsible for Göncz’s stance. Firstly, it has been suggested that the consensus-
based democracy underpinning Göncz’s political beliefs or philosophy influenced him in 
challenging the Zétényi-Takács Law (interview with Babus, 19 May 2007). As the main 
concern about the Compensation Law for Göncz was the issue of social division over the 
possible discriminatory elements within it, the Zétényi-Takács Law also contributed to the 
polarisation of Hungarian society so was equally inadmissable to him.158 The significance 
of social consensus embedded in Göncz’s political beliefs was displayed when he 
personally visited the Constitutional Court. Göncz stated: 
I came to this Court for the following reasons: 
▪ During the parliamentary debate about the proposed [the Zétényi-Takács 
Law], there were several concerns about its [constitutionality];  
▪ The petitions handed over to me have proved that the position of the law 
enforcers is divided. There are judges who find it irreconcilable with their 
conscience to cooperate in the law enforcement of the legislation;  
▪ According to several scientific conferences, the position of the law on these 
issues is divided in Hungary as well as abroad; 
▪ The foreign reactions to this law are rather unfavourable and numerous              
press publications have questioned the constitutionality of our country 
(Kurtan, Sándor and Vass, 1992b: 563). 
 
Certainly, the law not only divided general public opinion, but also legal experts at home 
and abroad. In this polarised situation, Göncz naturally questioned the constitutionality of 
the law, not to mention that the legislation conflicted with his political beliefs about 
consensus-based democracy. Kis explained how Göncz’s commitment to the idea of a 
consensus-based democracy could have affected Göncz’s action of vetoing the law. Kis 
noted that: 'The constitutional democracy that Göncz [envisaged] is one in which the 
majority in Parliament does not decide everything. There are civic rights that must be 
respected. The branches of power are separate and complement each other. Within 
Parliament, the opposition has certain rights to exercise and this means that the majority 
does not decide everything. Göncz made many efforts towards the realisation of a real 
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constitutional democracy or, as it is said, 'liberal democracy' (interview with Kis, 27 
September 2007). Given Kis’ explanation, democracy was workable for Göncz, if there 
was consensus in decision-making or if the problematic law itself was changed in a way 
that meant that dissenting opinions could be minimised. However, at the time, the Zétényi-
Takács Law was not unproblematic and neither did Hungarian society show consensus, in 
conflict with Göncz’s political beliefs. In this regard, the Court’s involvement seemed to 
be indispensable and, given that the major issue for Göncz was to find a way to bring about 
demands for political justice in a reassuring and democratic manner, it was perhaps 
unavoidable. It should be noted that, even if this act were only symbolic, in the annual 
New Year’s Greetings speeches Göncz gave to the general public; the significance of 
seeking social consensus and solidarity were the words most consistently emphasised 
throughout his Presidency.159  
 
A second plausible account for Göncz’s refusal to sign the retroactive legislation lies in his 
future-orientated or prospective political values. A great number of Hungarian academics 
have suggested that Göncz was one of the advocates for a peaceful transformation to 
democracy (interviews with Babus, Hegedűs, Kende, Rainer and Varga). This concept can 
be variously interpreted according to the context. According to Babus and Rainer, however, 
the rationale behind the peaceful democratic change was that it 'drew a thick line' between 
past and future. Thus, if the Communists were to be punished for their past misconducts 
through the application of retroactive justice, this would contradict the fundaments 
underpinning the legitimacy of a new democracy. The chief political editor of the 
economic weekly, Heti Világgazdaság, Endre Babus, maintained that:  
The basic notion of Hungary’s systemic change was that it must be orientated 
to the future… Without violence, the Communists handed over their power to 
the [opposition]… The new political elite did not wish to seek revenge on the 
old political elite… I think Göncz also attached [himself] to this notion, and 
seriously tried to [keep to] it all the time [Interview with Babus, 19 May 2007, 
my emphasis].  
 
Similarly, János Rainer expressed this view:  
My impression is that peaceful transformation for Göncz meant tabula rasa, in 
the sense of [granting] an amnesty… He thought that if [that] was the price for 
the peaceful transformation to democracy, it was worth not seeking political 
reckoning […] [Interview with Rainer, 22 August 2007, my emphasis]. 
 
The consistent emphasis above underscores the fact that Göncz also shared the basic notion 
of a peaceful transformation. A peaceful transition to democracy could be seen by Göncz 
as the turning point of a new beginning for Hungarian history and retroactive justice would 
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not be harmonious with the fundamental concept of peaceful democratic change. In fact, in 
an interview with the Hungarian daily, Népszava, Göncz reaffirmed the assertion, stating 
that:  
The political transformation to democracy for me [meant] that a line [between 
the past and present] must be drawn or [we must] stop [showing] hatred to the 
institution [which had dominated] for the last four decades. The law on Justice 
was not compatible with the ideal of the transformation and the requirement of 
a new beginning [of Hungary’s history] (Bíró, 2000).  
 
The final explanation lies in Göncz’s liberal democratic ideology or values. Firstly, the 
concept of liberal democracy, in particular concerned with justice, should be defined. 
According to Calhoun, liberal democractic ideology is in harmony with three elements: 
'social contract, the rule of law, openness and an inclusive approach' (Calhoun, 2004: 29-
44). Explaining that before making a social contract, individuals live in "a state of nature" 
(a concept introduced by Thomas Hobbes), Calhoun argues that a social contract 
establishes a society in which the principle of the rule of law applies. Also, reasoning that 
the past is the time before the-rule-of-law based society existed, Calhoun contends that 
these two elements essentially refer to a forward-looking value system. The final 
explanation offered by Calhoun is that liberal democracy guarantees that all people are 
equally treated before the law, and opportunity is open to everyone. According to this 
rationale, the rule of law, equality and perhaps the guarantee of basic human rights are the 
ultimate goals that liberal democracy pursues. Furthermore, as these democratic elements 
are intrinsically intertwined with future-orientated values, retroactive justice is precluded 
from the idea of liberal democracy. If Göncz also held this view then, it is highly probable 
that he would refuse to accept any type of retroactive justice.  
 
As has been discussed above, Göncz constantly rejected the retroactive law based on his 
commitment to future-orientated values. It is possible to argue that liberal and democratic 
ideology was behind his determination not to sign the law. Moreover, in view of a speech 
that Göncz delivered on the occasion of the International Colloquium on the European 
Agreement on Human and Cultural Rights, it would appear that his commitment to the 
guarantee of human rights had also informed his decision to veto the retroactive legislation. 
Göncz explained what human rights meant for him:  
Human rights, for me, ... are a never-ending struggle for human dignity... a 
political struggle concerned with curbing the powers that the state may exercise 
against the individual....We cannot make concessions where others who need 
protection from persecution or discrimination, or who suffer violation of their 
human rights [are concerned]. When the dignity of human beings is violated, 
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we must protest as hard as we can. We cannot tolerate the loss of other 
people’s dignity [...] (Tóth, 1999: 46).  
 
Göncz acknowledged that the human rights issue was the most challenging to him, but he 
made clear that he could not and - would not - concede his position on this issue. He 
stressed that in a democratic state, where human rights were guaranteed, perpetrators who 
committed crimes ought also to be equally treated before the law. Although this does not 
tell us whether Göncz had considered the human rights’ issue when dealing with the 
Communist past, this factor cannot be excluded entirely given its significance to his 
political beliefs. Indeed, a letter Göncz wrote to the Constitutional Court highlights the fact 
that Göncz did consider the human rights’ issue when dealing with the retroactive 
legislation. In his letter of 18 November 1991, one of the questions raised was as follows: 
'Does this law not undermine the principle of law "nullum crimen sine lege"160 which has 
become the principle of human rights supported by historical practice and international 
agreement?'.161 Thus, it is fair to suggest that in so far as the question of settling accounts 
with the past is concerned, Göncz sought to address the issue within a framework guided 
by the principle of the liberal-democratic equality before the law.  
 
Göncz’s democratic stance, however, was not favourably viewed by all Hungarian citizens. 
For instance, in response to my question, 162  Szilvia Varró, political editor of the 
Hungarian internet daily, Hírszerző, expressed her regret at Göncz’s role:   
It would have been good if Göncz had stood by justice... As a '56 veteran and a 
[member] of the democratic opposition, he should have played a more active 
role in [dealing with] the Communist past. As the President, he should have 
demanded the enactment of laws [rendering justice]. I think it was his job to 
lead Hungary to face the past [honestly], which has remained undone to the 
present day... He did nothing to help the [creation] of social peace. I regret to 
say that he could have done many [more] things for justice (Interview with 
Varró, 15 August 2007). 
 
For Varró it was deplorable to see that Göncz had not only failed to take a proactive role in 
the question of settling accounts with the past but, had actively prevented it. Varró believed 
that Hungary had not dealt with the past, and this remained a deficiency within Hungarian 
democracy. Göncz was responsible, because he was perceived to have done nothing to 
assist the process of coming to terms with the past. Thus, Varró implies that Göncz failed 
to fulfill his one of primary presidential duties – the representation of the unity of the 
nation - as his neglect of the past contributed to national discord which might have arisen 
due to the lack of clarity in attitudes toward the Communist era.  
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However, one should bear in mind that Göncz did offer his own solution to deal with the 
past. After the Court overturned the Zétényi-Takács Law, Göncz proposed a Bill for 
establishing a Special Commission for Historical Investigation.163 Reasoning that the 
preclusion of culpability decided by the Court did not mean that the state should avoid its 
obligation to examine important past events, Göncz urged that 'the state must co-operate 
[in the process of] look[ing] into the truth and reveal the names of perpetrators' (Magyar 
Nemzet, 4 March 1992). Göncz stated that: 
I asked [for] Parliament [to]... establish a Commission for Historical 
Investigation to Research (CHIR)... The Commission would be charged to 
[name] those responsible for violations and for acts committed against 
individual human lives... A complete disclosure of events and naming of 
persons responsible for the violation of law might help familarise us with the 
nation’s tragic recent past... [but] without infringing the Constitution and 
existing legal principles... [The CHIR] is to [help] ease the tension prevailing 
in our society because of our lack of clarity about the past [...] (Göncz, 1993: 4-
5). 
 
The extract above suggests that dealing with the past for Göncz does not mean the purge of 
wrongdoers, but a path of historical process for societal reconciliation. Göncz viewed that 
a key condition for this process – that of allowing people to exercise their legitimate right 
to knowledge about the past – should be met first. Göncz stressed that, without meeting 
this basic requirement, Hungarian society would not be able to reconcile itself with those 
perpetrators who had violated society’s democratic rights. For this reason, Göncz proposed 
the founding of the CHIR in the expectation that this body would help people face the 
country’s past honestly and their individual records that they had been sealed for decades. 
It should be noted that, when Göncz was active as a member of the Committee for 
Historical Justice, a full-scale independent investigation regarding show trials and legal 
cases that had been enforced since 1945 was considered as the key issue to be addressed 
(Section 3.3 of Chapter 3). In this respect, Göncz seemed to have made a clear distinction 
between the right to know about the past and, the issue of calling the Communists to 
account. In Kiss’s terms, Göncz may have been one of the advocates of the virtues of 
'reckoning with the past in order to ensure openness and to give everyone a chance for an 
honest confrontation with past behaviour' (Kiss, 2006: 926). Indeed, Péter Kende 
confirmed that Göncz’s determination for establishing the CHIR originated in the concept 
of allowing people to judge their past records for themselves. Kende noted thus: 
Göncz clearly saw that Hungarian society could not stand on its own without  
closing off the Communist past. At least, it must be closed symbolically... It 
required a body which had a moral authority, which could say to the public 
"Dear Hungarians and Fellow Citizens! We live in a new era, which came into 
being after the systemic change. We live in a society built on legal continuity 
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which cannot bring retroactive laws. But we can bring our verdict on some 
[important] matters which occurred during the Communist era"... [Where] it 
required a moral initiative, [Göncz realised this with his Bill]. [But] he could 
not find any partners for this (Interview with Kende, 5 October 2007). 
 
The genesis of this moral initiative lay in Göncz’s understanding and the lessons that he 
gained from his first hand experience of the hardship caused by miscarriages of justice. As 
Göncz stated: 
Reckoning is necessary. In my personal opinion, it should be made strictly 
within the framework of a state built on the rule of law. In a closed trial, I was 
sentenced to life imprisonment. It was not possible to appeal. I strongly feel 
that no procedure should be repeated that could be found illegal in retrospect 
(Magyar Dokumentáció, November 1991). 
 
In view of this, it is fair to say that, when assessing the question of coming to terms with 
the past, Göncz sought to address the issue within a framework guided by the liberal-
democratic principle that everyone ought to be treated equally before the law. 
 
5.2.4. The Law on Arable Land (Termőföldről szóló törvény) 
On 6 April 1994, the Parliament in Hungary adopted 'No. LV Law of 1994 on Arable Land 
'(hereafter the Law on Arable Land) for the following reason: 
On the basis of transforming ownership, in order to convert agriculture into a 
market economy built on private ownership; to help the trade of arable land 
and the use of land to obtain credit so that this facilitates the efficient 
functioning of new[ly] operating firms; to facilitate the establishment of 
landownership that is capable of pursuing competitive agricultural produce164 
[...]. 
 
Central to the debate over the Law on Arable Land was whether placing limitations on the 
purchase of land was necessary for the transformation of land ownership in Hungarian 
agriculture. The relative weakness of Hungary’s agricultural competitiveness on the 
international market was the official reason given for the adoption of this law (Halmai, 
2004: 349); its aim was clear - the protection of Hungary’s land market from foreign 
purchase. Several stipulations were included in the law, of which the point of contention 
centred on the regulation of who would be entitled to purchase land. Three categories - an 
individual Hungarian citizen, a domestic body or organisation, and a foreign individual or 
body – were identified to decide whether claimants were eligible for buying land (Heti 
Világgazdaság, 16 April 1994; Izsák and Nagy, 2004: 592). Those who fell within the first 
category could buy land, albeit with limited scope,165 whereas these in either of the other 
two were essentially excluded from undertaking land purchase transactions. There were 
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some exceptions in this law, but both domestic and foreign private organisations were 
ruled out for the purchase of land. For instance, among the exceptions, local government, 
public foundations, the Church and the state itself were granted a legal right to buy arable 
land with unlimited scope (Félix, 1994; Népszabadság, 30 April 1994). In contrast, other 
bodies such as the National Association of Agricultural Cooperatives and Producers were 
excluded. Consequently, the legality of the law was questioned, particularly with respect to 
whether it discriminated against potential buyers, who were foreigners or public bodies and 
private associations located at home and abroad. While the constitutionality of the law was 
in doubt, on 29 April 1994, Göncz, who had a reservation about signing the law, turned to 
the Constitutional Court, requesting a judicial review (of which details are discussed 
below). Two months later, the Court ruled that the Law of Arable Land was not 
unconstitutional (Sólyom and Holló, 1995: 197). 
 
Given that the Law of Arable Land may have included discriminatory elements, the 
question arises as to the grounds on which the Court justified that it conformed to the 
Constitution. When Göncz forwarded the law to the Court, he referred to the following 
clauses, asking whether the law was in harmony with these principles: 
Article 70/A: The Republic of Hungary shall respect the human rights and civil 
rights of all persons in the country without discrimination on the basis of race, 
colour, gender, religion, national or social origin [...]. 
Article 56: In the Republic of Hungary, everyone is legally capable. 
Article 9 (1): The economy of Hungary is a market economy, in which public 
and private property shall receive equal consideration and protection under the 
law (Halmai, 2004: 347). 
 
In essence, Göncz questioned whether distinctions being made between individual 
Hungarian citizens and foreigners, public bodies and private businesses at home and 
abroad upheld the principle of equality. Göncz wondered whether the law might have 
undermined the egalitarian principle which related to the human and civil rights’ elements 
of the Constitution and the right to enterprise and market economy. In response to Göncz’s 
questions, the Court ruled that the entitlement to ownership was not a part of the 
fundamental rights that were defined in the Constitution; it could, the Court ruled, be 
restricted if reasonable grounds were given for the imposition of the limitation (Halmai, 
2004: 348). Additionally, the Court ruled that it was rare to contravene the principle of the 
market economy, and the Law on Arable Land did not fall into this legal realm. The 
Court’s final justification was the exclusion of domestic and foreign bodies from the 
subject of land ownership was required, since allowing foreigners and certain domestic 
potential purchasers to buy land would give them leeway to use the law (Halmai, 2004: 
 138 
349). This meant that since establishing companies or private bodies could be considered 
the easiest way to bypass the law, for example, avoiding the legal limit on the acreage of 
land that could be bought, private businesses and bodies should be banned altogether from 
land ownership. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court’s decision seems to have 
considered the relative strength of purchasing power vested in legal bodies compared to 
that of an individual Hungarian citizen. Following the rationale of the Court’s decision, it 
is likely that without this protective measure, only those individuals and commercial 
bodies that possessed considerable financial resources would be capable of purchasing land.  
 
In this ruling, however, there was an element of ambiguity. Even if discriminatory 
measures were necessary for the protection of Hungary’s farmers and of its vulnerable land 
market from relatively richer foreign buyers, the law still seems to have compromised the 
principle of equality. Since none of the clauses within the Constitution detailed the 
circumstances under which land purchase would be restricted from domestic and foreign 
legal bodies, this legal lacuna itself suggested that the principle of equality was 
contravened. It should be noted that the arbitrariness of the Court’s decision was 
questioned by a dissenting judge of the Court, Géza Kilényi (Sólyom and Holló, 1995: 
210), whose view was later supported by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The ECJ 
ruled that the Hungarian Law of Arable Land violated the European Community Law, 
which required non-discrimination in the free movement of capital, goods, persons and 
services (Majoros, 2000: 5-6).166    
 
Göncz may have recognised this legal deficiency, and his anxiety may have been expressed 
in the form of a constitutional veto. He may have known that in the short term, the 
imposition of protective measures on agricultural landownership might benefit those 
farmers who were unable to compete with their counterparts possessed of greater financial 
resources. However, in his decision-making process, Göncz may have considered that in 
the long term, protective measures would not be advantageous for the modernisation of 
Hungary’s economy, particularly in relation to Hungary’s integration into Europe. It 
should be noted that at this time, Hungary had already applied for membership of the 
European Union,167 and the accession was considered as a principal way of modernising 
the transitional Hungarian economy. A speech delivered by Göncz at the 25th anniversary 
of the Club of Rome168 demonstrated how he understood 'integration' with respect to 
economic transformation:  
Integration – by which we mean the European Union – is a framework and a 
means to help the two halves of the continent adjust to each other and to the 
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global environment… The Central and Eastern European economies will have 
to modernise to achieve growth. For this modernisation, capital is required. It 
must come from exports [to] more accessible markets, particularly in Western 
Europe, from direct foreign investments and loans. We also need more 
advanced technology and better skills. Much of this will have to come from 
external sources, first of all from Western Europe, which has a direct and 
unequivocal interest in the rise of the other half […] (Tóth, 1999: 150-51).  
 
The extract above underscores the fact that for the modernisation of the Hungarian 
economy, an influx of foreign capital was essential. While this does not tell us how Göncz 
related the modernisation issue of Hungary’s agriculture to the whole economic 
transitional process, it is certain that economic transformation could not be achieved 
without opening Hungary’s market to Western Europe. Göncz had a holistic way of 
thinking and a good understanding of the complexity of contemporary transitional 
problems and, integration was seen as the key means for addressing the existing issues. In 
this respect, precluding foreign investors from land ownership would be counter-
productive to Hungary’s integration process into Europe. In fact, the significance of 
integration as a way to modernise Hungary’s economy was again underlined by Göncz. At 
a Think Tank Network meeting,169 Göncz defined what integration meant to Central and 
Eastern Europe: 
On the Central and East European side, the pros of integration, especially pan-
European integration, are obvious:  
Politically, it can provide the security that many of these countries lack; 
Economically, it can increase the modernisation process in Central and Eastern 
Europe and greatly facilitate our access to outside markets; 
Socially, it can help us establish the standards and systems appropriate to a 
modern society […] (Göncz, 1992: 207-08).  
 
This once more highlights the main contention that Hungary’s socio-economic and 
political transformation to democracy could not be attained without its integration into 
Europe. In a wider context and long-term perspective, Hungary’s accession to various 
international organisations was required as, not only would this bring about prosperity, but 
also social security, as well as democratic norms established in developed states. Mapping 
out Hungary’s position within Europe, Göncz may have thought that foreign access to the 
Hungarian land market would outweigh the benefits which a short-term protective measure 
might have brought to the modernisation of the Hungarian economy. As an agronomist 
who had gained first-hand knowledge and experience in the field (see Chapter 1 and 2), 
Göncz would have fully realised the inherent weakness of Hungary’s agriculture. However, 
this issue suggests to us that in the situation of a dilemma where nationalist or protectionist 
ideas and liberal or cosmopolitan ideas clashed, Göncz ultimately opted for the latter. 
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Behind this decision, his commitment to the principle of equality was clearly highlighted in 
this economic transitional issue. Having noted the importance of the egalitarian principle 
for Göncz’s political beliefs, it is now necessary to trace the continuity and discontinuity of 
these values in other areas of economic interest – the Law on Privatisation (will be 
examined in Chapter 6). Before embarking on this task, the following section of the 
chapter examines one of the most controversial issues in which Göncz became involved: 
control over the broadcast media. 
 
5.2.5. Control over the broadcast media 
As in other Eastern European states during the Communist era, the media in Hungary was 
placed under the control of the Communist party (Milton, 2000: 76). The 1974 Decree 
which justified the placing of the media under the control of the Council of Ministers 
(Arato, 1996: 226; Milton, 2000: 129) provides a good example of Hungary’s media 
situation. The end of Communism, however, opened a new era and offered an opportunity 
to transform this system of control. This was raised as a key topic for the agenda of the 
RTN (see Section 4.1 of Chapter 4) and 'in 1990 immediately after the political change in 
Hungary', there was a desire among new political elites to legislate a new media law 
(Pataki, 1992b; 1994: 30, 43). This plan, however, had never been realised during the 
Antall government, and the issue of controlling the media demonstrated how difficult the 
birth of this basic condition of democracy was. In the beginning, conflict over controlling 
the media was considered only as a matter for the heads of broadcast media and the Antall 
government. It developed into a serious political issue when Göncz stepped into the debate. 
In effect, his involvement not only brought about a series of sharp confrontations with the 
Antall government, but also contributed to political polarisation. This was evident in a 
series of pro-government versus anti-government public demonstrations, with the latter 
culminating in the formation of the Democratic Charter. 170  The following section 
examines this historically important event regarding the issue of media control and 
explores the background to this controversy.  
 
In July 1990, with the agreement of six parliamentary parties, two prominent sociologists, 
Elemér Hankiss and Csaba Gombár, were chosen as the new heads of the Hungarian 
national television and radio (Mézes, 1992: 61; Milton, 2000: 130; Pataki, 1994: 40). It 
was intended that these nominees could – until the passage of a new media law – lead the 
broadcast media in an impartial manner, free from political interference (Hankiss, 1996: 
246; 1999: 276). After six months, however, the first sign of a breach in this initial 
agreement became apparent when the Antall government began to put increasing pressure 
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on national radio, in an attempt to place it under their control. The former chairman of the 
national radio, Gombár, said: 'At the time, there were no commercial radio stations and this 
[the public radio] was the only radio station we had. In this situation, political parties 
naturally wanted to influence the programming of radio and television. I tried to resist this, 
to ensure that public radio be neutral and beyond government influence' (interview with 
Gombár, 1 October 2007). Thus, in the beginning of a struggle for control over the 
broadcast media, conflict was primarily centred on tensions between these two heads of the 
broadcast media and the head of government; polemical confrontations between Antall and 
Göncz were not yet crystalised in comparable political tensions.  
 
In the summer of 1991, when Antall submitted new nominees for the vice-presidencies of 
the state media to Göncz, conflict between Premier and President began. The nominations 
were aimed at placing pro-government figures in important positions, in the expectation 
that they might provide a counterbalance to Hankiss and Gombár (Sükösd, 1992, 2000: 
154). Objecting to Antall’s suggestion, however, Göncz did not sign the submission on the 
nominations, reasoning that 'his conscience would not allow him to agree with the 
nomination' (Magyar Hírlap, 13 July 1991; Népszabadság, 13 July 1991). Göncz’s 
comment prompted Antall to ask him to reconsider his decision, arguing that the President 
did not have the real right to refuse the Prime Minister’s suggestion. Despite this, Göncz 
did not yield, so Antall forwarded the issue of the President’s right of nomination to the 
Constitutional Court. On 23 September 1991, the Court ruled that the President must not 
oppose the nomination of state officials proposed by the government, unless those 
appointments endangered the democratic functioning of state institutions involved.171 
Despite this decision, Göncz did not change his position, citing that 'the danger of 
government control over broadcasting as the reasons for his refusal' (Oltay, 1992: 42). 
 
In January 1992, having faced an intransigent President, Antall again turned to the Court, 
asking whether there was a deadline for the President’s signing of the nomination of state 
officials proposed by the Premier. On 28 January 1992, the Court ruled that the President 
should give his signature in due course (Sólyom and Holló, 1993: 51). Additionally, the 
Court adjudicated that failing to meet a deadline would be against the law. Missing a 
deadline was considered to be unconstitutional, with the result that after a month, Göncz 
signed the nomination (Magyar Hírlap, 3 March 1992) and the conflict with Antall 
appeared to have come to an end.  
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In the late spring of 1992, however, their confrontation resurfaced over the decision to 
dismiss the head of national radio. In May 1992, Antall asked Göncz to sign his 
endorsement of Gombár’s dismissal, reasoning that Gombár had failed to fulfil his duties. 
However, Göncz did not accept Antall’s request and Antall again turned to the 
Constitutional Court. At this time, Antall raised four questions (discussed below), which 
included asking whether the President could refuse to endorse the removal of state officials 
suggested by the Prime Minister. On 8 June 1992, the Court replied, concluding that 'the 
President should not withhold his signature from the appointments and dismissals of 
leaders of state institutions requested by the Prime Minister, unless those suggestions 
endangered the democratic functioning of the state institutions' (Sólyom and Holló, 1993: 
207-08).  
 
On 22 June 1992, two weeks after the Court’s final ruling, Antall asked Göncz to agree to 
Gombár’s dismissal, along with that of the head of national television, Elémer Hankiss. 
However, Göncz opposed Antall’s request, reasoning that he would delay his signature 
until the passage of a new media law. At the end of the year, a new draft media law was 
eventually put to the vote, but the bill was killed off due to the abstention of the AFD 
(discussed below). Consequently, by the end of 1992, the issue of media control was not 
resolved, either by the decision of the Constitutional Court, or by the agreement of the 
Members of Parliament.  
 
The following year, on 6 January 1993, Hankiss and Gombár, who had been sharply 
involved in the media issue, asked Göncz to release them from office, claiming that 'It 
would have been nonsensical and cruel if each of our several thousand colleagues, 
managers, producers, cameramen, editors, security guards, cleaning women and others had 
been forced to decide day-by-day whom to obey: us, or the new men delegated by the 
Government'. 'We did not want to involve our innocent colleagues in this ordeal and we did 
not want to get entangled in a hopelessly vicious and degrading squabble with the 
Government’s men' (Hankiss, 1996: 253-54). With their resignation, the protracted media 
issue appeared to have ended. The former head of the Hungarian Journalists’ Association, 
István Wisinger, remembered the consequence of the removal of the heads of public media 
thus: 'Immediately after Hankiss and Gombár’s dismissal, a "house-keeping" took place in 
the Hungarian state television and radio… 129 employees were dismissed from the radio 
station [alone]. [Luckily] I kept my job but in return, I was silenced' (interview with 
Wisinger, 7 June 2007).  
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The dismissal of Hankiss and Gombár, however, did not end the issue of controlling the 
media. A petition of journalists for the removal of the new vice-presidencies submitted to 
Göncz (Magyar Hírlap, 2 November 1993) suggested that he was still in a position to 
assume a proactive role against the Antall government’s media policy. Indeed, as the 
subsequent issues of the Law of Radio Frequency and the La Stampa affair demonstrated 
(details are discussed in Sections 5.2.6 and 5.2.7), the question of the control of the public 
media continued until the end of the Antall government.  
 
Despite the fact that the issue of media control was a matter of contention for the political 
elite, it is unclear whether the severity of the crisis was simply attributable to tension 
between Göncz and Antall or whether it was a political battle compounded by the vested 
interests of various political forces. The present section examines possible factors which 
may have contributed to the development of the media issue, and explores the ways in 
which this relates to Göncz’s political values. 
 
In effect, the issue of control over the broadcast media was aggravated by Göncz’s 
persistent refusal to comply with Antall’s plan of restructuring the personnel and 
programming of public television and radio. Since the Court ruled that Göncz should 
conform to the Premier’s request, his constant refusal certainly increased the tension 
between these two figures and their political camps. It should be noted that Göncz’s 
intransigence not only incurred sharp criticism from members of the government, but also 
became a source of contentious legal dispute as to whether he had overstepped his 
constitutional authority. In response to such questions,172 Hungarian political scientist, 
András Körösényi, explained how he observed the issue of media control with particular 
respect to its effect on the alteration of presidential power: 
It was possible to debate what the scope of power was. This had to be 
[clarified] in the course of the political process... Ultimately, the Court 
curtailed and narrowed down the scope of presidential powers. As a result, in 
this constitutional debate, Göncz was defeated. Nevertheless, in my opinion, at 
the time, it was possible to interpret the Constitution in various ways. Göncz 
acted according to his beliefs, but he interpreted the scope of his power too 
broadly and went beyond it (Interview with Körösényi, 11 July 2007). 
 
Similarly, but with a different emphasis, a former Counsellor of the Constitutional Court, 
Gábor Halmai, stated that: 
Sólyom [the President of the Constitutional Court] always thought that Göncz 
overstepped his constitutional authority... He did not say this in public, but 
once he said something like if one read these decisions, it is clear who was in 
possession of the truth, either the Prime Minister or the President... Following 
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the ruling, one can clearly see who did not perform his constitutional duty. He 
did not say this was Göncz... but he thought Göncz had to sign those 
appointments (Interview with Halmai, 15 November 2007). 
 
Therefore, the question arises as to why Göncz constantly refused to accept Antall’s 
proposal, despite being aware of mounting criticism against him, and the possible 
consequences for his political career. One may assume that personal emotion, such as 
animosity between Antall and Göncz, could have been responsible for Göncz’s 
controversial stance. Despite the fact that their personal relationship had been gradually 
eroded through their clashes in a series of events, it is unlikely that personal hostility was 
the principal reason for the severity of the standoff that developed over the issue of control 
of the broadcast media. In response to a television reporter’s question - 'Mr. President, how 
would you describe your relationship with the Prime Minister [József Antall]?' - Göncz 
stated that:  
The father of the Prime Minister was [seen] as a prominent politician by me. 
This was at the time [when] I [worked] in the Smallholders’ Party. In 1956, we 
[Göncz and Antall] collaborated closely with one another... I considered him a 
friend.... The current conflict between us is not a personal clash [...] ('TV 2 
Interview' in Magyar Hírlap Observer, on 2 July 1992).  
  
One may interprete this as empty political rhetoric which helped to dissociate Göncz from 
any claimed accusations regarding his uneasy relationship with Antall. However, if, as 
Göncz argued, a sense of hostility between himself and Antall was not responsible for the 
impasse in this media control situation, one must look elsewhere for the origin of their 
conflict and the worsening of the crisis.  
 
One possible explanation may lie in the misconceptions of the Hungarian political elite 
about the overall role of the media in public and political life. According to Oltay, the 
Antall government and the opposition had differing perceptions of the function of the 
media (Oltay, 1993b: 41). Whereas both parties supported the independence of the media 
in principle, in practice they both expected the media to provide flattering coverage of their 
political positions. As far as the governing party was concerned, they claimed that they 
were entitled to have more favourable coverage in programming, as their seats in 
Parliament represented more constituencies than the opposition. Accordingly, the airtime 
of programming should be proportionally allocated according to seats in Parliament (Oltay, 
1993b: 41; Sükösd, 1992). In contrast, the opposition argued that one of the key roles of 
the media was to present a critique to the audience, often accompanied by commentary or 
pre-judged opinions in favour of the opposition, regarding the performance of the 
government (Oltay, 1993b: 41).  
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Hence, while both sides interpreted the role of the media differently, their failure to 
understand the concept of independent or objective broadcasting left them struggling for 
control over the media. Furthermore, in terms of the position of the governing party, since 
the majority of the Hungarian press was politically inclined towards the left (Oltay, 1992: 
42; Mézes, 1992: 63),173 they were desperate to keep the broadcast media under their 
control. As media expert, Áron Monori, neatly asserted, supervising the broadcast media 
became an increasingly important issue to the governing party (whose popularity had fallen 
dramatically following the taxi-drivers’ strike) for the propagation of their own political 
views (Monori, 2005: 265).               
 
The second explanation may lie in the Pact made between the HDF and the AFD. As has 
been examined in the Section 4.2.3 of Chapter 4, the nomination procedure of the heads of 
public media was agreed in the Pact, and was fully formalised as follows:  
§ (i) By the suggestion of the Prime Minister (after listening to the open 
hearing of the Parliament’s Cultural and Press Affairs Committee), the 
President of the Republic appoints and dismisses the Presidents and Vice-
Presidents of the Hungarian radio and television, as well as the director of the 
Hungarian News Agency;  
(ii) In order to exercise the right specified in Provision (i), the President is 
required to have a counter-signature from the Prime Minister.174 
 
Clause (i) defines the role-sharing regarding the appointment and dismissal of the heads of 
broadcast media. The Premier acts an initiator who recommends eligible candidates for the 
posts of media heads, and the President decides whether the heads of media remain in 
office or not. According to this procedure, the President is apparently granted some 
discretionary power regarding the right of implementing personnel management. The next 
clause, however, confuses the picture. The President’s right of decision is significantly 
constrained, as he or she cannot exercise this right without co-signature by the Prime 
Minister. According to Clause (ii), the Premier who initially recommends the potential 
candidates for media headships, now has the right to decide on the matter him- or herself. 
This is known as the counter-signatory system, where the Premier may disagree with the 
President by refusing to give his or her signature. However, the counter-signatory system 
could be utilised against the Prime Minister as well, as the President may object to the 
Premier’s proposition. This means that the actions of the heads of both state and 
government will only become effective if they reach a consensus about the appointment 
and dismissal of media heads.  
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The main problem in this procedure, however, was that it failed to spell out a concrete 
stipulation as to what the President’s appointment right meant in practice. According to the 
rule above, it is not clear whether the President is granted a real right to refuse to sign the 
Premier’s decision. Should it be an operative power, as far as the right to implement 
personnel management is concerned, the President has a certain jurisdiction and, within its 
scope, he or she could act as a part of the Executive alongside the Premier. However, given 
Hungary’s parliamentarianism, vesting the President with certain executive powers is 
contradictory to the fundamental form of government. It should be noted that in Hungary’s 
history, throughout the period from 1848 until the present, the Prime Minister, who is 
politically accountable to Parliament, has governed the country (Bölöny and Hubai, 2004; 
Szoboszlai, 1996: 122). The Pact also reaffirmed this principle as the basis of governance 
(the Section 4.2.3 of Chapter 4); thus it is illogical to suggest that the President is placed 
outside of the Executive branch, but has jurisdiction only in the appointment of state 
officials. If such were the case, there would be an explanation for this exception. 
Conversely, if the President’s right of appointment is in name only, the President is not 
authorised to oppose the Premier’s decision. However, the appointment procedure 
specified in the Pact does not provide such detail, which leaves considerable room for 
various interpretations. For example, László Salamon understood that the President’s right 
of appointment was only titular. Salamon argued thus: 
In a parliamentary system, the President does not have a discretionary power to 
decide. The right to make a decision is for only a formality... Not only does this 
apply to the President’s right of appointment of [media heads], but it is also 
concerned with the right to make all other appointments (generals, 
ambassadors, university professors and rectors); he does not have the right of 
deliberation. But, Göncz thought he did have this right.... As a result, in the 
'media war', he acted wrongly [...] [Interview with Salamon, 24 October 2007, 
emphasis mine]. 
 
In contrast, János Kis, who personally participated in drawing up the Pact asserted that 
with the HDF leadership agreeing that the President be given an important role in the 
appointment of state officials, this agreement itself suggests the imposition of self-
constraint on the Premier’s power. Kis contended that: 
The aim of role-sharing lay in the securing of an impartial and neutral public 
media service. Clearly, the intention of the legislators was that the President 
should play a real role so that he can help secure the distribution of impartial 
information. This is [possible] because the Prime Minister and the President 
must agree with one another [...] [Interview with Kis, 27 September 2007, my 
emphasis].  
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In short, as Milton notes, the obscure rule of sharing authority built into the appointment 
procedure 'generates opportunity as much as constraint, actors see different prospects and 
options that they can each justify as being within the rules' (Milton, 2001: 513).  
 
A third key factor which contributed to the stalemate was the ambiguous ruling issued by 
the Constitutional Court and its subsequent interpretations by Göncz and Antall. As stated 
above, during the development of the media issue, the Court brought in three rulings 
regarding the President’s right of appointment of state officials. However, these decisions 
were not completely clear and further contributed to a protracted media issue. For example, 
on 25 May 1992 when Antall turned to the Court, he asked what the President’s right of 
appointment and dismissal meant in practice. The questions raised can be summarised as 
follows:  
1. Whether the dismissal of the heads of public media put forward by the Prime 
Minister could violate the freedom of the press; 
2. Whether the President has a right of accepting [or refusing] a law related to 
the appointment and dismissal of [state officials]; 
3. Whether the President can exericse his deliberation right to dismiss [state 
officials];  
4. Whether the President needs to justify his decision if he refuses to dismiss 
state officials (what are the grounds on which the President can refuse to 
dismiss state officials) (Magyar Dokumentáció, June 1992a).  
 
In essence, Antall wished to know whether Göncz had a constitutional right to oppose his 
decision on the removal of the heads of the broadcast media, and whether his proposal 
would undermine the fundamental democratic principles of freedom of expression and 
freedom of the press. Upon Antall’s request, the Constitutional Court made a decision, but 
it was far from unequivocal. In its ruling, the Court replied that the head of state could only 
object to the nominees of the broadcast media suggested by the head of government, if 
such nominations endangered the democratic functioning of the state institutions involved 
(Magyar Dokumentáció, June 1992b). The practical meaning of the last phrase was open to 
debate and this ambiguity contributed to further disputes between Göncz and Antall (and 
even among the judges themselves). For instance, having dissented from the ruling, judge 
of the Constitutional Court, Géza Kilényi, held a different opinion. He argued that since 
the Constitution does not specify the context of the legal grounds on which the President 
may disagree with the government’s decision, the Court cannot provide its decision. 
Kilényi maintained thus: 'In Europe, there is no single Constitution with a text, [specifying] 
the grounds on which the President can refuse to give his signature. If he is not pleased 
with [those suggestions], he can refuse to sign the law in question' (interview with Kilényi, 
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9 May 2007). According to Kilényi, the Court appears to have taken too active a role, 
because making a new law or clause does not fall within the Court’s jurisdiction but 
belongs in the Legislature.175 In Arato’s terms, 'the Court itself has acquired quasi-
[constitutional] power' by making a new provision (Arato, 1995: 48), and this activism 
leads us to wonder whether the Court in fact overstepped its constitutional boundary.  
 
According to Kovács, the Court brought this ruling to demarcate the boundaries of the 
President’s discretionary power (Kovács, 2006: 20). This means that, other than in those 
exceptional instances where democracy is gravely at risk, the President is not authorised to 
make an autonomous decision. In the remaining cases, the President is obliged to secure 
agreement either from Parliament or the government. This legal requirement, however, 
does not mark the boundary of the President’s discretionary powers, but rather leaves 
leeway for various interpretations. When the President activates this right, the only legal 
condition that he or she needs to meet is always considering the situation within the entire 
context of democratic institutions involved (Ács, 2000: 53; Petrétei, 2001: 89). Having said 
that, neither the practical meaning of this nor that 'of democracy being in danger' is defined 
in the Constitution; this legal lacuna once more gave rise to ambiguity. The only clear issue 
is that the Court did not entirely remove the right of deliberation from the President. As 
long as the President refers to this provision (that democracy is in danger) as a solid 
grounding for his decision, in principle he or she can object to any governmental decision. 
As Arato notes, the President’s ability to resist to the governmental decision 'would survive 
unless the ruling coalition had the necesssary 2/3 [majority] vote to impeach the President' 
(Arato, 1996: 228). Indeed, even after the Court’s ruling, Göncz refused to countersign 
citing that 'the danger of government control over broadcasting as the reasons for his 
refusal' (Oltay, 1992: 42). 
 
Thus, it is important to ask why the Constitutional Court was unable to make an 
unequivocal decision regarding jurisdictionable disputes occuring in political institutions. 
While there may be various explanations for this,176 one possible account offered by 
Halmai and Ilonszki suggests that indirect political influences which built into the 
procedure of appointing judges were responsible for informing the decision. Gábor Halmai 
explained how political parties appointed Court justices who were politically close to their 
own ideological spectrums:  
The HDF [chose] László Sólyom; the Socialist or Liberal party [chose] Péter 
Schmidt, Imre Vörös, Antal Adám and Géza Kilényi [...] (Interview with 
Halmai, 15 November 2007).   
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Similarly but more explicitly, Gabriella Ilonszki accounted for the consequence of the 
judges’ appointment procedure on their decision, asserting that: 
In principle, the Constitutional Court is the most independent organ. But what 
is our [real] situation? Parties nominate constitutional judges and decide who 
will be the judges... If the candidates are intelligent enough to think of their 
future, we can imagine that they will [make a point of] joining whichever party 
will be beneficial to them to get a seat in the Court. The dominance of parties 
[túlpártosodás] is the most serious problem of Hungarian politics... This is the 
weakness of Hungarian democracy (Interview with Ilonszki, 16 October 2007).  
 
Despite the fact that the independence of the Constitutional Court was guaranteed on paper, 
in reality, the Court cannot be entirely free from political intervention without changing the 
appointment procedure currently in use. This by no means suggests that all Constitutional 
judges related their rulings to their previous political affiliations. It would rather depend on 
the matter of judgement whether justices were true to their judicial oaths or consciences.  
Nevertheless, given the political character of the Court and its highly politicised role, it is 
fair to suggest that the Court is another important decision-maker in the political process. 
As András Körösényi eloquently asserted:  
The Court’s broad powers and activism, and the judges’ philosophy of 
judgement and their understanding of their role, according to which they may 
go beyond the text of the Constitution, all show that the Constitution and 
Constitutional review do not involve some form of objective, neutral systems 
of norms that exists above politics, but are instead themselves a part of the 
political process [...] (Körösényi, 1999: 272-73). 
 
The final, and perhaps most important, factor that led to the exacerbation of this crisis was 
the absence of new media legislation. Without this basic legal framework, the 1974 Decree 
was still effective which, in practice, meant that the Antall government had the legal 
authority to interfere in the programming of the state media. Under these circumstances, 
the broadcast media was naturally susceptible to political pressure and influence. It should 
be noted that the 1974 Decree was found to be unconstitutional (Lánczi and O’Neil, 1996: 
92) and the government was instructed by the Court to legislate a new media law 
(Népszabadság, 9 June 1992a). The way in which the passage of the media law might 
provide a possible solution for the stalemate was discussed by a great number of media and 
legal experts. Among them, commentaries offered by Sükösd and Halmai are of particular 
relevance. Sükösd asserted that: 'The cause of the media war was there is no media law in 
Hungary... In my opinion, a [new] media law will give a guarantee that [will] reduce the 
intensity of the media war' (Monori, 2005: 275). Similarly, Halmai upheld the view that: 
'The media war demonstrated that in the absence of legal guarantee, it [will] not be 
possible to eliminate the problem that politics would directly intervene in the functioning 
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of the electronic press... The adoption of a media law will not only bring a cease-fire, but 
also a sustainable real peace [into politics]' (Monori, 2005: 275).  
 
Having noted that the media situation of Hungary was at an impasse because of the 
absence of a new media law, one must ask why the passage of a new media law was so 
difficult. Was this simply attributable to different viewpoints of the government and the 
opposition in their perceptions of the role of the media? Conflicting opinions on media 
function may have been one important contributing factor to the stalemate, but it is 
arguable that this is too simplistic an account. Perhaps, a more plausible explanation lies in 
the reluctance of the Hungarian political elite to relinquish control over the media. This 
attitude was exemplified in December 1992 a few days before the voting of the draft of a 
new media law. The wording of the draft content was somewhat amended by the 
Parliamentary Constitutional Committee in favour of the Antall government. Having noted 
that the draft had been arbitarily altered, the AFD refused to take part in the vote, 
obstructing the passage of the new media law (Pataki, 1993: 19). This one example does 
not mean that the Hungarian media was always manipulated by political elites. However, 
given the situation of the time and the continuing practice evident even after the adoption 
of a new media law, it is certain that political control over public media remained an issue. 
Áron Monori captured this well:  
Although the 2002 socialist-liberal democratic government’s interventions in 
the media and the press reached neither the level[s] of the period of the 
previous media war, nor did the psychosis which had characterised that period, 
this government also showed that after the systemic change, political elites in 
Hungary were [still] incapable of relinquishing their influence over the press 
and the media [...] (Monori, 2005: 287). 
 
Thus, it can be argued that the birth of a new media law was indeed hindered by the 
negative attitude of the Hungarian political elite.  
 
Having examined the various factors which may have contributed to this issue, it is 
necessary to ascertain why Göncz persistently held fast to his view. Was Göncz’s 
persistence primarily related to his political attachment to the opposition, especially to the 
AFD, as members of the Antall government claimed? Given that the issue of media control 
was further protracted by the clashes between the vested interests of the Antall government 
and the opposition, if Göncz was subject to the influence of the opposition, it is likely that 
he acted favourably towards them. An article published in one of the official dailies of the 
HDF, Magyar Forum, highlightes this point, claiming that: 'During the four years of the 
HDF government, Göncz, [sought] an anti-democratic, counter-balancing role and actions 
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against the will of electorate, and in any case his refusal to sign [the Premier’s proposal] 
represented the [interest] of the AFD' (Varga, 1995). In contrast, judging from Göncz’s 
own explanation, his political affiliation with the opposition appears not to have been the 
principal reason for his objection to accepting the Premier’s decision. In an interview with 
a weekly political magazine, Göncz argued that he had his own principles for making a 
decision independently of party influences. Göncz said: 'To be honest, it never occured to 
me that party leadership tied me. I am a free man [and I am free to] have my own opinions 
which are not influenced by party membership. Rather I identify with the party which is 
closest to my own [beliefs]' (Rádai, 1990). Similarly, in another interview, Göncz 
reaffirmed the position, arguing that: 'Unless the President wants to committ political 
suicide, he is not allowed to attach himself to a party. The President’s main task is to 
ensure that daily political skirmishes do not influence the decisions [which] may affect the 
entire society' (Wisinger and László 2007: 330).  
 
Perhaps, given the positions of their different political orientations, one can expect that the 
governing party and Göncz would hold opposing stances. In the normal practice of 
politicians, Göncz’s account may be just empty political rhetoric. However, the 
independent critical thinking which was evident in numerous documents suggests that a 
plausible explanation of Göncz’s controversial role in the media issue could be found in his 
liberal and democratic political beliefs.177 Göncz made numerous statements on what he 
thought about the role of the media in a democratic state, but a letter he wrote to Antall is 
of particular relevance. On 6 November 1992, Göncz wrote:    
Dear Prime Minister, 
 
In March 1994, there will be an election in Hungary. Among several things, it 
is necessary to [ensure] that radio and television fully and genuinely mirror the 
opinions of society and impartially give information on the events and facts in 
the public interest. Public service radio and television belongs to neither the 
coalition government nor the opposition, but to the people [...] (Kurtán, Sándor 
and Vass, 1993: 200).   
 
This lends weight to the claim that Göncz was a free statesman capable of judging the 
media situation according to his political beliefs. Although Göncz did not state his position 
regarding the government’s media policy, he was clearly of the view that, without the 
guarantee of press freedom, the Hungarian population would be incapable of forming their 
views and judgements on important matters. Göncz above all stressed that public media 
ought to be free from any political interference, and be placed under the control of society. 
In an interview with Kossuth Radio, Göncz reaffirmed this position, stating that: 
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Television and radio is a commonly-owned, national treasure. It belongs to the 
nation. As the Hungarian army is a national institution, as the Court is a 
national institution which must be independent, the state media should be 
controlled by society, not by other political forces. These institutions must be 
protected from daily political skirmishes (Wisinger and László, 1994: 192).  
 
The extract above again highlights the fact that the significance of press freedom was 
entrenched in the fabric of Göncz’s political beliefs. As he had emphasised in a letter sent 
to Antall, Göncz consistently maintained that under no circumstances should the 
independence of public media be violated by any political influences. This still does not 
tell us what precisely the media situation of the time was. However, it is clear that Göncz 
had his own idea on the role of media that it ought to be placed under civilian control to 
present the general public of impartial information. Thus, Göncz’s determination to resist 
the government’s decision should be interpreted as stemming from his political beliefs, or 
conscience rather than his partisan role, as members of the Antall government had claimed. 
In response to my question - 'In circumstances in which you were not certain of whether 
your decision was right, on what grounds you did make a decision?' – Göncz reaffirmed 
this reasoning, stating that: 
Göncz: Not only myself, but also everyone in power was put in [the difficult 
situation] of avoiding advisors. There was the endless wave of advice. Advice 
also came from each opposing side...    
Kim: If the advice was conflicting, how did you make a decision? 
Göncz: It may sound very strange to you, but people have their [own] instincts. 
Göntér: Göncz often said that he could feel [where] the truth was.  
Kim: How? According to his political instinct? 
Göntér: Yes, instinct!  
Göncz: This was my political instinct!  
Göntér: This instinct came from his 70 years of experience. This was his 
subconsiousness [developed through his life], of what he had lived through, 
[important moments] which he decided and experienced and the essence of all 
of these [...].  
Kim: Was that his instinct and conscience? 
Göntér: His conscience and instinct! There was no doubt that Göncz always 
stood with poor and [socially] disadvantaged people. In a word, he never 
sought power [Szóval, soha nem volt hatalmi szempontja] [...]   
(Joint interview with Göncz and Göntér, 10 January 2008).  
 
In terms of the impact Göncz had on Hungarian politics, his proactive role in this issue was 
not always desirable. In a situation of political division where the Antall government and 
the opposition clashed through a series of transitional issues – as evidenced by the taxi-
drivers’ strike, the issue of the protection of Hungarian agriculture from foreign ownership 
and the question of settling accounts with the Communist past – the media issue certainly 
contributed to the widening of a political polarisation. In this process, Göncz rather than 
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remaining the passive figurehead that his ceremonial and nominal role might have 
suggested, intervened in the events, stating his position based on his own agenda. As has 
been argued in this chapter, Göncz acted according to his political beliefs, but the members 
of the government considered his presidential conduct as that of a party politician who had 
failed to position himself above party factionalism or who preferred to meddle in the 
government’s business. Thus, the leadership of the Antall government concluded that 
Göncz was not eligible for the Presidency and attempted to adopt a draft parliamentary 
resolution to impeach him (Magyar Hírlap, 26 May 1992). András Körösényi captured this 
historic process well, particularly with respect to what long-term impact Göncz’s proactive 
presidential role had on the shaping of power relations in Hungarian politics:  
Well, in the light of Göncz’s view, these issues – the laws on compensation and 
on justice and the appointment of the heads of public radio and television – 
were crucial to him. They were the issues which he and Antall came into 
conflict about, and this [further] exacerbated the clash between the HDF and 
the AFD... They were the key events of political polarisation... In the 
development of Hungarian politics, from the 1990s until now, these issues 
determined the formation of the left-wing and right-wing blocs or at least 
affected the move in this direction... Göncz played a significant role in this 
political process (Interview with Körösényi, 11 July 2007). 
 
Thus, had Göncz not stepped into the government’s business, a different image could have 
been formed of Hungary’s party system and its politics. Perhaps, the escalation of conflict 
and political division between the HDF and the AFD could have been less severe than it 
was. However, this does not necessarily mean that Göncz should have remained silent in 
these critical transitional issues. As the Constitution dictates, in monitoring the democratic 
functioning of state institutions involved, the President is given another important task to 
fulfil. As already discussed above, this was a legitimate constitutional right of the President 
and the question of activating this power depended on the President’s understanding of the 
existing situation, and whether he or she regarded it as a sign of threat to democracy. In the 
event that Göncz felt obliged to invoke this right in dealing with the issue of controlling the 
media, this suggests that Göncz in fact committed himself to his constitutional duties. 
Indeed, in a public statement, Göncz indicated that his decision not to sign Antall’s 
proposal was grounded in his understanding of the existing situation of the media and its 
possible consequences on democracy. Göncz stated that:    
I am pleased to hear that, above all, the Constitutional Court stated that the 
freedom to express an opinion and, the concept of press freedom, are 
organically intertwined with the independence of information free from the 
state, the government, the parties and any other political forces. By taking this 
[view], the Court made clear that in the absence of this [the independence of 
information], democracy is in grave danger which one must protect it. My 
decisions were led by this awareness [...].   
 154 
... The [government] attempted to dismiss this personnel [media heads] without 
putting equivalent [figures] in place, and [this] would have endangered the 
conditions for providing an entire, balanced and factual information, and thus 
directly would have brought about the serious disruption of democratic order. 
For this reason, I did not dismiss the head of radio [...] [Népszabadság, 9 June 
1992b, my emphasis]. 
 
It is therefore arguable that conviction originating from his liberal and democratic views 
was the principal reason for Göncz’s objection to accepting Antall’s decision concerning 
the dismissal of the heads of the broadcast media. In the absence of a new media law, 
Göncz may have regarded the removal of the heads of the broadcast media as an infraction 
of both freedom of information and freedom of the press, which could in turn jeopardise 
Hungary’s transformation into a democracy. It is appropriate to conclude this exploration 
of controlling broadcast media and Göncz’s controversial proactive role with Hankiss’s 
views regarding the nature of Hungary’s democracy and its implications: 
After 1989 we had to learn that democracy cannot be imported, it cannot be 
bought "off the peg". And, it is not brought about and established overnight by 
a first and single free election. It may be generated only in the course of a long 
and tedious learning process in which everybody has to take part and has to 
take up his or her responsibilities... The Media War may have shown many that 
there is no democracy without citizens acting with responsibility and, if 
necessary, civi[c] courage... The fact that two fragile public institutions [radio 
and television], which could rely only on the letter and spirit of the law, were 
able to protect their newly-won autonomy against extremely strong pressures 
and attacks coming from the side of the Government and the governing parties, 
proves that all the main political actors observed, at least until the last act, the 
rule of law and accepted the basic rules of the democratic game, including one 
of the most important rules or principles that, in a democracy, interests can be 
achieved only within the framework of laws and rules that have been accepted 
by the community [...] (Hankiss, 1996: 256-57). 
 
5.2.6. The Law on Radio Frequency Management (Frekvenciagazdálkodás) 
The next issue in which Göncz became involved concerned the 'No. LXII Law of 1993 on 
Radio Frequency Management' (hereafter, the Law of Radio Frequency). There was not an 
immediately apparent link between the adoption of this law and the protracted issue of 
control over the broadcast media. However, considering the timing of the passage of the 
law – it was adopted a couple of months after the heads of broadcast media resigned – it is 
unlikely that the Antall government enacted the Law on Radio Frequency without 
considering the stalemate media issue. If a connection between these two issues did exist, 
the government’s intransigence over placing the public media in independent hands would 
have been displayed in this case, too. Similarly, in terms of Göncz’s position, he would 
have tackled the law in the same way he had the issue of control over the broadcast media. 
Thus, over time, Göncz would sustain his consistent liberal and democratic position in so 
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far as media freedom was concerned. The present section examines the key aspects of the 
law and asks how it related to Göncz’s political values, it is argued that Göncz is indeed 
committed to a consistent liberal and democratic stance which is evident in all his dealings 
on issues of media freedom.  
 
On 27 April 1993, the Hungarian Parliament adopted the Law of Radio Frequency noting 
that:  
 3.§  b) The government’s task is to set the objective of long-term radio        
       frequency management and supervise the process [...].  
     c) The government’s task is to harmonise the distribution of [public]     
       radio frequencies [...].  
24. §   In a state of emergency, under martial law and [in the event] of a          
       natural disaster, with the authorisation of Parliament, the Minister    
       concerned can temporarily limit or suspend the use of radio   
       [frequencies] for its own [benefit] [...].178  
  
Central to the Law of Radio Frequency was the question of whether the extraordinary 
situation could be justified as a legitimate reason for the temporary restriction of radio 
frequencies. 'The management of radio frequencies is a state affair' was the official reason 
given by the government; however, Göncz, who questioned the constitutionality of the law, 
turned to the Constitutional Court (Szerető, 1993; Magyar Nemzet, 26 May 1993; 
Népszabadság, 26 May 1993), for the following reasons:  
The President expressed his concern about the law in relation to [two issues]: 
whether the law contains a basic guarantee to [uphold] the [principle] of the 
freedom of press and opinion; whether it contains [a stipulation] to prevent [a 
government] monopoly on information [...].179  
 
In addition, Göncz asked the Court whether the Law on Radio Frequency should be 
considered as a 'separate or special law', which required a two-thirds majority vote from 
MPs. Referring to Article 19/D of the Constitution, which specified that a two-thirds 
majority vote of MPs was required to declare a state of emergency, Göncz questioned 
whether the law fell within this special category (Halmai, 2004: 199-200). In response, on 
29 July 1993, the Constitutional Court ruled that the Radio Frequency Law was not 
unconstitutional.180   
 
However, the grounds on which the Court ruled that the law was constitutional are open to 
question. In response to Göncz’s questions, the Court presented a somewhat ambiguous, 
and contraditory ruling. For instance, in responding to the possibility of violation to the 
principle of media freedom, the Court ruled that public radio and television frequencies 
could be limited because both media presents a special case in relation to the principles of 
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press freedom and freedom of expression (Halmai, 2004: 200). However, this definition as 
a special case contradicted the Court’s second reasoning, which stated that the Law of 
Radio Frequency was not a special law, thus it did not require a two-thirds majority vote 
from MPs. 181  In its first legal interpretation, the special character or peculiarity 
(sajátosság) which public radio and television may have had was the legitimate reason for 
the possible limitation of the use of radio frequencies. Thus, it is possible to question the 
reason for the Radio Frequency Law, which also dealt with a special situation, not being 
approached in the same way. In principle, the same rationale – of significance or 
peculiarity - should have been applied to the Law on Radio Frequency.182  
 
In view of this, it is perhaps not surprising that Göncz had doubts about the 
constitutionality of the law. In the absence of a new comprehensive media law183 and more 
importantly, on the basis of his political beliefs he may have wished to clarify whether the 
adopted legislation could be harmonised with the Constitution. Göncz may not have 
objected to the enactment of the law itself, but before its introduction, he preferred to clear 
up any doubts about the law. Indeed, in one Hungarian daily, Göncz stated his opinion that 
the law (which could have had a far-reaching impact for other issues) ought to be 
thoroughly examined before its implementation. Göncz maintained that: 
[In terms of] economic, infrastructural development, broadcasting, national 
defence and security policy, it is an extremely important law. Special 
[attention] should be paid to this: during the enforcement of the law, such 
constitutional anxiety that could be addressed before its enforcement, should 
not be [raised] and, [yet] the law shall take effect as soon as possible (Magyar 
Nemzet, 26 May 1993).   
 
Göncz clearly identified the main problem with the law: according to its current legislative 
form, there was not only a legal deficiency but also, a critical time issue. Thus, in the form 
of his constitutional veto, Göncz expressed his view that a cautious approach would be 
appropriate and, preferable to "shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted". In fact, 
in an interview with Kossuth Radio, Göncz further detailed his thought on the way in 
which radio frequencies could be regulated. In essence, he argued that the law should have 
been examined in a framework which took account of the country’s transitional situation, 
lest other important issues and democratic principles be undermined:  
After all, due to the absence of a media law, the issue of uncertainty occurred... 
This law is interconnected with economic, military and human rights. For 
instance, the law limits the functioning of [radio] frequencies in circumstances 
[under] which the lives of citizens and property security are endangered and, 
under martial law or in a state of emergency. These are all delicate legal 
regulations which are also connected with other laws. I felt that, before its 
introduction, it would be much better to thoroughly examine the law which 
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may have had complicated and far reaching [consequences for other issues]. If 
I don’t ask for 'norm[ative] control' [from the Court], [I] have accepted the law 
which my conscience allows me to sign [...] (Wisinger and László, 2007: 283-
84). 
 
Thus it can be argued that Göncz’s use of the constitutional veto on the Radio Frequency 
Law was not an act intended to oppose the law itself but, an attempt to clarify the obscurity 
within it. Through the veto, Göncz sought to address the question of whether extraordinary 
situations could be used as legitimate grounds for the temporary suspension of radio 
frequencies. Though Göncz’s view was not supported by the Court’s ruling, this issue 
clearly highlights the consistent point that Göncz made a decision according to his own 
democratic principles. Moreover, given the way in which he dealt with the Law on Radio 
Frequency, it is fair to suggest that this issue was not isolated in time, but in fact it was a 
continuation of the issue of control over the media. This was not, however, the end of the 
issue of control over media, as it resurfaced in autumn 1993 in dealing with the foreign 
press, namely La Stampa.  
 
5.2.7. The La Stampa affair 
The event took place in November 1993 when Göncz held an informal discussion with 
foreign correspondents, from Reuters, the Financial Times and elsewhere (Wisinger and 
László, 2007: 308). Among them, the Italian newspaper, La Stampa wrote that the public 
media in Hungary had been placed in a serious situation, since the press was again subject 
to government censorship (Népszabadság, 22 November 1993; Új Magyarország, 25 
November 1993). In an article entitled - "[Dealing with] the media issue, the President asks 
for international help!" (Pesti Hírlap, 22 November 1993) - Tito Sansa reported that the 
freedom of Hungary’s public media was overshadowed by the right-wing government’s 
policies (Magyar Hírlap, 26 November 1993). The article infuriated the government and, 
in refuting the reporter’s allegations, the factional leaders of the governing party called for 
an explanation from Göncz (Magyar Hírlap, 23 November 1993). In a written response 
Göncz explained that the analysis presented in the La Stampa article was the journalist’s 
interpretation, albeit one partially based on his comments (Magyar Nemzet, 24 November 
1993; Népszabadság, 24 November 1993; Népszava, 24 November 1993). As it left room 
for various interpretations, Göncz’s explanation did not satisfy the conservative wing of the 
government members, among whom members of the extreme right wing party the 
Hungarian Justice and Life Party (HJLP) attempted to set up an examination committee in 
Parliament (Népszabadság, 24 November 1993). The HJLP reasoned that the establishment 
of an examination committee was required, since the President had denigrated the 
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country’s image by representing foreign interests (Népszabadság, 24 November 1993). On 
6 December 1993, voting took place but, the HJLP’s proposal was rejected (Magyar Hírlap, 
7 December 1993) with an absolute majority (48 yes, 159 no and 26 abstention).  
 
The key to comprehension of the La Stampa issue lay in whether Göncz’s comments 
reflected the true situation of Hungary’s public media. Under the circumstances where the 
issue of the control of the broadcast media was a point of ongoing contention, publication 
of Göncz’s comments on Hungary’s media situation in the foreign press was seen as 
significant. The main problem was, however, that in dealing with the foreign press, Göncz 
had once again clashed with the government. In a letter, the factional leader of the HDF, 
Imre Kónya, denounced the comments published in La Stampa which, he claimed, 
presented a false and distorted image which disparaged Hungary’s prestige (Magyar 
Hírlap, 23 November 1993). Moreover, having strongly disagreed with the subtitle of the 
La Stampa piece – "The President is also against the right-wing government: Europe helps 
us!" - Kónya asked for an explanation from Göncz. In response, Göncz stated that, 
although he did not agree with the given title, the article showed an aspect of the true 
situation of Hungary’s public media:      
My Dear Friends! 
 
The article in La Stampa was partial[ly] an interpretation [by] the journalist 
based on his assessment of the situation and partially [based on] my comments. 
The newswriter has the right to choose the title of an article independently of 
whether or not I agree with his summarised judgements [...].   
Cause and effect are not same, but they are interrelated. In my opinion, the 
article in La Stampa and any other similar foreign [publications] do not hurt the 
interest of the Hungarian government [any] more than those political processes 
[control over the public media], which have given risen to the opportunity to 
write this article [...] (Népszava, 24 November 1993).     
 
Göncz stressed that addressing the issue behind the La Stampa scandal was more important 
than entering into an attempt to clarify whether or not he had ever made such a provocative 
statement regarding the country’s media situation. Göncz’s reply (especially in terms of its 
consequence for his relationship with the Antall government) certainly would not have 
alleviated any of the existing tension between him and the government. Having disagreed 
with the title of article, Göncz could have asked for its correction, which in turn would 
have helped him dissociate himself from the piece and thus, to avoid some of his critics’ 
most pointed accusations and allegations.  
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Members of the HJLP have argued that Göncz’s allegiance to the AFD and the HSP was 
primarily responsible for his controversial stance on this issue (Magyar Hírlap, 7 
December 1993). They claimed that, in dealing with the media issue, Göncz constantly 
represented the interests of the opposition who disagreed with the government’s position 
on media freedom and, that this case was not exceptional. However, according to a 
political commentator, László Kéri, the La Stampa issue rather appeared to be a politically 
exaggerated scandal, which was not uncommon in the routine of Hungarian politics at the 
time: 
In Hungary, the government in power is always wary of what [the international 
press] such as Le Monde, the Times and the International Herald Tribune 
write... This is a common [phenomenon]... Generally, politicians ask reporters 
in advance what the headline will be, and sometimes such comments which 
were not made during the interview are highlighted [such as the headline]... I 
don’t think Göncz asked the journalist what the headline would be. But the 
governing party unreasonably overreacted to this. It was ridiculous (Interview 
with Kéri, 12 June 2007).   
 
Given that the issue of media control was ongoing, it may also have spilled over into the 
La Stampa affairs; it is thus probable that the governing party reacted disproportionately. 
Otherwise, as Kéri proposes, some excerpts of the article were not derived from the 
interview upon which the piece was supposedly based. Göncz, however, did not take any 
action with regard to requesting clarification from Sansa or La Stampa. In response to a 
reporter’s question – 'On the basis of interview given to the Italian newspaper, [criticism] 
is again mounting against you. What is your opinion on this matter?' – as Göncz stated: 
It would be a lie if I say that I was pleased with [this scandal]... In the case of 
the La Stampa article, it’s a [matter] of interpretation... The journalist 
mention[ed] an event about which he had never spoken about [during our talk]. 
But, how he interprets my words, this [depends on] what one’s impression is... 
There is nothing more ridiculous than asking for redress, only because 
someone has a different impression. If fact is written incorrectly, it may be 
possible to request redress. But, this is not the practice of international press 
either... Because of [different] impressions and evaluations, asking for redress 
is almost inconceivable in the [maintenance] of international relations. I kept 
the transcript of the talk and the tapes, but I consider that using these would be 
entirely useless. This is not my issue, but La Stampa’s (Wisinger and László, 
2007: 307-08).  
 
The extract above underscores a consistent aspect of Göncz’s political beliefs; that media 
should be free from any political and personal interference. According to Göncz, all 
influences should be minimised in the interests of freedom of expression and of the press. 
Göncz clearly understood international practice and norms as well as written or unwritten 
rules regarding journalism. Following this line of thought, Göncz certainly made a decision 
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based on his own judgement, even if he did not agree with the entire reportage. Göncz 
stressed that in a democracy, the value of pluralism, including the rights to express 
opinions and to make arguments and counter-arguments, ought to be guaranteed, even if 
such views could be reflected differently from an individual’s standpoint. Thus, it is fair to 
suggest that Göncz dealt with the La Stampa affair, as he had previously tackled the issues 
of the media – the control of the broadcast media and the Law of Radio Frequency. As 
Göncz publicly made clear, he may indeed have endeavoured to keep his presidential oath 
as prescribed by the Constitution or stood by his own democratic principles. Göncz stated:  
Concerning the [role] of the President, the Constitution dictates that the head of 
state [shall] express the unity of the nation and safeguard the democratic 
functioning of state institutions. This means that the head of state neither 
represents [the interests] of the opposition nor [those] of the coalition 
government, but the common interest... Among the rights of freedom, the 
freedom of expression is given particular prominence, [as] the Constitution 
states that the Republic of Hungary acknowledges and protects the freedom of 
the press [...].  
At present, radio, television and electronic news agencies belong exclusively to 
the state; it is extremely important to [ensure] that the Hungarian population is 
informed of objective and multi-faceted opinions and counter-opinions. It is 
important to ensure that people themselves establish facts and different views 
and form their own political opinions. Without this [the freedom of the press], 
free elections with different political forces and the smooth functioning of the 
democratic order is inconceivable. Without this, citizens cannot be informed of 
contradictory statements and would not have a chance to discover the 
standpoints of various parties, interest groups and any other political [forces] in 
state affairs [...] (Magyar Nemzet, 2 July 1992). 
 
In light of this statement, it can be conclusively argued that when dealing with the issue of  
the media, Göncz pursued his democratic and liberal principle that freedom of the press 
and the freedom of expression must be firmly guaranteed, independently of political and 
personal influence. In Göncz’s terms, among the presidential tasks to be fulfilled, he may 
have considered that 'freedom of the press to be of the utmost significance' (Magyar Hírlap, 
2 November 1993). However, the proactive presidential role he undertook on this issue and 
that of dealing with the Communist past was not favourably received by the government, 
and this prompted the occurrence of a major political scandal on the 36th anniversary of 
the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. 
 
5.2.8. Göncz’s interrupted speech 
On 23 October 1992, Göncz was to deliver his annual memorial speech at Kossuth Square. 
However, Göncz received a frosty reception from a dozen of young extremists wearing 
Hungarian Nazi uniforms and demanding Göncz’s resignation (Miszlivetz, 1995: 115), and, 
was unexpectedly heckled by a group of the '56 veterans and, as a result, Göncz left the 
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podium without saying a word (Magyar Nemzet, 4 August 2000). The group of '56 
veterans hissed and booed Göncz, because they disapproved of his decision not to sign 
some of the proposed laws dealing with the Communist past (Debreczeni, 2003: 308).184 
However, a difference of opinions existed as to whether the young extremists had been 
brought to the national ceremony in the expectation that they might stir up a negative 
atmosphere. The opposition suspected the incident was organised, whereas the government 
saw it as a spontaneous event. The Minister of the Interior, Péter Boross, who was in 
charge of security at the time, claimed that Göncz made a mistake, because if he had 
commenced his speech, the heckling might have ceased (Papp, 2002; Stefka, 2000). He 
also claimed that the police did not intervene in the incident because there were no signs of 
a threat to the President’s security (Beszélő, 3 July 1993; 168Óra, 6 July 1993). In contrast, 
the opposition considered the incident as a serious security breach (Dornbach, 1992), 
questioning whether Boross had received prior warning of the incident. Ultimately, in an 
attempt to clarify the confused situation, the opposition suggested that a special 
examination committee be set up at parliamentary level (Magyar Hírlap, 29 October 1992; 
Népszabadság, 26 october 1992). However, the proposal was challenged by the Antall 
government who considered that the case should be closed off with an amendment of the 
criminal law dealing with the symbols of autocracy (Fowkes, 1999: 28; Magyar Hírlap, 27 
October 1992). With no agreement reached, half of the examination committee (whose 
membership was primarily composed of opposition and independent MPs) was established 
(168Óra, 6 July 1993; Somos, 1994). The Committee’s report suggested that this issue has 
not yet been clarified and was unresolved.  
 
In the plenum, the Prime Minister, József Antall, stated that he regretted the occurrence of 
the incident, yet he strongly denied any allegations of the government’s involvement 
(Magyar Dokumentáció, October 1992; Magyar Hírlap, 27 October 1992; Magyar Nemzet, 
26, 27 October 1992). This contradicted the opposition, who felt that the possibility of the 
government’s direct and indirect support for the incident could not be excluded. In 
response to Antall’s comments, the president of the AFD, Péter Tölgyessy, questioned 
whether the police and other responsible security agencies had dealt with the security issue 
appropriately. Referring to a previous incident which had occurred to the Prime Minister as 
an example – on 15 March 1990, Antall’s speech was interrupted by crowds of young 
people, but police acted promptly to remove them - Tölgyessy was suspicious of the fact 
that similar action had not been taken to protect the President (Magyar Hírlap, 27 October 
1992). For the opposition the inconsistent security approach towards the Prime Minister 
and the President may have led them to question whether political pressure had affected the 
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case. For the government, however, the matter may have been deemed as one for the 
Minister of Interior to resolve.  
 
While both accounts sound convincing, evidence discovered in the Hungarian press 
highlights the fact that the police knew about the extremist rally in advance. According to 
this information, the police waited for the extremists who traveled to Budapest from the 
countryside at the Eastern Railway Station.185 On arrival, the police confiscated their 
weapons and escored them to the head office of the Association of the Hungarian Political 
Prisoners, and later to Kossuth Square (Beszélő, 3 July 1993; 168Óra, 6 July 1993; 
Népszabadság, 30 October 1992). However, this does not prove that their aim was to 
hinder the President’s speech. Under police supervision, the extremists could have 
marched as they had planned. Since the Law of Assembly in effect at the time did not 
specify any provisions for the exclusion of simultaneity (Kilényi and Lamm, 1990: 60-
62),186 in principle, two different programmes could take place together. In view of this, 
there seemed to be no direct connection indicating that the event was organised by the 
government. Rather, it is more likely that the incident was an accident. The report of the 
Chief Prosecutor nonetheless suggests that a connection between the government’s 
instruction and the actions of the police cannot be ruled out entirely: 
There was a [scenario] whereby the police would hold back the skinheads who 
were arriving at the Eastern Railway Station until 9 [pm]. But the police did 
not find a legitimate reason to detain them... The fact is that János Bodrácska 
[the Chief of Budapest Police] ordered that the police stop the skinheads from 
[marching] to Kossuth Square, [but] the execution [of this order] was 
unsuccessful (Tódor, 1997). 
 
According to this report, Bodrácska’s decision appears to have been superseded by an 
order which may have come from his superior. Otherwise, miscommunication between 
police units may be responsible for the incident. Since the full report of the Chief 
Prosecutor is not accessible to research (Tódor, 1997),187 a conclusion cannot be drawn. It 
is only clear that this incident further escalated tension between Antall and Göncz and their 
political camps. As Mécs contended, due to the embittered relationship between them, it is 
possible that 'the government may have wished to [teach] a lesson to the intractable 
President' (Wisinger and László, 2007: 100) who refused to play a rubber-stamping role in 
dealing with state affairs. On the other hand, it could have been only a simple incident 
which was then politically exaggerated. As László Kéri neatly asserted: 
I don’t think the event was organised by Boross. It was an exaggeration of the 
HSP and the AFD claiming that Boross organised the entire thing. This is not 
true... Perhaps, Boross knew this would become a scandal but he didn’t want to 
prevent it... It wouldn’t be a big problem even if there was a small scandal... 
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The Government’s position at the time was Göncz got what he deserved. The 
opposition’s position was Göncz was a victim of the government’s conspiracy 
[...] (Interview with Kéri, 12 June 2007). 
 
Whether the incident was organised or not, the question arises as to why Göncz did not 
give his speech. According to the official account offered by the President’s Office, Göncz 
was incapable of commencing his speech, due to the loud noise from the crowds 
(Népszabadság, 28 October 1992). This, however, does not mean that Göncz was placed in 
a situation in which he should give up on his speech altogether. As other instances had 
shown, in even more hostile circumstances, politicians had been able to make speeches. 
For example, the former President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel completed a 
speech even faced by an egg-throwing reception by nationalist students (Népszabadság, 27 
October 1992). Following Havel’s example, Göncz could have begun his speech, although 
one cannot assume that they would have behaved in the same way under the same context. 
Therefore, it is necessary to look into other possible explanatory factors that might have 
contributed to Göncz’s decision not to give a speech.   
 
An article published in one Hungarian daily indicated that the psychological effect of 
heckling may have been one factor in Göncz’s failure to even begin his speech. Göncz was 
expected to attend an evening programme after delivering the memorial speech at Kossuth 
Square (Pesti Hírlap, 26 October 1992). For a state ceremony, along with the Prime 
Minister and the Speaker of the House, Göncz should have appeared at the National Opera 
House. The fact is, however, that despite the request of the Prime Minister (Pesti Hirlap, 
26 October 1992), Göncz did not attend the evening programme, which is indicative of the 
fact that the incident that took place at Kossuth Square had affected him. Having 
encountered an unsympathetic reception from the crowds he was somehow emotionally 
offended, and this may have led him not to participate in the evening programme. His 
feeling of frustration or anger may have been expressed in the form of protest by his 
absence from the Opera House. Gabriella Ilonszki aptly captured the way in which 
Göncz’s character had been put on view: 
I think this was exemplary, demonstrating Göncz’s faith in the role of the 
President. In my opinion, Göncz was basically a civil democrat who did not let 
himself drift into the defenceless position that political opponents or the 
extreme right-wing groups had envisaged, nor did he play fast and loose with 
them. He showed an example of civil courage of how he would behave towards, 
and treat, such people whom he didn’t consider as political partners (Interview 
with Ilonszki, 16 October 2007). 
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Göncz may have understood that in a democracy, everyone has the right to express their 
opinion. However, in circumstance where he did not approve of the disorderly behaviour 
of some extremists, he may have wished to send a message about his disturbed feeling. As 
conventional wisdom teaches, "silence can speak volumes".  
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the main characteristics of Göncz’s first 
Presidency and, to critically assess the stances and decisions that he undertook during this 
period. As a whole, the research presented in this chapter has confirmed the general belief 
established in the academic literature that the style of Göncz’s first Presidency was indeed 
proactive, controversial and riddled with conflict with the Antall government. However, 
contrary to the general assessment made by members of the Antall government and other 
critics, the research presented in this chapter has led to the conclusion that Göncz’s 
activities were neither influenced by the instruction of particular parties nor his affiliation 
with them. Rather, at the core of his decision-making, Göncz sought his own democratic, 
liberal values and political principles and they were well embodied by his Presidency. In 
particular, four democratic elements entrenched in the fabric of his political values were 
highlighted: a consensus-based democracy, the rule of law, the principle of equality, and 
the freedom of expression and press freedom. Depending on the context, the significance 
of these values were variously manifested and stressed by Göncz. However, he stated his 
firm position that, in so far as these democratic values were concerned, he would not 
simply act as the passive symbolic figurehead which his ceremonial and nominal role 
might have suggested. With this in mind, the following chapter further examines the 
continuity and discontinuity of Göncz’s democratic and liberal values in evidence during 
the second term of his Presidency. The chapter ultimately asks what Göncz sought to 
achieve during a decade as President and, to explore the implications of his actions and 
outlook for the development of post-Communist Hungarian politics.  
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Chapter 6. The second Presidency (1995-2000) 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the main characteristics of Göncz’s second Presidency (1995-2000). 
In the previous chapter, it was established that the decisions and actions that Göncz took 
during his first Presidency were far from uncontroversial, but in fact his presidential style 
was proactive and contributed significantly to the development of Hungary’s post-
Communist democracy. With this in mind, the present chapter further assesses Göncz’s 
actions and the role he played for the consolidation of post-Communist democracy during 
his second presidential term.  
 
Some of the existing Hungarian literature suggests that compared to the proactive and 
controversial style that Göncz exhibited during the first term of his Presidency, during his 
second presidential term he was, in contrast, largely passive and insignificant (analysis is 
presented in detail in Section 6.1). Moreover, it has been suggested that, one of the main 
reasons for this changed presidential style lay in the specific political context in which 
Göncz and his party - the AFD - were positioned. During Göncz’s first Presidency, the 
AFD was an opposition party and, as such, Göncz’s political attachment to the party meant 
that he fulfilled the role of counter-balance to the Antall government. In contrast, during 
Göncz’s second Presidency, the AFD was a member of the coalition government; Göncz’s 
oppositional role was reduced accordingly. This account is, however, limited as a 
justification for the evident transformation in Göncz’s role and influence. As has been 
argued in the previous chapter, Göncz’s proactive presidential role was not an outcome 
which had been shaped according to adherence to a particular party’s influence but rather 
lay in Göncz’s pursuit of liberal and democratic political beliefs. Furthermore, as will be 
discussed in Section 6.1 of the chapter, Göncz’s political affiliation does not explain his 
passive presidential style as evidenced during the final two years of his Presidency. This 
was the time when the conservative Orbán government was in power and the AFD was in 
opposition. Had Göncz sought to give expression to his partisanship, he should have taken 
a position which counter-balanced the Orbán government and their political agenda.  
 
This chapter therefore addresses a gap in the literature on Göncz’s political style and 
motivations by exploring the other factors which informed his political evolution. It is 
posited that the deterioration of Göncz’s mental and physical strength, the changing role of 
the Constitutional Court and the nature of Hungary’s democracy are all contributory 
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factors which must duly be considered if the last years of Göncz’s Presidency are to be 
understood fully.  
 
The first section of the chapter presents an overview of the main features and style of each 
encumbent government along with their relationship with Göncz. This lays the essential 
foundation for understanding the President’s relationship with the government of the time. 
The next section examines a set of issues and events in which Göncz became involved 
during his second presidential term. This section will question whether Göncz sought to 
pursue his liberal principled line, independently of governmental change. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is devoted to an examination of the factors which contributed 
to Göncz’s diminished political activities. This follows Göncz’s own views, thoughts 
regarding and reflections on his experience of serving as the first post-Communist 
President of Hungary and concludes the chapter.  
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6.1. Government in transition: The Horn and Orbán governments 
The parliamentary elections of 1994 and 1998 resulted in the establishment of two 
ideologically contrasting governments: the socialists (HSP) led by Gyula Horn, and the 
conservatives (AYD) led by Viktor Orbán. In 1994 the HSP secured a large majority in 
Parliament (209/386 seats, 54.1%) and could have formed its own government. Despite 
this advantage, it has been suggested that the socialists preferred to introduce 'consensual 
elements' into the decision-making processes (Ágh, 2001c: 480). This was evidenced, 
above all, by the formation of a coalition government with the former anti-Communist 
party, the AFD (Morlang, 2003: 75). During negotiations, a rift within the AFD’s party 
leadership led to the departure of the party’s former chairman, Péter Tölgyessy (Romsics, 
2007: 436) however, the power-sharing scheme eventually came to fruition.188 Similarly, 
the Horn government widened channels through which the opposition could participate in 
the decision-making process. In the composition of a draft of new Constitution, for 
example, a two-thirds majority vote which the HSP-AFD coalition government secured 
was sufficient to pass it. But the coalition government voluntarily increased the quorum 
from a two-thirds to a four-fifths majority (Halmai, 1998: 195), which is highly indicative 
of the fact that there was an attempt to create the conditions in which a wider consensus 
among the opposition parties could be reached. Additionally, and perhaps more 
importantly, the socialist leadership made a conciliatory or consensus-seeking gesture 
towards the President. As has been examined in Chapter 5, the President’s relationship 
with the Antall government was characterised by conflicts. In this hostile political 
atmosphere, consensus-based decision making between the Prime Minister and the 
President was hardly sought, not to mention that informal meetings which might have 
helped to alleviate these tension never took place. 189  In contrast, during the Horn 
government, Monday breakfast meetings were arranged on a regular basis between the 
Speaker of the House and the Prime Minister and the President (Babus, 2000; Népszava, 29 
June 2010). Thus, there was a substantial change in the style of governance. Endre Babus 
recalled that:  
The socialist-liberal government was committed to the idea of a consensus-
based democracy. They commanded a 71 % majority [of seats] in Parliament. 
They could have adopted the new Constitution by themselves. But, they 
voluntarily constrained their power. They made and kept a promise that they 
would adopt a new Constitution with at least a five party consensus out of six 
parliamentary parties (Interview with Babus, 19 May 2007).  
 
Thus, had the socialist-liberal government sought to maximise their majoritarian rule in the 
decision-making process,190 this could have led to a so-called 'constitutional dictatorship' 
(Arato, 1994: 7). However, the actual style of governance that they chose demonstrated 
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that, at least, they made a consensus-seeking gesture toward the opposition and the 
President.  
 
In contrast, the Orbán government established a stronger, power-concentrated institutional 
structure. At the centre, the Office of Prime Minister (OPM) became the key institution, 
which not only operated as an assistant body to the Prime Minister, but also had a strong 
decision-making function. For instance, during the Antall and Horn governments, cabinet 
meetings were convened as a forum where ministers were able to express their opinions 
and offer solutions to various matters. The cabinet’s political significance was diminished, 
since these meetings became a forum for the formalisation of decisions which had already 
been taken in the OPM (Körösényi, 2006: 30). In some respects, the opposition’s exclusion 
from the decision-making process is hardly surprising; a simple majority was primarily 
sought for the passage of new legislation.191 Indeed, according to Fricz, the government 
preferred to 'limit negotiati[ons] with opposition parties [on] questions in need of 
consensus' (Fricz, 2001: 543), even though some cases required a two-thirds majority. This 
tendency was evident in the passage of the Law on Organised Crime, the so-called 'Anti-
Mafia Package' (will be discussed in Section 6.2.5) and, more strikingly, in the introduction 
of new rules for the House (Bozóki, 2008: 215). Hitherto, a plenum had been held on a 
weekly basis. According to the new rules introduced in February 1999, the plenum in 
Parliament was to be held once every three weeks (Csuhaj and Kéri, 1998). As Körösényi 
and Kiss have noted, the plenum was a forum for open criticism of government policy by 
the opposition, and a chance for non-governing parties to offer their own alternatives 
(Körösényi, 1999: 236; Kiss, 2002: 746); a reduction in the frequency of plenary sessions 
demonstrates the manner in which the Orbán government approached the opposition at the 
time. Indeed, having grown discontent with this approach, the opposition turned to the 
Constitutional Court, asking whether the changes made to the Rule of the House 
contravened the Constitution (East European Constitutional Review, 1999, hereafter 
EECR). In response, the Court ruled that the Rules of the House 'did not provide adequate 
guidance for the planning of regular parliamentary sessions' (EECR, 1999 Summer), since 
the legislature had failed to include relevant regulations in the guideline. Thus, the Court 
instructed Parliament to pass new rules no later than 15 December 1999 but, the Orbán 
government proceeded as planned, claiming that the new rule of plenum 'had not been 
changed but simply re-interpreted' (Ágh, 2001a: 103). 
 
Thus, as Ágh contended, the structure of power concentration embedded in the decision-
making process and 'exclusive' approach towards the opposition and other political forces 
 169 
adopted by the Orbán government established a Hungarian style of 'quasi-majoritarian 
democracy' (Ágh, 2001a: 105; 2001b: 170-73) or the beginning of 'Presidentialisation' of 
Hungary’s parliamentarianism (Körösényi, 2006: 31).192    
 
In terms of both governments’ relationship with the President, the different styles of 
governance pursued by Horn and Orbán raise the following questions: how did these 
specific governing styles affect the character of Göncz’s second Presidency? Is there any 
causal relationship between the change of government and of Göncz’s presidential style? 
During the first term of his Presidency, Göncz’s desire for democratic, consensus-based 
decision making was clearly evidenced in his approach towards the question of the 
Communist past and the taxi-drivers’ strike. With this in mind, one would expect the Horn 
government, with its desire for consensus-based decision-making, to find a natural ally in 
Göncz. In contrast, the governing style of the Orbán government might have been expected 
to come into conflict with Göncz’s political beliefs. Thus, one might expect that Göncz’s 
presidential style would be marked by an adaptive or harmonious relationship with the 
Horn government, and conflict with its successor. Indeed, having noted the difference in 
Göncz’s approach towards these successive governments, critics argued that there was a 
link between governmental change and Göncz’s presidential style. The political editor of 
the Hungarian political weekly, Élet és Irodalom, Eszter Rádai noted: 
It is true that during the first term of his Presidency, Göncz took an 
oppositional role [to] the Antall government. [In contrast], during his second 
presidential term, Göncz visibly adapted himself to the Horn government. He 
did not do anything which went against the government […] (Interview with 
Rádai, 11 October 2007). 
 
Similarly, Szilvia Varró stated that:  
In the beginning, [perhaps] from the taxi-drivers’ strike onwards, Göncz was 
full of character. During the Antall government, he was very active… But in 
my memory, there was no single issue on which he stood against Gyula Horn. 
At least, it looked like this in public. Göncz liked Horn and he tended towards 
the left liberal [camp] during his second Presidency (Interview with Varró, 15 
August 2007).  
 
Both commentators emphasised that there was a difference between Göncz’s presidential 
style in the first and second terms of his Presidency; in contrast to his first Presidency, 
Göncz’s generated a less active - or more passive style - during the latter term, and his 
leniency towards the Horn government was very apparent. Moreover, according to these 
opinions, the main reason for this change of presidential style lay in Göncz’s political 
attachment to the socialist-liberal camp. Other relevant academic literature explaining 
Göncz’s presidential style has been cross-checked with these commentators’ accounts. 
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According to quantitative evidence and qualitative assessments presented by some political 
scientists (Körösényi, Tóth and Török), when compared to his first five years in office, the 
activities that Göncz undertook and style that he preferred during his second presidential 
term were more passive or weaker than those which characterised his first term.  
Table 3: Göncz’s political activities between 1990 and 2000 
                                            
             Governments in power 
 
 
Göncz’s activities 
1990-1994 
[Conservative 
coalition 
government led 
by Antall] 
1994-1998 
[Socialist-
liberal coalition 
government led 
by Horn] 
1998-2000 
*[Conservative 
coalition 
government led 
by Orbán] 
Speeches in parliament 22 4 2 
Representing Hungary abroad (the 
number of state visits, days spent abroad) 
49 (215) 79 (273) 35 (119) 
Concluding international [treaties] 1 - - 
Initiating referenda - - - 
Proposing independent legislation 5 - - 
Initiating an extraordinary parliamentary 
session 
- - - 
Participating in parliamentary sessions 71 15 12 
Veto of legislation on constitutional 
grounds 
7 - 1 
Veto of legislation on political grounds - 2 - 
*Note: The Orbán government lasted from 1998 to 2002. However, since Göncz’s presidential term 
came to an end in August 2000, the table has been adapted to his presidential term. Adapted from:  
(Körösenyi, Tóth and Török, 2003: 569). 
 
The above table illustrates that the amount of political activity Göncz undertook during the 
governments which followed the Antall government reduced considerably. Foreign policy 
was the only exception to this pattern, where Göncz’s representative and ceremonial role 
increased. Generally, however, his activities on the domestic political stance diminished 
noticeably. It might also suggest that Göncz’s Presidency can be largely divided into two 
contrasting presidential terms: a proactive and relatively strong Presidency during the 
Antall government; and a less active, acquiescent and weaker Presidency during the other 
governments. Indeed, in their qualitative assessment, Körösényi, Tóth and Törok came to 
this conclusion with regard to Göncz’s presidential style. 
Table 4: Government in transition and Göncz’s political role 
  1990-1994 
[The Antall 
government] 
1994-1998 
[The Horn 
government] 
1998-2000 
[The Orbán 
government] 
Parliamentary parties which voted 
for the President 
AFD (HDF) HSP, AFD HSP, AFD 
The political orientation of the 
parliamentary majority 
Right-wing 
(HDF-ISP-CDPP) 
Left-wing 
(HSP-AFD) 
Right-wing 
(AYD-ISP-HDF) 
The relationship between the 
President and the parliamentary 
majority [in terms of] political 
orientation 
 
Oppositional or 
contrasting 
 
Harmonious 
 
Oppositional or 
contrasting 
The President’s perception of his 
role 
Counter-balance Symbolic or 
supportive 
Symbolic 
Political conflicts between the 
President and government 
Frequent Minimal Rare 
The President’s political activities, 
his intervention in day to day 
 
Significant 
 
Diminished 
 
Diminished 
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politics 
The political weight of the President Intermediate-strong Weak Weak 
Adapted from (Körösényi, Tóth and Török, 2003: 571). 
 
Inferring from the table above, if one can divide Göncz’s presidential style according to 
two contrasting sets of criteria – proactive and strong versus passive and weak presidencies 
– what explains Göncz’s changed perception of the presidential role? In their conclusion, 
Körösényi, Tóth and Török suggest that one of the key factors of Göncz’s altered 
presidential style could be found in the particular political structure, from which the 
President originated. Given Göncz’s political origins from within the AFD - the largest 
opposition party during the Antall government - they argued that his political affiliation to 
the party led him to undertake an oppositional role during his first Presidency (Körösényi, 
Tóth and Törok, 2003: 565). In contrast, during the Horn government where his party was 
a coalition member, Göncz would not and did not undertake a counter-balancing role. This 
account, however, has limited justification. Given that during the Orbán government, the 
AFD was once again positioned on the opposition side, in principle, Göncz should have 
undertaken a counter-weight role. Yet, as Table 4 demonstrates, Göncz did not seek an 
oppositional role to the Orbán government, and instead maintained a symbolic and 
conflict-averse presidential style.  
 
Indeed, opinions offered by my interviewees highlight the fact that Göncz did not come 
into confrontation with the Orbán government. László Kéri characterised Göncz’s 
relationship with the Orbán government thus:     
Orbán knew where the threshold of constitutional power was. He always went 
to the boundary, but he did not do things which could have offered Göncz any 
opportunity to protest.… He left Göncz in peace and did not seek to enter into 
conflicts with him […] (Interview with Kéri, 12 June 2007). 
 
With a different focus, but a similar view, a former advisor to Orbán and the Minister 
of the OPM, István Stumpf held the opinion that: 
Orbán did not come into conflict with Göncz. I do not remember concrete 
examples which could have aggravated their relationship. Politically, they had 
different priorities [with regard] to representation. Göncz was a popular and 
liberal figurehead who preferred to bring his Presidency close to the people. He 
wanted to speak to people directly with openness. Orbán had a different 
perception of the roles of the President and the Premier, [a perception] which 
was much closer to a traditional concept. The head of state should not 
condescend to people but show a vision of the future and the direction of the 
country… Orbán had a different vision of what the President should be… But 
Göncz was not in conflict with him (Interview with Stumpf, 3 July 2007). 
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In view of these statements, it is certain that Göncz’s political attachment to the AFD alone 
does not sufficiently explain the evident transformation in his presidential style. Moreover, 
it can be fairly suggested that there were other important factors responsible for Göncz’s 
changed conception of the presidential role. Detailed analysis of this is presented in 
Section 6.3 of the chapter but before embarking on this task, the following section of the 
chapter examines a set of events and issues in which Göncz became involved during the 
second term of his Presidency. The section will question the consistency of Göncz’s 
actions with reference to understandings of Göncz’s democratic and liberal views that have 
been set out in the framework of this thesis.
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6.2. The pursuit of democratic values: the principle of equality and consensus-based 
decision making 
The Hungarian Constitution does not specify any clause for the President’s role with 
regard to economic policy. More precisely, economic policy does not fall within 
presidential competences. Despite the absence of this constitutional right, members of the 
opposition to the Horn goverment - the AYD, CDPP and HDF – urged Göncz’s 
intervention on economic issues. Their request, however, was rejected and, subsequently, 
Göncz’s acquiescence on the matter became a political scandal. This issue is not directly 
related to that of Göncz’s liberal and democratic ideas. Nevertheless, it is worth examining 
as it demonstrates well how Göncz’s sense of social consciousness was reflected in his 
presidential activities.      
 
6.2.1. Dealing with the economic stabilisation programme 
A month after the adoption of the economic stabilisation programme, Göncz stated his 
position:  
Let’s put an end to misery and create social security so that everyone knows 
what is going to happen tomorrow. [People] in the country wish to live without 
shock (Magyar Nemzet, 3 April 1995).  
 
On 12 March 1995, the Horn government made a sudden announcement that they would 
adopt an economic austerity programme, the so-called 'Bokros Package' (named after the 
Minister of Finance, Lajos Bokros) (Bak, 1995; Népszabadság, 13 March 1995). Horn 
argued that, without such drastic action, the country’s economy would soon become 
unmanageable (Magyar Nemzet, 13 March 1995), the government claimed this package 
was the only way to resolve Hungary’s economic crisis (Andor, 1998). Horn said: 'This 
country faces state bankruptcy with a $20 billion foreign debt. It needs foreign resources to 
pay its debts, boost growth and catch up. These foreign resources can be obtained if our 
affairs are put in order' (Fowkes, 1999: 156). 
 
Aiming to restore financial equilibrium to the prevailing situation and to the state budget 
(Adam, 1999: 61-64; Morlang, 2003: 78), specific approaches were formulated within this 
stringent programme. Among these, the most controversial measure directly affecting the 
general public was the radical retrenchment of state expenditure on social support and 
welfare benefits (EECR, 1995 Spring). In accordance with this package, for example, the 
government’s budgetary outlay for child-care and family benefits was to be suspended 
(Népszabadság, 13 March 1995), along with the introduction of tuition fees in higher 
education (Magyar Hírlap, 13 March 1995).   
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Not surprisingly, this drastic action prompted an immediate reaction from not only 
parliamentary parties, but also the general public and, Göncz himself. The general public, 
infuriated by the government’s announcement, took to the street to protest against the 
austerity programme and Lajos Bokros (Magyar Hírlap, 23 March 1995; Népszava, 14 
June 1995). Having faced such strong resistance, debate over the implementation of the 
programme continued in Parliament; among the opposition members, the AYD and the 
HDF asked Göncz not to commit his signature to the programme (Magyar Hírlap, 1 June 
1995; Magyar Nemzet, 3 June 1995; Népszava, 3 June 1995). However, on 13 June 1995, 
Göncz signed the Bokros package into law (Magyar Hírlap, 14 June 1995), reasoning that 
'the question of economic policy did not belong to his competences' (Varró, 2000). 
Frustrated, the dissenting members of Parliament - AYD, the HDF and other social 
organisations - turned to the Constitutional Court (Magyar Nemzet, 14 June 1995a), asking 
for a ruling on whether the package violated the Constitution. The Court ruled that in 
several areas the package was unconstitutionaland, would have to be amended 
accordingly.193 Despite the constitutional amendment which restricted the programme’s 
scope, public discontent grew. In the face of severe criticism, Lajos Bokros resigned in the 
early spring of 1996 and was replaced by Péter Medgyessy (Adam, 1999: 63). The new 
Finance Minister, however, continued the implementation of the stabilisation programme, 
and from the second half of 1996, the financial disequilibrium of Hungary’s economy was 
turned around and an economic recovery began (Bozóki, 2003: 428; Marer, 1999: 185). 
 
The opposition’s main criticism of Göncz’s role in dealing with the Bokros package was 
that he put his own self-interest above important socio-economic issues (Magyar Nemzet, 1 
June 1995). Reasoning that Göncz’s re-election (which was due at the end of June in the 
the same year) would depend on the votes of the socialist-liberal coalition government, 
which comprised an absolute majority in Parliament at the time (71%), the opposition 
claimed that Göncz’s signing of the Bokros package was directly related to his hope for 
victory in the presidential election.194 For example, in response to Göncz’s signing the 
package, an MP of the AYD, Lajos Kosa, claimed: 'In a difficult situation, Göncz had to 
decide [whether he would sign the package or not] because, the next Monday, the 
presidential election was to be held in Parliament. Since the coalition government has an 
absolute majority, obviously Göncz had to weight up the pros and cons' (Magyar Nemzet, 
14 June 1995b). However, if re-election was the sole reason for Göncz’s signature on the 
package, it is unreasonable to suggest that Göncz (who had pledged his commitment to the 
protection of people in need) was willing to accept such harsh economic measures without 
any hesitation whatever. In his inauguration speech, Göncz pledged that: 
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I have had the good fortune to share in the real lives of workers, peasants and 
of the free intelligentsia. I am therefore not the man to hammer away at narrow 
class interests. If I want to serve a particular group, it must be those who are 
not served by anyone: the unprotected, the defenceless... and those unable to 
compete in a competitive society, those who lack the means to protect 
themselves and who are therefore most in need of protection (Tóth, 1999: 21). 
 
As has been examined in Chapter 1, Göncz had first hand experience working as a skilled 
manual labourer which, in turn, contributed to the enrichment of his understanding of 
ordinary people’s lives. Göncz recounted that: 'All [my experience] [brought about] a 
schooling [effect] on my Presidency. If I had not known the lives of industrial workers, 
prison life and the internal structure of Communism within the prison, agriculture in which 
one third of the population was engaged, I could not have performed my presidential duty' 
(Papp, 2002). Hence, it can be argued that, had Göncz appreciated the concerns and needs 
that Hungarian population had to tackle on a daily basis, the austerity package would have 
disturbed his sense of social consciousness. But if the lack of presidential competences in 
economic policy put him in a position where he was obliged to sign the package, Göncz 
might perhaps find an alternative way to help the needy. Indeed, according to Göncz’s 
former social policy advisor, Sára Elias, he was not only conscious of social problems, but 
also tried to tackle them informally. This informal help was offered through various 
channels and in different ways, such as 'financing poor families, and feeding the children 
in need' (interview with Elias, 6 December 2007); the most important task Göncz and his 
wife committed themselves to was the establishment of the Special Care Foundation 
(Fogyatékos Alapítvány). This was founded in 1993 by a mutual initiative of civil society 
alongside the First Lady, Zsuzsánna Göntér and named the Special Education of Childern 
with Learning Disabilities. According to Göntér, during state visits to foreign countries, 
she and Göncz raised this issue with their counterparts, and managed to establish 
partnerships. Göntér recalled: 
We established the Foundation with 2000 Forints. After that George Soros 
donated 3 million Forints and when we visited foreign states, we also managed 
to get some financial support. For instance, it came from the Great Nobles’ 
Party of Luxemburg and the wife of the Dutch Prime Minister... They were 
also interested in [the provision] of Special Care. We received a series of 
donations from the Dutch government and civil organisations. For 3 or 4 years, 
we cooperated with the leading Dutch Special Care civil organisations. We 
launched a movement of building houses for childern who need special care... 
Across the country, we built 35 houses for childern with disabilities [...] (Joint 
interview with Göncz and Göntér, 10 January 2008).  
 
In consideration of this activity, it is unfair to suggest that Göncz’s pledge to represent the 
under-represented remained scant political rhetoric or that he put his self-interest before his 
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commitment to the presidential oath. On the contrary, these actions substantiate the claim 
that Göncz possessed a well developed social consciousness. Moreover, it is highly 
probable that the harsh economic measures called for in the Bokros package would conflict 
with Göncz’s social awareness. Therefore, the discrepancy between Göncz’s social 
consciousness and his decision not to challenge the austerity programme suggests that 
there were other important contributory factors leading him to sign the stabilisation 
programme. One of the contributory factors can be found in his appreciation of the general 
consensus – the introduction of the austerity programme was necessary for stabilising 
Hungary’s economy – that was shared by Hungarian intellectuals at the time.  
 
There was some disagreement over the necessity for the introduction of the package,195 
and some criticism of the way in which the government handled the crisis. For example, a 
former president of the Hungarian National Bank, Ákos Péter Bod, contended that had the 
Horn government taken more timely action, the introduction of radical economic actions 
could have been prevented: 
On 8 May 1994, there was a general election... The socialist party won the 
election by a big margin... The Bokros package was adopted in March 1995... 
So there was a period, almost one year in which the government did nothing, 
but [instead] just let the country’s economy drift... For me, the package was not 
a problem, but the eight [wasted] months; this infuriated me (Interview with 
Bod, 8 November 2007). 
 
Despite this dissenting opinion, a great number of Hungarian academics suggested that, 
given the country’s poor economic performance, the austerity programme was an 
indispensable part of the process necessary to settle Hungary’s financial crisis at the time 
(interviews with Ágh, Csaba, Hegedűs, Ilonszki, Kéri and Lengyel). The former 
government economic policy advisor, László Csaba, asserted that:  
The Bokros package was a necessary measure taken very late... The country 
struggled with a [budgetary deficit] which cannot be sustained especially after 
the crisis in Mexico...196 [There was a] 10 percent shortage in the balance of 
payments from the 1994 state budget... Neither the European Union nor the US 
were willing to intervene in this crisis... We had to do something. We had to 
act promptly (Interview with Csaba, 5 July 2007).  
 
Similarly, László Kéri expressed the view that:  
From the outside, it was possible to know something must be done, because 
financial collapse [could have occurred] within two months... I was in London 
in February 1995. I spoke to Miklós Németh, the Vice-President of the 
European Development and Investment Bank. He told me that bankers in 
London said 'the Hungarian economy would collapse by the end of May'. And, 
'no one would finance Hungary' (Interview with Kéri, 12 June 2007).  
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It can be seen that the Horn government had seemingly been put in a situation, where it 
were no longer possible to rely on external sources, or to balance the state budget. In these 
circumstances, tightening the budgetary outlay was perhaps the only viable option. It 
should be noted that the maintenance of the welfare-orientated economic system that was 
dependent on foreign capital and borrowing as had been established by the Kádár regime 
was only discontinued after the introduction of the Bokros package (Kornai, 1996: 946-49), 
which is highly indicative of the fact that macro-economic reform and fundamental 
restructuring of Hungary’s economy was long overdue.  
  
Göncz also seemed to be aware of the seriousness of the situation, primarily through 
regular consultation with the president of Hungarian National Bank, György Surányi. 
According to Surányi, when the stabilisation programme was almost ready for 
implementation, Göncz neither supported nor opposed it:  
... Göncz always asked me when poor and outcast people would be able to live 
in more humane and acceptable lives in this society... In February 1995... 
although the package programme was not yet entirely prepared, I outlined it to 
Göncz [as to] how painful the measure looked from the country’s [point of 
view]. The President neither accepted the package nor objected to it. He took 
the necessity [of the measure] into account, but understandably his social 
conscience was disturbed... Göncz always judged socio-economic questions in 
light of his plebian mentality [plebejus szellemben]... On countless occasions, 
he said that 'his task was to represent the [interests] of the neediest and the 
poorest, because the others can stand on their own two feet'... Göncz 
consistently showed an interest in economic policy, but government [members] 
and the Prime Ministers hardly knew about this [...] (Surányi, 2000: 112-18).  
 
The extract above underscores the fact that accepting the stabilisation programme would 
have been irreconcilable with Göncz’s social conscience, but he showed an appreciation 
for, and understanding of, the prevailing situation. According to Surányi’s testimony, 
Göncz’s silence does not mean he was indifferent towards these economic issues and the 
possible consequences of the austerity programmes. Rather, it suggests that Göncz 
unwillingly accepted the package as the situation was such that stringent economic 
measures were required. Indeed, in an interview with a Hungarian daily, Népszava, in 
response to the reporter’s question - 'Why did you not say a word when the Bokros 
package brought about unendurable burdens to the people?' - Göncz explained the reason 
behind his silence, stating that:  
I know that the Bokros package had a significant adverse impact on the poor, 
but [this] was the only way to prevent economic collapse [...] (Bíró, 2000).   
 
This substantiates the view that Göncz was indeed aware of the possible consequences of 
the retrenchment action, especially for destitute people. Having expected the negative 
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effects of the measures, he could have opposed them; however, it was Göncz’s 
appreciation of the urgent need to solve the country’s economic predicament. According to 
Göncz’s account, he reluctantly acceded to radical economic action, and perhaps may have 
wished that the subsequent consequences would not be long lasting. Indeed, in 1997 when 
the first signs of economic recovery became apparent, Göncz was quick to emphase that 
the most difficult period of readjustment had passed:  
Twenty months ago, the government was faced the direct threat of economic 
collapse... The prevention of the crisis required forceful [and] crude actions. 
Above all, those people who live on benefits and pensioners paid the price for... 
We got over the crisis. We cut out the roots of the [crisis], although the 
defenceless people still do not feel it at this moment... We can say that the first 
period of transformation has ended.197  
 
In light of these comments, it can be argued that Göncz’s acquiescence did not mean that 
socio-economic issues were outside of the realm of his interests or that he supported the 
government’s economic policy in order to secure his re-election to the Presidency.  
 
6.2.2. The Law of Incompatibility (Összeférhetetlenségi törvény) 
On 17 December 1996 the Hungarian Parliament adopted 'Law No. V of 1997 on the 
Amendment of the Legal Status of Members of Parliament' (hereafter, the Law on 
Incompatibility).198 The law was aimed at preventing MPs from exercising their political 
interests on the process of privatisation, the Incompatibility Law was to provide a basic 
legal framework for the separation of the economy from the political sphere.199 According 
to the law, MPs could not, for example, assume leading positions in public economic 
associations, while simultaneously acting as parliamentarians. The amendment process, 
however, was far from smooth and, the legislation process was hampered by political 
divisions between the socialists and the right wing opposition, as well as within the 
socialist-liberal coalition. In general, all agreed that the Incompatibility Law was necessary 
for the creation of a transparent public space (Stépán, 1997). However, consensus diverged 
on the matter of deciding the time of the law’s enforcement and deliniating the limits of the 
legality. The socialist leadership claimed that the law should only apply to those MPs who 
could secure their seats in the next Parliament, reasoning that the application of a 
retroactive rule contravened the principle of legal security (Magyar Nemzet, 17 June 1996). 
In contrast, the AFD and the opposition, especially AYD and the ISP insisted that sitting 
parliamentarians also be included as subjects in the application of the law (Magyar Nemzet, 
17 June 1996; György, 1997). The result was a compromise within the socialist-liberal 
coalition in which it was agreed that MPs could keep their dual positions, if their post in 
business was acquired before they were elected to Parliament (EECR, 1997 Winter).  
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Two weeks later, however, Göncz, who once supported the incompatibility legislation 
enactment refused to sign the law, instead returning it to Parliament for reconsideration 
(Népszabadság, 3 January 1997; Új Magyarország, 3 January 1997). Göncz gave specific 
reasons for his refusal (discussed below), but immediate reactions followed from 
parliamentary parties. As a whole, the opposition welcomed Göncz’s decision, whereas the 
socialist-liberal coalition expressed surprise (Magyar Nemzet, 3 January 1997). While 
debates over the Incompatibility Law continued in Parliament, the Speaker of the House 
Zoltán Gál made an important announcement – he would not call for the holding of an 
extraordinary parliamentary session (Magyar Hírlap, 7 January 1997; Magyar Nemzet, 7 
January 1997; Népszabadság, 7 January 1997) – which, in practice, meant that the revision 
of the original legislation would not be considered (Népszava, 9 January 1997). 
Subsequently, on 25 February 1997, Parliament overrode Göncz’s decision by re-adopting 
the law in its original form (Magyar Nemzet, 26 February 1997; Népszabadság, 26 
February 1997a).  
 
Göncz raised ten points of contention regarding the Law on Incompatibility, of which the 
following three were the most important elements: the principle of equality, the guarantee 
of free economic competition, and the protection of personal data and privacy. 
 
Firstly, Göncz questioned whether the Law of Incompatibility contravened the principle of 
equality (Magyar Hírlap, 7 January 1997; Magyar Nemzet, 7 January 1997; Népszabadság, 
3 January 1997; Új Magyarország, 7 January 1997). In particular, the distinction which 
depended on the timing of the acquisition of seats in Parliament was seen as a major 
problem, given that this clause decided whether MPs were permitted to retain a dual 
position. According to the amended incompatibility law, if a post in business had been 
obtained before MPs were elected to Parliament, they were allowed to take on a dual 
position. In a situation where a post in business was obtained after one had been elected to 
Parliament, the parliamentarian had to choose between positions (staying as an MP or 
becoming a businessman). For instance, it could bring about the following contradictory 
situation:  
Case A: In April, Ákos became an MP in the Parliament. 
In June, Ákos joined the board of directors in a state-owned firm. 
(Incompatible or not permissable) 
Case B: In April, Ákos was the director of a firm. 
In June, Ákos became an MP in the Parliament, but still runs the firm. 
(Compatible or permissable) 
Note: The name Ákos does not refer to a real member of the Hungarian Parliament. 
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This contradiction not only undermined the principle of equality, but could also have far-
reaching consequences. Since the party illustrated in Case B was still allowed to assume a 
dual position, if this firm was due to be privatised from state-ownership, it is very probable 
that Ákos could exercise his political interest in the privatisation process. Göncz may have 
recognised this legal drawback. It should be noted that 52 MPs who shared Göncz’s view 
turned to the Constitutional Court, asking whether this distinction contravened the 
Constitution (the Court ruled that it was against the principle of equality).200   
  
Secondly, Göncz suspected that the distinction made between public and private business 
violated the principles of free economic competition and of equality (Kéri and Zsoldos, 
1997; Magyar Nemzet, 7 January 1997; Új Magyarország, 7 January 1997). The law 
prevented MPs from engaging in public business, whereas seeking private business was 
permitted. The reason for the latter regulation was that some leeway should remain for 
MPs to enact private business, because they may need an additional income source. 
However, even if this flexibility was necessary, the discriminatory measure itself was seen 
as a problem. Referring to Article 9 prescribed in the Constitution - Hungary has a market 
economy in which public and private property are to receive equal consideration and 
protection under the law – Göncz wondered why this principle was not applied to the 
Incompatibility Law.  
 
The final issue raised by Göncz was whether the Law of Incompatibility guaranteed the 
protection of personal data and privacy (Magyar Hírlap, 7 January 1997; Magyar Nemzet, 
7 January 1997; Új Magyarország, 7 January 1997). The Incompatibility Law obliged MPs 
to declare the status of their property holdings at the beginning and end of their mandates, 
stating that: 'Upon the acquisition and termination of mandates, within 30 days, MPs shall 
be obliged to declare the [status] of their property to the Speaker of Parliament'.201 
However, Göncz questioned whether this requirement violated Article 59 of the 
Constitution which prescribed the protection of personal details and secrets (EECR, 1997 
Winter).  
 
On the whole, Göncz interpreted the Law of Incompatibility through the lens of his liberal 
democratic views. Above all, he asked for Parliament to legislate for a more effective and 
judicious law which was in harmony with the Constitution (Népszabadság, 7 January 
1997). Göncz stressed that ill-conceived clauses within the law be redefined prior to its 
enforcement. In terms of Göncz’s objections, however, there was a question mark over his 
decision to employ his political veto. Should Göncz have found a legal deficiency, he 
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could, in principle, have sent the legislation to the Constitutional Court for judicial review. 
According to my interviewees and the Hungarian literature, three factors are primarily 
responsible for Göncz’s decision to use his political veto.  
 
The first, official explanation offered by Göncz’s Spokesman, András Faragó, was that 
Göncz did not refer the law to the Constitutional Court, because 'it was only concerned 
with MPs' (György, 1997; Népszabadság, 7 January 1997). As the official title of the 
Incompatibility Law – The Legal Status of MPs – indicated, Göncz may have thought that 
problems concerning MPs should be tackled at their discretion. According to this account, 
Göncz appears to have given some leeway to MPs rather than calling on a third party to 
address the legal deficiency within the law. This explanation, however, is too simplistic 
and Faragó’s comment on the Law of Incompatibility was far from sufficient. 
 
Secondly, it has been argued that there was a possible link between Göncz’s political veto 
and the concept of a new Constitution (interview with Babus, 19 May 2007). Over the 
course of the Horn government, there was an attempt to adopt the new Constitution. 
Despite the fact that this new Constitution was eventually defeated, Babus argued that the 
concept of a new Constitution which would have resulted in the weakening of the 
President’s position had an impact on Göncz’s decision (Babus, 1996a; 1996b; 1996c; 
1997). Reasoning that the passage of the new Constitution could have further curtailed the 
President’s authority, Babus questioned whether Göncz’s discontent or, his understanding 
of the existing situation, was expressed in his use of the political veto. For example, among 
the President’s competences affected by the concept of a new Constitution, Babus argued 
that the following presidential powers could all have been eliminated:  
It appeared that there was a draft Constitution on a desk in Parliament, from 
which the President’s powers were to be significantly curtailed. The rights of 
the Commander-in-Chief, to propose bills and initiate national referenda could 
have been removed [...] (Interview with Babus, 19 May 2007).  
 
According to Babus, Göncz’s apparent resistance to the new amendment of the Hungarian 
Constitution (particularly with respect to the reduction of presidential powers) was 
expressed in the form of the use of his political veto.  
 
However, counter-opinions offered by a great number of legal experts and politicians who 
actually participated in the enactment of a draft Constitution (interviews with Hack, 
Kilényi, Kis and Somogyvári) suggest that a connection between these two factors does not 
exist. Kis stated: 
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I don’t remember why Göncz returned the Law on Incompatibility to 
Parliament. But, concerning the [scope] of the President’s [power], the status 
quo remained in essence… There was nothing to curb [presidential power] […]  
(Interview with Kis, 27 September 2007).   
 
Similarly, Somogyvári held the view that: 
No! It was not true... There were ideas to strengthen the President’s position... 
For instance, the law professor, Tamás Sárközy suggested that the President 
have some executive powers... So, it was not about the curtailment of the 
President’s rights, but the increase... But this was not realised [...] (Interview 
with Somogyvári, 22 May 2007). 
 
Both agreed that the proposed amendments to the Hungarian Constitution did not result 
ultimately in a change of presidential competences, even though there were some disputes 
over the reshaping of the President’s power. Given this counter-evidence, the reliability of 
Babus’ argument is questionable. Having noted this explanatory deficit in the literature, the 
actual contents of a new draft Constitution were examined. In particular, the relevant areas 
of presidential power that were to be subject to change were investigated. According to 
Babus, the rights associated with the role of Commander in Chief and presidential power to 
initiate national referenda should have been curtailed. However, the results of my analysis 
suggest that the President’s competences essentially remained intact, but for a slight 
modification in proposition rights (Magyar Hírlap, 2 June 1995). 202 Thus, it is unfair to 
suggest that Göncz’s political vetoing of the Incompatibility Law was an act of protest 
against the curtailment of presidential powers within the new conceptual framework of the 
Constitution.   
 
Finally, it was claimed that Göncz’s veto of the Law on Incompatibility may have been 
connected to the maintenance of his own popularity (Babus, 1997). Public confidence in 
the Horn government remained consistently low, chiefly owing to government 
involvement in corruption scandals.203 Göncz would also have been wary of the erosion of 
his own popularity, he may have used the issue of the Law on Incompatibility to dissociate 
himself from the Horn government. According to this analysis of the situation, self-interest 
was the principal reason behind the usage of his veto. However, this seems to be limited as 
a justification. If Göncz sought primarily to protect his own interests, this suggests that he 
was thinking and acting as a professional party politician. Yet the significance of Göncz’s 
professional political attitude was ultimately set aside, even by those critics who once 
proposed that a connection between Göncz’s political calculation and his veto might have 
existed. In response to my question,204 Babus altered the position that he had outlined in 
his previous statement:   
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I am not saying that Göncz could have been driven by his self-interests… At 
the time, I did not find such a contradiction in the draft law which could have 
explained his vetoing the law… For this reason, I began to find other motives 
in the background [of the constitutional situation which had arisen] [...] 
(Interview with Babus, 19 May 2007).  
 
Moreover, in an interview with Kossuth Radio, Göncz himself refuted the general 
assumption that he acted as a professional party politician, asserting that:  
I have never been a politician. It was true that I often fulfilled political roles in 
the course of my previous political activities. The activities undertaken during 
the resistance movement, during the '56 Revolution and after the collapse of 
the old system they were all quintessentially political. However, by nature, I 
did not behave in a way that people [might have] expected from a politician. 
Political careerism and ambition were absent in my case… I entered politics 
from the outside […] (Wisinger and László, 2007: 343).  
 
This stance could be interpreted as mere political rhetoric or gesture. In the routine of daily 
politics, as politicians normally deal with the press and public inquiry in a way that evades 
the point in question or justifies their actions, Göncz could have made this comment in an 
attempt to ward off criticism regarding his presidential role or style. However, even if this 
was the case, Göncz’s political calculation was not, it seemed, the principal reason for his 
refusal to sign the Incompatibility Law. As has been argued in the previous chapter, over 
the course of his Presidency, Göncz had consistently sought to express his liberal and 
democratic values. For example, the main reason for Göncz’s veto of the Law of Arable 
Land lay in his concern over potential discrimination against those wishing to purchase 
land (see Section 5.2.4 of Chapter 5); dealing with the Incompatibility Law, Göncz once 
again raised the principle issue of equality as the grounds for his refusal to sign the 
legislation. It is then unfair to suggest that Göncz put his self-interest before democratic 
principles which he held to be important.   
 
Thus, there are various analyses which go some way to explain Göncz’s decision to veto 
the Incompatibilty Law, but none of these furnishes us with a finite explicit explanation. It 
can be clearly seen that Göncz called on Parliament to reconsider the law due to his 
reservations about the legal deficiencies evident within its formulation. As these concerns 
were legally grounded, the reason why Göncz did not use his constitutional veto is still 
unclear; perhaps, the truth lay in the official explanation as it was presented by his 
Spokesman. Alternatively, as the political commentator, Orsolya Szomszéd contended, this 
issue was exaggerated by those people who assumed that Göncz would sign the law 
without any hesitation. Szomszed explained the context, stating that:  
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Perhaps, this was so disputed [among analysts] - including the author you 
mentioned [Babus] spelled out his assumption regarding Göncz’s decision – 
because Göncz had not used his veto for a long time [since 1993]. Göncz was 
not in conflict with the Horn government, so this issue attracted a lot of interest. 
The President’s action came as a surprise and caused such a debate (Interview 
with Szomszéd, 14 June 2007).    
 
The day following Göncz’s exercise of the veto on the Incompatibility Law, controversy 
over his veto once again arose when he challenged the revised version of the Law on 
Privatisation. 
 
6.2.3. The Law on Privatisation 
On 19 December 1996, the Horn government passed the amended draft of the Law on 
Privatisation. This amendment was made based on the previous legal framework ('Law 
XXXIX of 1995 on the Sale of State-Owned Entrepreneurial Assets', hereafter the Law on 
Privatisation) with the aim of accelerating the privatisation process. The legislative process 
was, however, far from smooth and controversy resurfaced between parliamentary parties. 
In particular, MPs disagreed as to whether local governments and co-operatives should be 
given preferential treatment in the course of the privatisation process. The point of 
disagreement was as follows: In extraordinary circumstance, would the State Privatisation 
and Property Management Corporation (SPPMC) be authorised to transfer state properties 
to local governments and cooperatives without restriction (Népszabadság, 21, 30 
December 1996; Szily, 1997).205 
 
Members of the socialist leadership reasoned that, since local government and agricultural 
cooperatives were assigned important social tasks to perform for the common good, the 
free handover of state property ought to be supported (Pogány, 1997). László Csaba 
explained the context and actual manner in which state properties were transferred to local 
governments in the early stage of the economic transformation: 
The time of free transfer of state property was approximately 1989-1992. This 
was the first period of transformation and the free transfer of state property was 
lawful at this time… Our constitution [states that] we give an important role to 
the local government. Property must be given to this local government because 
without it, local government cannot perform its function… [The solution] was 
basically allowing property to be transferred to [local governments] free of 
charge (Interview with Csaba, 5 July 2007).206 
 
It is not clear whether by the amendment of the Privatisation Law the socialists intended to 
extend the previous business practice to the case of co-operatives. However, the coalition’s 
junior partner (the AFD) and the right wing opposition parties (AYD, HDF and ISP) 
opposed the adoption of the law, reasoning that the complimentary transfer of state 
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property to local authorities and co-operatives would result in a corruption problem 
because this would favour those associations closely linked to the governing party 
(Népszabadság, 30 December 1996). Given that no agreement was possible, on 19 
December 1996, the socialists passed the revised law without the support of their coalition 
partner and the opposition (Magyar Nemzet, 4 January 1997).  
 
Two weeks later, however, Göncz challenged the law. As with the Law on Incompatibility, 
Göncz returned the Privatisation Law to Parliament for reconsideration (Magyar Nemzet, 4 
January 1997; Népszabadság, 4 January 1997). His actions were met with a mixed 
response from parliamentary parties. The opposition welcomed Göncz’s decision, whereas 
the socialist governing party took the same position that they had occupied during the 
dispute over the Law on Incompatibility; as the socialists viewed it, an extraordinary 
parliamentary session would not be necessary (Magyar Hirlap, 7 January 1997; 
Népszabadság, 7 January 1997). While parliamentary debates over the law continued, the 
coalition government and the opposition reached an agreement. The result was a 
compromise, whereby local governments but not agricultural cooperatives would benefit 
from the free transfer of state property (Magyar Nemzet, 26 February 1997; Népszabadság, 
26 February 1997b).   
 
The Hungarian socialist daily, Népszabadság, outlined Göncz’s main reservations about 
the law lay: 
According to the head of state, the law makes a groundless distinction between 
[various] economic organisations […]. 
The head of state also agreed with the concerns [shared by] six parliamentary 
parties; that the amended law violates equality of opportunity in the form of 
ownership and, in the sphere of [economic] competition and, makes a 
groundless distinction among the [cited] economic organisations. Co-
operatives [are] not subject to any [special] conditions for the free transfer of 
[state] property [to take place] (Népszabadság, 4 January 1997). 
   
Göncz questioned whether co-operatives should benefit from positive discrimination in the 
course of privatisation. According to Göncz, discriminatory measures within the legislation 
contravened the principle of equality across economic units. For this reason, he called on 
the Parliament to reconsider the point in question whether co-operatives should be 
regarded as a special case in relation to the privatisation process. Although Göncz did not 
directly mention that the relevant clauses within the Constitution should be consulted in the 
enactment of the legislative process, it is clear that the legislation adopted was 
irreconcilable with the egalitarian principle Göncz held to be of great importance. In fact, 
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an article published in Magyar Nemzet, highlights the fact that Göncz further detailed his 
thoughts regarding what issues should be considered in the establishment of the law:  
The President suggested that, before the final vote, the Speaker of the House 
[should bring] the law to Parliament for reconsideration. [This rethink] should 
take paragraphs 9 (1) and 12 of the Constitution into account in the 
composition of the law (Magyar Nemzet, 7 January 1997). 
 
Article 9 (1) of the Constitution defines the principle of equality under conditions of 
economic transformation, dictating that 'Hungary is a market economy, in which public 
and private property shall receive equal treatment.'207 In pinpointing this stipulation - in 
the same way that he had dealt with the Laws on Incompatibility and Arable Land - Göncz 
questioned whether discrimination was ever necessary for the course of the privatisation 
process. As stated above, the significance of performing social tasks for the common good 
was the official reason given by the socialists for their support of the Privatisation Law, 
and they attempted to authorise the SPPMC to transfer certain state properties to co-
operatives without restriction. Göncz understood, however, that this allowance might 
contravene Clause 9 (1) of the Constitution and, urged MPs to consider this in the 
legislative process. Similarly, Göncz sought to clarify the circumstances around the issue 
of what support the state was obliged to offer in the case of co-operatives. This question 
was raised with reference to Clause 12 of the Constitution, which dictated the state’s duty 
to support co-operatives: 'The State shall support a co-operative based on voluntary 
association and shall recognise the autonomy of such a co-operative'.208 Thus, the main 
reason for Göncz’s quarrel with the adopted legislation lay in an unclarified stipulation 
within the proposed law, where he highlighted that the principle of equality should be duly 
considered in the enactment of the Privatisation Law.    
 
In terms of the usage of his political veto, however, there was an element of ambiguity. 
Just as with the Law on Incompatibility, the main point raised by Göncz was one of 
legality, he could have turned to the Constitutional Court and requested a judicial review. 
According to the official explanation offered by Göncz’s Spokesman András Faragó, 
Göncz returned the Privatisation Law to Parliament, 'because of the simplicity of the 
anomalies in the law' (EECR, 1997 Winter). The practical meaning of this was not detailed 
in the literature; I asked Faragó to address this gap.  
 
According to Faragó, the President’s questions were related to technical problems within 
the Privatisation Law, and Göncz used a political veto to address them (emails with Faragó, 
21 and 25 August 2008). Faragó explained that the country had long awaited a new 
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privatisation programme, and the amended Law on Privatisation was expected to meet this 
need.209 Above all, a prompt promulgation of the law was required, but the existing 
problem – whether co-operatives should be considered as a beneficiary for the free transfer 
of state property – had to be resolved. The issue then lay in choosing between the political 
and constitutional veto and, how to proceed to find which was more advantageous to save 
time and resolve the problem. According to Faragó, in practice, the former required less 
time than the latter. Had Göncz used his constitutional veto to deal with the Law on 
Privatisation, the promulgation of the law could have been further delayed and, 
comparably, any possible delay brought about by the usage of his political veto would be 
significantly less lengthy. The causal relationship between veto type and potential 
legislative delay can be thus summarised: 
 
Scenario I) Constitutional veto 
 
 
Scenario II) Political veto 
 
 
It can be seen that in Scenario II the legal procedure is relatively more streamlined and less 
complex than in Scenario I, requiring less time for the passage of law. In this respect, if 
"technicality" was the point at issue, the political veto would be advantageous when 
compared to the constitutional veto. It should be noted that in Hungary, any individuals 
and groups have the right to initiate constitutional review proceedings; arguably this is 
indicative of the fact that the Constitutional Court’s caseload must be considered as a 
factor which may prevent the speedy resolution of veto requests.210 Legal expert Herman 
Schwartz noted: 'one very great problem that the Hungarian court faces is caseload. 
Because anyone can go to the court with a challenge to an enactment, it has been swamped 
with petitions' (Schwartz, 1993: 31). In contrast, discussing a bill returned to Parliament 
Bill passed Parliament 
rediscusses the bill 
Law adopted as it was or 
changed in content 
 
The President refers it to 
Parliament 
Bill passed Constitutional 
Review 
Returns bill to 
Parliament 
Rediscussion Law adopted 
 or annulled 
 
The President refers it to 
the Constitutional Court 
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would require relatively less time, as the Speaker of the House adds it to the agenda for a 
regular or extraordinary parliamentary session.   
 
Furthermore, in terms of Göncz’s desire to promote consensus-based decision making – a 
key principle of democracy in his view – the political veto might be seen as the reasonable 
solution for him to help MPs address the existing problem by themselves. Upon the 
submission of the Law on Privatisation, there was much disagreement both, within the 
governing party and the opposition as well as between the Parliamentary Constitutional 
Committee (PCC) and the government (Pogány, 1997). The PCC proposed that the 
controversial aspects of the legislation (authorisation of the SPPMC to transfer state 
property to co-operatives without restriction) be reconsidered (Szily, 1997), as they found 
the legislation to be seriously flawed. However, the governing party voted this proposal 
down and this unilateral decision resulted in the failure to reach consensus over the 
existing legal problem. Judit Csiha – the Minister of Privatisation without portfolio –– 
stated: '[It was] regrettable to see that insufficient time was given over to helping two 
[political] camps reach a consensus or seek a compromise. For this reason, the President 
returned the law to Parliament' (Pogány, 1997).  
 
As Csiha asserted, had Göncz decided that the lack of consensus between MPs and legal 
experts had been prompted by insufficient discussion of the law, his attempts to resolve the 
obstruction would be more effectively served by intervention on the platform of the 
political veto rather than the constitutional. As discussed in the Section 4.3 of Chapter 4, 
once the President invokes the political veto, MPs are obliged to discuss a bill which has 
been returned to Parliament. Until such time, the law is to, all intents and purposes, 
suspended (thus, the political veto is also known as the suspensory veto) in such 
circumstances the President acts as a facilitator for the re-ignition of parliamentary debates 
concerning the law in question. The available documentation does not allow confirmation 
of whether Göncz’s decision to veto the Privatisation Law was grounded in his desire to 
forge a consensus among MPs. However, given the significance of consensus for Göncz’s 
political beliefs, such a factor cannot be easily discounted when assessing his decision-
making capacity.  
 
Thus, whether Göncz’s decision to return the Privatisation Law was driven by his 
understanding of its technicality or his committment to a consensus-based decision making, 
his actions in this case lead to the conclusion that, in so far as his liberal and democratic 
views are concerned, there is an element of consistency: the pursuit of the principle of 
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equality. Although legislation was dealt with by Göncz at different times, he constantly 
emphasised that this basic democratic principle ought to be considered in the legislative 
process. Above all, he urged Parliament to pen a law which conformed to the principle of 
equality. The significance of this basic but fundamental democratic principle arose once 
more in connection with the issue of the granting a pardon, in the so-called of Péter Kunos 
case.    
 
6.3.4. Dealing with the case of Péter Kunos 
In an interview with Wisinger, Göncz stated his position with regard to the issuing of 
presidential pardons: 
In general, a pardon is about making a decision in a situation of dilemma; 
where cold reason and warm heart clash (Wisinger and László, 2007: 174). 
 
In the Hungarian legal context, issuing an individual pardon falls within the counter-
signatory system, which in practice means that the President is required to have the co-
signature of a responsible minister or, the Prime Minister (see the section 4.3 of Chapter 4). 
The following case demonstrates the way in which the President and the Minister of Justice 
approached this obligation differently in the matter concerning the release of an imprisoned 
former banking manager.   
 
In November 1994, the chairman of the Agricultural Bank, Péter Kunos, was arrested by 
police (Csák, Dániel and Zsubori, 2007). Initially, he was accused of financial corruption 
in banking, but in the first trial, heard at the Budapest District Court in July 1997, he was 
found innocent and acquitted (Napi Magyarország, 10 November 1998). On 30 April 1998, 
however, in a second trial resulting from appeal proceedings held at the request of the 
prosecutor, the Supreme Court overruled the previous decision, sentencing Kunos to two 
years’ imprisonment (Magyar Távirat Iroda, 26 September 2001). The court convicted him 
of financial corruption, reasoning that his misdeeds had compromised the transparency of 
Hungary’s economic society and public confidence in state officials (Csák, Dániel and 
Zsubori, 2007; Hetek, 24 April 1999). Having been denied the right to appeal (Fahidi, 
1999; Halmai, 1999), Kunos was due to begin his custodial sentence. However, citing 
health problems (claims supported by his doctor), Kunos petitioned for the provisional 
suspension of the sentence; a request that was accepted (Népszava, 10 November 1998). 
Meanwhile, he also pleaded for a presidential pardon.  
 
On 6 October 1998, once Kunos’ medical report had been considered, the Deputy 
Secretary of State in the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) approved a temporary suspension of the 
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prison sentence (Magyar Narancs, 19 November 1998). However, two days later, the 
decision was overruled by the Minister of Justice, Ibolya Dávid, who reasoned that the 
banker had not attached a proper medical report detailing his ill health to the suspension 
request (Népszava, 10 November 1998). Additionally, Dávid stated that she did not wish to 
overrule the decision of the Supreme Court by signing Kunos’ release (Népszabadság, 11 
November 1998). 
 
The petition was refused and, on 29 October 1998, Kunos began his imprisonment 
(Magyar Nemzet, 10 November 1998). Surprisingly, however, on 9 November 1998, 
Göncz issued a presidential pardon (Magyar Nemzet, 10 November 1998; Népszabadság, 
10 November 1998) and public attention was focused on whether the Justice Minister 
would sign Kunos’s release papers and it was far from certain that the Minister’s signature 
would be forthcoming. Indeed, on the following day, the Minister refused Kunos’ release, 
on the grounds that a medical report provided by the authorities - a MOJ doctor - proved 
that Kunos’s ill health was not serious enough to merit his release (Népszabadság, 11 
November 1998).    
 
Dávid explained that as Kunos’ appeal on poor health grounds was not convincing, the 
grounds on which Göncz wished to acquit him by pardon were unclear. Was it simply 
attributable to a difference of opinion regarding the medical report of the banker’s health 
status? Or was it a jurisdictional dispute between the President and the Justice Minister? 
According to articles uncovered in the Hungarian literature and my interviewees’ 
testimonies, three explanations were potentially responsible for the conflict between 
Minister and President. 
 
Firstly, differing interpretations of the information given in Kunos’ medical reports may 
account for the divergent conclusions reached regarding Kunos’ eligibility for release. 
Göncz issued a pardon Kunos on compassionate grounds. Having been informed of Kunos’ 
ill health (Népszabadság, 11 November 1998), Göncz granted a pardon to suspend his 
imprisonment for three years (Napi Magyarország, 10 November 1998; Népszava, 10 
November 1998). Dávid, however, questioned the authenticity of the report prepared by 
Kunos’ doctor, and referring to the opinion offered by the authorities, refused to release 
Kunos. With hindsight, there was another factor influencing Dávid’s and Göncz’s 
decisions. Given that Dávid’s party, the HDF, was a coalition partner of the Orbán 
government which objected to Kunos’ release, Dávid would have to represent the position 
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of the government. László Salamon explained the political context in which Dávid’s 
decision may have been made:  
The AYD’s stance was the same as Dávid’s. Ibolya Dávid was a member of the 
government led by Viktor Orbán. She was the Minister of Justice and the 
chairman of the HDF [...] (Interview with Salamon, 24 October 2007). 
 
Similarly, István Stumpf - who personally participated in the governmental meeting at 
which the issue was debated - reaffirmed the view that: 
Orbán [was] opposed to the pardon. His standpoint was the same as Dávid’s. 
This issue was raised [during the meeting] of the cabinet. I don’t remember 
precisely when and in what circumstances this issue was raised, but the 
government unanimously supported the Justice Minister [...] (Interview with 
Stumpf, 3 July 2007). 
 
Thus, political circumstances influenced Dávid’s decision not to release Kunos. Having 
considered the political context from the Minister of Justice’s viewpoint, the circumstances 
surrounding Göncz’s decision making process were also examined. According to Stumpf, 
Göncz’s decision to release Kunos seemed to have been informed by the AFD, which had a 
close link to the Agricultural Bank (AB) at the time. Stumpf claimed: 'The President 
represented the interests of the liberal intellectuals. It appeared that it was not the 
President’s idea to release Kunos but [the result] of lobbying [activities] of the AB. They 
[the AFD] received a great deal of money and support from the AB, and felt that, at least, 
they needed to try to persuade the President on the issue of a pardon for Kunos' (interview 
with Stumpf, 3 July 2007). This account is convincing up to a point as Stumpf may have 
had an opportunity to observe the situation closely while he worked as a Minister in the 
OPM. However, hard evidence in the form of documentation to substantiate the claim has 
remained either inaccessible or, is non-existent. Thus, it is implausible to say that Göncz’s 
decision to pardon Kunos was an act which resulted from party instructions. In response to 
my question,211 Gabriella Ilonszki confirmed this: 'I cannot check the truth. Only those 
who had full access to the decision-making process could know about it. It would not be 
possible to find any hard evidence. This remains only a speculation' (interview with 
Ilonszki, 16 October 2007).   
 
Another possible reason for the conflict between President and Justice Minister lies in their 
different understandings of the general public’s perception of justice at the time. It was not 
absolutely clear what the public felt about the Kunos issue. However, it is possible to say 
with some certainty that the majority thought Kunos should remain in jail (Budapestsun, 19 
November 1998). Ferenc Horkay-Hörcher observed: 'Hungarian public opinion always 
[held the view] that the small fish are convicted, whereas the big fish and the leaders are 
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always released... People always want to see leaders should be also called to account' 
(interview with Horkay-Hörcher, 16 November 2007). Had Dávid released Kunos, it would 
have infuriated the general public, and, could have damaged her political future 
significantly. István Stumpf believed that Dávid took advantage of the existing situation 
for her own future political career thus: 
In this conflict, her popularity significantly increased... She thought she could 
muster 'political capital' [by] engaging in a [conflict] with the President... The 
public atmosphere – which Dávid sensed – was that if this convicted criminal 
was released, it would send the wrong message to society: Justice does not 
extend to people of high position [akinek ilyen magas pozíciója van, arra az 
igazság kardja nem sújt be]... In taking the attitude that she did, Dávid 
accurately reflected public opinion... and profited by [her choice to do so] 
(Interview with Stumpf, 3 July 2007).   
 
In the eyes of the Hungarian population, Dávid could be seen as the Justice Minister who 
stood by the strict application of the rule of law, in return for which her political position 
would be consolidated.  
 
Göncz was also aware of the public’s sense of justice but according to his own explanation, 
Göncz viewed it differently from Dávid. In essence, Göncz thought that issuing a pardon 
and public opinion were separate matters. Göncz recalled: 
I was not surprised... I was certain that in her [given] situation, for political 
reasons, [Dávid] would not sign [the pardon]. At the time, it would appear that 
the lopsided prejudice [of the] public[’s] opinion had [meant that] her hands 
were tied... If the court had convicted - for example – Stadler, a banker, to nine 
years’ [imprisonment] and released him from prison, people would wonder 
why he was released. People would think this is strange. [Dávid] explicitly told 
me that she would not sign it and I told her I would [...] (Wisinger and László, 
2007: 334). 
 
Thus it can be argued that Göncz appreciated that, in the minds of the general public, no 
deed deserving of punishment should remain unpunished. From this viewpoint, Göncz’s 
approval of Kunos’ release would run counter to the concept of justice that the Hungarian 
population had. However, Göncz implied that despite the possible social consequences that 
his decision might have contributed to, there was another important reason to deal with 
public opinion differently from Dávid’s position. Although the quote above does not tell us 
why Göncz thought the public’s sense of justice was irreconcilable with his own 
understanding of the situation, it is certain that he dissociated his decision making from 
public opinion. It is therefore necessary to look elsewhere in order to understand what led 
him to tackle the Kunos issue in a different manner to the Justice Minister.  
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The final and most plausible explanation for Göncz’s chosen course of action lies with 
legal deficiencies within the Criminal Law, particularly with respect to the right of legal 
redress. In order to understand better why this problem affected Göncz’s decision to 
pardon Kunos, it is worth briefly examining Hungary’s judicial system. In essence, 
Hungary’s justice system consists of four levels: local courts; the county courts and the 
Municipal Court of Budapest; the Courts of Appeal; and the Supreme Court.212 Local 
courts - which deal primarily with civil lawsuits - are placed at the bottom of this structure, 
whereas it is the Supreme Court which gives a final verdict. The Courts of Appeal which 
deal exclusively with cases of appeal were introduced in 1997 to lessen caseloads lodged at 
the county courts and the Supreme Courts (EECR, 1998 Fall). This is the fundamental 
institutional basis on which Hungary’s judicial system currently operates, 213  and 
individual citizens are entitled to take legal proceedings with the right of appeals against 
rulings previously made.  
 
The main problem, however, was that the implementation of the 1998 Criminal Code 
(which had replaced the 1978 Criminal Code adopted during the Communist regime) was 
delayed until 2002 by a decision of the Orbán government.214 This deferment had far-
reaching consequences for the right of legal redress of the Hungarian population. Given 
that Act No. IV of 1978 the Criminal Code contained no clause for the right of legal 
remedy,215 deferring the enforcement of the 1998 Criminal Law placed the Hungarian 
population in a situation whereby they were still restricted by the inadequacies of the 
outdated 1978 Criminal Code. It is thus hardly surprising that Kunos was not granted the 
right to legal redress. Gábor Halmai detailed the way in which the absence of legal redress 
could have affected Göncz’s decision:  
At the first trial, Kunos was [found innocent] and acquitted. At the second trial, 
he was convicted and received two and a half years’ imprisonment. The 
problem was if a person was found guilty at a second trial, he or she did not 
have the right to appeal... There was no such [guarantee] in Hungarian 
Criminal Law. After this case, the relevant rule was inserted into [the 
legislation]... Kunos could never have enjoyed the [right] to legal redress... I 
think this was against the Constitution (Interview with Halmai, 15 November 
2007).  
 
Having recognised this legal lacuna within the Criminal Code, Göncz may have decided to 
issue a pardon. He may have thought that Kunos was a victim of the existing faulty legal 
system. It should be noted that when Kunos’ lawyer brought the case to the Strasbourg 
European Court of Human Rights (Hetek, 24 April 1999), he referred to the reasoning that 
Halmai had raised: The absence of the right to seek legal redress contravenes the basic 
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principle of universal human rights and the Constitution. This explanation is persuasive, 
and in terms of Göncz’s position, the issue of a pardon could be seen as a reasonable 
solution to the impasse, as Göncz could have addressed the existing problems 
simultaneously; that of compensating the victim, but without altering the legitimate ruling 
made by the Court. László Salamon explained what a pardon meant in practice within the 
Hungarian legal context:  
If one is granted a pardon, this does not mean that one is rehabilitated into 
society. There was once a famous archbishop József Mindszenty in Hungary. 
He was imprisoned and in 1956 released. But, when the Soviet army crushed 
the Revolution, he sought asylum in the US Embassy. He lived there for 15 
years... This issue was unpleasant to everyone, [including] the Kádár regime 
and the US government... An idea came that he should be sent abroad. If he 
[was willing to] go, they [the Kádár authorities] would not arrest him. To this 
end, the Kádár regime figured out a legal [solution] and [promised] to pardon 
him. But Mindszenty refused to request a pardon, because he was not guilty. I 
am saying this, because a pardon does not mean the absolution of the guilt but 
rather the right of asylum given to the criminals (Interview with Salamon, 24 
October 2007).      
 
In light of this statement, it is fair to suggest that the pardon Göncz issued to Kunos was 
not in fact aimed at overruling the Supreme Court’s decision. Rather it should be 
interpreted as an act undertaken in order to suspend law enforcement on a provisional basis. 
Göncz could have considered Kunos’ ill health or the absence of the right to appeal in his 
decision making. However, this account still does not enable us to clarify and reconstruct 
the precise context in which Göncz’s decision was reached. In order to address this 
explanatory deficit, further evidence demonstrating Göncz’s own explanation was probed. 
While very little documentary evidence is found in the Hungarian literature, some 
conclusions can be drawn from an interview Göncz gave to Kossuth Radio. This interview 
suggests that Göncz’s decision to release Kunos lay in the lack of consensus among legal 
experts at the time. Göncz stated: 
At the Ministry [of Justice], there is a division [dealing with] petitions... 
Opinions and proposals are offered here and it is very rare [to see] that [these] 
differ from the President’s opinion.216 If I did not agree with [those proposals], 
I made my own comment. In this case, it was inevitable that I would [express 
my disagreement], because the rulings of the court differed and, simultaneously, 
my perception of the legality [of the situation dictated] that prevailing public 
opinion should not influence the [case]. I agreed with Dávid that each of us 
would decide according to [our] conscience and would not regret our 
conclusions [...] (Wisinger and László, 2007: 335).  
 
This underscores the fact that in his decision-making, Göncz had indeed considered legal 
disagreements among jurists. Göncz was clearly of the view that, among legal experts, 
there was a discrepancy in opinions over the Kunos trial, and the general public was 
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following the case. While this still does not suggest that the absence of the right to appeal 
was the main reason for Göncz’s pardon, it is certain that Göncz considered the separation 
of public opinion from his decision-making to be significant. In contrast, the Justice 
Minister and the Orbán government failed to dissociate the public opinion from their 
decision-making processes. Eszter Rádai detailed the political context in which the Orbán 
government’s decision was originated: 
After all, this was a show trial… The Orbán government wanted to use this 
case to prove that they are different [in terms of] transparency, saying that 
'while they are in the government, they would deal with this kind of matter 
[suspicious corruption in banking business] in this way'... But this was a very 
strange affair. Kunos just sought to protect the bank’s interests... He wanted to 
secure a guarantee from his clients to reimburse money for the loan he gave.217 
This was an absolutely rational decision… but the people did not really know 
about what this trial was about, and the public atmosphere was against the 
banker (Interview with Rádai, 11 October 2007).   
 
This one opinion does not represent the view of the general public on the way in which the 
Orbán government dealt with the case. According to Rádai, however, it is clear that the 
Orbán government capitalised on the Kunos issue to promote their vested interests. In so 
doing, the government and the Justice Minister might have benefited from this political 
tactic to increase the public confidence in them and their popularity. Göncz, however, 
clearly displayed his position that public opinion was a separate matter. Given this 
differentiated approach, it is fair to suggest that Göncz’s mention of his conscience was not 
a mere political gesture, but a metaphor for his principled decision making.  
 
In terms of the political beliefs that were important to Göncz (the pursuit of a consensus-
based democracy), there is a question mark over his decision: A convicted individual was 
considered to be more important than the general opinion of Hungarian society. As has 
been examined in the previous and the present chapter, Göncz’s desire for consensus-based 
decision making was consistently evidenced through a series of issues and events: the taxi-
drivers’ strike, dealing with the Communist past and the Law of Privatisation. Having said 
that, had Göncz also sought to pursue a consensus-based decision making on this issue, in 
principle he should have upheld the position of the general public. Gabriella Ilonszki 
discussed the contradiction of that was demonstrated in this case:   
Ilonszki: I think this was a contradictory decision... [When] the protection of 
democratic values and sympathy for an individual were in conflict, Göncz 
decided to stand by the individual... Is a person worth more than democracy? 
For him, a person was more important than [democratic] principles. Possibly, 
[this] was his own value-system and he made his decision accordingly.  
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Kim: Are you saying that Göncz issued a pardon to Kunos on humane 
grounds? 
Ilonszki: This again touches on our earlier discussion. Göncz was a civic-
minded [statesman]. In his mind, a person was more important than the 
presidential post (Interview with Ilonszki, 16 October 2007). 
 
This suggests that in the situation of a dilemma where Göncz was unable to reconcile his 
political beliefs with his personal value-system, he opted for the latter. In light of Göncz’s 
commitment to civic values, he may have decided to stand by Kunos. However, this does 
not mean that if one has a civic mind or attitude, one tends to judge the situation in favour 
of the person in trouble. It would be a gross oversimplication to say that the term - civic 
minded - was necessarily associated with sympathy towards the individual, especially 
those in trouble. Nevertheless, considering Göncz’s down-to-earth attitude towards the 
Hungarian population (Körösényi, Tóth and Török, 2003: 570; Szász, 2010) and their 
sympathy towards him,218 this factor cannot be easily discounted when assessing Göncz’s 
decision making capacity. Indeed, in an interview with Hegedűs, Göncz commented that, 
in the circumstance under which he had to choose to either uphold his political beliefs or 
his personal value system, he would opt for the latter. Göncz stated thus:  
Perhaps, it sounds strange and contradictory, but I have my moral principles 
which I consider it to be more important than my political beliefs [...] (Hegedűs, 
1985). 
  
In consideration of this, it can be argued that dealing with the Kunos case, Göncz pursued a 
liberal line guided by his own principles which emphasised that every citizen, including 
wrongdoers, ought to be treated equally before the law.    
 
6.2.5. The Law on Organised Crime 
The final issue which Göncz became involved in was the Law on Organised Crime. 
Aiming to tackle organised crime more efficiently, the Orbán government adopted 'Act 
LXXV of 1999 on the Combat Against Organised Crime and the Related Phenomena and 
the Amendment of Related Acts of Parliament' (hereafter the Anti-Mafia Package).219 
Göncz, however, returned the Anti-Mafia Package to the Constitutional Court. The 
controversy which followed was not as significant as that which occurred after the Kunos 
case, but this issue clearly demonstrated where Göncz’s political values lay.    
 
In its electoral manifesto, the AYD stated their commitment to the enhancement of public 
security and their intention to tackle crimes more effectively (Kurtán, Sándor and Vass, 
1999: 867-68). Having noted that the Horn government had not dealt sufficiently well with 
crime, public safety was an issue which needed to be addressed (Fricz, 2001: 527), the 
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AYD pledged that they would take these issues more seriously. Subsequently, the Orbán 
government took office and, the parliamentary constitutional committee prepared a draft 
law, which was submitted to Parliament in November 1998 for consideration 
(Népszabadság, 10 November 1998). In effect, the Orbán government tightened the law by 
making a major amendment, which altered more than 100 clauses in the penal code 
(Népszabadság, 10 November 1998) and other related Acts.220 According to the modified 
law, for example, crimes concerned with illegal weapons’ trades, prostitution, human 
trafficking, border control, money laundering, child and drug abuse and others were 
subject to heavy punishment.  
 
The main problem was that, in order to implement this toughened law, the government 
would have to rely on the support of the opposition, given that the amendment of Acts for 
the regulation of the Police, Aliens and Asylum seekers belonged in the category of 
legislation which required a two-thirds majority vote.221 Despite this legal requirement 
having to be met, on 21 December 1998, the Orbán government decided that the Anti-
Mafia Package could be amended with by a simple majority (Magyar Dokumentáció, 
December 1998; Népszabadság, 22 December 1998). The government reasoned that a 
simple majority rule could be applied to altering the penal code, as long as it did not affect 
the fundamentals of the law (Napi Magyarország, 28 December 1998; Népszabadság, 9 
January 1999). In contrast, the opposition members, the HSP and the AFD, argued that the 
law which required a 'qualified majority' and could not be amended with a simple majority 
(Népszabadság, 9 January 1999).  
 
Given that no agreement was possible, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán asked Göncz to refer 
the law to the Constitutional Court. Upon Orbán’s request, on 8 January 1999, Göncz 
called on the Court (Magyar Nemzet, 9 January 1999), asking whether the law in question 
could be amended with a simple majority. On 23 February 1999, the Court ruled that the 
Acts previously passed by a qualified majority could not be altered with a simple majority 
(Sereg, 1999).      
 
Central to the division of opinions on the Anti-Mafia Package was the question of how the 
qualified majority rule should be applied to the alteration of laws. More specifically, the 
decision-making rule should have succinctly defined whether the following Acts - the 
Police, Alien and Asylum – could be modified by a simple majority, if amendment did not 
affect the fundamentals of those laws. Surprisingly, however, the Constitution did not 
provide a clear path of action and this gap within the basic law contributed to legal disputes 
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among MPs. For example, the Constitution dictated that the adoption of the Police Act 
required a two-thirds majority vote.222 This legal statement, however, does not provide the 
relevant guidelines as to which a decision-making rule applied to the amendment of the 
Police Act: A two-thirds majority vote or simple majority vote. Thus, this legal lacuna left 
considerable leeway for various interpretations. For example, should the Orbán 
government consider that strengthening the police’s criminal monitoring powers belonged 
in the sub-category of the Police Act, they could amend the law with a simple majority. In 
contrast, should the opposition regard that altering the surveillance rights of the police was 
a fundamental change affecting the entire Police Act, they would insist on keeping the 
qualified majority rule. Therefore, without clarifying the decision-making rule regarding 
the amendment of legislation, legal disputes among MPs would be likely to occur. It 
should be noted that in 1999, even when the political row over the amendment of anti-
mafia package was ended by the Court’s ruling, the issue of interpretation was still raised 
by a judge of the Constitutional Court, Lábady Tamás. In his dissenting view, Tamás 
argued that the Court should have 'examined each provision of the Anti-Mafia Package 
separately to determine which articles required passage by qualified majority' (EECR, 
1999 Summer).  
 
Göncz, in using his constitutional veto, seems to have been influenced by the desire to 
pursue a consensusal decision making process within Parliament. This preference has 
clearly been evident throughout Göncz’s Presidency which has encompassed three 
different governments (as exemplified by his actions in the event of the taxi-drivers’ strike, 
the issue of dealing with the Communist past and the Privatisation Law). Having noted this, 
the way in which the Orbán government dealt with the Anti-Mafia Package - the Orbán 
government’s preference for the expression of majoritarian rule - would have conflicted 
with Göncz’s political beliefs. The question is, then, how Göncz would express his 
discontent with the government’s approach and simultaneously help to end this political 
row? Göncz seems to have opted for a constitutional solution, given that the cause of the 
disagreement lay in MPs’ differing legal interpretations of the law. It is possible to ask for 
what reason the opposition did not bring the issue to the Court’s attention themselves. 
However, according to a rule adopted in 1998, after the final voting on any legislation, 
only the President can ask for a preliminary judicial review (Halmai, 2002: 25; Petrétei, 
2001: 148); without his involvement, the row could not have been resolved.223  
 
One may argue that Göncz simply initiated the constitutional review proceedings at 
Orbán’s request. Even if this was the case, Göncz did not have to comply if he did not 
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agree with the necessity for the referral. Indeed, Göncz’s comments on the Law on 
Organised Crime (particularly with reference to the decision-making rule) highlights the 
fact that he had an opinion on how to resolve the issue of the Anti-Mafia Package. On 29 
December 1998 when Göncz wrote a letter to the Constitutional Court, he made the 
following statement:  
The President of the Republic initiated the review of Sections 12-24, 36-37, 
Sections 46-49, 50 and 54 of the Act on Organised Crime in respect of whether 
they have been adopted in a constitutional procedural way, with the required 
proportion of votes, taking into account Article 40/A paras (1) and (2), Article 
58 para. (3) and Article 65 para. (2) of the Constitution224 [my emphasis]. 
 
The relevant clauses within the Constitution pinpointed by Göncz were about the duty of 
the police and armed forces, fundamental human rights and the detailed regulations of the 
size of majority over the passage of Asylum Act. According to these specific comments, 
Göncz clearly had his conception regarding the way in which the Court should examine the 
law in question during the judicial review process. For example, according to the selected 
clauses, Göncz seemed not only have sought to address the question of a decision-making 
rule, but also regarded other issues on which the law might potentially have had an impact. 
This possibility was evidenced through Göncz’s comments on whether the amendment of 
the Law on Organised Crime could be harmonised with the basic principle of human rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution. As discussed above, the strengthening of police 
survellience power was one of the amendments made in the Anti-Mafia Package. Göncz, 
however, questioned whether this toughened rule could contravene clause 58(3) of the 
Constitution which guaranteed the right of freedom of movement and residence. Given 
these specific points and details spelled out by Göncz, it is unreasonable to suggest that 
Göncz simply acted in favour of the Orbán government’s decision. On the contrary, it can 
be argued that Göncz’s veto of the Anti-Mafia Package was an act guided by the important 
political principles and values he upheld. 
 
In terms of Göncz’s desire to pursue consensusal decision-making within the Parliament, 
however, there is still a question mark over his silence on the issue of the new rules of the 
House. In Section 6.1 of this Chapter, it was established that the Orbán government had 
unilaterally decided to reduce the frequency of plenums in Parliament. This move would 
have been irreconcilable with Göncz’s political beliefs, and arguably, it can be seen as an 
anti-democratic action. However, Göncz did not intervene in this issue chosing instead to 
remain silent. Körösényi observed that:  
On the issue of the new rules of the House, Göncz would and perhaps should 
have stated his position. Even if this [rule] did not contravene the Constitution, 
it at least damaged the spirit of parliamentarianism. But to my memory, Göncz 
 200 
did not state his position. This indicates that he [was in the process of] 
withdrawing from politics... At the end of his term, he was very passive 
(Interview with Körösényi, 11 July 2007).  
 
According to Körösényi, Göncz’s inactivity was not only evident with regard to the issue 
of the new parliamentary rule, but it also informed his latter presidential term. In fact, as 
has already been examined in Section 6.1 of the chapter, this diminished political activism 
was the general characteristic of Göncz’s second Presidency and is well-documented in the 
literature. What, then, explains his changed presidential style? The following section of the 
chapter probes and addresses this important question by examining three explanatory 
factors.  
 
 201 
6.3. Explanation for Göncz’s diminished political activism 
According to articles discovered in the Hungarian literature and accounts offered by my 
interviewees, there are three primary factors responsible for Göncz’s diminished political 
activities. Firstly, the decline of Göncz’s mental and physical strengths and capacities may 
have contributed to the reduction of his activities. Despite the fact that Göncz was in good 
general health, former Chief Secretary of the presidential office, Mária Tóth, noted: 'It is 
possible to assume that Göncz felt more tired during the second term of his Presidency... 
albeit he had no serious illness [at any time] during the term of his Presidency' (interview 
with Tóth, 4 September 2007). Tóth would have had an opportunity to observe the 
President’s physical condition on an almost daily basis. However, even if one gives 
credence to her account, its objectivity is perhaps questionable given her position within 
the presidential office. It is the normal practice of politics for presidential staff to assess a 
President’s decision-making capacity (including physical status) more favourably than 
non-staff members might; it is possible that Tóth’s assessment is somewhat biased towards 
Göncz.  
 
Indeed, according to articles published in the Hungarian press, there were signs that Göncz 
had health problems. In December 1997 Göncz was hospitalised for two weeks for the 
treatment of dyspenea and a duodenal ulcer (Népszabadság, 20 December 1997; Dobszay, 
1998). Since this sick leave did not last long, the issues associated with presidential 
incapacity were not seriously debated by political elites at the time. However, given that 
Göncz had no similar health problem at any time during the first term of his Presidency,225 
it highlights the fact that there was a change in his physical condition. Göncz’s ailing status 
could be attributed to his hard working lifestyle. It was noted in the Hungarian press that: 
'Göncz works very hard from 8 am to 5 pm everyday. He reads almost all the available 
newspapers. He always writes speeches for himself. His [advisors] complain that they 
could not dissuade him from personally exchanging letters with Hungarian citizens' 
(Somos, 1997). Considering his advanced age (73-78 years old during the second term of 
his Presidency), the performance of official and unofficial presidential tasks would not 
have been easy for him. A great number of Hungarian academics have pointed to this issue 
(interviews with Körösényi, Lánczi, Lengyel, Rainer, Somogyvári and Stumpf), but the 
following accounts are of particular relevance. János Rainer stated that:    
With the passage of time, one’s activity diminishes... It is not possible that 
Göncz became suddenly exhausted. This was a process that started earlier, and 
something contributed to the development of this process [...] (Interview with 
Rainer, 22 August 2007). 
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Similarly but more explicitly, László Lengyel held the view that:   
During the Orbán government, many questioned why Göncz did not exhibit his 
proactive balancing role against this government. I think one of the most 
important [factors] indeed lay in his tiredness... The seven years of 
presiden[cy] made this old man feel extremely tired. During the first 
presidential term, he was terribly stressed out, [because of] political conflicts. 
This was an awful life (Interview with Lengyel, 13 September 2007). 
 
Thus, age or ill health could have been a factor which contributed to Göncz’s reduced 
political activism. However, it is possible that this was not the primary factor and there are 
other elements to be taken into account.  
 
A second, and perhaps more important, cause of Göncz’s diminished political activities lies 
in the clarification of the President’s constitutional competence. The essence of this 
argument is that the Constitutional Court played a key role in curtailing presidential 
powers (Oltay, 1992: 19-20; Paczolay, 1993: 39-43; Pataki and Schiemann, 1991: 5-9; 
Schwartz, 2000: 83-85), and this contributed to the change in Göncz’s perception of the 
President’s role. In order to better understand why the Court’s ruling was significant here, 
we need to step back and revisit the main points of the previous chapter. In Chapter 5, it 
was noted that during the first presidential term, Göncz undertook a proactive counter-
balancing role to the Antall government. Far from being the symbolic figurehead that his 
ceremonial and nominal role might have suggested, Göncz became involved in a series of 
issues and events, and made clear that he had his own agenda to fulfil. This was expressed 
in his public statements, speeches, and through challenging various legislation passed in 
Parliament. As has been argued, this activism was informed by Göncz’s desire to pursue 
his liberal and democratic beliefs that developed throughout his life.  
 
However, his proactive presidential style became subject to controversy and sharp criticism 
with centred on whether Göncz had ever overstepped the constitutional boundaries of his 
role. In particular, two issues – who controls the Hungarian army and who has a right to 
appoint and dismiss state officials – were heavily disputed among political elites and legal 
experts alike. In both cases the Court concluded that these areas of interest fell under the 
jurisdiction of the Prime Minister or responsible ministers. With these decisions, the scope 
of presidential power was clarified and Göncz had to manoeuvre within newly delineated 
constitutional boundaries. Indeed, if one examines Göncz’s understanding of the 
President’s role by comparing his view of it before and after the Court’s ruling, it becomes 
clear that the range and type of his subsequent political activism was influenced by the 
Court’s decision.  
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In an interview with Hegedűs conducted on 14 July 1990, for example, Göncz stated his 
initial position regarding who had the right to mobilise the Hungarian army: 
Hegedűs: Does the Commander-in-Chief belong to your jurisdiction or 
Parliament? 
Göncz: It lies under the jurisdiction of the President. 
Hegedűs: Does the parliamentary committee supervise the Hungarian army? 
Göncz: Yes. I think the Prime Minister is also responsible for the supervision 
of Hungarian army (Hegedűs, 1990). 
 
Considering the timing of the given interview, it is hardly surprising that Göncz, 
intervened in the taxi-drivers’ strike (which took place in autumn 1990) with reference to 
the military mobilisation right. The Court, however, curtailed this power, stating that the 
President cannot rule on his own actions which implies that this responsibility is only 
nominal (see Section 5.2.1 in Chapter 5). Similarly, regarding the President’s right to 
appoint and dismiss the heads of public media institutions, Göncz adhered to the position 
that it fell within his constitutional competence or at least he thought that consensus-based 
decision-making was required. Before the Court brought its decision over the President’s 
right to implement personnel management, Göncz thought that: 
Regarding the appointment of national media [institutions’ heads] or the right 
of being the Commander-in-Chief, [a decision] can be reached only through 
consensus between the President and the Premier (Debreczeni, 2003: 304). 
 
This once again highlights the fact that Göncz indeed considered the President’s right of 
appointment to be operative. According to Göncz’s understanding, the Law on 
Appointment – at the suggestion of the Prime Minister, the President appoints and 
dismisses the heads of public media – was a shared role; thus the President could 
legitimately participate in decisions regarding the distribution of frontline media 
appointments. However, the Court again curtailed this power, reasoning that 'the President 
should not withhold his signature from the appointments and dismissals of leaders of state 
institutions requested by the Prime Minister, unless those suggestions endanger the 
democratic functioning of the state institutions involved' (see Section 5.2.5 in Chapter 5). 
With these decisions, the vaguities associated with the President’s constitutional 
competency and the overlaps with other political players were clarified and, this 
contributed to the change of Göncz’s initial position on the President’s role. In response to 
my question,226 political scientist Attila Ágh reaffirmed the contention, stating: 
Let’s look at history. Göncz was the first [post-Communist] President. There 
was no established constitutional rule regarding the President’s role. There was 
a general rule in the Constitution but it was not clarified regarding the [extent 
of the] President’s powers.... For example, according to the Constitution, the 
President is the Commander-in-Chief. But the question was what this meant in 
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practice? The Court decided that the President is not politically responsible for 
his action, so he cannot make a "real" decision... As far as the right to appoint 
the heads of public radio and television goes, the Court once again decided in 
favour of the government’s [position]. Or the [concept] of a passive Presidency 
was born... The Court ruled that in Hungary there is a strong government but 
no dual executive. The President is not part of the Executive. This is almost a 
symbolic President. After this ruling, very few political conflicts arose because 
the President’s competence had been clarified... With this clarification, Göncz 
said, 'it is all right. I understood my role' and moved within his constitutional 
boundaries (Interview with Ágh, 3 October 2007, my emphasis).      
 
As Ágh contended, if the scope of presidential power was clarified by the Court’s ruling, 
Göncz would move within narrowly defined constitutional boundaries. Moreover, this 
newly regulated and comparatively weak presidential model would remain in his political 
consciousness. Göncz’s own view was put across in the Hungarian press and, indeed, 
supports the argument that the Court’s decisions altered Göncz’s perception on the role of 
the President.227 In an interview with 168Óra, Göncz stated his position regarding what 
the Court’s rulings meant for him: 
The Constitutional Court narrowed down [the scope] of my jurisdiction... I was 
only allowed to make my decision with the counter-signatures of Ministers... 
With the passage of time, it became clear to me that the President has no power 
but only a voice [szó] [...] [Mester, 2000, my emphasis].       
 
Similarly but more explicitly, in response to a reporter’s question - 'How have you 
enjoyed your role as President of the Republic?' - Göncz upheld the position, stating 
that: 
In my opinion, the President has no power... If the role [comes with any 
power] then that is a reflection of the existing [power] relations [between other 
political actors]... There were two occasions [of jurisdictional disputes] in 
which I confronted the government. One concerned the question of being the 
Commander-in-Chief. This was clarified by the Court’s [ruling]. Another was 
the Right of Appointment and this was also forwarded to the Court. But who 
would expect that this kind of fierce dispute could have occurred as a 
consequence of the taxi blockade and the issue of appointment of public media 
bosses... In any case, within the first four years the Court [clearly] demarcated 
the scope of presidential manoeuvre [...] [Wisinger and László, 2007: 327-28, 
my emphasis].   
 
Thus, it can be concluded that the change in Göncz’s conception of the President’s role and 
power was informed by the Court’s decisions.   
 
The final element contributing to the alteration of Göncz’s presidential role can be found in 
the nature of Hungarian democracy. More precisely, Göncz’s earlier proactive role was a 
function of Hungary’s inexperience vis-a-vis democracy. To better comprehend why this 
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factor influenced Göncz’s thinking on the presidential role, it is worth briefly looking into 
the country’s prior democratic history. Traditionally, Hungary had little experience of the 
presidential governance (Kukorelli, 1995: 210; Szoboszlai, 1996: 122; Sükösd, 1996: 347). 
The first presidential model came to being on 11 January 1919 with the election of Count 
Mihály Károly (Feitl and Kende, 2007: 197). Károly’s Republic, however, was short-lived, 
owing to the subsequent establishment of the Soviet Republic under Béla Kun (which itself 
lasted only 100 days). Thereafter, Admiral Miklós Horthy ruled as regent along with 
numerous Prime Ministers until the end of the Second World War. With the end of the War, 
the so-called Little Constitution – formalised as Act I of 1946 – was adopted as a 
fundamental form of the Presidency (Kovács, 2001: 352; Sükösd, 1996: 347). According to 
this Act, the President was to be elected by Parliament for four years. The ISP chairman, 
Zoltán Tildy filled the position and was succeded by a Social Democrat leader, Árpád 
Szakasits (Feitl and Kende, 2007: 198-201). Their Presidencies, however, only lasted for 
three years until 1949, as the Little Constitution was superceded by the first codified 
Constitution - the Communist Constitution. Thus, from 1919 until 1989, the conception of 
the President’s role and power was not entrenched in the minds of political elites or the 
Hungarian population. Instead, as Taras notes, 'the succession of undistinguished prime 
ministers may have, if anything, moulded Hungarian political culture into a less leadership-
conscious system than elsewhere in the region' (Taras, 1993: 165).   
 
In this circumstance, Göncz, who was elected as the first post-Communist President had no 
prior example to follow. Despite the fact that the amended Constitution of Act XX of 1949 
provided a set of general rules and stipulations regarding presidential powers on paper, the 
practical meaning of these remained unclear. The main issue was, however, that defining 
or interpreting the Constitutional texts was problematic, as the first generation of post-
Communist elites themselves had no prior experience or established norms of practice to 
follow. Consequently, during the initial stage of the so-called 'democratic institution-
building' process (Ágh, 1998: 84-96, 2001a: 90-93),228 conflicts among political players 
would be more likely to occur. Political scientist David Olson neatly observed the inherent 
characteristics of Eastern European democracies:  
In the new democracies... nothing is settled: neither the powers of offices 
within the regime, nor the relationship among them – especially among the 
major offices and institutions of president, parliament, and prime minister... 
The executive office is a temporary arrangement grafted on a residual 
constitution of the Communist era. The powers of the office are largely 
undefined, and the options available to it are more a function of contemporary 
exigencies than established practice [...] (Olson, 1994: 36).  
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Thus, 'in a consolidated democracy, the rules of politics have been fixed and, debate over 
constitutional change mostly relates to fine-tuning' (Henderson and Robinson, 1997: 175), 
whereas in post-Communist states, 'this stage has yet to be reached' (Henderson and 
Robinson, 1997: 175). In this respect, it is hardly surprising that Göncz became involved in 
conflicts and confrontations with other political actors. According to Olson, political 
skirmishes and jurisdictional disputes among political elites would continuously occur until 
routinised political practice or the code of political behaviour came to be fairly established 
in the political culture. Within the Hungarian context, by a process of trial and error under 
the first term of Göncz’s Presidency, such a step was more or less completed. As has 
already been discussed, during this period, the Constitutional Court played a key role in 
settling jurisdictional disputes among political players which, in turn, led to the 
clarification of constitutional competences. Subsequently, Göncz, who had also identified 
and located his own role and position within the new democratic constitutional order, 
became less involved in political frictions. István Somogyvári aptly captured the way in 
which the issue of "newness" - or the country’s lack of democratic experience - developed 
into conflicts among political actors when they variously interpreted the Constitution. 
Somogyvári noted: 
All institutions tried to find their roles… When political institutions began to 
operate, Parliament, the Constitutional Court and the President tried to find 
their roles and boundaries through interpretation of the Constitution… When 
the President interpreted the Constitution to mean that he had a real right to 
oppose the Premier’s decisions, the text of the Constitution provided such a 
basis which could develop into a jurisdictional debate. It was not clear what the 
roles of the Prime Minister and the President meant. The President judged that 
he had a real right to veto the Premier’s decisions. But the Court ruled that it is 
not so... It is natural to see that the Prime Minister, Government, Parliament, 
the Court and the President tried to find their roles. A new constitutional order 
had to be put into operation and through this process, the increase [in the 
number] of conflicts was natural, [because] the real function of each institution 
was shaped through conflicts... 229  I am saying this because in a new 
democracy, this was not at all surprising [Interview with Somogyvári, 22 May 
2007, my emphasis].  
   
Thus, having completed the initiation period that Hungary’s transitional democracy had to 
face, Göncz - along with other political players - gradually became familiar with their roles, 
functions and limitations of power which, in turn, contributed to the establishing patterns 
of political practice and behaviour. In fact, Göncz also pointed to the "newness" issue as a 
fundamental question that Hungary’s nascent democracy had to address at the time. Göncz 
recounted that:  
The Constitution in use today - the modified version of the old one - was 
created by three parties, those who sat down at the Round Table Negotiation… 
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It was not possible to know who would win the [founding general] election. 
But it was to their credit that they succeeded in creating such a Constitution 
which was correct and served as guarantees against excessive power which 
might give an opportunity to upset the established political balance arbitrarily...  
[But] there is no perfect Constitution. It was not possible to think of every 
condition, and to [presuppose] all [possible] situations to determine every 
necessary precise regulation about the complicated [matters]… In particular, 
this was the case [with regard to] the presidential post which up to that point 
had no established tradition, [in terms of] what is possible, not possible and 
what is allowed and not allowed. Also, what concrete problems this situation 
might raise? [...] (Wisinger and László, 2007: 327-28). 
 
It is clear that the country’s lack of democratic experience remained as a question in 
Göncz’s political consciousness. On the one hand, Göncz took the view that in the course 
of the political transformation to democracy, Hungary managed to formulate basic law 
which was not overtly weighted towards one particular political force. On the other hand, 
he considered that such a balanced constitutional arrangement contained inconsistencies 
regarding the delineation of presidential competences. According to Göncz, the locus of 
the existing problem lay in the country’s inexperience vis-a-vis presidential governance. 
Göncz did not directly mention that the issue of newness arising from the country’s 
inexperienced democracy was an inherent weakness and challenge that needed to be 
overcome. However, it is fair to suggest that the first transitional period of post-
Communist democracy carried an importance, as it would pave the way for establishing a 
fundamental framework and blue-print for the next generation of political elites to follow. 
In fact, in an interview with Magyar Hírlap, Göncz stressed how significant the first four 
years of the post-Communist democratic experience were: 
Göncz: Previously, Hungary was not a Republic, so there was no tradition of 
the Presidency and no example of the President’s [role] or [what] power the 
President [possessed]. The Constitution circumscribed the President’s powers 
very [tightly] and left him [certain room for] manoeuvre in order to make 
decisions and [take] action. [But] these were again curtailed by the 
Constitutional Court during the Antall government [...].  
Newspaper interviewer: In legal terms, this is a weak Presidency. 
Göncz: Yes. By the end of the Antall government, [politicians] eventually 
learned by experience and understood the scope for manoeuvre [available to 
them]... It became clear that the only [effective] instrument of power that 
remained available to the President was his voice [...] [Szále, 2003, my 
emphasis].   
 
Thus, if 'a nation’s politics is tamed or [consolidated] only when broad support for 
democratic procedures and institutions, as well as a shared acceptance of norms of 
accommodation and cooperation, develop among political elites' (Higley, Kullberg and 
Pakulski, 1996: 133), the first four years’ transitional period was the rite of passage that 
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post-Communist Hungary’s politics had to undergo. This basic but essential experience 
ultimately contributed to the refining of a set of new rules, roles and ideas that post-
Communist elites conceived differently at the initial stage of democratic transformation. 
Taking all these into account, it can be concluded that all three factors discussed above - 
the issues of ill health, of the country’s democratic inexperience and the clarification of 
constitutional competences refined by the Court’s decisions - were altogether behind 
Göncz’s diminished political activism or his weak presidential role. Göncz’s own views 
and thoughts regarding his experience as the head of state, delivered in his retirement 
speech, are appropriate for concluding this exploration of Göncz’s post-Communist 
Presidency: 
... Ten years ago, Parliament [elected] me to the Office of the President of the 
Republic – the first servant of the Hungarian population... The Constitution 
precisely defined the character of the Office and task of the Office-holder. The 
President represents the unity of the nation and safeguards the democratic 
functioning of state institutions above party politics. [The right] to represent 
and safeguard - is not the [same as the exercise of] power. Even the 
Constitution obliges the President to [have] a minister’s counter-signature [for 
the exercise] of [issuing] a pardon. [When] the President has reservations about 
the constitutionality of laws, he can only [express this] [through] sending it to 
Parliament [for reconsideration] or the Constitutional Court. The Constitution 
vests the President with real power only in extraordinary circumstances or [in 
the event of the outbreak] of war [...].  
His [voice] – the convicing power of the truth – thus only supports confidence 
in the [presidential] service. This voice expresses the desires and anxieties of 
the Hungarian population, the majority of whom are the rich and poor and the 
literate and illiterate alike. If he does [this], the President is the living 
conscience of the country, and possibly become a mediator of the people. He is 
responsible for the people in terms of moral aspect [...]. 
... The only instrument to me was [my] voice. It is possible that I made 
mistakes more than once. It is possible that I spoke out in [a situation] in which 
I should not have done so. It is possible that I remained silent when I had to say. 
But, silence sometimes speaks louder than words [...]. 
I worked with four governments altogether. I did not agree with any of them in 
every regard. But there is no reason or right to doubt their goodwill... I am 
indebted to the achievement the four governments have made. I am indebted to 
the country for its resolute [attitude] towards the future. And I am grateful for 
the citizens who living beyond our border, my Hungarian brothers for their 
[respect] and love. 
Finally let me say one sentence. With the help of the God, in the last day of my 
ten years’ working day, I can say this: 
Thank you Hungary! (Népszava, 4 August 2000). 
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Conclusion 
In reminiscing about his life, Göncz came to the following conclusion:  
I was often asked later why an agronomist had needed to be a welder, why 
welding called for a law degree. These questions were often coming up. I was a 
loner throughout my life. I went everywhere without the grounding, but always 
by outside compulsion [...] [Tóth, 2009, my emphasis]. 
 
It appears from Göncz’s statement that he wished to suggest that the life course he chose 
was forged as a result of the external pressure he experienced and the circumstances which 
surrounded him, as he merely drifted into the situation he now occupies. Perhaps, to some 
extent, this was true as Göncz’s life has been marked by the many twists and turns of his 
career; by his mid thirties, he had already experienced the life of a student in the resistance 
movement, a junior politician, a steelworker, an agriculturalist and a 1956 revolutionary 
(Chapters 1 and 2). For this varied career, the social and political circumstances such as the 
outbreak of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution were certainly an important factor which 
influenced his subsequent life course (imprisonment and the pursuit of a literary career 
thereafter).  
 
The important decisions that Göncz made, however, were neither coincidental nor simply a 
result of a nebulous external pressure. As an intellectual, he had his own principles and 
beliefs and there was always room for Göncz to make his own decisions. In fact, when 
analysing Göncz’s life particularly in terms of the values he committed to consistently, it 
becomes apparent that he strove after his ideals throughout his life. The practical 
application of these ideals resulted in his attempts to address different social issues of the 
age (as discussed in Chapters 1, 2 and 3), Göncz sought to realise his ideals by finding, and 
applying himself to, specific roles in the key social and political movements. In order to 
understand why Göncz struggled for democracy and its values, this chapter revisits the 
main arguments of preceeding chapters and assesses them critically in order to draw them 
together as a conclusion. Ultimately, the chapter probes the significance of Göncz’s 
political experiences and their implications for the understanding of contemporary 
Hungarian politics and its democratic development. To this end, I will begin the conclusion 
by addressing the main research questions raised in the introduction of the thesis.  
 
Göncz’s political developments before his election to the post-Communist Presidency 
The following questions have been identified and raised in this thesis: Firstly, from where 
did Göncz’s political ideals originate and what form did they take? Secondly, in which 
ways did Göncz seek to translate his political ideals into practice? Lastly, with regard to 
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Hungary’s transformation to democracy, what did Göncz seek to achieve and what did he 
actually accomplish as the first post-Communist President of the Republic of Hungary? 
 
In contrast to József Antall whose intellectual and political foundation originated in and 
was significantly informed by his privileged family tradition, especially from his father’s 
success as a politician (Debreczeni, 2003: 15), the genesis of Göncz’s political beliefs was 
not in his family but the circle, clubs and social movement in which he participated and his 
first hand experiences of the struggle against the autocratic rule of the age. Interestingly, 
the first important activity in which Göncz engaged during the formative period and which 
had a crucial impact on the shape of his social and political outlook was his scouting 
experience. Fostering a constructive social basis of well rounded and responsible citizens 
was the main goal and founding percept of the Scout movement when it was established in 
the United Kingdom (discussed in Section 1.1 of Chapter 1). The Hungarian version of 
scouting in which Göncz participated, however, had a different significance for him 
especially in terms of the development of his social consciousness.  
 
Born in Budapest, Göncz had not had an opportunity to observe the situation of rural 
society and discover the living conditions and social millieu in which the vast majority of 
the Hungarian population (landless peasants) lived during the inter-war period. Göncz’s 
scouting experience in rural areas and more importantly, his access to the literature of 
populist writers had a crucial impact on him in this regard. The peasant populist literature 
Göncz accessed suggested that the structure of Hungarian society was largely semi-feudal 
in character and rural area particularly fell outside the scope of modernisation. By virtue of 
wealth and superior education, the aristocracy and landed nobility held important posts in 
the state administration and possessed the significant portion of arable land. In contrast, the 
peasants had no land to cultivate and no access to credit and social benefits; in effect, their 
interests had been unjustly denied in the existing social order (The Horthy Regency March 
1920- November 1944). 'The land of three million beggars' (Tóth, 1999: 145) was well 
representative of the unbearable living conditions of the pauperised peasantry and the 
indifference of ruling elite towards the issue. Above all, Göncz realised that there was a 
moral imperative for radical social change and, land reform was seen as the key to 
resolving pressing social need. As concluded in Chapter 1, the impact of the ideas of 
peasant populism on Göncz’s political views remained enduringly significant, leading him 
to pursue peasant populist ideas thereafter. Göncz’s attendance at the PTWG social debate 
forum, his decision to become a member of the ISP, his agricultural study and his career as 
an agronomist and, more importantly, his emphasis on the importance of education for 
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peasants as well as his critique regarding the inadequacy of Soviet farming model in 
Hungary which delivered a speech in the Petőfi Circle, all testify to Göncz’s attachment to 
the significance of peasant populism during early years of his life. 
 
Concerning the origin of Göncz’s liberal values, his first hand experiences of the struggle 
against Nazism during the inter-war period and the Hungarian variant of Communism has 
been discussed in depth. As a whole, the analysis conducted in Part One of the thesis led to 
the conclusion that Göncz’s resistance to these extreme forms of political ideology 
contributed to the shaping of his liberal democratic beliefs. Moreover, it became evident 
that Göncz’s liberal political beliefs did not fit neatly into a particular political ideology or 
clear-cut platform; something that was expressed through his preference for the free market 
rather than the state’s interventionist economic policy. Göncz’s conception of liberal 
values was universal which, from the perspective of today, is representative of civic or 
human rights. The common values which were evidenced and highlighted by Göncz’s 
actions in the anti-Nazis students’ movement and his role following the suppression of the 
1956 Revolution lay in his commitment to the realisation of an independent, democratic 
and socially responsible society. As concluded in Part One of the thesis, Göncz’s desire to 
pursue liberal values in these resistance activities remained of the utmost significance, 
while his earlier political preference for the ideas of peasant populism receded into the 
background. In turn, the process of the shift in his political orientation towards liberal 
values was very visible.  
 
Thus, by the late 1980s, Göncz was able to draw his own conclusion that, for him, peasant 
populism had lost its contemporary relevance, although his emotional attachment to its 
ideals remained in his political beliefs (as evidenced by his participation in the founding of 
the re-constructed ISP at the Pilvax Coffee House). Instead, Göncz’s preference for liberal 
values over peasant populism was marked and this was clearly expressed by his 
participation in the founding of the NFI (an alliance of civic groups and associations) and 
his statement on liberal democracy. According to Göncz, liberal democracy referred to an 
institutional system in which different political visions and varied values could co-exist 
(discussed in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3). At the core of his conception of democracy, 
pluralism based on mutual understanding and tolerance of varied values appreciated by 
members of society was thus deeply entrenched within it. Göncz expressed this conviction 
when he took the initiative for the founding of the NFI, where he stressed the importance 
of the promotion of political plurality in the wider Hungarian society.  
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From the analysis of Göncz’s political beliefs, it became apparent that the populist-liberal 
elements were entrenched in his political beliefs and his desire to pursue its ideals was 
expressed through his actions. But then what does the co-existence of these values mean in 
practice in understanding Göncz’s contribution to Hungarian politics?  
 
When analysing the main features of Göncz’s political beliefs, what distinguishes him 
from any other Hungarian politicians is that the formation of his democratic ideals was 
neither informed by a particular political ideology nor took a specific form that might have 
fitted into Hungarian political tradition. Certainly, his attachment to the ideas of peasant 
populism and those of liberal democracy were expressed by his actions, decisions and 
proactive role undertaken during his life. Göncz’s leaning towards the 'populist-liberal' or 
rural-urban values, however, is interesting in itself as these two values have been 
considered as oppositional or anti-thetical in character in Hungarian intellectual and 
political culture. In fact, according to the literature pertaining to Hungary’s political system, 
this division has been considered as one of the defining political cleavages established in 
Hungarian politics (Elster, Offe and Preuss, 1998: 131-136; Körösényi, Tóth and Török, 
2003: 135-146; Szarvas, 1994: 121-25).  
 
The populists who saw themselves as a successor to the populist movement in the 1930s 
largely constituted 'self-educated provincial intellectuals' of peasant origins (Tőkés, 1996: 
176). At the core of their values, Hungarian tradition based in the virtue of agriculture, 
peasants and 'of rural and village life' was deeply entrenched; politically they were of a 
'nationalist and anti-capitalist' outlook (Falk, 2003: 431). Their primary concern was the 
fate of the Hungarian minority who lived beyond its neighbouring border. For the 
representation of their interests and values, the populist founded the HDF at Lakitelek in 
1987 (discussed in Section 3.1 of Chapter 3). In contrast, the liberals broadly 'drawing on 
the bourgeois urbanist tradition of political thought and literature' (Romsics, 1999: 415) 
were 'disproportionally Jewish' (Falk, 2003: 126) and politically they were of a liberal and 
cosmopolitan outlook. The guarantee of human rights including press freedom and the 
freedom of speech was placed at the core of their values and, the Hungarian minority issue 
was dealt with as a matter of universal human rights. As discussed in Section 3.1 of 
Chapter 3, in reaction to the founding of the HDF, the liberals founded their own political 
platform through the NFI and later transformed into the AFD. In brief, given their different 
political orientations and varied values established in their political and intellectual culture, 
the populist-liberal combination is inherently incompatible or irreconcilable.  
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In the fabric of Göncz’s political beliefs, however, these two oppositional elements had 
been deeply entrenched and consistently remained as defining features for him and his 
beliefs. Of course, as noted above, Göncz’s attachment to the ideas of peasant populism 
was overtaken by his pursuit of liberal democracy (prominently so after his involvement in 
the resistance of 1956 and dissident movements of the 1980s). Despite this, it is important 
to remember that along with his evident political preference for liberal values, the 
significance of peasant populism remained consistently within his political beliefs. András 
Körösényi noted the peculiarity of Göncz’s political orientation: 
Göncz was a person who had a link to the populist and liberal camp. He had 
the link to the sub-culture of the populist intellectuals and that of the liberal 
intellectuals. It is true the populists founded the HDF, whereas the urbanist 
founded the AFD. But there were people who did not entirely fit into each 
camp, rather an 'odd mixture'... Indeed, Göncz was the figure who could fall 
within both camps [...] (Interview with Körösényi, 11 July 2007). 
 
Similarly, András Lánczi held the view that: 
Göncz brought the populist element to the AFD. Within the AFD, it had never 
been nurtured naturally. In its platform, the populist line is not visible. But 
Göncz had the capability to made a link to this direction and indeed it was 
gleaned through him... The populist-liberal is not a usual concept. It is a 
unusual combination... and it is 'Göncz’s phenomenon' [...] (Interview with 
Lánczi, 12 July 2007).  
In practice, this means that the co-existence of populist-liberal values gave rise to an image 
of Göncz the image of him not as the figure who represented the narrow interests of a party 
or its programme, but who might act as mediator between the two oppositional camps. 
Indeed, as discussed in Section 4.2.3 of Chapter 4, this perceived image of Göncz was one 
of the most important contributory factors that led to his election as President of the 
Republic. According to the result of the first post-transitional parliamentary election, the 
HDF could have elected their presidential candidate, Sándor Csoóri (the leading figurehead 
of the populist writers). Yet, Antall considered that the presidential post chaired by Csoóri 
could be misused to challenge his authority, and instead found an alternative figure. Given 
Göncz’s previously populist leaning (in view of Göncz’s working experience as a junior 
politician at the ISP) and their joint actions during the resistance of 1956 (in the matter of 
the collection of signatories to support Bibó’s Draft Proposal), Antall had good reason to 
assume that Göncz’s position in the AFD could be acceptable. Thus, even if Göncz’s 
proactive role in the founding of the AFD (the HDF’s rival) was somehow acknowledged 
by Antall and his camp, Göncz was accepted as the President. Antall expected Göncz to 
play a symbolic presidential role, while leaving the real affairs of state to his government. 
However, as we have seen in Chapter 5, Göncz did not interpret the role of the President in 
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the manner that Antall expected. On the contrary, Göncz clearly demonstrated his liberal 
political principles and, that he had his own agenda and issues and would not simply 
undertake a ceremonial presidential role. The main characteristics of Göncz’s Presidency 
including his interpretation of the presidential role and responsibility and the significance 
of his values are re-assessed in terms of his contribution to Hungary’s democratic 
development in the conclusion of the thesis. Before then, having examined the nature of 
Göncz’s political beliefs and its practical meaning, it is necessary to explore the 
significance of the way in which he sought to realise his political beliefs. 
In terms of Göncz’s pursuit of liberal and democratic political beliefs, prior to his election 
to the post-Communist Presidency, Göncz had two chances to translate his ideals into 
practice. One was through his participation in the anti-Nazis students’ resistance movement 
and another was in resistance that followed the defeat of the 1956 Revolution. On both 
occasions, his ideals were defeated but his resistance to the inquity of the established order 
highlights the values that he upheld.  
 
First, as concluded in Section 1.3 of Chapter 1, Göncz’s involvement in the student armed 
resistance movement served as a catalyst which contributed to the development of his 
liberal and democratic beliefs. Near the end of the Second World War, during the 
Hungarian fascist Szalási regime, Göncz was conscripted into the Hungarian army. He 
served in the 25th Infantry Battalion, but upon realising that this was not a war he wished 
to commit to he soon deserted his military posting. Instead, he found his role in the civil 
resistance movement which consisted of a few hundred individuals hailing from a wide 
range of political and social backgrounds. Different groups conceived differing strategies 
to fight against the German troops and their varying political affiliations were barely 
subjugated to their anti-Nazi sentiment. According to Göncz, however, a common 
denominator which bound them together existed; this was their desire to create a free, 
independent and humane society. Having appreciated these goals and shared the sense of 
responsibility, Göncz decided to commit himself to the resistance movement.  
 
Similarly and more importantly, in autumn 1956 when the Hungarian population posed a 
revolutionary challenge to the ruling Communist regime, Göncz once again clearly 
demonstrated the stance he stood with and the goals he sought to achieve. Initially Göncz 
was uncertain about whether the events of 1956 were serving the interests of a particular 
group or a national upsurge that arose from the aspirations of the Hungarian population. 
Upon realising that the Revolution was the genuine manifestation of popular will (the will 
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of which sought to construct an independent, democratic and socially responsible society), 
Göncz decided to commit himself to the resistance that followed the suppression of the 
Revolution. Beginning with conveying István Bibó’s Draft Proposal to the Indian Embassy, 
continuing with the smuggling of Imre Nagy’s manuscript out to the West to the launch of 
the secret donation movement for the families of arrested revolutionaries, all these 
proactive roles highlight the fact that Göncz’s desire to pursue the ideals of the Revolution 
was indeed expressed by his actions. The result of these actions was not successful as it 
neither changed the Soviet leadership’s intentions for Hungary, nor attracted practical 
support and assistance from the West. As Göncz observed, the real politik which followed 
the suppression of the Revolution was well representative of 'the ruthless logic of the 
balance of power' (Rainer, Békés and Byrne, 2002: XIV) and the Cold War contested 
between the West and the Soviet Union. 
 
Despite this, Göncz’s resistance to the established order of the Kádár regime clearly 
demonstrated his stance and the values he upheld. As Gough notes, Kádár was able to 
consolidate his power only after brutal reprisals against those who struggled for freedom 
(2006: 250) and the condemnation of their crushed ideals (Lendvai, 2008: 242) as well as 
the forcing 'national amnesia' (the de-politicisation of social life) concerning the memory 
of 1956. In contrast, those with whom Göncz strove to bring together during the resistance 
movement proved to be vigorous debating partners who preserved their defeated but 
victorious ideals. Even during imprisonment Göncz, along with the '56-ers, defended their 
revolution retrospectively through their rumination on the events and significance of the 
Revolution. They kept their faith and envisaged the future of Hungary and waited for the 
appropriate time and circumstances in which they could realise their crushed ideals.  
 
Having established this, Chapter 3 further examined the way in which Göncz sought to 
realise his political ideals by exploring the significance of Göncz’s participation in the 
dissident movement of the late 1980s. The analysis presented in the chapter once more 
highlights the contention that Göncz’s desire to pursue his liberal ideas was clearly 
expressed by his actions in the founding of the NFI and the CHJ. As noted in Section 3.1 of 
Chapter 3, the second half of the 1980s in Hungary was a time in which internal and 
external circumstances moved favourably towards democratic change. Gorbachev’s 
accession to the Soviet leadership, the growing influence of reform Communists’ position 
within the hierarchy of the Hungarian Communist leadership and the emergence of 
democratic forces and their outspoken demands for radical economic and political change, 
all contributed to the erosion of the Kádár regime and his removal thereafter. Göncz along 
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with his friends sensed this atmosphere and took the lead in the process of reviving the 
dissident movement through taking initiatives regarding the formation of grass-root social 
organisations. Göncz’s proactive role in the drafting of the NFI founding statement and his 
participation in its social debate forum (where he shared his opinion and experience with 
younger generation) was exemplary in this regard; his pursuit of liberal political beliefs 
was more prominently evidenced by his action in the founding of the CHJ. As clearly 
stated in its founding statement, the main objective of the CHJ lay in dealing with the past. 
Having realised that the truth about the events and memories of the 1956 Revolution had 
been concealed for three decades during the Kádár regime, Göncz along with '56 veterans 
appealed to Hungarian society regarding the iniquity of the system. Redressing past 
wrongs was the main issue to be addressed and this in practice meant the reburial of Nagy 
and his associates as well as their subsequent rehabilitation which needed to be dealt with 
as a matter of urgency. To this end, on 5 June 1988, the CHJ was founded and during this 
process Göncz, as a Vice-President of the organisation, undertook a proactive role in 
mediation between the regime and society. Above all, Göncz stressed the regime’s open 
approach towards its past as a potential path towards a process of societal reconciliation. 
As noted in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3, this intention was well evidenced by the CHJ 
founding statement (which emphasised the opening of previously sealed legal cases and 
secret files), and more prominently by the letter Göncz wrote to the General Secretary of 
the HSWP, Károly Grósz. In the letter, Göncz emphasised that the regime’s dishonest 
attitude towards its past resulted in disharmony between Hungarian society and the 
government, and proposed that a dialogue with society be started. This endeavour was not 
successful as the proposition was rejected, but on 16 June 1989 - the 32nd anniversary of 
Nagy’s execution - the long cherished desire shared by Göncz and the '56 veterans came to 
fruition. As Rainer notes, '16 June 1989 the day of Nagy and his associates’ reburial in no 
way constituted the end of the reworking of the history of the Soviet system in Hungary, 
especially with respect to the Kádár era' (Rainer, 2009: 195).230 Nevertheless, as history 
tells us it was this very day that marked the beginning of the end of Communism and 
catalysed Hungary’s transition to democracy; it is fair to suggest that, while he was 
reacting to historical events and external forces, Göncz made an important contribution to 
Hungary’s democratic transformation and its move towards that direction. 
 
Göncz’s political achievements as the first post-Communist President 
Having noted the importance of Göncz’s contribution to Hungary’s transformation to 
democracy, the remaining chapters (Part Two) were devoted to examining the significance 
of his political achievements as the first post-Communist President of Hungary. As a whole, 
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the analysis of Göncz’s Presidency presented in Part Two of the thesis led to the 
conclusion that Göncz contributed to the consolidation of democracy in two ways. Firstly, 
he advanced the establishment of the Office of the Presidency and secondly he advocated 
the promotion of liberal and democratic values in the political as well as social sphere of 
Hungarian society. 
 
In terms of the democratic institution-building process, Göncz played a key role in shaping 
the role of the Presidency. As noted in Section 6.3 of Chapter 6, in its history, Hungary did 
not have a well established tradition of presidential governance or template for the role of 
the President. The Presidencies held by three heads of state during the inter-war period – 
Mihály Károly, Zoltán Tildy and Árpád Szakasíts – lasted only four years in total. After 
the political transformation of 1989, Göncz’s years as President were thus a time (at least 
at first) of hopeful creativity. Göncz had his own conception regarding the Presidency and 
the newly amended Constitution provided an institutional basis and guideline. Some 
stipulations within the Constitution were, however, inconsistent and vaguely defined 
(discussed in Section 4.3 of Chapter 4); each political actor who had different ideas about 
the President’s role and responsibility came into jurisdictional dispute both with Göncz and 
one another. These disagreements concerned, for example, the President’s right to lead the 
Hungarian army, that of international representation and the right to appoint and dismiss 
state officials (Chapter 5). These issues all arose during Göncz’s first presidential term 
where the first democratically elected Antall government was in power. Göncz interpreted 
these issues as ones that fell under the jurisdiction of the President or, at least, he believed 
that they gave rise to decisions that ought to be shared by President and Prime Minister. In 
contrast, Antall and his cabinet members understood that the President’s constitutional 
powers were titular, thus Göncz did not have a right to claim such interests. In effect, this 
jurisdictional dispute caused constitutional debate among political elites and legal experts 
over the scope of presidential powers and the post holder’s role and responsibility. As 
noted in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.5 of Chapter 5, during this jurisdictional dispute, the 
Constitutional Court played a central role in delimiting presidential powers. In effect, the 
Court concluded that the President is not held accountable for his political actions, thus he 
did not have powers to exercise. As a result, much of the vision and motivation that had 
initially inspired Göncz to act as a proactive President was dissipated. This perception 
ultimately contributed to the change of Göncz’s presidential style, in which a less active 
and conflict-averse presidential approach was prevalent during his second Presidency 
(Section 6.3 in Chapter 6). There was a partial exception to this pattern – the question of 
presidential pardon – but, in his retirement speech as Göncz made clear, this issue once 
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again contributed to reinforcing his conviction that granting a pardon did not fall within the 
presidential competences. Thus, in terms of the process of political institution building and 
its subsequent routinised practice in Hungarian political culture, it is possible to say that, 
while he was constrained by external forces beyond his control, Göncz played a key role in 
the shaping of the basic attributes of Presidency. From today’s perspective, there is little 
doubt as to what is the main role of the President within Hungary’s constitutional 
framework: the central task lies in the performance of ceremonial and symbolic duties. 
 
Secondly, Göncz contributed to the rooting of liberal and democratic values in Hungary’s 
political culture. As stated above, Göncz’s political preference for these values derived 
from his first hand experience in fighting against the autocratic rule of the age. The 
common values that Göncz embraced in these activities were his commitment to the 
realisation of a free, democratic and socially responsible society. Having said that, 
Chapters 5 and 6 probed whether Göncz successfully represented and embodied such 
values when he became the President of Hungary. On the whole, the analysis presented in 
these chapters led to the conclusion that Göncz was indeed committed to his principled 
liberal and democratic beliefs throughout his Presidency. In particular, the following 
democratic elements underpinned in the fabric of Göncz’s political beliefs were 
highlighted: consensus-based democracy, the principle of equality, the rule of law and the 
freedom of expression and press freedom. There was a difference of emphasis in his value 
system (media freedom was the most significant during his first Presidency, whereas it was 
the principle of equality that was highlighted during his second Presidency), but the four 
democratic values were well embodied by his Presidency.  
 
First, Göncz’s desire for a consensus-based democracy was explored within the framework 
provided by the following events and issues: the taxi-drivers’ strike, dealing with the Laws 
of Privatisation and of Organised Crime. While these events took place under three 
different governments, Göncz consistently stressed that consensus-based decision be 
sought in order to address the point in question. During the taxi blockade, Göncz took on a 
mediation role, negotiating between strikers and the government and, he emphasised that 
the strike be settled through mutual agreement. In this event, Göncz’s desire for seeking a 
peaceful and non-coercive solution was ultimately highlighted by his public statement. 
Similarly, dealing with the Law of Privatisation and the Anti-Mafia Package, Göncz 
stressed that the disagreement be resolved by consensus. In the former situation, Göncz 
returned the law to Parliament to provide an opportunity for MPs to settle the existing legal 
dispute themselves. In the latter, Göncz forwarded the package to the Constitutional Court 
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to help clarify the point of contention between the governing party and the opposition. The 
letter Göncz sent to the Court clearly underscored the fact that the lack of clarity of the 
decision-making rule – whether the law which required a two-thirds majority vote could be 
amended with a simple majority was differently interpreted by the governing party and the 
opposition – was Göncz’s main reservation about signing the law.   
 
Second, and more prominently, the significance of the egalitarian principle was evidenced 
by Göncz’s actions in dealing with the following issues: the question of the Communist 
past, the granting of a pardon in the Kunos case, and the Laws of Arable Land and of 
Incompatibility. These issues were once again raised under three successive governments, 
but regardless of this regime change, Göncz stressed how important the principle of 
equality was. Dealing with the Law of Compensation, Göncz made clear that the 
distinction between land and other forms of property for claiming monetary compensation 
from the state ought to be resolved before its enforcement. Similarly, dealing with anti-
Communist legislation, Göncz constantly emphasised that the perpetrator who should have 
been duly punished for past crimes under the new regime also be equally treated before the 
law. Any retroactive justice which undermined the egalitarian principles of the new 
Hungarian Republic was inadmissable to Göncz; he stressed that past injustice ought to be 
corrected strictly within the framework of a state built upon the principle of the rule of law. 
The equal treatment of criminals before the law was again highlighted in the Kunos trial. In 
this issue, Göncz consistently underscored the value that the convicted banker ought to be 
treated equally before the law. The majority opinion of Hungarian society was against 
Kunos’ release. In his decision-making capacity, however, Göncz displayed his firm belief 
that the wrongdoer who had not been granted a right to legal redress ought to be treated 
fairly. The same stance was again expressed by Göncz in dealing with the Law of Arable 
Land and of Incompatibility. In the former case, Göncz stressed that domestic and foreign 
investors alike be granted the right of land ownership. In the latter, Göncz urged that 
discriminatory measures within the law (initially only dependent on the length of time that 
MPs had held their parliamentary seats) be reconsidered in the legislative process.  
 
Finally, the significance of the principle of press freedom and the freedom of expression 
was the highlighted in the issue pertaining to control over the broadcast media, the La 
Stampa affairs and the Law of Radio Frequency. All these situations arose during the 
Antall government; a government which attempted to place the public media under their 
control. Göncz, however, stated his firm position that under no circumstances should the 
freedom of expression and media freedom be violated by political and personal influence. 
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His liberal political conviction was most strongly demonstrated in this issue, the extent to 
which some members of the conservative leadership attempted to impeach Göncz for his 
controversial stance and interpretation of his role and responsibilities. Despite this, Göncz 
made clear that in so far as the press freedom and the freedom of expression are concerned, 
he would not concede his position to the government’s demands.  
 
However, this is not to suggest that Göncz’s pursuit of liberal and democratic values 
always had a positive effect on Hungarian politics. As noted in Chapter 5, the political 
division that existed between the conservative and the liberals came to be widened further 
by Göncz’s involvement and, subsequently, this widening gap developed into the 
polarisation of politics. In effect on the side of the liberal camp, Göncz was seen by his 
camp as a symbol of democracy (as epitomised by the formation of the Democratic 
Charter). In contrast, among the conservatives, he was thought of as a partisan and divisive 
figurehead who failed to represent the unity of the nation. However, even if Göncz’s 
political role could not be assessed favourably in all aspects, it should be noted that four 
democratic elements underpinning his political beliefs were important values per se. Göncz 
was not the father of this value system but its champion and a symbol of its continuity; the 
picture of Hungary’s democracy would have been different without him.  
 
Two decades have passed since Hungary’s transition to democracy and Göncz’s election to 
the Presidency. Ferenc Mádl (formerly a law professor), László Sólyom (an ex-President of 
the Constitutional Court) and currently Pál Schmitt (a former Olympic fencing champion), 
who came from distinctive backgrounds have succeded to the Presidency and pursued their 
political goals and agendas. It is perhaps too early to discuss and evaluate Göncz’s political 
legacy in regard to how his successors view Göncz and his political achievements as a role 
model for approaching the presidential post however, this is a potential topic and avenue 
for future research.231  Yet, it is fair to suggest that the political activism and the 
presidential activity that Göncz undertook during this pivotal transitional period is already 
an important integral part of Hungary’s history. During this process, Göncz firmly stood by 
his liberal principles and democratic values and made them the central tenets of his 
Presidency. As Pridham notes, if the path to democratic consolidation 'requires the gradual 
removal of uncertainties that usually surround transition and then the full 
institutionalisation of a new democracy, the internalisation of its rules and the 
dissemination of democratic values' (Pridham, 2000: 20), Göncz at least brought the virtue 
of liberal values into Hungarian politics. He did not, and was not able to, harmonise the 
three pluralistic values which he espoused, but played his part in the consolidation of 
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Hungary’s democracy. In an essay on the role of politicians and intellectuals, Göncz stated 
his opinion that: 
... The three kinds of values, let us call them conservative, liberal and socialist 
for simplicity’s sake, are not isolated but are simultaneously present in 
everybody, much like chips of glass of different colours in a kaleidoscope. As 
it turns, so the pattern changes. It is not us but history that turns the 
kaleidoscope... We can count on the fact that, depending on how the 
kaleidoscope turns, the colours are rearranged even for individuals, creating a 
conservative, liberal or socialist pattern. The same is true for societies [...]. 
Democratic institutions built from the grassroots up, social autonomy, would 
properly ensure that the individual’s, that is everybody’s natural need for 
equality and justice was satisfied, since that is its very purpose: ensuring 
everybody freedom of thought and an institutional framework for the equality 
of all citizens. 
Is all that a dream? If the growth of our infant democracy continues 
uninterrupted, this will perhaps become established truth after two or three 
parliaments... This can of course only happen if conservatives and socialists 
accept freedom as a legitimate need, if liberals and socialists do not doubt the 
legitimacy of faith and tradition, and liberals and conservatives accept equality 
and solidarity as legitimate needs as well. And if the three kinds of values are 
present in every man, and in every party, albeit in different proportions. The 
only open question is whether the [three] values are always supportive of 
progress, all of them, and always. This is where the responsibility of politicians 
come in, and that of the intellectuals, artist or writer who moves on the fringe 
of politics [...] (Göncz, 1994: 9-10).  
 
Through conducting in-depth interviews with Göncz and those elites who directly or 
indirectly became involved in politics, this research laid the groundwork of a political 
biography of Göncz. The analysis of accounts based on interviewing was instrumental in 
understanding Göncz’s political beliefs, his value system and his own interpretation on the 
key events and issues of the age. Given his ailing physical status, Göncz would not and  
could not have engaged in political and public matters. Göncz stated: 'I have received 
numerous invitations but my physical condition does not allow me to meet these [requests]. 
I would attend the events which are the most important to me but my priority is spending 
time with my family' (Gréczy, 2006).232 In this regard, the thesis makes a valuable 
contribution to the body of literature concerned with Göncz’s own views on, and 
experiences of, post-Communist transitional presidencies. Göncz was certainly a strong 
advocate of liberal democracy and played an important part in the process of delineation of 
powers in an ever-evolving context provided by the process of political transformation. 
The opening of archives and the disclosure of Göncz’s personal documents to research in 
the future, however, may suggest differing perspectives and assessments regarding 
Göncz’s political philosophy and his achievements; this political biography is not – and 
cannot be – finite. Nevertheless, as Francis Bacon observed, "it is the true office of history 
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to represent the events themselves, together with the counsels, and to leave the 
observations and conclusions thereupon to the liberty and faculty of every man’s 
judgement".233  Thus I do hope that this first English language scholarly biography 
provides some insights into and answers to, questions raised in this thesis, and contributes 
to the wealth of knowledge of contemporary Hungary’s history. 
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Chapter 4 
109
 The significance of this day was memorialised by the adoption of 'Act XXVIII of 1990 on the 
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Stark, 1991: 209-45; Kónya, 2002: 267-85; Sajó, 1996: 74-88; Swain, 2006: 145-52).  
113
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government (emails with Tölgyesy, 14, 16 August 2010).   
124
 The President can dissolve Parliament only in these very unusual circumstances: first, when Parliament 
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Amendment of the Constitution of Hungary).  
133
 '2006 évi LIV Törvény a Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmányáról Szóló 1949 évi XX Törvény Módósításáról' 
(Act LIV of 2006 on the Amendment of Act XX of 1949 regarding the Constitution of Hungary).  
134
 Initially, the President only had a right to set the date of national referenda, but the constitutional 
amendment adopted as Act LXI of 2002 expanded this right to the point at which it currently remains. 
135
 The terminology of this follows the Hungarian political scientist, András Körösényi. 
Chapter 5 
136
 Hungary moved towards privatisation gradually. The direct sale state-owned properties and firms to 
private businessmen was preferred (Fowkes, 1999: 26, 112-17; Henderson and Robinson, 1997: 248-49).     
137
 This Agency fulfilled the role of 'supervising the privatisation processes' (Romsics, 2007: 322).   
138
 According to Orbán’s speech delivered in Parliament, one of the reasons for the increase of petrol prices 
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lay in compensating for the deficit in the state budget which, in turn, highlights the fact that the increase of 
crude oil prices on the international market was not solely responsible for the government’s action. For the 
speech, see: (Bozóki, 1992: 482-83).   
139
 Horváth was in charge of the situation because Antall was in hospital for surgery at the time. 
140
 This was 'not effectively operated' until the beginning of the blockade. The main reason for this lay in the 
Antall government’s reluctance to 'accept the trade unions as legitimate partners'. The Antall government did 
not consider the IRC as an important forum for political discussion (Cox and Vass, 1994: 164-65).  
141
 Moldoványi claimed there was no hard evidence because an order to dispatch military forces was never 
given (Moldoványi, 2001). However, there is still a possibility that the government might have given only a 
verbal order so as not to leave a paper trail of evidence; one cannot simply say that Göncz’s judgement was 
wrong.  
142
 Göncz stayed in his office until the crisis was over (interview with Tölgyessy, 15 October 2007).   
143
 '1989 évi XXXI törvény az Alkotmány módósításáról' (Law XXXI of 1989 on the Amendment of the 
Constitution).  
144
 '2002 évi LXI törvény a Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmányáról szóló 1949 évi XX törvény 
módósításáról (Law No. LXI of 2002 on the Amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Hungary regarding Law No. XX of 1949'); The 'Constitution of Hungary'. 
145
 According to the Hungarian ambassador, András Gulyás, in foreign policy, Havel and Walesa could 
exercise wider powers than Göncz (interview with Gulyás, 3 July 2007).  
146
 http://www.complex.hu, accessed on 23 August 2010.  
147
 If claims of compensation valued more than £3300, only 10% of the original value was compensated.  
148
 This cut-off date was chosen, because 'the first session of the fake Parliament' controlled by the 
Communists was held at the time (Okolicsanyi, 1991a: 8).   
149
 This was complemented by the adoption of the Third Compensation Act. According to this Act, those 
victims and heirs who were executed, imprisoned, and taken to labour camps between 11 March 1939 and 23 
October 1989 were entitled to benefit from partial monetary compensation (Népszabadság, 2 November 
1991).   
150
 The AFD claimed since all Hungarian people suffered from the Communist rule, 20,000 (HUF) should be 
equally distributed to everyone.   
151
 The second version of the Compensation Law was adopted after the Court ruled the first Compensation 
Act was unconstitutional. This expanded compensation coverage with the inclusion of those damages and 
losses incurred between 1 May 1939 and 8 June 1949 (Népszabadság, 2 June 1992). 
152
 Having found the number of beneficiaries covered by the first Compensation Act was arbitrarily reduced 
by the amendment of the law, Göncz sent it to the Court (Sólyom and Holló, 1994: 221).  
153
 Placing a limit on the holding of a cooperative’s property for the purpose of compensation was not found 
to be unconstitutional. 
154
 These dates were chosen as they were the juncture of the new beginnings of Hungary’s history. On 21 
December 1944, the first provisional National Assembly was held at Debrecen. Similarly, on 2 May 1990, the 
first session of the post-Communist Parliament began.   
155
 'The ruling of the Constitutional Court', Case No. 42/1993, in http://www.mkab.hu, accessed on 24 
August 2010. 
156
 The Geneva Convention stated that war crimes and crimes against humanity are not subject to the statute 
of limitations. See: 'Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
against Humanity', in http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/warcrimes.pdf, accessed on 24 August 2010.   
157
 '1993 évi XC Törvény az 1956 Októberi Forradalom és Szabadságharc során Elkövetett Egyes 
Bűncselekményekkel Kapcsolatos Eljárásról', in http://www.complex.hu., accessed on 24 August 2010.  
158
 According to a poll conducted by the Medián Institute, only 53% of respondents said the Communists 
who were accountable for their past misconducts should be called to account (through making those names to 
available to the public). 26% of respondents said nothing should be done to these wrongdoers. For fuller 
details, see: (Beck, 1992). 
159
 Göncz Árpád Újévi Köszöntő Beszédei (1991-2000) az MTI sajtóadatbázisa alapján (The New Year’s 
Greeting of Árpád Göncz between 1991 and 2000 based on the MTI press data), presented by the Library of 
the Hungarian Parliament.  
160
 The meaning in English is that 'no crime no punishment without a previous penal law'.   
161
 'The ruling of the Constitutional Court', Case No. 11/1992, in http://www.mkab.hu., accessed on 24 
August 2010. 
162
 The question raised was as follows: During the Antall government, numerous laws which often gave rise 
to dispute were passed in Parliament. For instance, in dealing with the Communist past, referring to moral 
responsibility, the Antall government passed the Laws of Compensation, of Justice and of Screening. 
However, on several occasions, Göncz vetoed these laws. Of these, how do you evaluate Göncz’s actions or 
his role in dealing with the Law of Justice? 
163
 This model was in fact practised in the South Africa. 
164
 'The Law No. LV of 1994 on Arable Land', in http://www.complex.hu, accessed on 25 August 2010.  
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165
 The maximum which an individual Hungarian citizen can buy is 300 hectars. 
166
 Hungary reached an agreement with the EU on the opening of land market. According to this, foreigners 
can buy arable land from 2011, albeit that it had been partially opened to those who were willing to making a 
living from agriculture (Agra Europe, May 9 2003).  
167
 Officially, on 1 April 1994, Hungary submitted its application to join the EU, in http://www.mfa.gov.hu, 
accessed on 25 August 2010.  
168
 This is a non-profit-making international organisation whose 'mission is to act as a global catalyst for 
change through the identification and analysis of the crucial problems facing humanity'. For details, see: 'The 
Club of Rome', in http://www.clubofrome.org, accessed 25 August 2010.  
169
 The Promethée is a Paris-based think-tank association.   
170
 Initially, the Charter was the texts of '17 points composed by liberal Hungarian intellectuals' outlining the 
minimum conditions of democracy (interview with Konrád, 7 September 2007). After Kónya and Csurka 
formulated a radical idea in their essays on the way in which the government should govern the country, it 
gained an impetus to draw on public participation, increasingly turning into a peaceful civic movement 
(Bozóki, 1996: 178-213).  
171
 'The ruling of the Constitutional Court', Case No. 48/1991, in http://www.mkab.hu., accessed on 26 
August 2010.  
172
 The question raised was as follows: During Göncz’s Presidency, a number of controversial bills were 
passed. For example, in an attempt to deal with the Communist past, the Antall government introduced the 
Laws of Compensation and of Justice. However, these laws were challenged by Göncz. Similarly, in the 
issue of the control over broadcast media, Göncz persistently refused to sign the appointment and dismissal 
of the heads of media suggested by Antall. Of these, could you tell me in which event Göncz played the most 
important role? Secondly, how do you evaluate his action? 
173
 Oltay argued that among Hungarian newspapers, 'the government’s views are reflected in these two 
dailies - Új Magyarország and Pesti Hírlap' (Oltay, 1992: 42). 
174
 'The Law No. LVII of 1990 on the Appointment Procedure of the Heads of the Public Media'. 
175
 For details, see (Petrétei, 2001: 148-152; Körösényi, Tóth and Török, 2003: 528-31).  
176
 One possible account lies in the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. The Court does not have 
competences in the provision of a concrete ruling on jurisdictional disputes that arose among state institutions, 
but is limited to abstract 'norm control'.  
177
 A good example is found in the correspondence exchanged between Antall and Göncz, Göncz and the 
Constitutional Court and others. These letters had been exchanged over the period of the occurrence of 
controlling media and Göncz stressed that media be independent (Kurtán, Sándor and Vass, 1993: 186- 205). 
178
 The 'No. LXII Law of 1993 on Radio Frequency Management' in http://www.complex.hu, 
accessed on 25 August 2010.  
179
 'The ruling of the Constitutional Court', Case No. 48/1993, in http://www.mkab.hu, accessed on 25 
August 2010; Also see (Magyar Dokumentáció, July 1993).   
180
 'The ruling of Constitutional Court', Case No. 48/1993, in http://www.mkab.hu, accessed on 25 August 
2010.  
181
 'The ruling of Constitutional Court', Case No. 48/1993, in http://www.mkab.hu, accessed on 25 August 
2010. 
182
 The Court ruled that regulating radio frequencies is a technical matter and freedom of press and opinion is 
a secondary one, concluding that the question of technicality took precedence over the freedom of press and 
expression in this case.  
183
 The new media law was adopted in 1996 during the Horn government.  
184
 According to Boross, the direct cause of the '56 veterans’ protest lay in Göncz’s refusal to accept András 
Márton’s request. The chairman of the military section of the Committee for Historical Justice, Márton asked 
Göncz to let him give a speech along with him, but this request was refused by Göncz (Somos, 1997).  
185
 Swain asserts that the ISP could have been behind the organised event, with evidence for such 
involvement being the appearance of 'gangs of skinheads who had been invited up to Budapest' (Swain, 
1993: 80). 
186
 The holding of an event can be prevented by the police only under the condition that the event would 
seriously 'interfere with undisturbed functioning of any representative organ or court or to cause a 
disproportionate disruption of traffic' (Kilényi and Lamm, 1990: 61). 
187
 The head of the Cabinet of the Interior Ministry, András Gyekiczki, said the full report of the case could 
not be made available to the public in the interests of national security. 
Chapter 6 
188
 Kiss suggested that one reason for the AFD’s decision to enter a coalition with the HSP lay in their vested 
interests which in practice meant that it would be better for the party 'not to sit another term in opposition 
than to firmly distinguish themselves from the HSP and its chequered past' (Kiss, 2006: 933).  
189
 The offices of the President and the Premier were located in the same bloc at Parliament, but they usually 
did not see one another. Exchange of letters was the preferred method of communication (interview with 
Lengyel, 13 September 2007).   
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190
 For a detailed discussion regarding the concept of majoritarian and consensual democracies, see: (Ágh, 
2001a: 89-112).  
191
 For a detailed discussion of the Orbán government’s governing style and their concept of democracy, see: 
(Bozóki, 2008: 206- 216).  
192
 According to Körösényi,'Presidentialisation' means the increase of the Premier’s independent decision-
making powers and increased independence from the control of the governing party and Parliament alike. 
Conventionally, the Premier’s powers under parliamentarianism depend on whether the governing party 
supports or opposes the Premier’s decision. But, once the Premier’s power is centralised and he or she 
becomes less subject to the check of Parliament, in theory, becoming close to the Presidential model. 
193
 The essence of the ruling was that the Legislature is entitled to transform the system of social supports, if 
it provides a transitional period for the introduction of a new system. However, the Bokros package was 
unconstitutional, since it did not offer a proper preparatory period. (Case 31/1995, and 43/1995, in 
http://www.mkab.hu, accessed on 24 August 2010); (Magyar Dokumentáció, July 1995). 
194
 For the details of Göncz’s re-election, see: (Babus, 1995; Bodnár, 1995; Magyar Hírlap, 20 June 1995; 
Népszabadság, 20 June 1995; Népszava 20 June 1995).  
195
 Kövés and Matolcsy shared the view that the austerity programme was 'the result of incorrect diagnosis' 
of Hungary’s economic ailments (Adam, 1999: 62). 
196
 This economic crisis took place in December 1994 prompted by radical devaluation of the Mexican Peso.  
197
 'Göncz Árpád újévi köszöntő beszédei 1991-2000 (New Years’ Speech of Árpád Göncz 1991-
2000)', presented by the Library of Hungarian Parliament.  
198
 In Hungary’s history, the first attempt to legislate this law was made in 1875. According to Bihari, this 
law became the foundation of following amendments, and it was the 1946 Hungarian Parliament that 
formalised it as the 'XXVI Law of Incompatibility' (Bihari, 1997: 6). 
199
 '1997 évi V. Törvény az Országgyűlési Képviselők Jogállásról szóló 1990 évi LV. Törvény Módósításáról' 
(The Law No. V of 1997 on the Legal Status of Members of Parliament regarding the Amendment of the Law 
No. LV of 1990)' in http://www.complex.hu, accessed on 25 August 2010.  
200
 (Case, No. 30/1997), in http://www.mkab.hu, accessed on 25 August 2010.  
201
 'The Incompatibility of Members of Parliament', in http://www.complex.hu, accessed in 25 August 2010. 
202
 The President’s right to propose a draft of bill was to be removed (Magyar Hírlap, 2 June 1995).  
203
 According to poll, the socialist-liberal coalition’s involvement in financial corruption was seriously 
questioned by the general public, and this was demonstrated by public distrust in the government (Szabó, 
1997: 641).  
204
 The question raised was as follows: Concerning the Law on Incompatibility, you explained that three 
factors - the prevention of eroding Göncz’s popularity, preparation for the 1998 parliamentary election and 
his leniency towards the Horn government – were primarily responsible for his veto. According to this, it 
appears that the seeking of self-interest was the main reason of Göncz’s veto. What is your opinion? 
205
 The Horn government merged two privatisation agencies – The State Privatisation Agency and the State 
Holding Company - into a unit to streamline the bureaucratic procedure and accelerate the privatisation 
process (Fowkes, 1999: 156).  
206
 Indeed, the relevant legal framework was formulated as the '1991 XXXIII Law on Transferring certain 
State Properties into the Ownership of Local governments'.  
207
 'The Constitution of Hungary', in http://www.parlament.hu, accessed on 10 August 2010.  
208
 'The Constitution of Hungary', in http://www.parlament.hu, accessed on 10 August 2010. 
209
 Ágh upheld the view, asserting that the Law of Privatisation contributed to the fast reshaping of 
ownership structure, despite corruption problems plaguing the privatisation process (Ágh, 2001c: 482). 
210
 If the President requests a judicial review, the Court is obliged to take it as a priority. However, it is still 
unclear usually how long it takes time to proceed.   
211
 There is an interpretation that Göncz issued a pardon Kunos, because the AFD which received support 
from the AB persuaded Göncz to do so. It was claimed that during Kunos’ trial the people who were close to 
the AFD attended and this showed how lobby activities were behind this case. What is your opinion about 
this? 
212
 'The Judicial System in Hungary' in, http://www.birosag.hu, accessed on 25 August 2010.  
213
 The relevant clause was included in the Article 45 (1) of the Constitution, see: http://www.parlament.hu, 
accessed on 25 August 2010.   
214
 Arguing that the reform plan of the justice system 'was not well structured' (EECR, 1998 Fall), the Orbán 
government decided to delay the enforcement of the law.  
215
 'Act No. IV of 1978 on the Criminal Code', in http://www.1000ev.hu, accessed on 25 August 2010.  
216
 Until 1999, Göncz granted 1218 pardons in total (Bihari, 2000) and this case was the only one in which 
the President and the Justice Minister were unable to reach a consensus (Wisinger and László, 2007: 335).  
217
 The essence of the deal Kunos made with his client was the AB gave a loan, in return the client’s 
company had to allocate some portion of shares or incomes to them (Csák, Dániel and Zsubori, 2007).  
218
 The survey institute, Szonda Ipsos conducted poll regarding the general public’s sympathy towards Göncz 
and Antall. In every criterion, Göncz was judged much more favourably than Antall, including Göncz’s 
integrity and modesty (Bakony, 2005: 20). Moreover, the sympathy of Hungarian population towards Göncz 
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was evidenced by his consistently high level of popularity; around 80% throughout his presidency (Babus, 
2000). His popularity also contributed to the increase of public confidence in the presidential office compared 
to other any state institutions (Babus, 2001).    
219
 1999 évi LXXV Törvény a Szervezett Bűnözés Valamint Az azzal Összfüggő egyes Jelenségek Elleni 
Fellépés Szabályairól és az Ehhez Kapcsolódó Törvénymódosításról, in http://www.complex.hu, accessed on 
26 August 2010.  
220
 These were Act XXXIV of 1994 on the Police, Act LXXXVI of 1993 on Aliens, Act on Asylum, Act on 
the Border Guards and Act XII of 1998 on Travelling Abroad.  
221
 The relevant provision is Article 40B of the Constitution. 
222
 'The Constitution of Hungary', in http://www.parlament.hu, accessed on 26 August 2010.  
223
 Until 1997, if MPs did not agree with the legislation adopted, they were entitled to request a priori judicial 
review from the Constitututional Court. To take this legal proceeding, at least, 50MPs were required to meet 
the quorum.    
224
 The ruling of the Constitutional Court, Case No. 1/1999, in http://www.mkab.hu, accessed on 26 August 
2010. 
225
 At least, the relevant information was not made available to the press.  
226
 The same question was consistently raised among my interviewees to probe different perspectives and 
opinions. Among 52 interviews, the question was raised with 23 interviewees. The vast majority of them (20) 
pointed to the clarification of constitutional competence as the main factor responsible for Göncz’s reduced 
political activism. Among them, Ágh’s account was the most comprehensive and succinct thus, it is included 
as an example here. The questions raised were as follows: During Göncz’s Presidency, in the press numerous 
political analyses and critiques on Göncz were published. According to these, in terms of domestic politics, it 
would appear that during the first term of his Presidency, Göncz relatively played more proactive and 
controversial role than his second Presidency. Firstly, do you agree with this comment? If you do, I would 
like to ask you what was primarily responsible for Göncz’s changed presidential style? Secondly, how do you 
evaluate his role and actions? 
227
 Göncz’s interviews with (Bíró and Németh, 2000; Szálé, 2003).   
228
 The institution-building is the first step towards the consolidation of democracy. Theoretically, it consists 
of three levels: macro- meso- and micro- political institutions. The first refers to the fundamental form of 
state, such as to decide whether it takes on parliamentary or presidential form of government. The second 
means the 'modernisation of state administrations, central governments, nation-wide organisations'.The final 
process refers to local and municipal governments and civil organisations at grass-root level. The sequencing 
of institution-building from macro to micro-politics, however, does not proceed step by step but in fact 
complete at varying phases and degrees. According to Ágh, by the mid of 1990s, at least Hungary completed 
institution-building process at the macro-levels. 
229
 For a comparative study of how 'constitutional contestation and conflict settlement were instrumental in 
the development of president-cabinet relations', see: (Raadt, 2009: 83-101). 
Conclusion 
230
 This is because of the positive esteem in which Kádár is held by the Hungarian population. According to 
Gough, the Hungarian population was, and is, nostalgic for him even if they have acknowledged his role in 
the 1956 Revolution (Gough, 2006: 254). In fact, according to the polls conducted in April 1999 and August 
2006, Kádár was regarded as one of the most positive personalities in twentieth century of Hungarian history. 
'A 20. Század értékelése' (Assessment of the twentieth century), in http://www.median.hu, accessed on 1 
December 2010.  
231
 There are some articles of comparative analysis between Göncz and his successors (Fricz, 2010; 
Szomszéd, 2010; Magyar Hírlap, 10 February 2007; Népszabadság, 6 August 2010; Népszava, 29 June 
2010). However, these are far from comprehensive which enables researchers to observe the process of how 
Hungarian population and political elites have considered the political achievements of three post-
Communist Presidents.    
232
 A similar view was expressed by Göncz when he politely refused to attend the 20-ieth anniversary of the 
founding of the AFD. Göncz said: 'his [advanced] age and [ill] health condition prevents him from attending 
the event to celebrate together' (HetiVálasz, 1 November 2010).  
235 http://www.quoteworld.org/categories/history, accessed on 3 December 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 232 
                                                                                                                                                    
Appendix 
 
Göncz as an agronomist prior to the outbreak of the 1956 Revolution 
 
  
Göncz in the 1950s, with his eldest daughter and son, Kinga and Bence 
 
 
 Havel, Göncz as the President of Hungary, Antall from left to right 
 233 
                                                                                                                                                    
Bibliography  
 
Chapters and articles with authors’ names in English, German and Hungarian 
Ablonczy, B. (2006) Pál Teleki (1874-1941): The life of a controversial Hungarian 
politician, New York: Columbia University Press., pp. 129-148.  
Ács, N. (2000) Az államfő (The Head of State) in Országgyűlési választások, az  
országgyűlés és az államfő (The parliamentary elections, the parliament and the Head of 
State), Budapest: Budapesti Közgazdaságtudományi és Államigazgatási Egyetem 
Államigazgatási Kar., pp. 51-62. 
Adam, J. (1999) Transition to a market economy in Hungary, in Adam, J. Social cost of 
transformation to a market economy in post-socialist countries: The case of Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, Basingtoke: Macmillan Press., pp. 52-67.  
Ágh, A. (2001a) 'Early consolidation and performance crisis: The majoritarian-consensus 
democracy debate in Hungary', West European Politics, Vol.24, No.3.  
Ágh, A. (2001b) Early democratic consolidation in Hungary and the Europeanisation of the 
Hungarian polity, in Pridham, G., and Ágh, A. (eds.) Prospects for democratic 
consolidation in East Central Europe, Manchester: Manchester University Press., pp. 157-
179.  
Ágh, A. (2000) In the midst of systemic change, in Kostecki, W. (eds.) Transformation of 
post-Communist states, London: Macmillan Press., pp. 151-167. 
Ágh, A. (1998) The politics of Central Europe, London: Sage Publications., pp. 84-96.   
Ágh, A. (2001c) The socialist-liberal government 1994-1998, in Ormos, M., and Király, B. 
(eds.) Hungary: Governments and politics 1848-2000, New York: Columbia University 
Press., pp. 448-492. 
Andor, L. (1998) 'New strikers in old team: Parliamentary elections in Hungary', Labour 
Focus on Eastern Europe, No.60. 
Arato, A. (1994) 'Election, coalition and constitution in Hungary', The Hungarian 
Quarterly, Vol.35, No. 135.  
Arato, A. (1995) 'Parliamentary constitution making in Hungary', East European 
Constitutional Review, Vol.4, No.4.  
Arato, A. (1996) The Hungarian constitutional court in the media war: Interpretations of 
separation of powers and models of democracy, in Sajó, A., and Price, M. (eds.) Rights of 
access to the media, The Hague: Kluwer Law International., pp. 225-41.   
Argentieri, F. (2008) Dealing with the past and moving into the present, in Curry, J., and 
Wolchik, S. (eds.) Central and East European Politics: From Communism to democracy, 
New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher., pp. 215-230.   
Ash, T. (1990) We the people: The Revolution of '89 witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin 
& Prague, London: Granta Books., pp. 47-60.  
Bába, I. (2007) Békés átmenet: Adalékok a kialkudott rendszerváltáshoz (Peaceful 
transformation: Data on the bargained systemic change), Budapest: Demokratikus 
Átalakulásért Intézet., pp. 37-40, 65-70.  
Bakony, A. (2005) Köztársasági elnök kontra kormány: Az államfői intézmény kialakulása 
Magyarországon (The president of the republic versus government: The formation of the 
presidential institution in Hungary), Budapest: Hungarian political Science Association., 
pp. 1-24.  
Báldy, P. (2003) Az alkotmány magyarázata (The explanation of the constitution), 
Budapest: KJK-KERSZÖV Jogi és Üzleti Kiadó., pp. 371-393. 
Barany, Z. (1999) ‘Out with whimper: The final days of Hungarian socialism’, Communist 
and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 32, No.2.   
Bayer, J. (2005) 'The process of the change of the political system in Hungary: Deepening 
crisis, emerging opposition', East European Quarterly, Vol.39, No.2.  
Baylis, T. (1996) 'Presidents versus prime ministers: Shaping executive authority in 
 234 
                                                                                                                                                    
Eastern Europe', World Politics, Vol. 48, No.3.   
Békés, C., Byrne, M., and Rainer, J. (2002) (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A 
history in documents, Budapest: Central European University Press., pp. 4-12, pp. XXXV-
XLVII.  
Benziger, K. (2008) Imre Nagy, martyr of the nation: Contested history, legitimacy, and 
popular memory in Hungary, Plymouth: Lexington Books.   
Berki, R. (1992) 'The realism of moralism: The political philosophy of István Bibó', 
History of Political Thought, Vol.13, No.3.  
Berry, J. (2002) 'Validity and reliability issues in elite interviewing', Political Science and 
Politics, Vol.35, No.4.  
Bihari, M. (1997) 'A képviselők összeférhetetlensége és a hatalommegosztás' (The 
incompatibility of MPs and the seperation of power), Politikatudományi Szemle, Issue 1.  
Bihari, M. (2005) Magyar politika 1944-2004: politikai és hatalmi viszonyok (Hungarian 
politics 1944-20004: political and power relations), Budapest: Osiris Kiadó., pp. 47-81, 
346-61, 395-407.  
Bölöny, J., and Hubai, L. (2004) Magyarország kormányai 1848- 2004 (The Governments 
of Hungary from 1848 to 2004), Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó. 
Bonn, G. (1991) 'Indisches Tagebuch: Die ungarishe Revolution und der indische 
Diplomat M.A. Rahman – Herausforderung und Bewaehrung (Indian diary: The Hungarian 
Revolution and the Indian Diplomat M.A. Rahman – Challenge and accomplishment)', 
Indo Asia, Vol. 33, No. 2.  
Bozóki, A. (2008) 'Consolidation or Second Revolution?: The emergence of the New Right 
in Hungary', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.24, No.2.  
Bozóki, A. (1996) 'Intellectuals in a new democracy: The Democratic Charter in Hungary', 
East European Politics and Societies, Vol.10, No.2.  
Bozóki, A. (2002) Introduction: The significance of the Roundtable Talks, in Bozóki, A. 
(ed.) The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The genesis of Hungarian Democracy, Budapest: CEU 
Press., pp. XV-XXXIV. 
Bozóki, A. (1992) Political transition and constitutional change in Hungary, in Bozóki, A., 
Körösényi, A., and Schöpflin, George, (eds.) Post-Communist transition emerging 
pluralism in Hungary, London: St. Martin’s Press., pp. 60-70.  
Bozóki, A. (2003) Politikai pluralizmus Magyarországon 1987-2002 (Political pluralism 
in Hungary from 1987 to 2002), Budapest: Századvég Kiadó., pp. 79-107, 183-211, 324-
370.  
Bozóki, A. (1992) Tiszta lappal: A Fidesz a magyar politikában 1988-1991 (With a Clean 
Record, Fidesz in the Hungarian politics 1988-1991), Budapest: FIDESZ.  
Bozóki, A., and Karácsony, G. (2002) The making of a political elite: participants in the 
Hungarian Roundtable Talks of 1989, in Bozóki, A. (ed.) The Roundtable Talks of 1989: 
The genesis of Hungarian democracy, Budapest: Central European University Press., pp. 
71-102. 
Brown, A. (2000) ‘Transnational influences in the transition from communism’, Post-
Soviet Affairs, Vol. 16, No.2.  
Brown, J. (2003) Nehru: A political life, New Haven and London: Yale University Press., 
pp. 1-6, 257-271, 338-345.   
Bruszt, L. (1990) '1989: The negotiated revolution in Hungary', Social Research, Vol.57, 
No.2.  
Bruszt, L., and Stark, D. (1991) 'Remaking the political field in Hungary: From the politics 
of confrontation to the politics of competition', Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 45, 
No. 1. 
Bryman, A. (2004) Social research methods, Oxford: Oxford University Press., pp. 322-
323, 412-415.  
Caine, B. (2010) Biography and history, New York: Palgrave Macmillan., pp. 1-20.  
 235 
                                                                                                                                                    
Calhoun, N. (2004) Dilemmas of justice in Eastern Europe’s democratic transitions, New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan., pp. 13-50. 
Cartledge, B. (2006) The will to survive: A history of Hungary, London:Timewell Press. 
Chamberlayne, P, Bornat, J., and Wengraf, T. (2000) (eds.) The turn to biographical 
methods in social science: Comparative issues and examples, London and New York: 
Routledge., pp.1-25.  
Comisso, E. (1995) 'Legacies of the past or new institutions?: The struggle over restitution 
in Hungary', Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 28, No.2.  
Cox, T. (2006) '1956-Discoveries, legacies and memory', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.58, 
No.8.  
Cox, T., and Furlong, A. (1994) 'Political transition in Hungary: An overview', Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.10, No.3.  
Cox, T., and Vass, L. (1994) 'Civil society and interest representation in Hungarian political 
development', The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 10, No.3. 
Crampton, R. (1997) Eastern Europe in the twentieth century and after, London and New 
York: Routledge., pp. 78-94, 222-225, 288-303. 
Cservenka, J. (2000) 'A történelem alattunk van (We are in the history)', Europai Utas, 
April issue.  
Csizmadia, E. (1995) A magyar demokratikus ellenzék: Monográfia 1968-1988 (The 
Hungarian democratic opposition: Monography 1968-1988), Budapest: T-Twins Kiadó., 
pp. 381-391, 430-436.     
Deák, I. (1995) 'A fatal compromise? The debate over collaboration and resistance in 
Hungary', East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 9, No.2.  
Debreczeni, J. (2003) A miniszterelnök: Antall József és a rendszerváltozás (The Prime 
Mminister: József Antall and the systemic change), Budapest: Osiris Kiadó., pp. 15-25, 
156-170, 274-311.  
Dexter, L. (1970) Elite and specialised interviewing, Evanston: North Western University 
Press., pp. 3-20.  
Dezső, M., and Bragyova, A. (2007) Az országos népszavazás Magyarországon (The 
national referendum in Hungary), in Jakab, A., and Takács, P. (eds.) A Magyar jogrendszer 
átalakulása 1985/1990-2005 (The transformation of Hungary’s legal system 1985/1990-
2005), volume 1, Budapest: Gondolat-ELTE ÁJK., pp. 86-99.  
Ekiert, G. (1996) The state against society: Political crises and their aftermath in East 
Central Europe, Princeton: Princeton Univesity Press., pp. 3-120.   
Elster, J. (1993) 'Bargaining over the presidency', East European Constitutional Review, 
Fall 1993/Winter 1994.  
Elster, J. (2006) Introduction in Elster, J. (ed.) Retribution and reparation in transition to 
democracy, New York: Cambridge University Press., pp. 3-12.   
Elster, J. (1996) Introduction in Elster, J. (ed.) The Roundtable talks and the breakdown of 
Communism, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press., pp.1-19.  
Elster, J., Offe, C., and Preuss, U. (1998) Institutional design in Post-communist societies: 
Rebuilding the ship at sea, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., pp.63-108.  
Enriquez, C. (1998) Elites and de-Communization in Eastern Europe in Higley, J., Pakulski, 
Y., and Wesolwski, W. (eds.) Post-Communist elites and democracy in Eastern Europe, 
New York: St. Martin Press., pp. 277-295.  
Fahidi, G. (1994) 'Paying for the past: the politics and economics of compensation', The 
Hungarian Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 136.  
Falk, B. (2003) The dilemmas of dissidence in East-Central Europe, Budapest: Central and 
European University Press., pp. 109-154. 
Feitl, I., and Kende, J. (2007) (eds.) Demokratikus köztársaságok Magyarországon 
(Democratic Republics in Hungary), Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó., pp. 11-24.  
 236 
                                                                                                                                                    
Fekete, M. (2000) (ed.) Prominent Hungarians [at] home and abroad: London: Fehér 
Holló Press.  
Fleming, D. (1995) 'Compensation or restitution?: An analysis of the Hungarian Land 
Compensation Acts 1991-92', Journal of Property Valuation & Investment, Vol. 13, No.4.  
Fowkes, B. (1999) The post-Communist era: change and continuity in Eastern Europe, 
London: Macmillan Press., pp. 23-29, 49-60, 109-117, 155-160. 
Fricz, T. (2001) The Orbán government, an experiment in regime stabilisation: The first 
two years (1998-2000) in in Ormos, M., and Király, B. (eds.) Hungary: Governments and 
politics 1848-2000, New York: Columbia University Press., pp. 395-425.  
Göncz, Á. (1946) 'Baloldaliság és reakció (Leftness and reaction)', Nemzedék, 27 
December. 
Göncz, Á. (1993) 'Breaking the vicious circle', Common Knowledge, Vol.2, Part 1.  
Göncz, Á. (1992) Europe rediscovering its own map, in Bressand, A., and Csáki, G. (eds.) 
European reunification in the age of golbal networks, On the Institute for World 
Economics and Promethee., pp.207-209. 
Göncz, Á. (1991) Gyaluforács: Esszék, Jegyzetek, Interjuk (Shaving: Essays, Notes, 
Interview), Pesti Szalon Könyvkiadó. 
Göncz, Á. (1994) 'Intellectual or politician?', The Hungarian Quarterly, Vol.35, No.136.  
Göncz, Á. (2004) Sodrásban I (In the mid-stream I), Budapest: Ulpius-ház Könyvkiadó. 
Göncz, Á. (2004) Sodrásban II (In the mid-stream II), Budapest: Ulpius-ház Könyvkiadó. 
Gopal, S. (1989) Jawaharlal Nehru: A biography, Oxford: Oxford University Press., pp. 
298-311.  
Gough, R. (2006) A good comrade: János Kádár, Communism and Hungary, London· New 
York: I.B. Tauris., pp. 1-38, 77-118, 150-161, 228-258.  
Granville, J. (2001) 'István Bibó after 1956', in István Bibó and the history of Hungary in 
the 20th century, International Conference Papers, Trento., pp. 87-91.  
Gyarmati, G. (2005) Hungary in the second half of the twentieth century, in Tóth, I. (ed.) A 
concise history of Hungary, Budapest: Corvina·Osiris., pp. 587-633.   
György, A. (1947) 'Post-war Hungary', The Review of Politics, Vol.9, No.3.  
Guha, R. (2007) India after Gandhi: The history of the world’s largest democracy, 
London: Macmillan., pp. 161-167.  
Hack, P. (2007) Az átmeneti igazságszolgáltatása (The transitional justice), Jakab, A., and 
Takács, P. (eds.) A magyar jogrendszer átalakulása 1985/1990-2005, Kötét I (The 
transformation of Hungary’s legal system 1985/1990-2005, vol. I), Budapest: Gondolat-
ELTE ÁJK., pp. 538-568.   
Halmai, G. (2004) Alkotmánybírósági esetjog (The case-law of the Constitutional court), 
Budapest: Indok kiadó.  
Halmai, G. (2002) Introduction: The end of activism after ten years’ practice of the Sólyom 
Court, in Halmai, G. (ed.) Constitution found?: The first decade of Hungarian 
constitutional review on fundamental rights, The Netherlands: Book World Publications.   
Halmai, G. (1998) 'The reform of constitutional law in Hungary after the transition', The 
Journal of the Society of Legal Studies, Vol.18, No.2.  
Halmai, G. (1999) Volt-e jogorvsolati joga Kunos Péternek? (Was there the right of legal 
redress to Péter Kunos?), in Halmai, G. (ed.) A személyi szabadság és tisztességes eljárás 
(The personal freedom and fair proceeding), Budapest: Indok Kiadó.   
Halmai, G., and Scheppele, K. (1997) Living well is the best revenge: The Hungarian 
approach to judging the past, in McAdams, J. (ed.) Transitional justice and the rule of law 
in new democracies, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press., pp. 155-182.   
Hankiss, E. (1990) East European Alternatives, New York: Clarendon Press., pp. 34-47, 
82-96.  
Hankiss, E. (1999) Média-ko-média avagy elnök a pagodában (Media vs. "Comedia" or the 
president in the 'pagoda') in Proletár reneszánsz (Proletariat Renaissance), Budapest: 
Helikon Kiadó.   
Hankiss, E. (1996) The Hungarian media war of independence, in Sajó, A., and Price, M. 
 237 
                                                                                                                                                    
(eds.) Right of access to the media, The Hague: Kluwer Law International., pp. 243-257.   
Hasan, M., Prasad, H., and Damodaran, A. (2005) (eds.) Selected works of Jawaharlal 
Nehru: 1 September-30 November 1956, vol. 35, New Delhi: A Project of the Jawaharlal 
Nehru Memorial Fund.  
Hasan, M., Prasad, H., and Damodaran, A. (2006a) (eds.) Selected works of Jawaharlal 
Nehru: 1 December 1956 - 21 February 1957, vol. 36, New Delhi: A Project of the 
Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund.  
Hasan, M., Prasad, H., and Damodaran, A. (2006b) (eds.) Selected works of Jawaharlal 
Nehru: 22 February1957 – 30 April 1957, vol. 37, New Delhi: A Project of the Jawaharlal 
Nehru Memorial Fund.  
Hasan, M., Prasad, H., and Damodaran, A. (2006c) (eds.) Selected works of Jawaharlal 
Nehru: 1 May 1957-31 July 1957, vol. 38, New Delhi: A Project of the Jawaharlal Nehru 
Memorial Fund.  
Hasan, M., Prasad, H., and Damodaran, A. (2007) (eds.) Selected works of Jawaharlal 
Nehru: 1 August-31 October 1957, vol. 39, New Delhi: A Project of the Jawaharlal Nehru 
Memorial Fund.  
Hegedűs, A. (1994) A petőfi kör vitái: hiteles jegyzőkönyvek alapján (Debates of the Petőfi 
circle: based on reliable records), Budapest: 1956-os Intézet., pp. 149-158.  
Hegedűs, A. (1997) The Petőfi Circle: The Forum of Reform in 1956 in Cox, T. (ed.)  
Hungary 1956: Forty years on, London and Portland: Frank Class., pp. 108-131. 
Held, J. (1996) (ed.) Populism in Eastern Europe: Racism, Nationalism and Society, New 
York: Boulder., pp. 1-17.  
Held, J. (1980) (ed.) The modernisation of agriculture: Rural transformation in Hungary 
1848-1975, New York: East European Monographs, Boulder., pp. 197-233.  
Henderson, K., and Robinson, N. (1997) Post-Communist politics: An introduction, 
London: Prentice Hall., pp. 1-20, 163-175, 245-250, 360-370.  
Hingley, J., Kullberg, J., and Pakulski, J. (1996) 'The persistence of post-Communist elites', 
Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, No.2.  
Holmes, S. (1993) 'A forum on Presidential Powers', East European Constitutional Review, 
Fall 1993/Winter 1994.  
Huyse, L. (1995) 'Justice after transition: On the choices successors elites make in dealing 
with the past', Law & Social Inquiry, Vol. 20, No. 1.  
Isaacs, J., and Downing, T. (1998) Cold War, London: Bantam Press. 
Ishiyama, J., and Velten, M. (1998) 'Presidential power and democratic development in 
post-Communist politics', Communist and post-Communist Studies, Vol. 31, No.3.  
Izsák, L. (2001) The Kádár regime and its collapse, in Ormos, M., and Király, B. (eds.) 
Hungary: Governments and politics 1848-2000, New York: Columbia University Press., 
pp. 359-411. 
Izsák, L., and Nagy, J. (2004) Magyar történeti dokumentumok 1944-2000 (Hungarian 
historical documents 1944-2000), Budapest: Nemzeti Tankönyvkiadó.  
Izsák, L, and Pölöskei, F. (et al.) (2003) Magyar miniszterelnökök 1848-2002 (Hungarian 
Prime Ministers from 1848 to 2002), Budapest: Kossuth Kiadó.  
Jenkins, R. (1995) 'Politics and the development of the Hungarian non-profit sector', 
International Journal of voluntary and Nonprofit Organisations, Vol. 6, No.2.  
Josselson, R., and Lieblich, A. (1995) Introduction in Josselson, R., and Lieblich, A. (eds.) 
Interpreting experience: The narrative study of lives, London: Sage Publications., pp. IX-
XII, 27-43. 
Kenedi, J. (1996) (ed.) A fogoly Bibó István vallomásai az 1956-os forradalomról (The 
confessions of the prisoner, István Bibó about the 1956 revolution), Budapest: 1956-os 
Intézet., pp. 43-45, 55-64, 127-133, 170-175, 193-201.  
Kenez, P. (2006) Hungary from the Nazis to the Soviet: The establishment of Communist 
regime in Hungary, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., pp.217-238. 
 238 
                                                                                                                                                    
Kidwai, M. (1984) 'India’s stance on the Hungarian crisis', Indian Journal of Politics, 
March issue.  
Kilényi, G., and Lamm, V. (eds.) Democratic changes in Hungary: Basic legislations on a 
peaceful transition from Bolshevism to democracy, Budapest: Public Law Research Centre 
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences., pp. 55-60.   
Kiscsatári, M. (2009) 'Annus mirabilis', The Hungarian Quarterly, Vol.50, No.194.  
Kis, J. (2003) Constitutional democracy, Budapest: Central European University Press., pp. 
271-300. 
Kis, J. (1991) 'Post-Communist politics in Hungary', Journal of Democracy, Vol.2, No.3. 
Kiss, C. (2002) 'From liberalism to conservatism: The Federation of Young Democrats in 
post-Communist Hungary', East European Politics and Societies, Vol.16, No.3.  
Kiss, C. (2006) 'The misuses of manipulation: The failure of transitional justice in post-
Communist Hungary', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.58, No.6.  
Kis, J., Kőszeg, F., and Solt, A. (1992) (eds.) Beszélő: Összkiadás, III. Kötet (Speaker: 
compilation, vol. III), Budapest: AB-Beszélő Kiadó., pp. 399-401, 603-611, 880-897.  
Kiss, J., and Vida, I. (2005) (eds.) Magyarországi pártprogrammok 1988-1990 (Hungary’s 
party programmes 1988-1990), Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó., pp. 47-113, 124-136.   
Kiss, S., and Vitányi, I. (1983) A Magyar diákok szabadságfrontja (The Freedom Front of 
the Hungarian Students), Az Antifasiszta Ifjúsági Emlékmű Szervezőbizottsága., pp. 100-
132, 242-243. 
Kontler, L. (2002) A history of Hungary: Millenium in Central Europe, New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan.   
Kónya, B. (2000) 'Hungary’, The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol.59, 
No.5.  
Kónya, I. (2002) Hungary’s negotiated revolution in Congdon, L., and Király, B. (eds.) 
The ideas of the Hungarian Revolution, suppressed and victorious 1956-1999, New York: 
Columbia University Press., pp. 267-286.  
Koppany, S. (1986) 'Hungarian opposition groups hold meeting to discuss nation’s future', 
Radio Free Europe Background Report, presented by the Open Society Archive.  
Kornai, J. (1996) 'Paying the bill for Goulash Communism: Hungarian development and 
macro-stabilisation in a political-economy perspective', Social Research, Vol. 63, No. 4.  
Körösényi, A. (1999) Government and politics in Hungary, Budapest: Central European 
University Press., pp. 27-70, 173-190, 263-287. 
Körösényi, A. (2006) Mozékony patthelyzet (Agile stalemate), in Gombár, C. (ed.) 
Túlterhelt demokrácia: Alkotmányos és kormányzati alapszerkezetünk (Overburdened 
democracy: Our constitutional and basic governing structure), Budapest: Századvég 
kiadó., pp. 7-47.  
Körösényi, A. (1992) The decay of Communist rule in Hungary, in Bozóki, A., Körösényi, 
A., and Schöpflin, G. (eds.) Post-Communist transition: Emerging pluralism in Hungary, 
New York: St. Martin Press., pp. 1-12.  
Körösényi, A., Tóth, C., and Török, G. (2003) A Magyar politikai rendszer (The 
Hungarian political system), Budapest: Osiris Kiadó., pp.131-156, 524-549, 553-572. 
Körösényi, A., Tóth, C., and Török, G. (2007) A magyar politika rendszer (The political 
system of Hungary), Budapest: Osiris Kiadó., pp. 26-53.  
Kőrösi, Z. (1991) Névjegyzék (Register), in Litván, G. (ed.) Az 1956-os magyar 
forradalom: reform, felkelés, szabadságharc and megtorlás (The 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution: reform, uprising, freedomfight and reprisal), Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó., pp. 
201-220. 
Kőrösi, Z., and Molnár, A. (2003) Carrying a secret in my heart: Childern of the victims of 
the reprisal after the Hungarian revolution in 1956, Budapest: Central and European 
University Press., pp. 73-102. 
Kovács, Á. (2006) Viták a köztársasági elnök jogköréről (Debates on the scope of the 
presidential powers), Debrecen: Debreceni Állam és Jogtudományi Kar., pp. 3-55.  
Kovács, É. (1993) (ed.) Marionettbábu vagy félisten?: A köztársasági elnökkel kapcsolatos 
 239 
                                                                                                                                                    
hatásköri viták a Magyar sajtóban (Marionette or demigod: Debates over the scope of the 
president’s [powers] in the Hungarian press), Politikai Tanulmányok, presented by the 
1956 Institute., pp. 4-108.  
Kovács, V. (2001) 'A köztársasági elnök: a végrehajtó hatalomon kívűl és a politika felett?' 
(The President of the Republic: outside of the power [branch] of the executive and above 
the party?), Magyar Közigazgatás, Vol.51, No.6.  
Kovrig, B. (1984) Hungary in Harmstone-Rakowska, T. (ed.) Communism in Eastern 
Europe, Bloomington: Indiana University Press., pp. 86-111.  
Kozák, G. (1991) A forradalom utóvédharcai (Rearguard struggles of the Revolution), in 
Litván, G. (ed.) Az 1956-os magyar forradalom: reform, felkelés, szabadságharc and 
megtorlás (The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: reform, uprising, freedomfight and reprisal), 
Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó., pp. 85-116.  
Kramer, M. (1998) 'The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: 
Reassessment and new findings', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.33, No.2. 
Kukorelli, I. (1995) The Presidency in Király, B. (ed.) Lawful revolution in Hungary 1989-
94, New York: Columbia University Press., pp. 195-255.  
Kurtán, S., Sándor, P., and Vass, L. (1999) (eds.) A Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Párt választási 
negyven pontja (40 election points of the Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party), in Magyarország 
politikai évkönyve 1998 (The 1998 year book of Hungary’s politics), Budapest: 
Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja közhasznú Alapítvány. 
Kurtán, S., and Sándor, P., and Vass, L (1991) (eds.) A taxi blokád (The taxi blockade), in 
Magyarország politikaiévkönyve 1990 (The 1990 year book of Hungary’s politics), 
Budapest: Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány. 
Kurtán, S., Sándor, P., and Vass, L. (1992a) (eds.) 'Az MDF Frakció Elnökségének 
Állásfoglalása Tervezete: Igazságtételt Alkotmányosan és Törvényesen' (The Draft of the 
Standpoint of the MDF Factional Presidium: Justice [must be done] constitutionally and 
legally), in Magyarország politikai évkönyve 1991 (The 1991 year book of Hungary’s 
politics), Budapest: Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja közhasznú Alapítvány. 
Kurtán, S., Sándor, P., and Vass, L. (1992b) (eds.) 'Göncz Árpád, a Magyar Köztársaság 
Elnökének Beszéde az Alkotmánybíróság Teljes Zárt Ülésen 1991 December 17-én' (The 
Speech of the President of the Republic of Hungary, Árpád Göncz in the Closed Session of 
the Constitutional Court on 17 December 1991), in Magyarország politikai évkönyve 1991 
(The 1991 year book of Hungary’s politics), Budapest: Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar 
Központja közhasznú Alapítvány. 
Kurtán, S., Sándor, P., and Vass, L. (1990) (eds.) A közvélemény 1989-ben (The public 
opinion in 1989) in Magyarország politikai évkönyve 1989 (The 1989 year book of 
Hungary’s politics), Budapest: Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja közhasznú 
Alapítvány. 
Kurtán, S., and Sándor, P., and Vass, L (1993) (eds.) ‘Médiavita: a levelézesek éve (A 
media debate: The year of correspondence)’, in Magyarország politikai évkönyve 1992 
(The 1992 year book of Hungary’s politics), Budapest: Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar 
Központja közhasznú Alapítvány. 
Lánczi, A., and O’Neil, P. (1996) 'Pluralisation and the politics of media change in 
Hungary', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.12, No.4.  
László, E. (2006) The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: myths and realities, New Jersey: 
East European Monographs., pp. 185-195.  
Lázár, G. (1992) (ed.) A politikai közvélemény a Medián kutatásinak tükrében (The 
political public opinion as reflected by the polls of Medián) in Kurtán, S., and Sándor, P., 
and Vass, L. (eds.) Magyarország politikai évkönyve 1992 (The 1992 year book of 
Hungary’s politics), Budapest: Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja közhasznú 
Alapítvány.  
Lendvai, P. (2008) One day that shook the Communist world: The 1956 Hungarian 
uprising and its legacy, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press., pp.1-53, 225-
 240 
                                                                                                                                                    
245.  
Lewis, P. (1994) Central Europe since 1945, London and New York: Longman., pp. 226-
246, 280-290.  
Lilleker, D. (2003) 'Interviewing the political elite: Navigating a potential minefield', 
Politics, Vol.23, No.3.  
Linz, J., and Stepan, A. (1996) Problems of democratic transition and consolidation, 
Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press., pp. 3-15, 293-316.  
Litván, G.. (1989) ' A Nagy Imre-Csoport (The Imre Nagy group)', Századvég, 1-2 issue. 
Litván, G. (1991) (ed.) Az 1956-os magyar forradalom: reform, felkelés, szabadságharc 
and megtorlás (The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: reform, uprising, freedomfight and 
reprisal), Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó., pp. 85-117.  
Litván, G. (2008) Maradunk a tényeknél: Történeti-politikai írások (Let’s remain in the 
facts: Historical-political writings), Budapest: 1956-os Intézet., pp. 273-291, 310-338.  
Litván, G. (1996) (ed.) The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, revolt and repression 
1953-1963, London and New York: Longman., pp. 23-132, 181-211. 
Litván, G., and Varga, K. (1995) Bibó István életút dokumentumokban (Path of life of 
István Bibó in documents), Budapest: 1956-os Intézet Osiris-Századvég., pp. 448-532. 
Lomax, B. (1993) Hungary at the crossroads in Whitefield, S. (ed.) The new institutional 
architecture of Eastern Europe, Basingstoke: Macmillan., pp. 79-97.  
Lukács, G. (1992) A Teleki Pál Munkaközösség rövid története (Brief history of the Pál 
Teleki Panel), in Csicsery-Rónay, I., and Vígh, K. (eds.) Teleki Pál és kora: A Teleki Pál 
emlékév előadásai (Pál Teleki and his era: The memorial lectures of Pál Teleki), Budapest: 
Occidental Press., pp. 54-65.   
Marer, P. (1999) Economic transformation, 1990-1998, in Braun, A., and Barany, Z. (eds.) 
Dilemmas of transition: The Hungarian experience, New York: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publisher., pp. 157-195.  
McGregor, J. (1994) “The Presidency in East Central Europe”, RFE/RL Research Report, 
Vol.3, No.2.   
Menon, K. (1963) The flying troika, London: Oxford University Press., pp. 167-180, 211-
213, 258-260.  
Menon, K. (1967) The lamp and the lampstand, London: Oxford University Press., pp. 93-
106.  
Mészáros, I. (1993) Teleki Pál nemzetnevelő programja (The programme of Pál Teleki’s 
national educator), Gödöllő: Teleki Pál Egyesület., pp. 5-12, 57-64.  
Mézes, F. (1992) ‘The media war’, The New Hungarian Quarterly, Vol.127, No.33.  
Mihály, P. (1997) 'A kárpótlás (The compensation)', 2000, Vol.9, No. 3.  
Mihály, P. (2004) A kárpótlás (The compensation), Budapest: Kulturtrade Kiadó., pp. 7-24.  
Milton, A. (2001) 'Bound but not gagged: Media reform in democratic transitions', 
Comparative Political Studies, Vol.34, No.5.   
Milton, A. (2000) The rational politician: Exploiting the media in new democracies, 
Aldershot: Ashgate., pp. 57-72, 121-152.   
Miszlivetz, F. (1995) Vadkelet-party (Wild Eastern-party), Szombathely: Savaria 
University Press., pp. 119-133, 229-237. 
Mitchell, W. (1981) Foreword in Mitchell, W. (ed.) On narrative, Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press., pp. VI-X. 
Molnár, M. (2001) A concise history of Hungary, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Molnár, A. (2009) Ötvenhatosok a rendszerváltásról ('56-ers about the political 
transformation of 1989), Budapest: 1956-os Intézet., pp. 38-143.   
Monori, Á. (2005) Mediaháborúk (Media Wars) in Bajomi-Lázár, P. (ed.) Magyarország 
mediatörténet: A késő Kádár-kortól az ezredfordulóig (The history of Hungarian media: 
From the late Kádár period to the millennium), Budapest: Akademiai Kiadó., pp. 259-288.  
Morlang, D. (2003) Hungary: Socialists building capitalism, in Curry, J., and Urban, J. 
(eds.) The left transformed in post-Communist societies: The cases of East Central Europe, 
 241 
                                                                                                                                                    
Russia and Ukraine, Lauham: Rowman & Littlefield publisher., pp. 61-93.  
Mudde, C. (2001) 'In the name of the Peasantry, the Proletariat, and the People: Populism 
in Eastern Europe', East European Politics and Societies, Vol.15, No.1.  
Nagy, G. (1990) 'Felsőfokú nyelvtanfolyam a börtönben (Advanced language course in the 
prison)', Új Tér-kép, 30 May.  
Nehru, J. (1961) India’s foreign policy: Selected speeches, September 1946-April 1961, 
Delhi: The Publications Divisions, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Government 
of India., pp. 555-564. 
Nehru, J. (1942) Jawaharlal Nehru: An autobiography, London: John Lane. 
Némedi, D. (1995) 'Remarks on the role of peasants in the Hungarian ideology’, Journal of 
Popular Culture, Vol.29, No.2.  
Okey, R. (2004) The demise of Communist East Europe 1989 in context, London: Arnold., 
pp. 70-79, 83-89.  
Okolicsanyi, K. (1990) 'President Arpad Goncz and the Office of the Presidency', Report 
on Eastern Europe, Vol.1, No.42.   
Okolicsanyi, K. (1991a) 'The compensation law: Attempting to correct past mistakes', 
Report on Eastern Europe, Vol. 2, No. 19. 
Okolicsanyi, K. (1991b) 'Compensation law finally approved', Report on Eastern Europe, 
Vol.2, No.36.  
Okolicsanyi, K. (1993) 'Hungarian compensation programs off to a slow start', RFE/RL 
Research Report, Vol.2, No. 11.  
Olson, D. (1994) The new parliaments of new democracies: The experience of the Federal 
Assembly of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, in Ágh, A. (ed.) The emergence of 
East Central European Parliaments: The first steps, Budapest: Hungarian Centre of 
Democracy Studies., pp. 35-46.  
Oltay, E. (1992) ‘Hungary’, RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 39.  
Oltay, E. (1993a) 'Hungary attempts to deal with its past', RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.2, 
No.18.  
Oltay, E. (1993b) 'Hungarian radio and television under fire', RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 
2, No. 38.  
Oltay, E. (1992) 'Towards the rule of law: Hungary', RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.1, 
No.27.  
O’Neil, P. (1997) Hungary: political transition and executive conflict: the balance or 
fragmentation of power, in Taras, R. (ed.) Post-Communist presidents, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press., pp. 195-217.  
O’Neil, P. (1993) 'Presidential power in post-Communist Europe: The Hungarian case in 
comparative perspective', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.9, 
No.3.  
O’Neil, P. (1998) 'Revolution from within: Analysis, transition from authoritarianism, and 
the case of Hungary', World Politics, Vol.48, No.4.  
Paczolay, P. (1992) 'Judicial review of the compensation law in Hungary', Michigan 
Journal of International Law, Vol.13, No.4.  
Paczolay, P. (1993) The new Hungarian constitutional state: Challenges and perspectives, 
Howard, D. (ed.) Constitution making in Eastern Europe, Washington: The Woodland 
Wilson Centre Press., pp. 21-49.  
Palasik, M. (2002) Kovács Béla: 1908-1959 (Béla Kovács: 1908-1959), Budapest: 
Occidental Press. 
Pál, L. (1991) '1956 és ami utána következett (1956 and which followed thereafter)', Kapu, 
12 issue.  
Pataki, J. (1992a) 'Dealing with Hungarian communists’ crimes, RFE/RL Research Report, 
Vol.9, No.1.  
Pataki, J. (1994) 'Hungarian radio staff cuts cause uproar', RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.3, 
 242 
                                                                                                                                                    
No.19.  
Pataki, J. (1992b) ‘Political battle in Hungary over broadcasting dismissals’, RFE/RL 
Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 30. 
Pataki, J. (1993) 'Power struggle over broadcasting in Hungary', RFE/RL Research Report, 
Vol. 2, No. 11.  
Pataki, J., and Schiemann, J. (1991) 'Constitutional court limits presidential powers', 
Report on Eastern Europe, 18 October.  
Peabody, R. (1990) (et al) 'Interviewing political elites', Political Science and Politics, 
Vol.23, No.3.  
Petrétei, J. (2001) A köztársasági elnök (The President of the Republic), in 
Magyaralkotmányjog II: Államszervezet (The law of the Hungarian constitution II: State 
organisation), Budapest-Pécs, Dialóg Campus Kiadó., pp. 87-101. 
Petrétei, J. (2005) 'A köztársasági elnök vétójogáról (About the veto of the Republic of the 
President of [Hungary]) ', Jogtudományi Közlöny, Vol. 60, No. 4.  
Petrétei, J. (2001) Az alkotmánybíróság (The Constitutional Court), in 
Magyaralkotmányjog II: Államszervezet (The law of the Hungarian constitution II: State 
organisation), Budapest-Pécs, Dialóg Campus Kiadó., pp. 141-160.   
Pimlott, B. (1999) 'Is contemporary biography history?', Political Quarterly, Vol.70, No.1.  
Pittaway, M. (2003) Hungary, in White, S., Batt, J., and Lewis, P. (eds.) Developments in 
Central and East European politics, London: Palgrave Macmillan., pp. 57-73.  
Pokol, B. (2003) 'Separation of powers and parliamentarism in Hungary', East European 
Quarterly, Vol.37, No.1.  
Pridham, G. (2000) The dynamics of democratisation: A comparative approach, London 
and New York: Continuum., pp. 1-28, 285-314. 
Raadt, J. (2009) 'Contestable constitutions: Ambiguity, conflict, and change in East Central 
European dual executive systems', Communist and post-Communist Studies, Vol. 42, No. 1.  
Rainer, J. (2002a) A progress of ideas: The Hungarian Revolution of 1956, in Congdon, L., 
and Király, B. (eds.) The ideas of the Hungarian revolution suppressed and victorious 
1956-1999, New York: Columbia University Press., pp. 7-35.  
Rainer, J. (2009) Imre Nagy: A biography, London and New York: I. B. Tauris., pp. 166-
198. 
Rainer, J. (1993) ‘István Bibó-A great political diagnostician’, Hungarian Quarterly, vol. 
34 No. 132.  
Rainer, J. (2002b) The reburial of Imre Nagy: A symbolic act of democratic transformation 
in Hungary, in Congdon, L., and Király, B. (eds.) The ideas of the Hungarian revolution 
suppressed and victorious 1956-1999, New York: Columbia University Press., pp. 287-
312.  
Révész, S. (1995) Antall József távolról 1932-1993 (József Antall from birds eye view, 
1932-1993), Budapest: Síkkiadó., pp. 28-44, 81-92. 
Révész, S. (2000) Beszélő évek 1957-1968 (Years of speaker 1957-1968), Budapest: A 
Beszélő Politikai és Kulturális Folyóirat Kiadása.  
Richards, D. (1996) 'Elite interviewing and approaches and pitfalls', Politics, Vol.16, No.3.  
Ripp, Z. (2006) Rendszerváltás Magyarországon 1987-1990 (Political transformation in 
Hungary from 1987 to 1990), Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó., pp. 88-97, 168-175, 346-376, 
426-448, 542-547.  
Robert, P. (1998) 'The politics of history: some methodological and ethical dilemmas in 
elite-based research', British Educational Research Journal, Vol.24, No. 1.  
Roberts, B. (2002) Biographical research, Buckingham: Open University Press., pp. 1-15, 
115-123. 
Romsics, I. (2007) From dictatorship to democracy: The birth of the third Hungarian 
republic 1988-2001, New York: Columbia University Press., pp. 13-194, 285-415.  
Romsics, I. (1999) Hungary in the twentieth century, Budapest: Corvina and Osiris.  
 243 
                                                                                                                                                    
Romsics, I. (2005) Hungary in the two world wars, in Tóth, I. (ed.) A concise history of 
Hungary, Budapest: Corvina·Osiris., pp. 500-547.  
Romsics, I. (2000) (ed.) Magyar történeti-szöveggyűjtmény 1914-1999. I (Text collection 
of Hungarian history between 1914 and 1999 Vol. I), Budapest: Osiris Kiadó. 
Romsics, I. (2001) The first four years of democratic transformation in Ormos, M., and 
Király, B. (eds.) Hungary: governments and politics 1848-2000, New York: Columbia 
University Press., pp. 412-446.  
Rose-Ackerman, S. (2005) From elections to democracy: Building accountable 
government in Hungary and Poland, New York: Cambridge University Press., pp. 55-74.  
Rothschild, J., and Wingfield, N. (2000) Return to diversity: A political history of East 
Central Europe since World War II, Oxford:Oxford University Press., pp. 96-103, 153-160, 
203-210, 237-245, 277-281.   
Schwartz, H. (1993) 'The new courts: An overview', East European Constitutional Review, 
Spring issue.  
Schwartz, H. (2000) The struggle for constitutional justice in post-Communist Europe, 
Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press., pp. 1-11, 75-108.  
Sajó, A. (1996) The Roundtable Talks in Hungary, in Elster, J. (ed.) The Roundtable Talks 
and the breakdown of Communism, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press., 
pp. 69-98.  
Saláta, K. (1989) Fejezetek a Független Kisgazda Párt 1945-ös küzdelméből (Chapters on 
the Independent Smallholders’ Party from 1945 struggle), Washington D.C: Occidental 
Press.  
Schiemann, J. (2005) Presidentialism, parliamentarism and opposition intransigence: The 
presidency, in The politics of pact-making: Hungary’s negotiated transition to democracy 
in comparative perspective, New York: Palgrave Macmillan., pp. 85-137.  
Schöpflin, G. (1991) ‘Conservatism and Hungary’s transition’, Problems of Communism, 
Vol. 40, No. 1/2.  
Schöpflin, G. (1977) Hungary in McCauley, M. (ed.) Communist power in Hungary 1944-
1949: London: The Macmillan Press., pp. 95-109.  
Shugart, M. (1993) 'Of Presidents and Parliaments', East European Constitutional Review, 
winter issue.  
Sólyom, L., and Holló, A. (1992) Az alkotmánybírósági határozatai 1991 (The rulings of 
the constitutional court in 1991), Budapest: Triorg Kiadó. 
Sólyom, L., and Holló, A. (1993) Az alkotmánybírósági határozatai 1992 (The rulings of 
the constitutional court in 1992), Budapest: Triorg Kiadó. 
Sólyom, L., and Holló, A. (1994) Az alkotmánybírósági határozatai 1993 (The rulings of 
the constitutional court in 1993), Budapest: Triorg Kiadó. 
Sólyom, L., and Holló, A. (1995) Az alkotmánybírósági határozatai 1994 (The rulings of 
the constitutional court in 1993), Budapest: Triorg Kiadó.  
Stanger, (2004) 'How important are new Constitutions for democratic consolidation?:  
Lessons from the Postcommunist states', Democratization, Vol. 11, No. 3. 
Stark, D. (1996) 'Recombinant property in East European capitalism', The American 
Journal of Sociology, Vol.101, No.4. 
Stein, A. (1969) India and the Soviet Union: The Nehru era, Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press., pp. 81-97.   
Sükösd, F. (1996) Az elnöki intézmény, a Magyar köztársasági elnöke (The presidential 
institution, the President of the Republic of Hungary), in Kiss, L. (ed.) Válogatott fejezetek 
a rendszeres alkotmánytan köréből (Selected chapters from the systematic studies of 
constitution), Pécs: Janus Pannonius Tudományegyetem Állam és Jogtudományi Kar 
Kiadó., pp. 343-365.  
Sükösd, M. (2000) Democratic transformation and the mass media in Hungary: From 
Stalinism to democratic consolidation, in Gunther, R., and Mughan, A. (eds.) Democracy 
 244 
                                                                                                                                                    
and the media: A comparative perspective, Cambridge University Press., pp. 122-163.  
Surány, G. (2000) A bizalom elnöke (The president of reliability), in Borbíró, Z. (ed.) 
Göncz Árpádnak (To Árpád Göncz), Budapest: Helikon., pp. 112-118.   
Swain, N. (1993) Hungary, in White, S., Batt, J., and Lewis, P. (eds.) Developments in 
East European politics, London: The Open University., pp. 66-82. 
Swain, N. (2006) Negotiated revolution in Poland and Hungary, 1989, in McDermott, K., 
and Stibbe, M. (eds.) Revolution and resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to 
Communist rule, Oxford: Berg Press., pp. 139-152.  
Swain, G. (2011) Tito: A biography, London: I.B. TAURIS., pp. 1-3, 116-129, 185-191. 
Swain, N., and Swain, G. (2003) Eastern Europe since 1945, London and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan., pp. 71-93, 179-185.  
Szabó, C. (1997) Átalakulófélben: A kormány és tevékenységének közmegítélése 1996ban 
(In the process of transformation: Public opinion on the government and its activities in 
1996), in Kurtán, S., Sándor, P., and Vass, L. (1997) (eds.) Magyarország politikai 
évkönyve 1996 (The 1996 year book of Hungary’s politics), Budapest: Demokrácia 
Kutatások Magyar Központja közhasznú Alapítvány. 
Szakolczai, A. (2002) Repression and restoration 1956-1963, in Congdon, L., and Király, 
B. (eds.) The ideas of the Hungarian Revolution, suppressed and victorious 1956-1999, 
New York: Columbia University Press., pp. 167-186.  
Szarvas, L. (1994) 'Parties and party factions in the Hungarian parliament', Journal of 
Communist and Transition Politics, Vol.10, No.3.  
Szilágyi, S. (1991) István Bibó, Central Europes political therapist, in Nagy, K. (ed.) and 
Boros, A. (trans.) Democracy, Revolution, Self-determination: Selected Writings, New 
York: Boulder., pp.527-546.   
Szoboszlai, G. (1996) Parliamentarism in the making: crisis and political transformation in 
Hungary, in Lijphart, A., and Waisman, H. (eds.) Institutional design in new democracies: 
Eastern Europe and Latin America, Colorado: Westview Press., pp. 117-136.  
Szomszéd, O. (2005) 'Államfői jogkörök alkalmazása a gyakorlatban' (Application of the 
presidential powers in practice), Politika Tudományi Szemle, Vol. 14, No.1.  
Taras, R. (1993) Leaderships and executives, in White, S., Batt, J., and Lewis, P. (eds.) 
Developments in East European politics, Macmillan, pp. 163-185.   
Tőkés, R. (1996) Hungary’s negotiated revolution: Economic reform, social change and 
political succession, Cambridge University Press., pp.1-34, 175-209, 396-440. 
Tőkés, R. (1997) Party politics and political participation in post-Communist Hungary, in 
Dawisha, K., and Parrott, B. (eds.) The consolidation of democracy in East-Central Europe, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., pp. 109-144. 
Tőkés, R. (1970) 'Popular front in the Balkans: 3. Hungary’, Journal of Contemporary 
History, Vol.5, No.3.  
Tölgyessy, P. (1999b) Elégedtlenségek egyensúlya: Válogatott írások (Balance of 
discontentment: Selected writings), Budapest: Helikon Kiadó., pp. 9-35, 201-207.  
Tóth, M. (1990) (ed.) A magyar írószövetség közgyűlése: Jegyzőkönyv (The general 
meeting of the Hungarian Writers Association: Record), Budapest: Magyar Írókszövetsége., 
pp. 66-86.  
Tóth, M. (1999) (ed.) Árpád Göncz in mid-stream, Budapest: CORVINA·UNESCO. 
Vásárhelyi, M. (2006) A történelemben: válogatott beszédei és írásai a nyolcvanas-
kilencvenes ékből (In the history: select speeches and writings from the 80s-90s), 
Budapest: Élet és Irodalom Kiadása., pp. 157-162. 
Vida, I. (2002) 'Parasztpolitikus az úri Magyarországgal szemben (Peasant politician [who 
was] against the gentry Hungary)', História, 2002/2003 issue. 
Vigh, K. (1992) Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre 1886-1944: A küldetéses ember (Endre Bajcsy-
Zsilinszky 1886-1944: A man with mission), Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó.  
Vitányi, I. (2002) 'Göncz Árpád (Árpád Göncz)', Essay, presented by Iván Vitányi. 
 245 
                                                                                                                                                    
Unwin, P. (1991) Voice in the wilderness: Imre Nagy and the Hungarian Revolution, 
London: Macdonald., pp. 107-119, 217-229.  
Welsh, H. (1996) 'Dealing with the communist past: Central and East European 
experiences after 1990', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48, No.3.  
Weydenthal, J. (1991) 'The Visegrád Summit', Report on Eastern Europe, 1 March. 
Whitehead, L. (1994) East Central Europe in comparative perspective in Pridham, G., 
Herring, E., and Sanford, G. (eds.) Building democracy?: The international dimension of 
democratization in Eastern Europe, London: Leicester University Press., pp. 32-57.  
Wilson, K., and Wilson, C. (1989) Voices of dissent: Two plays by Árpád Göncz, London 
and Toronto: Associated University Presses.  
Wisinger, I., and László, G. (1994) Göncz Árpád: Beszélgetések az elnökkel (Árpád Göncz: 
Talks with the president), Bupapest: Pesti Szalon Könyv Kiadó. 
Wisinger, I., and László, G. (2007) Visszanézve: Beszélgetések Göncz Árpáddal (Looking 
back on: Talks with Árpád Göncz), Budapest: Gloria Kiadó.  
Wisniewski, R., and Hatch, J. (1995) Life history and narrative: Questions, issues, and 
exemplary works, in Wisniewski, R., and Hatch, J. (eds.) Life history and narrative, 
London: The Falmer Press., pp.113-129.  
 
Journal articles without authors’ names 
'Constitutional Watch', East European Constitutional Review, Spring 1995, Vol. 1, No. 1.  
'Constitutional Watch', East European Constitutional Review, Winter 1997, Vol. 6, No.1.  
'Constitutional Watch', East European Constitutional Review, Fall 1998, Vol.7, No. 4.   
'Constitutional Watch', East European Constitutional Review, Summer 1999, Vol. 8, No.3.  
'Constitutional Watch', East European Constitutional Review, Winter/Spring 1999, Vol. 8, 
No. 1-2.   
Hungary restricts foreign access to farm land (2003), Agra Europe, Vol. 4, No.1.   
 
Newspapers with authors’ or editors’ names in English and Hungarian 
Babus, E. (2000) 'A Gönczi dekád (A decade of Göncz)', Heti Világgazdaság, 10 June. 
Babus, E. (1996a) 'Alkotmánykoncepcio-vita: A szentek keze' (The debate on the 
conception of a new constitution: We all favour ourselves), Heti Világgazdaság, 18 May.  
Babus, E. (1996c) 'Alkotmánykoncepcio-vita: Az elnök új ruhája' (The debate on the 
concept of a new constitution: The President’s new clothes), Heti Világgazdaság, 30 
November.  
Babus, E. (1997) 'Államfői vétók: Taktikai fault?' (The veto of the Head of State: Tactical 
faul), Heti Világgazdaság, 11 January. 
Babus, E. (1996b) 'Átszerkesztett alaptörvény-koncepció: Újra itt van' (The concept of a 
redrafted constitution: Here it is again), Heti Világgazdaság, 9 November.  
Babus, E. (2001) 'Egydimenziós elnök' (The one dimensional president), Heti 
Világgazdaság, 4 August. 
Babus, E. (1995) 'Újra Göncz Árpád, az államfő: Szimpla duplázás' (Again Árpád Göncz, 
the Head of State: Simple repetition), Heti Világgazdaság, 24 June. 
Bak, M. (1995) 'Távozik a kormány két minisztere' (Two government’s ministers leave 
their posts), Népszava, 13 March.  
Barabás, T. (1989) 'A "Bibó-tanszék" tanitványa (Disciple of the "Bibó-department")', Esti 
Hirlap, 7 July.  
Beck, L. (1992) 'Nem az igazságtétel a legfontosabb feladat' (Justice is not the most 
important task), Magyar Hírlap, 21 October. 
Bihari, T. (2000) 'Göncz Árpád egy elnöki évtizede' (A decade of Árpád Göncz’s 
presidency), Népszava, 1 July.  
Bíró, L. (2000) 'Erkölcsi tőkémet nem élhetem fel a napi politikában' (I cannot use my 
moral [authority] in daily politics), Népszava, 30 December. 
 246 
                                                                                                                                                    
Bíró, L., and Németh, P. (2000) 'A társadalmi felemelkedés megteremtése a legsürgetőbb' 
(The creation of social progress is the most urgent), Népszava, 14 March. 
Bodnár, L. (1991) 'Az alkotmánybírósághoz fordult Göncz Árpád' (Árpád Göncz turned to 
the Constitutional Court), Népszava, 14 May. 
Bodnár, L. (1995) 'További öt évre Göncz Árpád a köztársasági elnök' (For another five 
years, the President of the Republic of Hungary [is] Árpád Göncz), Magyar Nemzet, 20 
June.  
Buják, A. (2000) 'Göncz Árpád: Tiz éve (Árpád Göncz: ten years)', 168 Óra, 8 June. 
Csák, C., Dániel, A., and Zsubori, E. (2007) 'Agrobank-ügy: példát statuáltak: 
(Agriculturalbank-affair: set as an example)', Figyelő, No. 36, Vol. 51.   
Csuhaj, I., and Kéri, T. (1998) 'Az ellenzék bírálja az új parlamenti munkarendet' (The 
opposition criticises the new parliamentary work order), Népszabadság, 28 December. 
Dobszay, J. (1998) Gyendelkedő köztársasági elnök: Recept nélkül (Ailing the President of 
the Republic: Without prescription), Heti Világgazdaság, 10 January. 
Dornbach, A. (1992) 'A rendőrség tudott a skinheadek mozgósításáról' (The police knew 
about the mobilisation of the skinheads), Népszabadság, 28 October. 
Fahidi, G. (1999) 'Egykézés' (Only child), Heti Világgazdaság, 3 July. 
Farkas, G. (1990) 'És mit mond a Festő?' ('And what the painter says?'), Népszabadság, 21 
October.  
Farkas, G. (1991) 'Lépés a körkörös barátság felé' (Step towards a multi-lateral friendship), 
Népszabadság, 15 February. 
Farkas, G. (1991) 'Nem vissza, előre kell menni! (No step back, but must go forward!)', 
Népszabadság, 29 October.  
Fekete, A. (1991) 'Alkotmánybírósághoz fordult az elnök (The President turned to the 
Constitutional Court)', Népszabadság, 19 November. 
Félix, P. (1994) 'Földönkívüliek (Outsiders from [the law] of arable land)', Héti 
Világgazdaság, 29 April.  
Fricz, T. (2010) 'Jó köztársasági elnök lehet Schmitt Pál (It is possible that Pál Schmitt 
would be a good President of the Republic)', Magyar Nemzet, 23 July.  
Görgy, B. (1997) 'Bumerángparti (Boomerang party)', Magyar Narancs, 9 January.  
Gréczy, Z. (2006) 'Én már láttam válságban az országot, a mostani nem az (I have already 
seen that the country was in crisis [but] that is not [our] present [situation])', Népszabadság, 
24 July.  
Halmai, G. (1991) 'A köztársasági elnök kifejezi a nemzeti egységet (The President of the 
Republic represents the unity of the nation)', Magyar Hírlap, 22 July.   
Halmai, G. (1995) 'Hogyan (ne) bíráljuk az államfőt? (How can or cannot we criticise the 
Head of State?)', Élet és Irodalom, 30 June.  
Hámor, S., and Bárfai, G. (1991) 'Ninch elévülés (There is no [statutory] limitation)', 
Népszabadság, 5 November.  
Hegedűs, A. (1998) 'Visszatekintés 1988-ra (Retrospect about 1988)', Magyar Nemzet, 13 
June.  
Kéri, T., and Zsoldos, A. (1997) 'Göncz részletezte alkotmányos aggályait (Göncz detailed 
his constitutional anxieties)', Népszabadság, 7 January.  
Kis, J. (1990) 'A megállapodás (The agreement)', Beszélő, 5 May. 
Komor, V. (1989) 'Történelem és igazságtétel (History and justice)', Magyar Nemzet, 8 
February.  
Kovács, L. (1992) 'Göncz Árpád: Megkérdőjelezhetetlen az alkotmánybíróság döntése 
(Árpád Göncz: The decision of Constitutional Court cannot be questioned)', Népszabadság, 
6 March.  
Kozák, G.. (2008) 'TEB-ből TIB (From TEB to TIB)', Élet és Irodalom, Vol.52, No.24.  
Kurcz, B. (2010) 'A szolidáritás zenéje: a váci börtönsztrájk (The music of solidarity: The 
Vác prison [hunger] strike)', Népszava, 22 October.  
Lengyel, L. (2000) 'Az utolsó munkanap két elnöki ciklus után (The last working day after 
two presidential term)', Népszabadság, 3 August. 
 247 
                                                                                                                                                    
Lengyel, G. (1992) 'Mindenki kapod utána, de csak kevesen érik (Everyone tries to get this 
thing but not everyone has the chance to get it)', Magyar Hírlap, 6 November.  
Lovas, I. (2002) Ha Mádl Göncz lenne (If Mádl would become Göncz), Magyar Nemzet, 
26 June. 
Mátraházi, Z. (1989) 'Drámákba foglalt börtönnapló (Prison diary [depicted] in dramas)', 
Magyar Nemzet, 11 November.  
Mester, Á. (2000) 'Maradtam, aki voltam (I remained as I was)', 168Óra, 21 December. 
Moldovány, T. (2001) 'Elnök, blokád és szerepzavar' (President, Blockade and interfering 
role), Hetiválasz, 5 October.  
Petri, A. (2002) 'Ez volt történelemünkben az a rövid pillanat, amikor a társadalom 
egységes volt (In our history, this was the brief moment when the society was united)', 
Népszava, 22 October.  
Pogány, S. (1997) 'Göncz Árpád nem írta alá a privatizációs törvényt (Árpád Göncz did 
not sign the law of privatisation)', Magyar Hírlap, 4 January.  
Rádai, E. (1990) 'Elnök is járhat villamossal (The president also can use the tram)', 168 
Óra, 8 May.  
Sereg, A. (1999) Alkotmánysértő a maffiaellenes törvénycsomag (The Anti-Mafia Package 
violates the Constitution), Népszabadság, 24 February.  
Sereg, A. (1991) 'Göncz Árpád az alkotmánybíróságon (Árpád Göncz is in the 
Constitutional Court), Népszabadság, 18 December.  
Somos, A. (1997) 'A köztársasági elnök hét éve: Díszmagyar (The seven years of the 
President of the Republic: Honourable citizen)', Magyar Narancs, 20 March.  
Somos, A. (1997) 'Díszmagyar (Honourable Hungarian)', Magyar Narancs, 20 March. 
Somos, A. (1994) 'Halottnak a beöntés ('Pears before swine')', Magyar Narancs, 8 
December. 
Stefka, I. (2000) 'Támogatás a politikai üldözötteknek (Support to the victims of political 
persecution)', Magyar Nemzet, 4 November 2000.  
Stépán, B. (1997) 'Jog és etika (Law and ethics)', Magyar Hírlap, 7 January.  
Sükösd, M. (1992) 'Médiaháború (Media war)', Magyar Narancs, 27 May.  
Szále, L. (2006) 'Beszélgetés Göncz Árpáddal, a magyar köztársaság volt elnökével (Talk 
with Árpád Göncz, the former President of the Republic of Hungary)', Magyar Hírlap, 20 
October.    
Szále, L. (2003) 'Egy hatalmi eszközöm volt: a szó (My power instrument was [my voice])', 
Magyar Hírlap, 12 April.  
Szász, I. (2010) 'Elnököktől az elnökig (From Presidents to the President)', Népszava, 3 
July. 
Szegő, M. (2010) 'Mementó 1990: Göncz Árpádot elnökké választják (Memento 1990: 
Árpád Göncz is elected to the [office] of the president)', Heti Világgazdaság, 3 August. 
Szerető, S. (1993) 'A frekvenciagazdálkodási törvény normakontrollját kéri az elnök (The 
president asks for the norm control of the Law of Frequency Management)', Magyar 
Hírlap, 26 May.  
Szily, L. (1997) 'Nem lesz fennakadás a magánosításban (There will be no delay in 
privatisation)', Világgazdaság, 6 January.  
Szomszéd, O. (2010) Sólyom László rendhagyó öt éve (Five years of László Sólyom['s] 
non-conformist [Presidency]), 4 August. 
Tódor, J. (1997) 'A legfőbb ügyészség titkosított jelentése' (The classified report of the 
Chief Prosecutor), Magyar Narancs, 27 March.   
Tölgyessy, P. (1999a) 'Mire jó az államfői hatalom?' (What is good for the power of the 
head of state?), Magyar Nemzet, 24 December.  
Tölgyessy, P. (1993) 'Tette, mint lehetett (He did his best that he could do)', Népszabadság, 
18 December.  
Vajda, P. (1991) 'Göncz Árpád ott lesz Visegrádon' (Árpád Göncz will be in Visegrád), 
Népszabadság, 14 February. 
Varga, I. (1995) 'Az ellensúlyozó' ('The counter-balancer'), Magyar Fórum, 15 June. 
 248 
                                                                                                                                                    
Varró, S. (2000) 'Az elnök tíz éve: Göncz Árpád távozik (The ten years of the president: 
Árpád Göncz is off from the Office)', Magyar Narancs, 1 June. 
Veress, J. (2010) 'Teaforrdalom (Tea revolution)', Népszava, 22 October. 
 
Newspapers without authors’ or editors’ names in English and Hungarian 
Beszélő (1993) A botrány legalitása (The legality of the scandal), 3 July.  
Beszélő (1990) A köztársaság börtönviselt ideiglenes elnöke (The ex-convict interim 
President of the Republic), 5 May. 
Budapest Sun (1998) Why offer a presidential pardon?, 19 November.  
Élet és Irodalom (2008) Ötvenedik évforduló, huszadik évforduló (50th anniversary [of the 
execution of Imre Nagy], 20th anniversary [of the founding of the Committee for 
Historical Justice], 13 June 
Esti Hírlap (1995) Dr. Göncz Árpád életrajza (Dr. Árpád Göncz’s biography), 20 June.  
Göncz Árpád újévi köszöntő beszédei (1991-2000) az MTI sajtóadatbázisa alapján (The 
new year’s greeting of Árpád Göncz between 1991 and 2000 based on the MTI press data), 
presented by the Library of Hungarian Parliament.  
Hetek (1999) Vége az Agrobank-sztorinak (The end of the Agricultural Bank’s story), 24 
April.  
Heti Válasz (2010) Göncz Árpád fogadta az indiai nagykövetet (Árpád Göncz accepted the 
Indian ambassador), 1 November.  
Héti Világgazdaság (1994) Földtörvénykezés (Dealing with the law of [arable] land), 16 
April. 
Irodalmi Újság (1988) Történelmi igazságtételt!: Felhívás a magyar társadalomhoz 
(Historical justice!: Proclamation to the Hungarian society), Vol.39, No.3.   
Kis Újság (1945) Gyöngyösi külügyminiszter nyitotta meg a Teleki Pál Munkaközösség 
külpolitikai tanfolyamát (The Foreign Minister, Gyöngyösi opened the coursework of 
foreign policy of the Teleki Pál Work Cooperative), 26 May. 
Kossuth Népe (1945) A szovjet-Unió ma a leghatalmasabb világpolitikai tényező (The 
Soviet Union is now the most powerful factor of world politics), 27 May. 
Magyar Dokumentáció (1995) Alkotmánybírósági döntés a Bokros csomagról (The 
decision of the constitutional court on the Bokros package), July.  
Magyar Dokumentáció (1993) Alkotmánybírósági határozat a frekvenciagazdálkodási 
törvényről (The ruling of the Constitutional Court concerning the Law of Frequency 
Management), July.  
Magyar Dokumentáció (1992) Alkotmányellenes a Zétényi-Takács felé törvény (The law 
of Zétényi-Takács is against the Constitution), March.  
Magyar Dokumentáció (1992a) Antall József kérdesei az alkotmánybirósághoz (The 
questions of József Antall to the Constitutional Court), June.  
Magyar Dokumentáció (1992b) Az alkotmánybiróság a köztársasági elnök kinevezési 
jogkörről (The Constitutional Court [made its decision] about the scope of the president’s 
right of appointment), June.  
Magyar Dokumentáció (1991) Göncz Árpád az alkotmánybírósághoz fordult (Árpád 
Göncz turned to the Constitutional Court), May.  
Magyar Dokumentáció (1991) Göncz Árpád az igazságtételről (Árpád Göncz [speaks out] 
about the justice), November.  
Magyar Dokumentáció (1998) Törvény a szervezett bűnözés elleni fellépésről (Law is 
about the [combat] against organised crime), December.   
Magyar Dokumentáció (1991) Vita a bűnök elévüléséről (Dispute over the statue of 
limitation of crimes), October.  
Magyar Dokumentáció (1992) Vita a Kossuth téri incidensről (Dispute over the incident of 
the Kossuth Square), October.  
 249 
                                                                                                                                                    
Magyar Hírlap (1992) A elnök az alkotmány szerint nem vonható politikai felelősségre 
(According to the constitution, the president is not [held] responsible for his political 
[actions]), 25 May.  
Magyar Hírlap (1993) A koalíció levele Gönczhez (The letter of the coalition to Göncz), 
23 November.  
Magyar Hírlap (1995) Alkotmáyozás: A Magyar köztársaság új alkotmányának 
koncepciója (Constitutionalisation: The new concept of the Hungarian constitution), 2 June 
special edition.   
Magyar Hírlap (1989) A nemzet méltósággal rótta le kegyeletét a mártírok előtt (With 
nation’s dignity, [people] paid tribute to the martyrs), 17 June.  
Magyar Hírlap (2007) Államfők köszöntötték Gönczöt (The heads of state thank Göncz), 
20 February. 
Magyar Hírlap (1992) Az előzményekre csak a bizottság nem kíváncsi (The committee is 
not interested in the antecedents), 29 October.  
Magyar Hírlap (1995) Az országgyűlés előtt a titoktörvény (The secret law is before the 
parliament), 1 June. 
Magyar Hírlap (1993) Elvetélt MIÉP-javaslat a Parlamentben (The proposal of the MIÉP 
was aborted in Parliament), 7 December.  
Magyar Hílap (1997) Göncz alkotmányos szabályozást kíván (Göncz wishes constitutional 
regulation), 7 January.  
Magyar Hírlap (2000) Göncz állíotta le a taxisblokád katonai felszámolását (Göncz 
stopped the military [intervention] in the blockade), 24 October.  
Magyar Hírlap (1995) Göncz Árpád aláírta a stabilizációs törvényt (Árpád Göncz signed 
the law of stabilisation), 14 June. 
Magyar Hírlap (1993) Göncz Árpád a sajtószabadság ügyét szívügyének tekinti (Árpád 
Göncz considers the freedom of the press to be of utmost significance), 2 November. 
Magyar Hírlap (1992) Göncz Árpád kinevezte az alelnököket (Árpád Göncz appointed the 
vice presidents [of the broadcast media]), 3 March.  
Magyar Hírlap (1991) Göncz Árpád négy kérdése a kárpótlásról (The four questions of 
Árpád Göncz about the compensation), 14 May. 
Magyar Hírlap (1990) Göncz Árpád nyilatkozata (The statement of Árpád Göncz), 27 
October. 
Magyar Hírlap (1991) Göncz elnök nem nevezett ki alelnököket (The president, Göncz did 
not appoint the vice presidents of [the broadcast media]), 13 July.  
Magyar Hírlap (1988) Hálózat helyett Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége (Instead of the 
Network, Alliance of Free Democrats), 14 November.  
Magyar Hírlap (1995) Kifütyülték a pénzügyminisztert ([People] catcalled the Minister of 
Finance), 23 March. 
Magyar Hírlap (1993) La Stampa: Ügyetlen kísérlet az elnök bajba keverésére (La Stampa: 
Clumsy attempt to get the president in a trouble), 26 November.  
Magyar Hírlap (1995) Leértékelték a forintot (The Forint has been devalued), 13 March.  
Magyar Hírlap (1992) Nyilatkozattervezet az elnöki hatáskörről (The draft of [resolution] 
regarding the scope of the president’s power), 26 May. 
Magyar Hírlap (1995) Újra Göncz Árpád a Magyar köztársaság elnöke (Again Árpád 
Göncz [is elected] to the President of the Republic of Hungary), 20 June.  
Magyar Hírlap (1992) Vita a Kossuth téri tüntetésről (Debate over the demonstration of the 
Kossuth Square), 27 October.  
Magyar Hírlap Observer (1992) TV 2 Interview, 2 July.  
Magyar Nemzet (1995) A család védelemre szorul ([The Bokros package] is for the 
protection of family), 3 April.  
Magyar Nemzet (1991) A kárpótlási törvény több pontja alkotmányellenes (In several 
aspects, the law of compensation is against the Constitution), 30 May.  
Magyar Narancs (1998) A Kunos-ügy: Nincs kegyelem (The Kunos affair: No pardon), 19 
November.  
 250 
                                                                                                                                                    
Magyar Nemzet (1992) Alkotmányellenes az elévülési törvény (The obsolete law is against 
the constiution), 4 March.  
Magyar Nemzet (1997) A privatizációs törvénymódósítást sem írta alá Göncz Árpád 
(Árpád Göncz did not sign the amendments to the Law of Privatisation), 4 January.  
Magyar Nemzet (1992) Az államfő nem írta alá a médiaelnökök felmentését: Göncz Árpád 
beszéde a radióban és a televízióban (The Head of State did not sign the dismissal of the 
heads of media: The speech of Árpád Göncz on radio and television), 2 July.  
Magyar Nemzet (1995b) Az ellenzék bírálja de megérti az államfői döntést (The 
opposition criticises but understands the decision of the head of state), 14 June. 
Magyar Nemzet (1997) Az összeférhetetlenségi törvényt visszakapta a T. Ház (The T 
House [parliament] received the Law of Incompatibility), 3 January.  
Magyar Nemzet (1997) Csiha Judit megfelelő jogi konstrukciót vár (Judit Csiha expects an 
appropriate legal construction), 7 January.  
Magyar Nemzet (1990) Drámai légköben megegyezés született (Agreement was reached in 
a dramatic atmosphere), 29 October.  
Magyar Nemzet (1992) Éles viták a Kossuth téren történtekről (Sharp debates over the 
incident of the Kossuth Square), 27 October.  
Magyar Nemzet (1995) Göncz Árpád aláírja? (Is Árpád Göncz signing [the package?]), 3 
June.  
Magyar Nemzet (1995a) Göncz Árpád aláírta a stabilizációs törvényt (Árpád Göncz signed 
the stabilisation law), 14 June. 
Magyar Nemzet (1993) Göncz Árpád az alkotmánybíróság véleményét kéri (Árpád Göncz 
asks for the opinion of the Constitutional Court), 26 May.  
Magyar Nemzet (1995) Göncz Árpád súlyos dilemma előtt áll (Árpád Göncz is [in] a 
serious dilemma), 1 June. 
Magyar Nemzet (1993) Göncz Árpád válaszlevele a koalíciós pártoknak (The letter of 
Árpád Göncz to the coalition parties), 24 November.  
Magyar Nemzet (1995) Kemény gazdasági döntéseket hozott a kormány (The government 
made a harsh decision in economic [matters]), 13 March. 
Magyar Nemzet (1998) Kunos kegyelmet kapott Göncztől (Kunos was granted a pardon 
[by] Göncz), 10 November. 
Magyar Nemzet (1989) Ma temetik a mártírokat (Today the martyrs are buried), 16 June. 
Magyar Nemzet (1999) Normakontrollt kér az államfő (The Head of State asks for a norm 
control), 9 January.  
Magyar Nemzet (1997) Parlament vétó az ingyenes szövetkezeti vagyonjuttatásra 
(Parliament’s veto to the free handover of the state property to the [agricultural] 
cooperative), 26 February.  
Magyar Nemzet (1988) Szabad Demokraták Szövetságévé alakult a Szabad 
Kezdeményezések Hálózata (The Network of Free Initiatives is [trans]formed into Alliance 
of Free Democrats), 14 November. 
Magyar Nemzet (2000) Tíz év után elköszönt Göncz Árpád (After ten years, Árpád Göncz 
took leave), 4 August. 
Magyar Nemzet (1996) Ütközőpont a hatályba lépes (Point of [issue] is the [date of law 
enforcement]), 17 June.  
Magyar Nemzet (1992) Vizsgálóbiztottság alakul? (The investigation committee is 
formed?), 26 October.  
Magyar Távirat Iroda (2001) Októberben várható ítélet a volt Agrobank-elnök ügyében (In 
October, the verdict is expecting in the affair of the former president of the Agricultural 
Bank), 26 September.  
Napi Magyarország (1998) Göncz megkegyelmezett Kunosnak (Göncz [granted a[ pardon 
to Kunos), 10 November.  
Napi Magyarország (1998) Maffiaellenes törvény (Anti-maffia law), 28 December.  
Népszabadság (1990) A Demokrata Fórum alakít kormányt (The Hungarian Democratic 
Forum forms the government), 10 April.  
Népszabadság (2000) A honvédség nehézjárművei elindultak (The heavy vehicles were 
dispatched from the Hungarian army), 24 October. 
 251 
                                                                                                                                                    
Népszabadság (1990a) A kormány bűnös hibát követett el amikor erőszakkal fenyegetőzött 
(The government committed crime when they threatened with coercion), 27 October.  
Népszabadság (1998) A kormány szigorítaná a BtK.-t (The [Orbán] government would 
tighten the criminal law), 10 November.  
Népszabadság (1990) A kormány szociális piacgazdaságot ígér (The government promises 
a social market economy), 23 May.  
Népszabadság (1990b) A köztársasági elnök az erőszak ellen: Bénult közutak, ninch 
megállapodás (The president of the republic is against the [exercise] of the public force: 
National roads are paralysed, there is no agreement), 27 October.  
Népszabadság (1992b) A köztársasági elnök nyilatkozata (The statement of the President 
of Republic), 9 June. 
Népszabadság (1992a) Alkotmányellenes az 1974-es kormányhatározat (The 1974 
Government Decree is against the Constitution), 9 June.   
Népszabadság (1991) A parancsnok marad (The general remains), 3 April.  
Népszabadság (1995) A parlament ismét Göncz Árpádot választotta meg köztársasági 
elnöknek (The Parliament again elected Árpád Göncz for the President of the Republic of 
Hungary), 20 June. 
Népszabadság (1991) A politikai üldözöttek kárpótlásáról (About the compensation of the 
politically persecuted [people]), 2 November.  
Népszabadság (1991) A radikális reformer (The radical reformer), 7 August.  
Népszabadság (1992) A rendőrség tudott a skinheadek mozgósításáról (The police knew 
about the mobilisation of the skinheads), 28 October.  
Népszabadság (1993) A MIÉP vizsgálatot kér az államelnök ellen (The MIÉP asks for an 
examination against the president), 24 November.  
Népszabadság (1989) A nemzet megrendülten búcsúzott Nagy Imrétől és Mártírtásaitól 
([With] devastation, the nation said good bye to Imre Nagy and the martyrs of his 
associates), 17 June. 
Népszabadság (1990) A nép válassza-e az államfőt? (Whether the people elect the Head of 
State?), 11 June.  
Népszabadság (1997b) A szövetkezetek nem juthatnak ingyenes állami vagyonhoz (The 
free transfer of state property cannot be [made] to the cooperatives), 26 February. 
Népszabadság (1990) Átlagosan 65 százalékkal drágult (On average, oil price is increased 
by 65 percent), 26 October.  
Népszabadság (1989) A végtisztesség legyen a nemzeti megbékélés jelképe (Giving the 
last respect to [Nagy Imre and his associates] would be the symbol of the national 
reconciliation), 1 June.  
Népszabadság (1999) Az AB-hez fordult Göncz (Göncz turned to the Constitutional Court), 
9 January.  
Népszabadság (1997) Az államfő orvosi kivizsgálásra jár (The Head of State went to see a 
doctor), 20 December.  
Népszabadság (1996) Az ellenzék alkotmányellenesnek tartja a privatizációs törvényt (The 
opposition considers the law of privatisation to be unconstitutional), 21 December.  
Népszabadság (1998) Az ellenzék szerint kétharmados a maffiaellenes törvénycsomag 
(According to the opposition, the anti-maffia package is [the law which requires] a two-
thirds [majority vote]), 22 December.  
Népszabadság (1992) Az elnök nem sértődött meg (The president was not offended), 28 
October. 
Népszabadság (1990) Bíró Zoltán: Csoóri nem vállalta (Zoltán Bíró: Csoóri did not accept 
[the co-charimanship of the MDF], 4 June.  
Népszabadság (1992) Bodrácska János ismét célpont (János Bodrácska is the target again), 
30 October.  
Népszabadság (1988) Célunk megismertetni Magyarországot (Our goal is to have Hungary 
be known [to the world]), 12 July.  
 252 
                                                                                                                                                    
Népszabadság (1992) Demokráciában a szólásszabadság az államfőt is megilleti (In a 
democracy, the freedom of speech also applies to the Head of State), 27 October. 
Népszabadság (1997) Göncz a privatizációs törvényt is visszaküldte a parlamentnek 
(Göncz also returns the law of privatisation to parliament), 4 January.  
Népszabadság (1993) Göncz Árpád aláírta az igazságtétel törvényt (Árpád Göncz signed 
the law of justice), 25 October.  
Népszabadság (1993) Göncz Árpád jobboldali veszélyre figyelmeztet (Árpád Göncz 
warned of right wing danger), 22 November.  
Népszabadság (1996) Göncz Árpád mérlegeli a privatizációs törvény aláírását (Árpád 
Göncz thinks over giving his signature to the law of privatisation), 30 December.  
Népszabadság (1994) Göncz Árpád nem írja alá a földtörvényt? (Doesn’t Árpád Göncz 
sign the law of arable land?), 30 April.  
Népszabadság (1991) Göncz Árpád nem nevezi ki az alelnököket (Árpád Göncz does not 
appoint the vice-presidents of [broadcast media]), 13 July. 
Népszabadság (1993) Göncz az alkotmánybírákhoz küldte a frekvenciatörvényt (Göncz 
sent the law of frequency to the constitutional judges), 26 May.  
Népszabadság (1990) Hogyan válasszunk elnököt? (How do we choose our president?), 5 
July.  
Népszabadság (1992) Javaslat parlamenti vizsgálatra (Proposal for the parliamentary 
examination), 26 October.  
Népszabadság (1990a) Július 29: Népszavazás az elnökválasztásról (29 July: Referendum 
about the presidential election), 28 June. 
Népszabadság (1992) Kárpótlás (Compensation), 2 June.  
Népszabadság (1998) Kunos börtönben marad (Kunos remains in prison), 11 November. 
Népszabadság (1991) Lépésem segítheti Gönczöt (My action can help Göncz), 18 
November.  
Népszabadság (1989) Ma: Gyászszertartás a Hősök terén (Today: Funeral service at the 
Heroes' Square), 16 June.  
Népszabadság (1990a) Május közepén már lesz új kormány (In the middle of May, there 
will be [a] new government), 3 May.  
Népszabadság (1989a) Megállapodás a háromoldalú politikai egyeztető tárgyalásokon 
(Agreement on the tripartite political negotiations), 19 September.  
Népszabadság (1989b) Megállapodás: a politikai egyeztető tárgyalások 1989 június 13-a és 
szeptember 18-a közötti szakaszának lezárásáról (Agreement: about the closing off the 
political negotiations which took place during the period between 13 June 1989 and 18 
September), 19 September. 
Népszabadság (1989) Nagy Imre (Imre Nagy), 16 June.  
Népszabadság (1997) Nem lesz előrehozott parlamenti ülésszak (There will not be an 
[extraordinary] parliamentary session), 7 January.  
Népszabadság (1990) Nem szavazott a nép (The people did not vote), 30 July. 
Népszabadság (1997a) Nem változott az összeférhetetelenségi törvény (The Law of 
Incompatibility is not changed), 26 February.  
Népszabadság (1990b) Népszavazás az elnökválasztásról (Referendum about the 
presidential election), 28 June.  
Népszabadság (1990b) Október 23 nemzeti ünnep (23 October is a national holiday), 3 
May. 
Népszabadság (1997) Összeférhetetelenség: Göncz visszaküldte a törvényt 
(Incompatibility: Göncz returned the law to [parliament]), 3 January. 
Népszabadság (1990) Sokkal több mint százezer aláírás (Much more than 100,000 
signatures), 18 June.  
Népszabadság (1995) Súlyos stabilizációs kormánycsomag ([The] serious stabilising 
government package), 13 March. 
Népszabadság (1988) Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége alakult (Alliance of Free Democrats 
 253 
                                                                                                                                                    
was formed), 14 November. 
Népszabadság (2010) TGM: Sólyom elnökségének mérlege zéró ([According to] Mikós 
Gáspár Tamás, the balance of Sólyom Presidency is zero), 6 August. 
Népszabadság (1990) Vége a blokádháborúnak (End of the blockade war), 29 October. 
Népszabadság (1990) 160 ezer aláírás hiteles (160, 000 signatures are valid), 26 June. 
Népszava (1945) A nép és a külügyi szolgálat (The people and the foreign policy service), 
27 May. 
Népszava (2009) A szabadságot mindennap meg kell védeni ([We] must protect freedom 
everyday), 16 June. 
Népszava (2010) A szolidaritás zenéje: a váci börtönsztrájk (The music of solidarity: the 
Vác strike), 22 October. 
Népszava (1991) Az alkotmánybírósághoz fordult Göncz Árpád (Árpád Göncz turned to 
the Constitutional Court), 19 November. 
Népszava, (1989) Az MDF elnöke Antall József, köztársaságielnök-jelöltje Für Lajos (The 
president of the MDF, József Antall, the presidential nominee of the Republic Lajos Für), 
23 October.  
Népszava (1997) Az MSZP várhatóan újra megszavazza az összeférhetetlenségi törvényt 
(Expectedly, the MSzP again votes for the law of incompatibility), 9 January.   
Népszava (1995) Bokros száz napja (Hundred days of Bokros), 14 June.  
Népszava (1995) Göncz Árpád aláírja a Bokros-csomagot (Árpád Göncz signs the Bokros 
package), 3 June. 
Népszava (1998) Göncz Árpád aláírta Kunos kegyelmi kérvényét (Árpád Göncz signed the 
petition for [granting] a pardon [to] Kunos), 10 November.  
Népszava (1993) Göncz mondta, de nem így (Göncz said it but not in this way), 24 
November.  
Népszava (1988) Kádár János nyilatkozata (Statement of János Kádár), 18 March.  
Népszava (2000) Köszönöm Magyarország (Thank you Hungary), 4 August. 
Népszava (1989) Ma: végső tiszteletadás Nagy Imrének és mártírtársainak (Today: last 
tribute to Imre Nagy and the martyrs of his associates), 16 June. 
Népszava (2010) Nehéz államfői örökség vár Schmittre (Difficult presidential [task] lies 
ahead Schmitt), 29 June.  
Népszava (1995) Újra Göncz Árpádot válaszotta köztársasági elnöknek az országgyűlés 
(The parliament again elected Árpád Göncz for the President of the Republic of Hungary), 
20 June. 
New York Times (1989) In Hungary, a prophet honored, 16 June. 
Pesti Hírlap (1993) Az elnök (is) nemzetközi segítséget kér médiaügyben (Dealing with 
media issue, the president asks for international helps), 22 November.  
Pesti Hírlap (1992) Göncz Árpád este nem ment operába: Tüntető távollét (Árpád Göncz 
did not go to the Opera House: Absence of protest), 26 October.  
Szabad Szó (1945) A népből fakadó erőkre szeretnénk építeni Magyarország külpolitikáját 
(We would like to build the Hungarian foreign policy which arises from the people), 27 
May.  
The Baltimore Sun (1990) Árpád Göncz: steelworker, lawyer, playwright and President, 24 
September. 
The New York Times (1990) Dr. Tibor Hám, a politician in Hungary and physician in U.S., 
9 July.    
The New York Time (1989) In Hungary, a prophet honored, 16 June.   
The New York Times (1990) Parliament elects formerly imprisoned writer as president, 3 
May. 
Treaty of Peace with Hungary (1947), The American Journal of International Law, vol.42, 
no.4.  
Új Magyarország (1997) Göncz Árpád visszaküldte (Árpád Göncz returned [the law of 
incompatibility to parliament]), 3 January.  
 254 
                                                                                                                                                    
Új Magyarország (1997) Összeférhetetlen osztogatás? (Incompatible distribution?), 7 
January.  
Új Magyarország (1993) Topolino vörösben ás feketében (Topolino in red and black), 25 
November.   
168Óra (1991) Aki megmentette Göncz Árpádot ([The person] who saved Árpád Göncz), 
23 April. 
168Óra (1993) 'A vizsgálat lezárult, felejtsük el?' (The investigation is closed, shall we 
forget about it?), 6 July.  
168Óra (1990) Elnök is járhat villamossal (President can also commute by tram), 8 May.  
168Óra (1992) Kinek a forradalma? (Whose the revolution is?), 27 October.  
168Óra (1991)'56 eleven emléke (1956 is [in] a living memory), 22 October.  
4 x 4 (1997) Litván György beszélget a 75 éves Göncz Árpáddal (György Litván talked 
with 75 years old Árpád Göncz), 20 February. 
 
Unpublished archival data 
'A felhívással egyetértek és támogatom a Hálózat létrehozását' (I agree with the 
[proclamation] and support the creation of the Network) in HU OSA 302-0-6, presented by 
the Open Society Archive. 
A Teleki Pál Munkaközösség, a magyar értelmiség demokratikus szervezetének 
munkaterve (The Pál Teleki Work Group, the work plan of the democratic organisation of 
Hungarian intellectual), presented by the National Archive of Hungary. 
'Demokrácia reménye (Hope of democracy)', HU OSA 302-0-5, Fonds 302: Samizdat 
Publication of Gábor Demszky presented by the Open Society Archive. 
Göncz Árpád levele Grósz Károlyhoz (The letter of Árpád Göncz to Károly Grósz), 
manuscript, presented by the 1956 Institute.  
Grósz Károly Miniszterelnök levele Göncz Árpádhoz (The letter of the Prime Minister, 
Károly Grósz to Árpád Göncz), manuscript, presented by the 1956 Institute.  
Hegedűs, A. (1985) An Oral History of Göncz, volume 1, presented by the 1956 Institute. 
Hegedűs, A. (1990) An Oral History of Göncz, volume 2, presented by the 1956 Institute. 
'Kéziiratok' (Manuscripts) in HU OSA 302-0-5, Fonds 302: Samizdat Publication of Gábor 
Demszky.  
Magyar Értelmiség! (Hungarian Intellectuals!), documentary leaflet presented by the 
Hungarian National Archive. 
Teleki Pál Munkaközösség, Magyar Értelmiség Demokratikus Szervezetének külpolitikai 
tanfolyama' (Pál Teleki Work Group, the coursework of foreign policy of the Democratic 
Organisation of Hungarian Intellectuals), presented by the National Archives of Hungary. 
Tóth, M. (2009), 'Göncz Árpád: Az eszmék felezési ideje (Árpád Göncz: Ideas have a 
longer half-life)', abridged version of the Oral History of Árpád Göncz.   
'Vázlat a Hálózat múködéséről (Draft on the functioning of the Network)', in HU OSA 302-
0-6, presented by the Open Society Archive. 
 
Official documents: The following documents are presented by the librarian of 
Hungarian parliament, Helga Kardos. 
1989 évi XXXI törvény az alkotmány módósításáról (Act XXXI of 1989 on the 
amendment of the Constitution).  
1990 évi XL törvény a Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmányának módósításáról (Act XL of 
1990 on the amendment of the Constitution of Hungary).  
2002 évi LXI törvény a Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmányáról szóló 1949 évi XX törvény 
módósításáról (Act LXI of 2002 on the amendment of Act XX of 1949 regarding the 
Constitution of Hungary). 
2006 évi LIV törvény a Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmányáról szóló 1949 évi XX törvény 
módósításáról (Act LIV of 2006 on the amendment of Act XX of 1949 regarding the 
 255 
                                                                                                                                                    
Constitution of Hungary).  
De-classified telegram, Case ID: 200403498, United States Department of State Review 
Authority.   
 
Audial and visual data 
'A forradalom nem kisajátítható (The revolution cannot be appropriated)', Göncz’s 
interview with Kossuth Radio (1990) 22 October, CD-ROM, presented by the Open 
Society Archive.  
Göncz’s interview with Bartok Radio (2002) 12 July, CD-ROM, presented by the 
Hungarian archivist, Krisztina Kulcsár. Hungarian National Archive. 
Kóthy, J., and Topits, J. (2006) 'Forró ősz a hidegháborúban (A fiery autumn in the Cold 
War)', documentary film, directed by Judit Kóthy and Judit Topits.   
Papp, Z. (2002) 'Göncz', portrait film, part 1 and part 2, directed and presented by 
Zsigmond Gábor Papp. 
'1956 Enciklopédiája (Encyclopedia of 1956)', CD-ROM, presented by the 1956 Institute.  
 
Interviews 
Ágh, A. (2007) 3 October, A political scientist at the University of Corvinus. 
Babus, E. (2007) 19 May, A chief political editor of Heti Világgazdaság. 
Bíró, Z. (2007) 10 December, A founding member and the former President of the HDF. 
Bod, Á. (2007) 8 November, A former president of the Hungarian National Bank currently 
a professor at the University of Corvinus. 
Csaba, L. (2007) 5 July, A former economic advisor to Mihály Kupa, currently, a professor 
at the Central European University.  
Elias, S. (2007) 6 December, A former social policy advisor to Göncz. 
Gombár, C. (2007) 1 October, A former head of the Hungarian national radio. 
Göncz, Á. (2006) 18 July, A former President of Hungary.  
Göncz, Á., and Göntér, Z. (2008) 10 January, A former President of Hungary and the First 
Lady.  
Gulyás, A. (2007) 3 July, A former ambassador and a foreign policy advisor to the 
president, László Sólyom.  
Gyenes, J. (2007) 23 August, The widow of the former Minister of Defence to the Nagy 
government Pál Maléter and a founding member of the Committee of Historical Justice. 
Hack, P. (2007) 6 July, A former MP of the AFD.  
Halmai, G. (2007) 15 November, A former Chief Counsellor of the Constitutional Court. 
Hegedűs, A. (2007) 29 October, A former MP of the AYD.  
Horkay-Hörcher, Ferenc (2007) 16 November, A political scientist at the Péter Pázmány 
Catholic University. 
Ilonszki, G. (2007) 16 October, A political scientist at the University of Corvinus.  
Kéri, L. (2007) 12 June, A political commentator. 
Kende, P. (2007) 5 October, A historian, veteran of the 1956 and currently the Chairman of 
the 1956 Institute.  
Kilényi, G. (2007) 9 May, A former judge of the Constitutional Court.  
Kis, J. (2007) 27 September, A former member of the democratic opposition and ex-
chairman of the AFD.  
Konrád, G. (2007) 7 September, A former Chairman of International Pen Club.  
Kónya, I. (2007) 11 December, A former parliamentary factional leader of the HDF. 
Körösényi, A. (2007) 11 July, A politican scientist at the University of Eötvös Loránt. 
Kozák, G. (2007) 19 September, A former head of the Oral History Section of the 1956 
Institute. 
Kulin, F. (2007) 14 November, A former factional leader of the HDF. 
Lánczi, A. (2007) 12 July, A political scientist at the University of Corvinus. 
 256 
                                                                                                                                                    
Lengyel, L. (2007) 13 September, An economist and political commentator at the Institute 
of Financial Research. 
Litván, G. (2006) 22 July, A historian and former director of the 1956 Institute. 
Miszlivetz, F. (2007) 16 July, A founding member of the Network of Free Initiatives and a 
Director of the Institute of Social and European Studies Foundation.  
Rádai, E. (2007) 11 October, A chief political editor at Élet és Irodalom. 
Rainer, J. (2007) 22 August, A historian and the Director of the 1956 Institute. 
Regéczy-Nagy, László. (2007) 5 October, A former military officer, '56 veteran and co-
convict of Bibó’s trial. 
Salamon, L. (2007) 24 October, A former MP of the HDF, currently, an MP of the AYD. 
Somogyvári, I. (2007) 22 May, A former General Secretary of the Parliamentary 
Constitution-Drafting Committee.  
Stumpf, I. (2007) 3 July, A former Minister of the Office of the Prime Minister.  
Szomszéd, O. (2007) 14 June, A political commentator.  
Szunyog, K. (2007) 19 Augsut, The former head of the Office of the President. 
Tölgyessy, P. (2007) 15 October, A former president of the AFD. 
Tormássy, Z. (2007) 21 August, The current secretary of Göncz. 
Tóth, M. (2007) 4 September, A former chief Secretary of the Presidential Office.  
Varga, L. (2007) 27 August, A historian and member of the Screening Committe.  
Varró, S. (2007) 15 August, A journalist at the Magyar Narancs and currently, at the 
Hírszerző. 
Vitányi, I. (2007) 23 November, a veteran of the Hungarian anti-fascist movement and an 
MP of the HSP. 
Wisinger. I. (2007) 7 June, A former head of the Hungarian Journalist Association. 
 
E-mails correspondence 
Faragó, A. (2008) 21 and 25 August 2008, A former Spokesman of the Office of the 
President.  
Kis, J. (2010) 4 and 10 August 2010, A former President of the AFD and currently a 
professor at the Central European University. 
Tölgyessy, P. (2010) 14, 16 August 2010, A former Chairman of the AFD and currently a 
political commentator. 
 
 
Internet Resources 
Laws and Acts adopted: The following Acts are accessible via the websites 
http://www.1000ev.hu, or http://www.complex.hu.   
'1946 évi Törvény Magyarország Államformájáról (Act I of 1946 on the State Form of 
Hungary).   
'A Magyar Népköztársaság Alkotmánya (Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the 
Peoples’ Republic of Hungary)'. 
'Act No. IV of 1978 on the Criminal Code'. 
'1990 évi XXVIII törvény az 1956 Októberi Forradalom és Szabadságharc Jelentőségének 
Törvénybe Iktatásáról (Act XXVIII of 1990 on the Significance of the 1956 October 
Revolution and Freedom Fights).  
'1990 évi LVII Törvény a közszolgálati tájékoztatási eszközök vezetőinek kinevezési 
rendjéről (Law No. LVII of 1990 on the Appointment Procedure of the Heads of the Public 
Media). 
'1991 évi XXV Törvény a tulajdonviszonyok rendezése érdekében az állam által 1949 
Június 8-a után az állampolgárok tulajdonában igazságtalanul okozott károk részeleges 
kárpótlásáról szóló elfogadott törvény' (Law No. XXV of 1991 on Partial Compensation 
 257 
                                                                                                                                                    
for Damages Unlawfully Caused by the State after 8 June 1949 to Properties Owned by 
Citizens in the Interest of Settling Ownership Relations). 
'1991 évi XXXIII Törvény egyes állami tulajdonban lévő vagyontárgyak önkormányzatok 
tuljadonába adásáról' (The 1991 XXXIII Law on Transferring certain State Properties into 
the Ownership of Local Governments). 
'1993 évi LXII Törvény a frekvenciagazdálkodásról' (Law No. LXII of 1993 on 
Radio Frequency Management). 
'1993 évi XC Törvény az 1956 októberi forradalom és szabadságharc során elkövetett 
egyes bűncselekményekkel kapcsolatos eljárásról' (Law No. XC of 1993 on the Procedure 
related to certain crimes committed during the 1956 Revolution and Freedom Fight'. 
'1994 évi LV Törvény a termőföldről' (Law No. LV of 1994 on Arable Land). 
'1997 évi V. Törvény az Országgyűlési Képviselők Jogállásról szóló 1990 évi LV. Törvény 
Módósításáról' (The Law No. V of 1997 on the Legal Status of Members of Parliament 
regarding the Amendment of the Law No. LV of 1990). 
'1999 évi LXXV törvény a szervezett bűnözés valamint az azzal összfüggő egyes 
jelenségek elleni fellépés szabályairól és az ehhez kapcsolódó törvénymódosításról' (Act 
LXXV of 1999 on the Combat Against Organised Crime and the Related Phenomena and 
the Amendment of Related Acts of Parliament). 
 
The rulings of the Constitutional Court: The following rulings are accessible via the 
official website of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, in http://www.mkab.hu. 
The rulings of the Constitutional Court in 1991 (Case 48/1991). 
The rulings of the Constitutional Court in 1992 (Case 8/1992; Case 11/1992; Case 
36/1992). 
The rulings of Constitutional Court in 1993 (Case 4/1993). 
The rulings of the Constitutional Court in 1993 (Case 42/1993; Case 48/1993). 
The rulings of the Constitutional Court in 1994 (Case 35/1994). 
The rulings of Constitutional Court in 1995 (Case 31/1995 and Case 43/1995). 
The ruling of Constitutional Court in 1997 (Case 30/1997). 
The ruling of Constitutional Court in 1999 (Case 1/1999). 
 
Others 
'A FKGP part története (History of the Independent Smallholders’ Party)', in 
http://www.fkgp.hu., accessed on 12 July 2010.   
'A Magyar Piarista Rendtartomány története (The history of the Hungarian Piarist 
Province)', in http://www.piarista.hu/kivagyunk/piaristak, accessed on 10 July 2010.   
'A 20. Század értékelése (Assessment of the twentieth century)', in http://www.median.hu, 
accessed on 1 December 2010. 
'Boy scouts' in http://www.britannica.co.uk, accessed on 10 July 2010. 
'College of Social Science: Ethics Committee', in http://www.gla.ac.uk/lbss/research/ethics, 
accessed on 30 September 2010.  
'Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War crimes and Crimes 
against humanity', http://www2.ohchr.org/English/law/pdf/warcrimes.pdf., accessed on 7 
May 2010. 
'Extensive and intensive farming', in http://www.britannica.com., accessed on 22 July 2010.  
'Ez az én legbelsőbb, személyes ügyem (This is my deepest and most personal affair)', in  
http://www.c3.hu/scripta/beszelo/99/10/02besz,htm, accessed on 30 July 2010.  
'Göncz Árpád' in, http://www.rev.hu/sulinet56/online/szerviz/kislex/biograf/goncz.htm, 
accessed on 12 July 2010. 
'Göncz Árpáddal Mink András és Révész Sándor beszélget 1989-ról (András Mink and 
Sándor Révész discussed with Árpád Göncz about 1989)', in 
http://www.c3.hu/scripta/beszelo, accessed on 30 July 2010.  
 258 
                                                                                                                                                    
'Hungarian encyclopedia (Magyar Életrajzi Lexikon)', in 
http://mek.niif.hu/00300/00355/html/index.html., accessed on 11 July 2010. 
'Hungary in the European Union' in http:// www.mfa.gov.hu, accessed on 7 May 2010.  
‘Khrushchev’s secret speech’ in http://www.soviethistory.org., accessed on 22 July 2010. 
'Levente-movement (Levente-mozgalom)', in http://mek.niif.hu, accessed on 11 July 2010.  
Majoros, D. (2000) 'A strategy to bring Hungarian land ownership legislation into 
conformity with European Community law' in 
http://commercialdiplomacy.org/pdf/ma_projects/majoras_dora.pdf, accessed on 14 May 
2010. 
'Mi a börtönben négy évig győztesnek éreztük magunkat (In the prison for four years, we 
considered ourselves as victors)', in http://www.bibotarsasag.hu, accessed on 22 July 2010.  
Palasik, M. (2000) 'Affair of the Hungarian Community and its lessons (A Magyar 
közösség ügy és tanulságai)', in http://www.rev.hu/sulinet45/szerviz/szakirod/palasik2.htm, 
accessed on 12 July 2010. 
Papp, O. (2002) ‘The path of one man in the twentieth century (Egy férfi útja a XX. 
Században)’, in http://www.bibotarsasag.hu/., accessed on 9 July 2010. 
'The Association of Hungarian boy scouts', in http://www.cserkesz.hu/, accessed 9 July 
2010. 
'The Club of Rome', in http://www.clubofrome.org, accessed on 25 August 2010.  
'The Committee for Historical Justice in 1988 (A TIB 1988-ban'), in 
Http://beszelo.c3.hu/99/09/16kozak.htm, accessed on 26 February 2009.  
'The Constitution of Hungary' in http://www.parlament.hu, accessed on 10 August 2010. 
'The Institute of the 1956 Institute', in http://www.rev.hu., accessed on 10 July 2010. 
'The Judicial System in Hungary' in, http://www.birosag.hu, accessed on 25 August 2010. 
'The NÉKOSZ Legend', in http://ww.rev.hu., accessed on 10 July 2010.  
'Remarks at the welcoming ceremony for President Árpád Göncz of Hungary', in 
http://ftp.resource.org/gpo.gov/papers/1999/1999_vol1_899.pdf, accessed on 25 October 
2010. 
'1956 Revolution', in http://hungaria.org/1956/, accessed on 25 July 2010.  
Http:// eletfogytiglan.nolblog.hu/archives/2009/06, accessed on 25 January 2010.  
Http://www.mult-kor.hu, accessed on 22 July 2010. 
Http://www.quoteworld.org/categories/history, accessed on 3 December 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
